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At first glance, Kenya and Tanzania, the scene of some of Al Qaida's most impressive attacks, would appear to be fertile ground for recruiting militants into the global Islamist jihad. Substantial Muslim populations, widespread poverty, poor policing, inadequate border control, and systemic political and economic corruption would seem to make these East African countries potentially rich environments in which to attract new Al Qaida members. However, other factors essential to the terrorist recruitment process are largely absent. Despite claims that the traditionally tolerant Muslim populations of Kenya and Tanzania re being radicalized, the evidence suggests that Islamist radicals have in fact made little headway. Although individuals may have forged links with Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden and his network have few followers. Of course, this is subject to change. But in the near term, absent an environment of radicalism, as in a major recruitment ground like Pakistan, it is difficult to see how Al Qaida can expect to attract more than a handful of new members. That said, the United States could do far more in the region to prevent the emergence of violent Islamist extremism.

Conditions in the East African countries of Kenya and Tanzania are ideal for conducting terrorist operations. American government officials have correctly characterized these countries as part of the "soft underbelly" of global terrorism.[1] Porous borders, pervasive corruption, and the lack of police capacity allow terrorists to move about freely, find safe haven, and establish logistical hubs. Small arms and other weapons are readily available on black markets.[2] A wealth of enticing American, British, and European "soft targets," such as large expatriate communities, tourist attractions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), make these countries attractive arenas for terrorist operations. Kenya shares a 420-mile border with Somalia, a lawless and disorderly "failed state" that is widely believed to be a terrorist safe haven. Kenya has been a venue for international terrorism since 1980, when a Palestinian Liberation Organization sympathizer bombed

a tourist hotel, killing 16 people.[3] In recent years, Al Qaida has been the international terrorist organization with the most significant presence in the region. In August 1998, Kenya and Tanzania were the scene of one of Al-Qaida's most audacious pre-9/11 operations, when terrorists carried out near-simultaneous suicide attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing 303 people and injuring more than 5,000.[4] In November 2002, near the coastal Kenyan city of Mombasa, terrorists fired surface-to-air missiles at an Israeli jet packed with passengers. Although the missiles missed the plane, a subsequent Al Qaida suicide bombing at a resort near Mombasa popular with Israeli tourists killed 15 people.[5] According to published accounts, Al Qaida has established "terror centers"[6] in the region, and as many as 10–15 terrorist "sleeper cells" are alleged to exist in Kenya today.[7] Some of the cells still appear to be active. In June 2003, for example, a terrorist suspect reportedly told Kenyan police interrogators that Al Qaida operatives were plotting to attack the U.S. embassy with an explosives-filled truck and an airplane carrying a bomb.[8]

But while Kenya and Tanzania are permissive environments for terrorist operations, logistics, and sanctuary, these countries are relatively unpromising recruitment grounds. At first glance, this claim seems counterintuitive. In addition to poor border security, inadequate policing, and widespread corruption, other factors might suggest that these countries are potentially rich environments for drawing in new Al Qaida members. Poverty is widespread, with more than 50 percent of Kenyans, and 36 percent of Tanzanians, living below the poverty line.[9] State institutions are weak, corrupt, and in some cases, non-existent. Indeed, Kenya and Tanzania, like many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, are little more than "politico-territorial entities,"[10] unable to meet their most basic obligations to their citizens. Muslims in both Kenya and Tanzania are largely excluded from political and economic power. What is more, a number of local Muslims were recruited into Al Qaida's global network during the 1990s, and some Kenyans and Tanzanians have been induced to perform logistical and other tasks. Finally, senior U.S. military officers have alleged that East African Muslims have been recruited to join the insurgency in Iraq.[11]

However, other factors essential to the terrorist recruitment process are largely absent in the region. Although some U.S. government officials claim that Islamic extremists from the Gulf States, South Asia, and the Middle East are radicalizing the traditionally tolerant Muslim populations of Kenya and Tanzania,[12] the evidence suggests that Islamist radicals have in fact made little headway.[13] Field research in Kenya and Tanzania during September 2003, which included extensive interviews with Muslim clerics, NGO representatives, political activists, journalists, government officials, and academics, as well as an analysis of press reports and academic studies, suggests that extremism has failed to take root in any substantial way. Although individuals may have forged links with Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden and his network have few followers. Of course, this is subject to change. But in the near term, absent an environment of radicalism, as in a major recruitment ground like Pakistan, it is difficult to see how Al Qaida can expect to attract more than a handful of new members.

This article is divided into three sections. First, it will examine terrorism's operational environment in Kenya and Tanzania, and highlight those factors, such as porous borders, weak security forces, and corruption, that make these countries attractive to members of bin Laden's network. Second, it will consider the potential for these countries to function as a recruitment pool for the network, arguing that this potential has been overstated. Finally, it will consider strategies for helping to ensure that Kenya and Tanzania do not become more substantial recruiting grounds for Al Qaida.

The Operational Environment

Al Qaida began establishing cells in East Africa during the early and mid-1990s and it was these cells that were responsible for the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies. Terrorism analysts speculate that security and intelligence agencies never entirely eliminated these cells, and that Nairobi- and Mombasa-based remnants were responsible for the November 2002 attacks on Israeli tourists.[14] Fazul Abdallah Mohamed, the Comoros-born mastermind of the embassy bombings, is widely considered responsible for the Mombasa attacks.[15] Like his fellow Mombasa and Nairobi co-conspirator, Ahmed Salim Swedan, Fazul was a product of Al Qaida training in Afghanistan.[16]

Despite being on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's highly publicized list of the 22 most wanted international terrorists, Fazul seems to have drawn no official scrutiny while living in the coastal town of Lamu near the Somali border. Under the alias "Abdul Karim," Fazul did what many Al Qaida operatives have done in Western Europe, North America, and other regions: He went to ground, lived quietly, taught at a madrassa, and married a local woman.[17] The introduction to his future wife was made by Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a so-called street preacher scheduled to be tried in 2004 in connection with the attacks near Mombasa.[18] Rogo, according to prosecutors, also harbored Fazul on Siyu Island in Lamu District between 2001 and 2003.[19] Long-time coastal residents suggest that this is the ideal way for a criminal or terrorist outsider to establish himself within the Muslim community. "We don't have the ability to vet people," said one Mombasa businessman:

> It is not for us to judge. If he is a Muslim, that is enough. You do need to be known, but if a husband brought in money, and said he was a business-man, not a lot of questions would be asked by a wife or her family. Even if there were suspicions, they would be that he is involved in drugs or smuggling, not terrorism. If a wife had suspicions about her husband, she would certainly not go to the police, but might talk to friends or relatives.[20]

In characteristic Al Qaida fashion, planning for the November 2002 attacks was protracted and meticulous, beginning in the aftermath of embassy bombings. According to a draft United Nations report, Fazul assembled a team along the coast, and established a small-scale lobster fishing business to provide cover for the group's activities.[21] A year before the attacks, some members of the group gathered in Mogadishu, Somalia, where they received ideological and weapons training, with locally purchased weapons. Later, a number of the terrorists returned to the Mombasa region, where they were joined by other elements from the network, and by the following April, the group had identified its targets and was conducting surveillance. Before the attacks, the group divided into four sub-groups, with one staying in Mogadishu, a second carrying out the suicide bombing of hotel near Mombasa, a third in Lamu preparing a boat for escape to Somalia, and a fourth, under Fazul's command, carrying out the failed missile attack on the airliner. The surviving members of the organization fled to Lamu and on to Mogadishu, although a number later returned to Kenya.[22] In August 2003, a suspect in the attacks, Feisal Ali Nassor, killed himself and a police officer when he detonated a grenade as he was being taken into custody. A subsequent raid on a Mombasa house yielded a weapons cache and ammunition, and confirmed to authorities that terrorist cells were still active in Kenya.[23]

These episodes reveal important aspects of the terrorist presence in Kenya. They also serve to illustrate significant features of the problem in Tanzania, where many of the same conditions prevail, although no significant international terrorism has occurred

there since 1998. Terrorists (as well as other illicit actors, such as drug traffickers and arms dealers), are able to move across borders freely, as demonstrated by the ability of Fazul and his co-conspirators to travel unimpeded from Kenya to Somalia and back again. Ancient trade routes extend as far as the Baluchi coast in Pakistan, and dhow traffic is almost entirely unmonitored.[24] A deeply entrenched "culture of smuggling" and many unpatrolled coves along the coast exacerbate the problem.[25] Larger ports, such as Mombasa's new port, appear to be tightly monitored, although less modern ones, such as those on Zanzibar, are completely open. Airport security, despite some U.S. assistance, remains lax, with paper records rather than computer terminals the norm. Rampant corruption at land border crossings, seaports, and airports further erodes the state's ability to control its borders.[26]

The events surrounding the 2002 attacks and their aftermath show profound weaknesses in Kenya's security forces. In the words of one foreign reporter, "there is no serious national police force."[27] The police lack real investigative capabilities, preferring instead to rely on torture, intimidation, and imprisonment to extract information.[28] Action against suspected terrorists often takes the form of mass arrests, such as "Operation Fagia" ("clean up") in Mombasa in August 2003, when as many as 1,000 people were taken into custody.[29] The most basic equipment, including computers and patrol cars, are virtually non-existent in both countries. Sheer incompetence is also a major problem, as demonstrated by the fact that a terrorism suspect was able to detonate a grenade while being taken into custody, suggesting that police had neither searched nor handcuffed him. In Kenya, there is little uniformed police presence, even in the capital, although in Tanzania, policemen are more visible. In general, however, the Tanzanian police appear to suffer from many of the same shortcomings as those evident in Kenya.[30]

According to one local official in Mombasa, "security is the public's responsibility. We can't be everywhere."[31] However, the police in both countries are widely hated and feared, and in the view of much of the public, any encounter with law enforcement officers is likely to be unpleasant at best. "If we saw bad people, we wouldn't go to the police," noted a representative of a Muslim NGO on Zanzibar.[32]

Finally, recent terrorist activity calls into question the ability of Kenya's intelligence agency, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) to identify, monitor, and disrupt terrorist operations. Modeled on Britain's Secret Intelligence Service ("MI6"), the NSIS is far more capable than the police, both operationally and analytically, according to one U.S. official in Nairobi.[33] However, other observers suggest that the NSIS has changed little since the days of President Daniel arap Moi, when its principal mission was spying on his regime's political opponents. "They had the ability to spy on people they knew,"observes one foreign correspondent, adding that he thought it was unlikely that the country's ethnically Bantu, Christian, and non-Arabic leadership had any real understanding of the Muslim community.[34] According to one Kenyan columnist, the NSIS has "virtually no human intelligence sources . . . within the established terrorist networks. . . . Our small economy cannot afford that expense. We will have to rely on the intelligence gathered by friendly agencies."[35]

The Recruitment Pool

If terrorism were simply a function of a lack of state capacity, corruption, poverty, and a sizeable Muslim population, Kenya and Tanzania would be extremely promising countries for Islamic terrorist recruitment.[36] However, although some local Muslims have been recruited to assist in terrorist operations *within* the region, few appear to have been enlisted to serve outside the region in Al Qaida's global insurgency. Swedan, for ex-

ample, left his hometown of Mombasa to receive religious instruction in Pakistan. He returned a religious extremist, with a long beard and "Pakistani" dress, and began attending the radical Sakina mosque in Mombasa.[37] Although an "international" terrorist by the U.S. definition, his most important terrorist activities have been within the East Africa region. Interviews with well-informed local observers turned up no evidence of Tanzanians or Kenyans who have left their countries to travel to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, or any other jihadist destinations. Finally, it should be noted that even some of the Kenyans and Tanzanians who have participated in regional terrorist operations, and provided logistical and other support, appear to have done so unwittingly.[38]

Virtually any country in the world has *some* potential as a recruitment pool, as illustrated by the "Lackawanna Six" and John Walker Lindh, all of whom are American citizens. A substantial pool, on the other hand, requires at least three elements: (1) a lack of state capacity, particularly in the areas of police, intelligence, and law enforcement; (2) a "mobilizing belief," such as Salafist/jihadist extremism; and (3) "appropriate agitators" who can propagate these ideas and create an effective terrorist force.[39] Both Kenya and Tanzania clearly meet the first and third conditions. However, an appropriate mobilizing belief is not present in either country—or more precisely, it has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of Muslims, including those for whom such an ideology might most appeal, such as young, theological conservatives who profess a deep hatred of U.S. foreign policy.

Contrary to the claims of some journalists, radical Islam is not gaining ground in Kenya or Tanzania.[40] In the former, anti-American sermons are preached on Fridays at the Jamia mosque and other places of worship in Nairobi's Eastleigh neighborhood, and anti-American articles appear frequently in the country's Muslim press. At the same time, however, the extremist Wahabbi ideology that was spreading in Kenya during the 1980s and early 1990s appears to be in decline. According to one moderate cleric based in Mombasa, a reputed hotbed of Muslim extremism:

> In the past, 30 [local] people a year used to go to Saudi Arabia to study, but maybe five a year go now. [The extremists] used to send youths to the mosques to abuse our imams, but not any more. We know all the extremists by name, and we can count them on two hands. . . . Out of the 200 mosques [in Mombasa], maybe five could be considered extremist.[41]

A similar decline in extremism is evident in Tanzania. Journalists have painted an alarming picture of Islam in that country, alleging that 30 mosques in the capital are "under radical control,"[42] that fundamentalists in Zanzibar have "begun bombing bars and beating women who go out without being fully covered,"[43] and that a clandestine Islamic organization, *Simba wa Mungu* ("God's Lion") is carrying out attacks against moderate Muslims and foreigners.[44] In fact, other Tanzanian and foreign observers have failed to confirm the existence of such an organization, and suggested that the attacks on bars and tourists were in fact acts of reprisal spurred on by neighbors complaining of noise and rowdiness.[45] As in Kenya, promoters of Wahabbism have alienated local Muslims, 75 percent of whom identify themselves as Sufis, a traditionally tolerant Islamic sect. "They [the extremists] are trying to disturb people's minds," noted a Muslim NGO representative, who added that the Saudis seemed only interested in building mosques. "We don't need more mosques, we've already got 50 in Stone Town," he said.[46] Anti-American demonstrations during U.S. military operations in Iraq have been rare and sparsely attended, with the largest drawing fewer than 1,000 people. That said, anti-Western Islamic firebrands, such as Ponda issa Ponda, secretary of the Committee for

Muslim Rights in Tanzania, have frequently clashed with authorities, and extremist mosques, such as Mwembe Chai in Dar es Salaam, continue to attract followers, although they are far fewer than press accounts have suggested.[47] Interestingly, the radical preaching that does occur is primarily theological in nature, with little discussion of political topics, as would be typical in an Egyptian or Saudi mosque.[48]

Mitigation Strategies

Although extremist strands of Islam have failed to gain substantial numbers of converts in Kenya and Tanzania, the experience of other countries, such as Nigeria, suggest that previously tolerant communities can become radicalized.[49] Such radicalization, it has been argued, is a necessary part of the environment for large-scale recruitment into the international jihadist movement. Muslims in both Kenya and Tanzania are acutely aware of their political marginalization, and many frequently complain that the "global war on terrorism" is a rationale for religious persecution. "We were better off under British colonial rule," according to one Muslim activist in Mombasa.[50] Heavy-handed government attacks on Muslim communities, the lack of economic opportunity, and growing political frustration may in the future prove to be more fertile material for exploitation by terrorist recruiters.

Forestalling these developments will require major changes in Kenyan and Tanzanian political, social, and economic structures, policies, and programs. Although the United States should encourage and support serious reform, it is unlikely that Washington will be able to bring about fundamental change. Only Kenyans and Tanzanians will be able to resolve such pressing problems as the exclusion of Muslims from political and economic power.

In the meantime, however, the United States can take some steps to dampen the appeal of violent Islamic extremism. Sadly, the sophisticated apparatus the United States and its allies created during the Cold War for waging political warfare and the "war of ideas" was dismantled.[51] Only in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 have policymakers begun to think seriously about how public diplomacy, propaganda, and information operations can be used in a strategic way against Al Qaida and its affiliates. As a first step, the United States should recognize that in Kenya and Tanzania, as in other parts of the Muslim world, violent extremists have antagonized local populations. As part of a campaign to delegitimize jihadist ideology, the United States should help local adversaries of extremism find public forums for their views by supporting print and electronic media, cultural festivals, and academic institutions.

An even more pressing challenge in Kenya and Tanzania—indeed in most of the developing world—is the gross inadequacy of the police and other security services. Thirty years of counterterrorism experience in North America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America have shown that the police are indispensable components in any effective counterterrorism campaign. In Kenya and Tanzania, the police are unable, and in some cases, unwilling, to provide even the most rudimentary public safety services to the public. Serious crimes, including murder, typically go unsolved.[52] Shortfalls in basic equipment is a continuing challenge, although a larger obstacle is a lack of professionalism, training, honesty, and community presence. Police in Muslim communities are typically Christian, and in conservative districts such as Lamu, their tendency to drink and disregard other local customs and standards has thoroughly alienated local populations.[53] Given such practices, and a widespread reputation for brutality and corruption, it seems unlikely that the police are an effective antiterrorism force. The United

States supports specialized antiterrorism forces in both countries, although they remain undermanned, poorly equipped, and lacking in investigative capabilities. In Kenya, for example, the police antiterrorism unit's "strategic plan" consists of nothing more than a "wish list" of equipment, and many members of the unit are "over-the-hill" officers nearing retirement.[54] Although a sophisticated and specialized antiterrorism unit is obviously desirable, the United States would be better served by working to professionalize and modernize conventional police forces.[55]

Finally, gathering sufficient intelligence about Al Qaida recruitment and other terrorist activities in the region remains a formidable challenge. In much of the world, the U.S. intelligence community relies on two primary means for gathering intelligence: (1) American and allied signals intelligence (SIGINT) and other technical means, and (2), information provided by friendly local intelligence services.[56] Whether SIGINT is adequate to provide an understanding of the Al Qaida threat is beyond the scope of this article. However, as suggested in earlier sections, depending on Kenyan and Tanzanian agencies for timely, accurate, and usable information is problematical. As with any nations, these two countries are likely to "filter" any information they have gathered through their foreign policy priorities and interests. Thus, the United States is likely to receive a distorted (or a least partial) picture, at least some of the time. A bigger problem in dealing with the Kenyan and Tanzanian services involves their lack of intelligence capacity. Given the Muslim–Christian divide in these countries, a chronic lack of resources, and the focus these services have traditionally had on identifying, monitoring, and disrupting anti-regime dissent, it seems unlikely that either nation has intelligence agencies of the size, skill, and resources necessary to understand and track Al Qaida recruitment.[57]

To address this shortfall, the United States should consider strengthening the intelligence capabilities of both countries. Since the birth of the modern American intelligence community in the late 1940s, Washington has had long experience in building the capacity of friendly security intelligence services.[58] At the same time, U.S. policymakers must assume that significant local gaps are likely to remain, and that the United States must be prepared to mount its own unilateral clandestine collection operations. Important areas requiring attention include the following:

- *The extremist presence in Muslim communities*: These communities, including those along the coast, which include many Muslims of Arab and South Asian ancestry, are largely closed to non-Muslim outsiders, and thus remain largely opaque. A network of undercover operatives who are able to deeply entrench themselves within these areas are essential for developing a fuller understanding of Al Qaida activities in the region.[59]
- *Subversion by extremists*: By definition, terrorists carry out, or threaten, politically motivated violent acts against noncombatants. At the same time, terrorists also typically engage in a range of nonviolent or less-violent acts designed to destabilize governments. These include the use of front groups, strikes, propaganda, and the suborning or corruption of political leaders, police and other government officials. Such subversion is likely to be taking place in this region (and in others where Al Qaida operates), but today, there is little systematic understanding of the nature of this threat and what might be done to counter it.
- *Border control*: Finally, the inability of local authorities to control the movement of people into or out of these countries remains a major counterterrorism gap. Developing the networks described earlier will help address the problem, but it is

unlikely to be enough. Here, U.S. technology, such as unattended ground sensors (UGS) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is likely to prove useful.

Conclusion

In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Edmund Burke famously described the republic's revolutionary ethos as an "armed doctrine" designed to foster revolution across the European continent. The extremism propagated by bin Laden and his circle, and their ideological comrades in the broader Muslim world, is a twenty-first century descendant of this armed doctrine—universalistic in its ambitions, violent in its operations, and implacable in its hostility to its adversaries. Fortunately, this salafist/jihadist ideology has so far failed to take root in Kenya and Tanzania, and as a result, these countries have not proven to be particularly fertile ground for recruitment to the global jihad.

However, Kenya and Tanzania may prove to be more promising Al Qaida recruitment targets in the future. Thwarting this will require broad political, social, and economic reforms within the two countries, and the much greater inclusion of Muslims in civic and economic life. Preventing the emergence of Kenya and Tanzania as recruitment pools—and thwarting terrorist activities more generally in the region—will also require a new U.S. approach to counterterrorism assistance. Contrary to the claims of some of its critics, the Bush administration has hardly underplayed the terrorist threat in Kenya, Tanzania, or the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.[60] The Bush administration's East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), announced in June 2003, will provide $100 million in new assistance to the region to strengthen border security, combat terrorist financing, and enhance aviation security.[61] Yet much more needs to be done, particularly with respect to conventional "cop-on-the-beat" law enforcement, which remains grossly inadequate in both countries. Without professional, modern police forces committed to public service and respected by all sectors of society, Kenya and Tanzania will remain part of the "soft underbelly" of the global campaign against Al Qaida.

Notes

1. See, for example, testimony of former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, *Africa and the War on Terrorism*, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 November 2001, p. 11.

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], *Strategic Survey 2002/3: An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs* (London: IISS, 2003), p. 332.

3. "International Terrorists Target Kenya," *East Africa Standard*, 28 November 2002.

4. For an overview of the August 1998 attacks, see Jane Corbin, *The Base: Al-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror* (London: Pocket Books, 2003), pp. 72–85.

5. Office of the Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2003), p. 5.

6. "African Victims of Jihadism: Sudan, Nigeria, and the East Coast," Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 24 December 2002. Available at (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=157584&attrib_id=7451).

7. Ambrose Murunga, "We're Not Yet Ready to Fight Terrorism," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 17 June 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (abbreviated hereafter as FBIS).

8. Aidan Hartley, "Now the U.S. Backs its Old Enemies," *Spectator* (London), 15 November 2003; and testimony of Karl Wycoff, , State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa,

1 April 2004. Available at (http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/Wyc040104.htm). (Abbreviated hereafter as Wycoff testimony).

9. Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], *World Factbook 2003*. Available at (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html#Econ); and (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tz.html#Econ).

10. Richard Joseph, "Africa: States in Crisis," *Journal of Democracy* 14(3) (July 2003), p. 161.

11. Brigadier General Mastin Robeson, commander, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, quoted in "Anti-Terror Team Touts Progress in Iraq," *New York Daily News*, 25 November 2003.

12. See, for example, "Workshop on Regional and Sub-Regional Counterterrorism Strategies," Aspen Wye River Conference Center, 27–28 February 2003.

13. For more on contemporary Islamist extremism and its violent manifestations, see Maha Azzam, "Al-Qaeda: The Misunderstood Wahhabi Connection and the Ideology of Violence," Royal Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper No. 1, February 2003; and Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), particularly chapter 9.

14. IISS, *Strategic Survey 2002/3,* p. 332.

15. See for example Desmond Butler, "5-Year Hunt Fails to Net Qaeda Suspect in Africa," *New York Times*, 14 June 2003, p. 1.

16. Interview with U.S. government official, Nairobi, 15 September 2003; and Andrew England, "Investigators Believe Suspect in Nov. 28 Attacks on Kenyan Coast Was Connected to the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings," *Associated Press Worldstream*, 23 March 2003.

17. George Wright, "The 'Master Terrorist' Who Sparked Kenya Alert," *Guardian* (London), 16 May 2003.

18. Alisha Ryu, "Kenya Charges 4 with Murder in November Terror Attacks, *VOA* [Voice of America] *News*, 24 June 2003. Available at (http://www.voa.com).

19. "Man Accused of Harbouring Terrorist Appears Before Nairobi Court," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 12 April 2003, FBIS.

20. Author's interview, Mombasa, 19 September 2003.

21. Draft report of the [UN] Panel of Experts in Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1474 (2003), n.d. [2003], p. 53.

22. Ibid., pp. 53–54. The terrorists fired Soviet-made SA-7b GRAIL surface-to-air missiles at the airliner. Steel gas cylinders loaded with ammonium nitrate were used to bomb the hotel; traces of either TNT or RDX explosives were also found on the scene. Ibid., pp. 53, 57.

23. "Weapons Seized in Mombasa Confirm Breakthrough in Terror," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 13 August 2003, FBIS.

24. Author's interview with journalist, Nairobi, 14 September 2003.

25. Matthew Rosenberg, "Smuggling, Bribery Along Kenya's Coast Gives al-Qaida and Opening to Get Weapons, Kenyan, U.S. Officials Say," Associated Press, 28 November 2003.

26. Author's interview with Muslim activist, Mombasa, 20 September 2003.

27. Author's interview, Nairobi, 14 September 2003.

28. Author's interview with academic, Nairobi, 15 September 2003.

29. "Courts Fine About 300 People Arrested in Police Swoop in Mombasa," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 2 September 2003, FBIS.

30. Author's interview with U.S. government official, Dar es Salaam, 22 September 2003.

31. Author's interview, 19 September, 2003.

32. Author's interview, Stone Town, Zanzibar, 24 September 2003.

33. Author's interview, 15 September 2003.

34. Author's interview, Nairobi, 16 September 2003.

35. Ambrose Murunga, "We're Not Yet Ready to Fight Terrorism," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 17 June 2003.

36. Estimates of the Muslim populations in these countries vary. The U.S. government places the Kenyan Muslim population at 8 percent, although many local Muslims claim the figure is actually 30–50 percent. CIA, *World Factbook 2003*. Available at (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html#People); and "East African Muslims and the 11th September Crisis,"

Mambo! The Newsletter of the French Institute for Research in Africa (Nairobi III(1) (2002), p. 4. In Tanzania, 35 percent of the population is Muslim. *World Factbook 2003*. Available at (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tz.html#People).

37. Author's interview with Mombasa business owner, 19 September 2003.

38. Author's interview with Kenyan NGO representative, Nairobi, 15 September 2003.

39. The second two components are taken from Stefan Mair, "Terrorism and Africa," *African Security Review* 12(1) (2003), pp. 107–108.

40. See, for example, Gørill Husby, "Islam Gains Ground in East Africa," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 2003, pp. 30–31. For more nuanced accounts of Islam in the region, see Arye Oded, *Islam and Politics in Kenya* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), particularly chapter 14; and Abdin Chande, "Radicalism and Reform in East Africa," in Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels (eds.), *The History of Islam in Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000), pp. 349–369.

41. Author's interview, Mombasa, 18 September 2003.

42. Maalim Bassaleh, "Muslims Not Fighting Christians But With the Government," *Nasaha* (Dar es Salaam), 24 September 2003, FBIS.

43. Lisa Beyer, "Saudi Arabia: Inside the Kingdom," *Time*, 15 September 2003, p. 50.

44. Husby, "Islam Gains Ground," p. 30.

45. Author's interviews in Dar es Salaam and Stone Town, 22–24 September 2003.

46. Author's interview, Stone Town, 24 September 2003.

47. "Tanzanian, U.S. Security Agents Reportedly Arrest Two Prominent Muslim Leaders," *Nasha* (Dar es Salaam), 14 May 2003, FBIS. However, according to one Tanzanian religious official, Ponda is "connected" with *Simba wa Mungu*. Author's interview, Dar es Salaam, 22 September, 2003.

48. Author's interview with NGO representative, Stone Town, 24 September 2003.

49. Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, "Africa and the War on Terror," *RUSI Journal* 148(5) (October 2003), p. 13.

50. Author's interview, 20 September 2003.

51. For a discussion of the serious gaps in America's public diplomacy capabilities, Council on Foreign Relations, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 18 September 2003); and Carnes Lord, "Psychological-Political Instruments," in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (eds.), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004).

52. Matthew Rosenberg, "Slow Progress in Kenya Investigation Shows Difficulties Facing Police," Associated Press, 30 November 2002.

53. Author's interviews with foreign journalist, Nairobi, 14 September.

54. Interview with U.S. official, Nairobi, 17 September 2003. The United States has supplied $3.1 million in antiterrorism assistance to Kenya since 1998.

55. A modest "police development program" designed to impart basic law enforcement skills has been underway in Tanzania since 2002, although nothing comparable is being done in Kenya. Wycoff testimony.

56. Evan Thomas and Mark Hosenball, "Moving Targets," *Newsweek*, 1 December 2003.

57. Counterterrorism, while obviously a pressing concern for the United States, is likely to remain a relatively low budget priority for these countries. Jonathan Stevenson, "Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance," *Survival* 45(4) (Winter 2003-04), p. 157.

58. For more on this point, see William Rosenau, "The Eisenhower Administration, U.S. Foreign Internal Security Assistance, and the Struggle for the Developing World, 1954–1961," *Low-Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 10(3) (Autumn 2001); and William Rosenau, "The Kennedy Administration, U.S. Foreign Internal Security Assistance, and the Challenge of 'Subterranean War,' 1961–1963," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* (forthcoming, 2004).

59. The model here is the Israeli *Mist'aravim*, the undercover detachments used by that country's internal security service, Shin Bet.

60. See, for example, Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2004), p. 86.

61. Wycoff testimony.