



# Resilience Factors and Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Mozambique

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# ACRONYMS

ARPP	Advancing Reconciliation and Promoting Peace
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CNDS	National Defense and Security Council
CPC	Community Policing Committees
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DAI	Development Alternatives Incorporated
DFID	the Department for International Development
ERDIN	Resilience and Development Strategy for the North
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGD	National Institute for Disaster Risk Management and Reduction
MCRP	Mozambique Community Resilience Program
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PEGDI	Displaced Management Policy and Strategy
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
VE	Violent Extremism
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
VERLT	Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## The Emergence of Violence in Mozambique

On October 5, 2017, a wave of organized violence began in Mozambique, when a group of armed men attacked a string of police stations in the Moçimboa da Praia district, in Cabo Delgado province. Initially state responses to the violence tried to portray the violence as an act of disgruntled youth. However as of 2021, the group referred to locally as al-Shabaab (the youth), or Ansar al Sunnah has been able to deal significant blows to the military forces of Mozambique, kill people and expand in geographical scope, strategic coordination, and sophistication. The militants have not published an official ideology or specific grievances but are probably looking to create a new social order that would afford them greater economic and political power (Devermont & Columbo, 2019).

In 2019, the Mozambican President used for the first time the term “terrorism” to classify the nature of the violence but, the official recognition of the presence of terrorists in Mozambique only took place on April 23, 2020, when the National Defense and Security Council (CNDS)<sup>1</sup> stated that Mozambique was facing an “external aggression perpetrated by terrorists.

Over the years, attacks have led to militant control from the districts of Quissanga (25.03.2020) Macomia (28.05.2020) Mocimboa da Praia (11.08.2020) and Palma on (24.03.2021) causing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis (CDD, 2022) and precipitating the intervention of the regional forces (SADC-SAMIMI) and Rwandan forces starting between June and July 2021, with about 3,000 soldiers. There are reports that Rwanda has increased the number of soldiers on the ground<sup>2</sup>, although there is no official confirmation from the Mozambican authorities.

As consequence of the violence, Mozambique has currently about 946,508 so-called internally displaced persons (IDP) in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa. Until the last attacks that affected the districts of Ancuabe (05.06.2022)<sup>3</sup>, Erati (05.09.2022)<sup>4</sup>, Memba (07.09.2022)<sup>5</sup>, Montepuez (20.10.2022)<sup>6</sup>, and Chiure (26.10.2022)<sup>7</sup>, the south districts of Cabo Delgado and the Nampula province were considered the safest and, consequently, were where thousands of people moved during the last five years of conflict. However, in recent times the situation has been changing with reports of attacks in almost all districts of the province of Cabo Delgado and neighboring provinces

## Violent Extremism

Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism poses an existential threat to security, development, and well-being both at the domestic and international levels. It has become clear that combating this threat requires more than security/military-based responses. Although they allow governments to deal with immediate threats and, therefore, restore security, longer-term solutions that address the underlying factors fueling the violence need to be addressed. The international community has recognized that working on longer-term solutions to violent extremism (VE) requires, as Ciarán Devane (2018)<sup>8</sup> puts it, an understanding on what drives people to join violent extremist groups.

The phenomenon of VE is growing in Africa. It is becoming more common and multi-factorial, meaning that the evidence for what drives it is multi-faceted, complex, and sometimes contradictory. Even more complex is the understanding on what leads one to join violent extremist groups – what could be a motivation for one person may not even apply for someone else, as Devane (2018) states, the

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<sup>1</sup> National Defense and Security Council (CNDS) chaired by the President of the Republic acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Defense and Security Forces (FDS)

<sup>3</sup> [Mozambique: Terrorists Attack Village in Ancuabe - allAfrica.com](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Mozambique: Armed men attack in Nampula province – AIM report | Club of Mozambique](#)

<sup>5</sup> [Mozambique: Terrorists Attack Village in Memba - allAfrica.com](#)

<sup>6</sup> [Mozambique: Militants attack ruby mine in Cabo Delgado Province Oct. 20 | Crisis24 \(garda.com\)](#)

<sup>7</sup> [Insurgents threaten Nampula as attacks sweep through Chiure – Zitamar](#)

<sup>8</sup> CEO of the British Council, in “Community of Practice on Preventing Violent Extremism: Building Pathways: What works on developing young people’s resilience to violent extremism” by the British Council (2018).

pathway to join violent extremist organizations (VEO) is deeply personal, therefore, cannot be predicted by one factor alone. Hence, what governments and international organizations have increasingly been doing is to track the multiple forms of capital available to populations at risk of joining VEOs and use this information to recommend interventions that increase their capacity to resist the push and pull forces that contribute to violence and this, according to Grossman et al (2020), is essentially building resilience to VE.

This literature review focuses on the factors through which community resilience, in the context of VE, can be strengthened. It is divided into two parts: the first explores the literature on the concept of resilience and the factors that influence it and the second reviews existing literature on how community resilience can be strengthened, considering the cases of Mozambique, Kenya, and Tanzania.

## The Concept of Resilience and the Factors Underpinning Individual/Community Resilience to VE

The concept of resilience has been used for many years in different fields and disciplines. It can be, and has been, applied to the environmental, ecological, social, economic, and political fields. The concept can also be applied on several levels – from the micro to the macro, the individual to the societal, and the local to the national (Sigsworth et al, 2020). Therefore, there are various definitions and understandings of the concept, depending not only on the field but also on the institution/organization. For instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defines resilience as the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) understands it as the capability to cope independently with crises and to prepare for recurring stresses in order to mitigate negative effects of crises and to gradually overcome them permanently through structural changes. The European Commission sees it as the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as drought, violence, conflict, or natural disaster. Finally, the Department for International Development (DFID) sees it as both the process and capacity to be better prepared to withstand and rapidly recover from a shock.

While these definitions may apply to the organizations' specific context or field of intervention, they have in common the understanding of resilience as an ability or capacity to overcome adversity. In the field of VE specifically, resilience has been a significant component of the efforts to prevent violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) in various countries for more than a decade, and the focus of these efforts have been on building individual and community resilience, looking at the concept of resilience as linked to prevention or resistance to violent extremist ideologies and to those who espouse them (Grossman, 2021). As Doosje et al. (2016), cited in Grossman (2021), also notes, before someone becomes radicalized, investing in resilience is a means of preventing violent extremism, but after that happens, resilience retains its core meaning of resistance.

Within the framework of prevention and resistance, individual resilience is defined, according to Stewart (2018), with four elements: (1) confidence: encompassing strengths such as having positive emotions, optimism, positive attitude and beliefs and self-belief; (2) social support: including strengths such as self-awareness, awareness of others and empathy and sociability; (3) adaptability: with strengths such as intelligence and problem solving, and ability to improvise; and (4) purposefulness: considering strengths such as sense of purpose, conscientiousness, meaningfulness and self-control. This means that individuals who present strengths across the four elements are more resilient as they are self-starters who use their networks to build positive collective action and are less susceptible of resorting to violence.

Community resilience, on the other hand, is defined as: “community’s ability to leverage social capital to detect radicalization risks, prevent the recruitment of community members into violent extremism, and bounce back after instances of recruitment via learning and adaptability that permits the community to better limit future recruitment” (Wimelius et al, 2018). Social capital here refers to the networks of relationships among people who live and work in a particular society that enable that society to function effectively (Sigsworth et al, 2020).

Many efforts to build or strengthen individual and community resilience to VE focus on social capital. According to Sigsworth et al (2020), the efforts that center on social capital, as well as on community competence, as the “collective ability of individuals to learn about their social environment and use that information to identify problems and develop solutions to address those problems in order to meet the needs of the community”, tend to be more effective. Research on what shapes social capital and community competence, hence influencing individual and community resilience, reveals that there are essentially five important factors to be considered.

Considering the BRAVE-14 measure, developed by Michael Grossman, Kristin Hadfield, Philip Jefferies, Vivian Gerrand and Michael Ungar, these five factors are: (1) cultural identity and connectedness; (2) bridging capital; (3) linking capital; (4) violence-related behaviors; and (5) violence-related beliefs. However, although initially developed by these authors, this literature review underlines the five factors brought by Sigsworth et al (2020), as they are more comprehensive, since they include the social-economic factors, left aside by Grossman et al. (2017). Hence, the five factors that shape social capital and community competence, according to Sigsworth et al (2020), are:

1. **Bonding capital** refers to cultural identity and connectedness, an individual familiarity with his/her own cultural heritage, practices, beliefs, traditions, values, and norms. Gunnestad (2006), cited by Grossman et al (2017), suggests that people who master the rules and norms of their new culture without abandoning their own language, values and social support are more resilient than those who tenaciously maintain their own culture at the expense of adjusting to their new environment. They are also more resilient to violent extremism than those who forego their own culture and assimilate completely with the host society.
2. **Bridging capital** entails social connections, relationships, and active engagement with people outside of an individual’s cultural or ethnic group. It consists of having trust and confidence in people from other groups, having support for and from people from other groups; having the skills, knowledge, and confidence to connect with other groups, valuing inter-group harmony and active engagement with people from other groups. Without bridging capital, a community runs the risk of missing out on the knowledge, resources, and skills available in other networks, and this can lead to feelings of isolation and disenfranchisement among minority groups. Hence, learning to be tolerant towards different views enhances the ability of a community to participate collectively in finding solutions to common local problems and strengthens their resilience to violent extremism.
3. **Linking capital** speaks to the respect, trust, confidence, and communication between community members and those in authority (be they government officials, community leaders or religious leaders). It involves having trust in community organizations; having the skills, knowledge, and resources to make use of institutions and organizations outside one’s local community; and the ability to contribute to or influence policy and decision making relating to one’s own community. As Putnam (2000), cited by Grossman et al (2017), states, the absence of linking capital correlates to an absence of trust in institutions and services, and the trust gap in turn accelerates vulnerability to violent extremism.
4. **Violence-related behaviors and beliefs** refers to the willingness to speak out publicly

against violence; willingness to challenge the use of violence by others; acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts; the degree to which violence is seen to confer status and respect; degree to which violence is normalized or well tolerated for any age group in the community.

- 5. Socio-economic wellbeing and development:** socioeconomic conditions play a role in creating an environment that is more conducive to the narratives of violent extremists, with poverty and marginalization encouraging members of a community to seek economic security and social acceptance elsewhere. The quality of education, and particularly religious education, also plays an important role in strengthening critical thinking and building resilience.

## How to Strengthen Individual and Community Resilience to VE: Case Studies in Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique

The following focuses on how resilience to VE can be strengthened, considering the factors described above, by looking at some case studies from South-East Africa, such as Tanzania, Kenya and, specifically Mozambique.

**In as far as Tanzania** is concerned, a study conducted by ALPS Resilience in 2018, revealed that the country, specifically the Pwani region which shares borders with Cabo Delgado in Mozambique and is under the threat of VE, had relatively high levels of resilience to VE, manifested through the five factors of the BRAVE-14 measure. For instance, communities from Pwani showed trust, confidence, mutual support and active engagement between them (regardless of the ethnic group or religion). They also showed trust in authorities and community organizations, and other agencies within their communities and bonding capital was also strong as they believed it was important to maintain their traditions and that their lives are guided by their culture. Finally, they also showed non-violent behaviors and beliefs (ALPS Resilience, 2018).

Despite presenting strong signs of resilience to VE, the study still recommended that resilience continue to be strengthened as the occurrence of VE in the neighboring regions of Cabo Delgado and the socioeconomic inequalities constituted risks factors for the recruitment of young people to join VEOs. Hence, the recommendations were that resilience in Tanzania had to be strengthened through programmatic responses such as building capacity through support grants for livelihood and agricultural activities, fostering cultural identity and connectedness among the smaller minority groups, building cultural interconnectedness between ethnic/linguistic/religious groups, and working with the local government and civil society organizations in Pwani in order to increase the presence/visibility and activities of the government. In turn, these interventions would reduce real or perceived feelings of dissatisfaction and, therefore, strengthen individual and community resilience to VE (ALPS Resilience, 2018).

**In Kenya**, a study conducted by Sigsworth et al (2020) in three sites of the country (Nairobi, Kwale, and Wajir) concluded that there are major risk factors that contribute to increased vulnerability of young people to join VEOs, the most prevalent being the abuse of community members at the hands of the police and economic distress. Although the interviewed communities reported that police brutality, profiling and extrajudicial killings raise tensions between the communities and law enforcement authorities, numerous signs of resilience as well as evidence of areas where existing strengths can be enhanced and developed to build a more robust resilience were identified. Poverty, unemployment, lack of economic opportunities and exclusion from the prevailing politics however fueled distrust between communities.

The following actions were identified as needing to be addressed to strengthen community resilience:



continuous sensitization to the negative impacts of VE as well as discussions on how to deal with it by improving the quality of education; promotion of a more proactive role for ethnic and religious leaders in promoting cultural cohesion within their identity groups, including advocating for cultural tolerance and the advantages of cultural pluralism; realization of cross-cultural and interreligious events that foster a shared sense of identity among all community members; and facilitation of dialogues to help develop a sense of connection between a diversity of actors within a community, as well as to avoid “suspect individuals”, something that has been identified as a major flaw in programs aimed at preventing radicalization (Sigsworth et al, 2020).

**In as far as Mozambique** is concerned, ALPS Resilience undertook, in the years of 2018 and 2020, two studies on the community resilience capacities and vulnerabilities in the context of VE in Northern Mozambique, respectively in Nampula and Cabo Delgado. These studies revealed that both provinces presented strong resilience capabilities, however Cabo Delgado had more vulnerabilities than Nampula.

In Nampula (2018) communities presented strengths in the overall five resilience factors, showing signs of community engagement and connectedness, trust in the government authorities, strong cultural identity and solid non-violent behaviors and beliefs. The major risk factors in Nampula were linked to the context of cyclones (considering that the research was conducted right after cyclone Kenneth, which affected both Nampula and Cabo Delgado) and were also linked to poor involvement in group activities and to overall socioeconomic inequalities in the country (ALPS Resilience, 2018).

Communities from Cabo Delgado (2020), on the other hand, showed moderate levels of resilience to VE, manifested in the poor connectedness of the communities and their culture and in the low levels of engagement within the communities, especially by the male counterparts and the youth, who are most vulnerable (conversely, women who engage more within the community had weak participation in decision-making). In addition, perception of political autonomy and equal treatment remained poor, especially amongst the youth population who showed dissatisfaction in relation with the government authorities, and violent norms were rejected throughout the communities, but still the willingness to effectively oppose violent behavior and beliefs proved underdeveloped (ALPS Resilience, 2020).

Moreover, in Cabo Delgado inter-community connectivity was found moderate to low as individuals proved to be more positive towards engagement with similar communities rather than with different ones. In fact, cultural tensions became apparent amongst people originating from different districts (especially Mocimboa da Praia<sup>9</sup> and Quissanga) and ethnic tensions were also identified between the Mwani, Makua and Makonde groups as Mwani are considered as being intolerant of other ethnic groups while the Makonde are perceived to hold feelings of superiority over other ethnic groups. Muslim communities expressed intolerance towards Christians (i.e. the Christian diet, styles of worship and interfaith marriages) and the study found that Muslim communities proved to be more receptive to violent rhetoric than Christian communities. In fact, the difference between religious groups in Cabo Delgado proved significant because Muslims make up a majority in Cabo Delgado and VE in the province is strongly linked to extremist Islamic ideologies (Ibid).

The results of the ALPS studies are consistent with the evolution of the situation in Cabo Delgado, especially in the centers created to accommodate IDPs who are forced to share spaces. The Centers for displaced persons, represent an important focus of the conflict because they are areas of high concentration of people of different ethnicities, languages, and religions. Although there are no studies or reports, these centers also have high possibilities of accommodating networks of radicalization and recruitment and, in some areas, small tensions begin to arise between the receiving communities, and the displaced communities for various reasons such as feelings that the displaced are favored by humanitarian agencies and the refusal of receiving communities to share their land so that the displaced can produce their food, confirming the moderate inter-community connectivity.

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<sup>9</sup> The first district to suffer the first terrorist attacks in Mozambique on October 5, 2022

In recent months, the flow of humanitarian aid has suffered some limitations<sup>10</sup>, especially the distribution of food, mostly carried out by the World Food Program which, in addition to having suffered an inflation in the number of people registered to receive food, has also begun to face difficulties in regularly distributing food. In the centers, families and groups that did not have access to food felt discriminated against, reinforcing their convictions that only certain groups had access to support. Despite the efforts of the United Nations and the Mozambican government to mobilize more support, what is certain is that the mistrust among IDPs has increased thus reinforcing their antagonistic positions and jeopardizing efforts to prevent violence.

To understand the mistrust and tensions in the centers, it is important to understand the historical context of the violence in Cabo Delgado. Cabo Delgado has a history of conflict and poverty between the three main ethnolinguistic groups. These ethnolinguistic groups are: Makuas (67,1%) mostly associated to the Islamic religion in coastal areas, but with strong Christian penetration in the hinterland, Makonde's (20%)<sup>11</sup>, Christian, concentrated on the Mueda plateau extending into southeastern Tanzania and Muidumbe, with strong presence in military centers in Montepuez, Maputo, Pemba and Nampula, and Mwanis (5,9%)<sup>12</sup> and present in almost the entire length of the coast of Cabo Delgado usually dedicated to a combination of fishing activity, small subsistence agriculture as well as commercial activities (Feijó, 2020).

Politically, these three groups have different preferences. For instance, data on the electoral processes in 1994 and 2014, demonstrated that, although the major opposition party Renamo did not obtain hegemony over the ruling party (Frelimo) in the entire province, it achieved more significant electoral results in coastal areas where much of the population is Muslim and predominantly Makua and Mwani, against complete hegemony of the ruling party in the plateau districts and inland areas of the province (Brito, 2020). These political differences continue to be verified throughout Cabo Delgado and in the IDP centers and can explain the moderate levels of resilience to VE, manifested in the poor connectedness between the communities, both in the origin areas and in the displaced centers.

When the first attacks started to occur in the Mueda Plateau areas (Nov. 2021) a group of former Mozambique liberation fighters with direct links to the ruling party asked for weapons to fight the rebel groups<sup>13</sup> and recently, the government deposited a proposal in parliament to approve the action of forces in areas of conflict in Cabo Delgado to defend themselves against attacks. This government decision served to reinforce the perception that political autonomy and equal treatment is poor, especially amongst the youth population in the districts that, having experienced the same generalized violence, did not have the possibility of creating their own forces to stop the advance of the rebel groups.

As in Kenya, the relationship between communities and the police in Cabo Delgado represents a factor to be considered when analyzing the resilience of communities in the face of violence. Recent publications show that communities in the districts of Metuge, Mueda, Nangade, Pemba, and Mecufi despite trusting the police authorities, reported brutalities and extrajudicial killings against community members (UJC, 2021). While police brutality is a constant throughout the country (Bjørn, 2016), the context and polarization in Cabo Delgado make this phenomenon a watershed in the relationship between communities, especially between the youth and the police authorities. To mitigate this problem, agencies of the United Nations for Migration have been financing the reactivation of community policing in several districts of the province.

Community policing emerged in 2001 with the designation of Community Policing Committees (CPCs), as a response to the increasing crime in the peripheral neighborhoods of Maputo city, human

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<sup>10</sup> [Fundos Secam à Medida que a Fome Cresce em Cabo Delgado | As Nações Unidas em Moçambique](#)

<sup>11</sup> The Makonde are the least affected by poverty in Cabo Delgado, due better conditions derived of to the existence of an elite that actively participated in the liberation war, and which have better housing conditions and ability to access consumer goods

<sup>12</sup> were always considered traitors because of its relations with the colonial power.

<sup>13</sup> [“Força Local” segue eliminando terroristas em Cabo Delgado - O País - A verdade como notícia \(opais.co.mz\)](#)

rights violations such as lynchings, and the need for closer relations between the police and the community to ensure public safety. The initiative involved local leaders in the resolution of local problems and quickly spread across the country and is currently being implemented in Cabo Delgado<sup>14</sup> with the support of the International Organization for Migration in the context of extremist violence to engage community leaders and youths to collaborate with the Police.

## Resilience of Communities in the North of Mozambique as Tool to Inform Better Approaches for P/CVE programs

Considering these aspects, ALPS Resilience (2020) recommended that interventions to strengthen resilience to VE should focus on empowering local conflict resolution mechanisms and on building social cohesion through dialogues, especially intercultural and interreligious dialogues to settle existing intra-community tensions. They also recommended that interventions should also address issues of weak governance in remote areas, facilitating conversation between community leaders and local government by building good relationships between government authorities such as police and the military and the communities, particularly the youth. Finally, it was recommended that interventions should seek to address unemployment through the implementation of livelihoods, upskilling and youth development programs.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are acknowledged as very important entities that can help in strengthening individual and community resilience to VE by convening the dialogue sessions and other initiatives that can help build social cohesion and a more positive relationship between communities and the government authorities. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that local NGOs and civil society organizations (CSO) are involved in the efforts to prevent VE. ALPS Resilience (2020) proposes capacity building activities coupled with direct support (funding) opportunities to capacitate local NGOs and CSOs in community-building; this will allow these organizations to operate and serve their communities more effectively.

In general, in all the case studies reviewed, all the five factors were considered important in the approaches to strengthen resilience to VE. The interventions to this end revolve around giving a voice to the youth and women in community decision-making by, for instance, providing mentorships for the youth to support them on how to actively and constructively engage in community forums, providing leadership-skills capacity building for women and capacity building for male leaders on good governance, with an emphasis on the principles of participation, representation, inclusivity, human rights, cultural diversity and social cohesion. Interventions should also enhance economic development by creating socio-economic and skills development opportunities for the youth and women; improving the relationships and cooperation between state authorities and community members, and in general, empowering CSOs and NGOs so that they then empower the communities to become more resilient to VE ideologies.

### **IDPs' and Host Communities' Views about Violence as a Legitimate Means for Conflict Resolution in Cabo Delgado and Neighboring Districts that Border the Province (Lalaua, Memba, Mecuburi and Erati in Nampula)**

On September 7, 2022, militants attacked villages in the districts of Erati and Memba, killing six people and kidnapping three others (Crisis24, 2022). These two districts belong to the province of Nampula and border districts in Cabo Delgado. Memba is known as one of the main areas of recruitment for VEOs and despite not having a significant displaced population it has always been a district under security alert.

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<sup>14</sup> [OIM apoia PRM na formação sobre policiamento comunitário em Cabo Delgado - O País - A verdade como notícia \(opais.co.mz\)](https://opais.co.mz/noticia/opais.co.mz)

According to the survey in 2018, violence related behaviors had low levels of support and/or endorsement in Nampula, (ALPS Resilience, 2018) but Erati and Memba scored the lowest in bridging capital, linking capital and violence-related beliefs and, curiously, were the first districts attacked when the violence reached Nampula. In fact, it was already expected that these provinces would be the first to be attacked not only because of the low scores in the factors mentioned but also because of their proximity to Cabo Delgado. Memba, in addition to being identified as a preferential recruiting area for VEOs, shares a border with the Mecufi district in Cabo Delgado by sea and the sea has been a preferential means in the movement of terrorist groups. Erati in turn shares a border with the Chiure district in Cabo Delgado across the Lurio river and is adjacent to the Memba district. The results found in the resilience assessment are consistent with the fact that they were the first to be attacked. Other districts in Nampula that had similar scores and are in the same circumstances as Memba and Erati are Lalaua and Mecuburi districts.

This low support for violence was also identified in IDP camps in Cabo Delgado and Nampula, where communities showed strong opposition to the use of violence as a tool to solve problems (Guivala and Chingotuane, 2022). This data represents an important fact insofar as the communities that generally reported ethnic and/or religious differences in their areas of origin, especially in the north of Cabo Delgado, in the IDP camps, showed a more tolerant view of these differences, probably because everyone, regardless of their religion and/or ethnicity, had been victims of extremist violence.

Despite the unanimity on the non-use of violence, IDP centers have created other sources of conflict as the massive displacement of the population has established new relationships between displaced people and locals in host communities, giving rise to new conflicts that affect the daily lives of communities with significant impacts on the erosion of social cohesion and the resurgence of violence, as well as the increase of criminal acts not directly linked to the armed conflict that takes place in Cabo Delgado (Mukadzi, 2022).

## **Current Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Programs for Northern Mozambique.**

There is a widespread idea that the repression of terrorism should encompass hard and soft measures (Frazer & Nünlist, 2015). With the arrival of foreign troops in Mozambique in June (Rwanda) and July (SADC) 2021, the repression against organized violence took on new contours, but a void remained in Mozambique's strategy for dealing with violence.

Countering violent extremism (CVE) or preventing violent extremism (PVE) refers to the “soft” side of counterterrorism<sup>15</sup> strategies that tackle the drivers which lead people to engage in politically- or ideologically motivated violence and aims to engage with these personal, individual causes at the micro-level (Frazer & Nünlist, 2015).

Officially, Mozambique is not yet implementing a strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE), but government and civil society organizations have implemented initiatives trying to adjust its actions to a P/CVE strategy, although far from applying a full strategy.

- On May 12, 2020, the Council of Ministers created the Northern Integral Development Agency (ADIN) to boost economic development in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula under four main pillars: 1) humanitarian assistance 2) economic development 3) community resilience and 4) communication, to promote job creation for young people in northern Mozambique as a way of discouraging them from joining terrorist groups.

- On December 28, 2020<sup>16</sup>, the Government created the National Institute for Disaster Risk Management and Reduction (INGD) for, among other purposes, promoting social reintegration of those affected in the communities, as well as assisting communities in resettlement villages and other places where there are IDPs. This institution is tasked with implementing the Internally Displaced Management Policy and Strategy (PEGDI).
- On September 21, 2021, the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan (2021 – 2024) was released to guarantee the humanitarian, social and economic conditions for the normalization of life in the affected areas and ensure the return of the population to their areas of origin.
- On September 8, 2021, the government created a Policy and Strategy for the Management of Internally Displaced Persons (PEGDI) aimed to mitigate the adverse effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, and natural or man-made disasters which have not crossed the borders of the Republic of Mozambique. IDPs in vulnerable situations benefit from assistance under this strategy.
- In November 2021, ADIN created the Resilience and Development Strategy for the North (ERDIN), which aims to address the roots of poverty, exclusion, inequality, deficient human capital, and the lack of developmental gains in the North, as well as the causes of VE in Cabo Delgado Province. ERDIN also aims to support the capacities of local communities to manage climatic or other shocks. ERDIN also integrates the cross-cutting issues of human rights, gender, youth, and climate resilience.
- In 2019, the Mozambique Community Resilience Program (MCRP) was implemented in Cabo Delgado and Nampula by Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) to prevent and counter VE in northern Mozambique through small grants to respond to changes in the context of violence. Thereby integrating local, government and civil society organizations efforts in violence prevention and violence awareness.

## Conclusion

About 5 years have passed since the outbreak of extremist violence in northern Mozambique. Among considerations related to poverty, political and economic exclusion, ethnic tensions, and the central government's inability to deal with violence, Mozambique has, albeit timidly, begun to understand the seriousness of the phenomenon and the impossibility of resolving it only by military means. Understanding how resilience factors work together has been part of the challenges that the government and the international community have faced in Mozambique, which are reflected in research (although there is still very little on resilience) and in the definition of the best strategies for dealing with tensions between communities and expectations of thousands of young people who miss opportunities every day due to their lack of education and belonging or not to certain ethnic groups. Mozambique has made a considerable effort to, while mobilizing military resources for the war, deal with social challenges, although it has had difficulty recognizing some of the social factors as causing the onset of violence.

Such factors include poverty, corruption, and abuse of power by police authorities as well as policies that over the years have benefited certain social and/or ethnic groups to the detriment of others, and are discussed, albeit superficially, in this document

Understanding resilience as a transversal element for development and for the prevention of violence thus becomes crucial for the future actions of the government of Mozambique and of all national and international partners involved in the humanitarian response and in efforts to contain violence.

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<sup>16</sup> With approval of Decree n° 41/2020

The new Mozambiquan initiatives approved at the legal and political level, despite being ambitious do not seem to be enough to contain violence for several reasons, the main one being that they ignore poverty, unemployment, and exclusion as the main causes of the violence that has emerged in Cabo Delgado. In addition, initiatives taken because of international pressure appear to be uncoordinated and there are no effective mechanisms capable of guaranteeing that the objectives for which they were created will be met. Finally, this is further aggravated by the significant lack of international funding for the number of projects that Mozambique needs to implement to address the multiple challenges related with the violence.

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