

Countering Violent Extremism: Program and policy approaches to youth through education, families and communities

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Abstract. The focus of international and national strategies for countering terrorism in the past decade has shifted from using hard security measures alone to combat terrorism, to a more multi-sectoral, comprehensive approach, which also includes more preventive strategies known as countering violent extremism (CVE). For example, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations are focusing on CVE through Pillar 1 of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which addresses “conditions conducive” to the spread of terrorism. This relatively new approach is also apparent through the formation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as a multilateral platform for addressing counter-terrorism issues, and the subsequent establishment of Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, as the first institution to solely focus its efforts in long-term, preventive measures to foster resilience against violent extremism and terrorism. The CVE programs and policies that are emerging both out of the UN, the GCTF, Hedayah and the broader international community are based on an established basic methodology that 1) identifies push and pull factors that lead to recruitment or radicalization into violent extremism, and 2) designs interventions that specifically eliminating these root causes. This paper explores the international framework supporting the development and implementation of targeted interventions, specifically to minimize youth recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism through two program areas: 1) CVE through formal educational institutions, 2) building community resilience through families and communities. This paper also describes the recent work by Hedayah and other international bodies in these two program areas, and recommends potential next steps and ways forward to make these programs more effective.

Keywords. Terrorism, prevention, countering violent extremism, education

Introduction

The focus of international and national strategies for countering terrorism in the past decade has shifted from using hard security measures alone to combat terrorism, to a more multi-sectoral, comprehensive and preventive approach to terrorism and violent extremism. More countries are developing counter-terrorism policies that include this emphasis on preventing terrorism and violent extremism by reducing the drivers for support of violent extremist groups and ideologies. Whilst some government policies

and strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism have been established for a number of years, others' strategies and practices are in the beginning stages of development.

This shift in the international community for counter-terrorism efforts that encompass more preventative strategies is also represented at the multilateral level, including the United Nations' Global Counterterrorism Strategy. The strategy promotes a multidimensional approach and urges states to address "conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism" [1]. The formation of the multilateral platform in 2011, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), also reveals a stronger focus on preventing violent extremism. This was especially prevalent through the establishment of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group as one of the five working groups of the GCTF [2]. Moreover, multinational organizations such as the European Union have also developed comprehensive strategies for addressing terrorism and violent extremism that includes prevention methods [3].

The evolution of the international community's counter-terrorism strategies with more focus on prevention has led to the formation of Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, which is an initiative of the GCTF. Hedayah was officially launched at the Third GCTF Ministerial Meeting in Abu Dhabi in December 2012, and aims to be the global hub of dialogue and collaboration, training and capacity building, and research and analysis related to countering violent extremism in all its forms [4].

CVE, while a relatively new concept in the international discourse, has an established basic methodology that has been implemented for a number of years through national and international programs and policies. The first stage of the methodology is identifying the push and pull factors of violent extremism in a given local area. The second stage is designing a targeted intervention program to address and overcome the push and pull factors. The third stage is implementing this intervention in regions or for individuals that are at-risk for recruitment, or vulnerable to radicalization.

Youth are often mentioned as the group that is most vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. For example, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) has expanded its youth members (under the age of 20) from 9% of the organization in the 1970's to roughly 60% of the organization in 2005 [5]. Thomas Samuel documents a number of violent extremist organizations in South and Southeast Asia that have targeted youth populations as part of their recruitment strategies, ranging from the Abu Sayyef Group in the Philippines to Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia [6]. Similarly, Moeed Yusuf argues that youth radicalization in Pakistan is a growing threat because of a large and growing population of youth in the country combined with a number of risk factors such as poverty, low education, rising inequality and increasing campaigns by violent extremists to recruit youth [7].

There are also ongoing efforts and discussions on engaging with youth more actively as part of international counter-terrorism strategies. For example, there is increased pressure from certain civil society organizations for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution on Youth, Peace and Security, giving counter-terrorism agencies within the UN the mandate to involve youth more in efforts to combat violent extremism and terrorism [8]. A good practices document produced by the GCTF, the *Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism* also suggests "CVE programming should place a specific emphasis on youth at risk of radicalization and recruitment" [9].

Although not all violent extremists are young people, CVE programs and policies can have a significant effect by tailoring their aims and objectives to a youth population. This report outlines some of the potential programs and policy interventions for countering violent extremism specifically aimed at youth through two sub-themes: 1) CVE through formal educational institutions, and 2) building community resilience through families and communities. The following sections describe in more detail the recent work by the international community, the United Nations, the GCTF and Hedayah on CVE in these two areas, and some of the possible recommendations for how to move forward with better tackling the issues of youth recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism. The recommendations and reflections in this report draw heavily on a joint effort between Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to explore CVE in a series of expert meetings, the first on the *Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism* in September 2013, and the second on the *Role of Families and Communities in Building Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism* in December 2013, and more detailed summaries and recommendations can be found in the subsequently published meeting notes [10].

1. CVE through Formal Educational Institutions

The first potential CVE intervention for young people is through formal educational institutions and organizations at the primary, secondary and higher education levels. The international community has increasingly focused on the role of educational institutions in counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism measures. In November 2013, the topic was highlighted at the UN Security Council when former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair observed that violent extremism “will never be defeated by security measures [alone], only the education of young people can achieve [its] demise” [11]. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy addresses education in its first pillar, by noting that an effective counter-terrorism strategy should take necessary action “to promote a culture of peace, justice and human development, ethnic, national and religious tolerance, and respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs or cultures by establishing and encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes involving all sectors of society” [12]. The UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) also notes “the role of the media, civil and religious society, the business community and educational institutions... in fostering an environment which is not conducive to incitement of terrorism” [13].

The GCTF has also included education as one of its priority areas. The GCTF CVE Working Group’s Workplan for 2012/13 suggested that identifying and developing best practices for government engagement with educational institutions aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism was a priority [14]. The Plenary Meeting of the CVE Working Group, held in London in June 2013 re-emphasized the need for applying CVE strategies to education by focusing on specific areas. The *Ankara Memorandum* also cites educational institutions as a platform to counter violent extremism, noting that critical thinking skills, civic education, community engagement and volunteerism in schools may help address drivers of violent extremism in certain countries [15].

Much of the international and multilateral organizations cite educational institutions as one potential mechanism to prevent violent extremism, noting that CVE related policies and programs in education should be part of a broader, more

comprehensive approach to CVE. It is also important to emphasize that the specific relevance of education for CVE depends on the local push and pull factors, recognizing that the educational background of some convicted terrorists do not reflect a lack of or low quality of education. For example, a 2002 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research noted that tendencies for political violence and terrorism were not linked to low education or low income in the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon [16]. A recent study in the United Kingdom suggested that the profile of people sympathetic to violent protest and terrorism within the country were youth (under 20) who were enrolled in full-time education, and from higher-income families [17]. There is also anecdotal evidence of violent extremists who are highly educated, sometimes in a university context. For example, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon Bomber, attended the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, and Tamerlan Tsarnaev attended community college, although he dropped out after three semesters [18].

Of course, education has also been used by violent extremist organizations as part of the radicalization process, or as an incentive to join violent extremism. For example, in the Colombian context, recent interviews with former members of the Colombian violent extremist organization Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) suggested that FARC leaders promise secondary and higher education to FARC recruits, and train their members in concepts usually reserved for university study, such as philosophies of war [19].

Given international community's growing interest on formal education as a way to counter violent extremism and the literature suggesting that low or poor education is not always a driver to violent extremism, Hedayah took the lead within the GCTF to better outline the nuanced research and discourse on the topic among international experts. As part of the strategy to achieve this goal, Hedayah hosted two meetings in September 2013 on the margins of the UN General Assembly. The first meeting, co-hosted with the Global Center on Cooperative Security, was an expert roundtable on the *Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism*. Participants generated a set of concrete recommendations for future program and policy on CVE and education [20]. Hedayah and the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations hosted a Senior Official Meeting to raise high-level political awareness of this topic, where senior counter-terrorism policymakers and practitioners from the GCTF countries gathered to highlight some of the key challenges and solutions to policy related to CVE and education.

The outcomes of these two meetings in September 2013 drove the agenda for a workshop and a training program on CVE and Education in May 2014 in Abu Dhabi. The Workshop, co-organized by Hedayah and the GCTF, brought together practitioners and policymakers from ministries of education, ministries of the interior and foreign affairs, educators, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector to share examples of good practices from initiatives that have used education as a tool for CVE. Hedayah and the US Institute of Peace (USIP) also organized a training program for teacher trainers and regional education administrators on CVE program design, and how educators can address the threat of violent extremism in a number of ways, drawing from psychology, sociology, crime prevention and child development. The discussions at these series of meetings will culminate in a GCTF good practices document. Based on the meetings listed above, a number of recommendations

emerged regarding countering violent extremism through formal educational institutions. Some of the main highlights are listed in the sections below.¹

1.1. Overall Insights: Educational institutions and CVE

There was agreement by policymakers, practitioners and experts that educational institutions can be a mechanism for CVE interventions if they relate to and can affect the local push and pull factors that lead to violent extremism. In some cases, however, it may be counterproductive to label CVE interventions in an educational setting as “CVE,” or even endanger the lives of the people who are implementing the program. On the other hand, labeling an intervention as CVE to policymakers may have added value, for example, in helping with acquiring funding for the program.

1.2. Educational policies contributing to CVE

A number of key recommendations were made with regards to school policies and their effects on CVE. First, drop-out rates among primary and secondary schools were identified as a significant contributor to recruitment into violent extremism in some contexts, and it was recommended that schools addressing high drop out rates may have some effect on reducing recruitment into violent extremism.

It was also recommended that in areas where unemployment is high, and where unemployment was identified as a push factor into violent extremism, vocational and technical education might reduce the potential recruitment of the violent extremist groups. In this regard, there was an emphasis on the private sector’s role contributing to the development of vocational and technical training programs. A number of existing programs are already working in this area, and could be expanded to have CVE effects. For example, Microsoft’s YouthSpark program created an online platform directed at youth seeking job skills relevant to employment [21]. Similarly, Google.org has also sponsored vocational programs that develop computer science and coding skills for youth such as Code.org [22].

In instances where schools were not integrated between religious groups, sects or ethnic groups, it was recommended that better integration policies would be established to overcome feelings of exclusion and promoting tolerance between community groups. Additionally, it was suggested that cultivating positive relationships and partnerships between community groups and actors and formal educational institutions can have positive CVE effects. It was noted that educational institutions are able to facilitate community dialogue and provide a space for open and frank discussion. All this is particularly relevant for situations in which violent extremism is related to inter-group conflict. It was recommended that universities in particular would be a good platform for community actors to voice their concerns on pressing issues and solve community disputes.

Recent studies in the field of education support this recommendation for more integrated schools in areas of inter-group conflict, and allowing schools to be a place of community dialogue. This recommendation is supported by, for example, recent reports from Northern Ireland focusing on schools divided along ethno-religious lines.

¹ The recommendations in this paper reflect the views of the experts attending the workshops, meetings and trainings, and the authors of this paper. The viewpoints do not necessarily reflect the position of Hedayah.

In this case, studies have shown that inter-group contact in a school setting is closely correlated with more positive orientations towards the other group than students with no inter-group contact [23]. In Sarajevo, multi-ethnic contact through after-school programs such as clubs and parent councils have shown to reduce inter-ethnic tensions in local communities [24].

It was also recommended that ministries of education should be involved and made more aware of CVE, including relevant local push and pull factors and CVE program design. This sort of training could create buy-in among the relevant policymakers, create synergies between ministries of education and relevant counter-terrorism ministries, and encourage the comprehensive approach to CVE.

1.3. Involving teachers in a cohesive CVE strategy

Training teachers and social workers on CVE was identified as another possible intervention. However, it was noted that for certain teachers working in conflict areas, adding a special concern on violent extremism could add unnecessary strain, and have negative effects. Training educators on identifying early warning signs of violent extremism was an additional recommendation. For this to be effective, a good system of processing signs of potential radicalization should be established in the local law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, there was also a discussion of the risk of training teachers on early warning signs meant that educational institutions could potentially be perceived by the community as law enforcement instruments, thus limiting the effects of the CVE intervention. Therefore, it was also important that any CVE intervention in formal educational settings establish and maintain clear boundaries related to law enforcement organizations.

1.4. Educational curriculum development

There were a number of recommendations regarding the possible skills that could be taught through educational curriculum in formal institutions that could help build individuals' and communities' general resilience to violent extremism. For example, critical thinking skills were identified as important for young people to evaluate multiple viewpoints and see them as valid. This was identified as crucial especially for young people to challenge the violent extremist narratives. Some evidence-based approaches to developing these sorts of skills as a way to reduce radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism have already been utilized with some success. For example, Jose Liht and Sara Savage developed an educational model in the United Kingdom that works on increasing individuals' integrative complexity, or the "ability to perceive multiple viewpoints or dimensions on an issue" [25] that was shown to increase tolerant views of opposing groups of British youth. A different field of research shows there have also been some successes in using mindfulness techniques to reduce violence both in schools and in the broader community [26]. Apart from introducing these types of skills in the educational curricula for pupils and students, it was also noted that there might be a need to train educators to be better equipped to deal with critical or radical/extremist views expressed during classes.

Another component of educational curriculum that can have CVE effects is through civic education and citizenship. It was recommended that broad-based citizenship programs that promote universal values such as tolerance and social inclusion could have some effect on building resilience to violent extremism.

However, it was also noted that these values taught should be relevant to the local context, and that schools should avoid teaching values that could be perceived as “imported” into the local community. This recommendation was in agreement with some existing programs that have shown that citizenship programs increase tolerance within communities. For example, Project Citizen program in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that participants that underwent citizenship training showed greater tolerance towards members of other political groups than non-participants [27]. A different project in Nigeria, Tolerance Academy, sought to overcome religious hatred in youth through a non-profit, youth-based education program aimed at developing social entrepreneurs and building a tolerant, peaceful society [28].

1.5. Role of sports, arts and cultural programming in education

It was noted that sports, arts and culture can have added value to CVE efforts, especially when they are an integrated part of a broader educational activities. Moreover, participants suggested that this programming should be carefully designed and deliberate. Sports, arts and culture by themselves do not naturally counter violent extremism, but can be CVE relevant when they reinforce the skills and values that are taught in a the broader educational program. Additionally, sports, arts and culture can only be used for CVE purposes if relevant to the local push and pull factors of recruitment or radicalization into violent extremism. It was also mentioned that for instance sport activities can on the other hand be a recruitment place or soft target for violent extremist groups.

For these more specific CVE purposes, it might be useful to draw from the good practices and lessons learned from other area studies in the fields of sport, art and culture, and identify relevant elements from those programs for tailored CVE interventions. For example, it has been shown that sports may decrease social exclusion, decrease youth delinquency, increase the learning performance of children in schools, and increase a child’s capacity to develop moral character [29]. There have been some successes with using sports programs that incorporate cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) to reduce the occurrence of youth violence in Chicago [30]. Moreover, art, theatre and culture have been utilized by development actors to raise awareness about health, gender, education and other social issues—all of which might have strong implications for countering violent extremism. For example, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) used hands-on theatre with youth in its Youth Theatre for Peace program in rural, conflict-prone areas of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan [31].

Given the growing interest in the topic of sports, arts and culture in CVE programming and the need for more evidence of the effectiveness of these programs, Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security convened an expert roundtable titled *Countering Violent Extremism: What role for sports, arts and culture?* in May 2014. The recommendations and outcomes of the meeting will be made available in a forthcoming report of the meeting published by Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security.

2. Families and Communities

A second potential mechanism for CVE interventions is by reaching youth vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization through their families and communities. The

discussions within the UN counter-terrorism sector regarding families and communities in CVE efforts stem primarily from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Resolution 1325 has promoted the roles of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, areas that can also play important roles in countering violent extremism and in delegitimizing and reducing support for extremist groups [32]. UN Security Council Resolution 2122 (2013) also specifically identified the critical contributions of women and women's organizations to conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding [33], and the subsequent mandate of the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate in UN Security Council Resolution 2129 (2013) provides an additional mechanism, of both research and technical assistance, for carrying out the women, peace and security agenda within the UN system [34].

While the discussions within the UN have focused on the role of women in peace and security measures, there has only been a limited discussion of the roles that families might play in preventing violent extremism. In the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Pillar 1 recognizes the facilitating support for the "needs of victims and their families" as a way to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism [35], and subsequent documents supporting this pillar also address victims and their families. However, there is not, as of yet, a particular mention in relevant UN counter-terrorism documents of how families may prevent or counter violent extremism outside the context of victims of terrorism.

The specific topic of the role of families and communities has surfaced during discussions at GCTF meetings, which led to two good practices documents: the *Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism*, and the *Ankara Memorandum*. The *Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing* document suggests methods for building trust within communities and advises on community engagement efforts that promote stability and cooperation between different sectors [36]. The *Ankara Memorandum* identifies community groups such as women, religious leaders, youth, educators, civil society, the private sector and law enforcement, all of these groups potential actors for building resilience against violent extremism [37]. The Senior Official meeting on CVE and Education hosted by Hedayah in September 2013 also placed a special emphasis on the role of families and communities in providing informal education to young people as one of the three session topics.

Existing research has also emphasized the critical role that mothers, fathers, siblings and social networks can play as a conduit of values and traditions, and particularly in shaping the worldviews of children and youths, both at an early age before formal education and during school years. This means that during the years of formal education, involving families and communities in students' education can have the effect of reinforcing values and lessons learned in school. On the other hand, experts have also noted that families can be supportive of violent extremist groups and ideas, and may in some cases provide an enabling environment for young people to join extremist groups, either decisively or unknowingly. For example, a recent study on the Somali youth diaspora in Minneapolis have also suggested that family separation or loss, weak parental support, parents wholeheartedly trusting others in the mosque, and a lack of awareness of radicalization and recruitment were all risk factors that contributed to increased recruitment into violent extremist organizations [38].

The emphasis on the role of families and communities also builds on an existing body of literature on disengagement and de-radicalization that suggests that family members play crucial roles in the disengagement process. Rebuilding family

relationships is a crucial component of the multi-disciplinary rehabilitation programs for Neo-Nazis and white supremacy groups in Europe [39] the reconciliation program for Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka [40] and for Al Qaida detainees in Saudi Arabia [41].

In order to further investigate the possibilities of incorporating families and communities into CVE efforts, Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Security convened a roundtable in December 2013 on the *Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience against Violent Extremism*. The discussions considered the roles families and communities have played in such efforts to prevent and respond to violence, and how these might inform CVE policies and practices. The meeting also build on a meeting co-hosted by the Global Center and the Institute of South Asian Studies in Singapore, in September 2013, titled “Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism in South Asia: What Role for Women and Civil Society?” [42]. Based on the discussions that took place in the international community as well as at Hedayah’s meetings, a number of themes emerged relating to CVE interventions through families and communities specifically pertaining to youth. These recommendations are not exhaustive, but the highlights are described in further detail below.

2.1. Youth as valuable members of the community

Echoing the current discourse on the role of youth as a relevant actor in peace and security efforts, youth were identified as the most likely instigators of change within the community. The idea of investing in and developing young community leaders as responsible citizens and role models and positive peer pressure for the broader youth population was reiterated as a key step forward in efforts for countering violent extremism. For that reason, it was discussed that youth leadership might have an ability to shape the development of CVE programs and policies in a way that better addresses the local push and pull factors related to youth recruitment. It was recommended that including youth’s needs and aspirations in the program design stages for CVE can be a way to ensure the program is attractive and effective for engaging with youth. Furthermore, it was also recommended that CVE programs should not only focus on the obvious youth leaders—that in fact, the marginalized can be the most vulnerable to recruitment, and CVE program developers should provide opportunities for these marginalized youth to succeed in their own context without resorting to violent extremism.

2.2. Mothers steering youth away from violent extremism

Another key element related to families and communities in building community resilience is the role of mothers as influential in steering youth either towards or away from violent extremism. It was recommended that where appropriate, networks of mothers could be engaged for CVE efforts. Some existing programs have already had success in this area. For example, the PAIMAN Alumni Trust in Pakistan engages mothers and youth in moderating extremism in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [43]. It was also recommended that mothers’ voices, particularly mothers of victims of terrorism and of perpetrators of violent extremism, were powerful narratives that could be harnessed for promoting peace and countering the narrative of violent extremism. This recommendation has been implemented by a number of organizations working on supporting victims of terrorism, for instance by

the NGO Sisters Against Violent Extremism, which highlights the narratives of women from Northern Ireland, Spain, Israel, Palestine, Pakistan, India, Yemen and Indonesia [44].

On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that women and mothers do not always have a positive role to play in violent extremism. For example, Mia Bloom has written extensively about the willing participation of women and girls in violent extremist organizations, with examples from Russia, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Iraq and others [45]. The subject has also been part of recent discussions in the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), which held a workshop on the topic of *Women, Girls, Gender in Extremism: Gender-Specific Approached in Prevention/Intervention*. Part of a broader project evaluating women in extremism, the workshop discussed women's involvement in Neo-Nazi and rightwing extremism in Europe [46].

2.3. Role of father figure in CVE

Another relevant recommendation pertaining to families, youth and CVE was the need to further explore the roles of fathers in both recruitment and prevention of violent extremism. This is especially true in the context of the father-son relationship, and the strong role a father figure plays in many cultures. Experts described cases in which an absent father figure led to feelings of resentment and isolation, which sometimes contribute to a young person's vulnerability to recruitment into violent extremism. There has been some research to support this claim, particularly in the context of South Asia. For example, among militant boys age 12-18 in Swat, Pakistan, 65% of the supervising authority figures (male) were absent [47]. However, generally this area remains under-explored in terms of research, programming and policy, and it was recommended that this topic be explored further.

2.4. Non-local communities

Also coming to light in the discussions on communities was the role of non-local communities in both recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism. It was recognized that the communities that youth identify with most strongly are not necessarily the communities that they live in themselves—especially in an increasingly globalized world. These communities include online chat forums and social media platforms, but also broader, international communities that make youth feel part of a greater good, for example compassion or support for a conflict abroad. It was suggested that non-local communities can have both a positive or negative effect on recruitment and radicalization—identifying with a non-local community may cultivate positive change, or increase their vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment.

Conclusion

Based on the existing research, policy and programs, there is real potential in further developing CVE programming through formal educational institutions. However, educational institutions and programs are not always relevant to the local push and pull factors related to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. When educational institutions are relevant to CVE, programs with a deliberate design to address these factors are most effective. Additionally, appropriate education alone is

not sufficient for CVE purposes. Moreover, educational institutions also have the greatest effect as a CVE mechanism if educational actors coordinate with other actors in the broader community to create comprehensive, mutual, reinforcing approaches.

In the context countering violent extremism, families and communities have a potential impact on building youth resilience against violent extremism because these are actors that can be influential in the lives of youth. However, this theme remains still needs further research to truly articulate how and why families and community actors are able to affect change and prevent recruitment into violent extremism.

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