Reintegration of Al-Shabaab's Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful Reintegration

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Abstract

This article attempts to examine an issue regarding the reintegration of disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants in Somalia. Nowadays, some countries have undergone current generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), known as third-generation DDR; in the Somali context, although DDR is designed to disengage and rehabilitate defectors of Al-Shabaab for their reintegration into society, in practice, its implementation is not preceded by conventional approaches to conventional DDR, and it has suffered from various problems and contradictions. Previous research and information on the subject are extremely limited, due to a severe security situation. Accordingly, the author conducted interviews in Somalia in 2016 and 2019 with disengaged combatants and community members, to examine conditions necessary for good reintegration. The findings of the interviews revealed a gap in understanding between ex-combatants and members of the community, which significantly undermines the prospect of successful reintegration. A detailed analysis of the findings firstly shows that two problems exist regarding rehabilitation: a lack of knowledge, and an absence of accountability and transparency; secondly, further associated problems, such as severe unemployment, unstable security, financial difficulty, and distrust of the current government, which has devastating consequences for reintegration.

Author Bio(s)

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By virtue of the changing nature of conflict in the world, approaches to conflict resolution have been transforming, to become more diversified and complicated. In this context, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), a significant element in the transitional phase (Muggah, 2006), has been developed to respond to various types of conflict and armed groups. As researchers and international organizations such as Muggah and O'Donnell (2015), Piedmont (2015), and the International Organization for Migration (2019) describe, there have been three generations of DDR: the first occurred in the wake of the Cold War, in the era of state-building; the second was borne out of the failure of DDR in Haiti, in the era of development; and the third has been developed in an era of radicalization. These generations have dealt with violent extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, in a field where there are no preconditions such as peace agreements and minimum security, which are required to implement conventional DDR.

Third-generation DDR is usually called for in the context of situations that involve counter-terrorist action and measures for countering violent extremism (CVE). Also, another notable feature is that this type of DDR is usually implemented in a fragile state, which has suffered from conflict, corruption, and a lack of capacity. This new type of DDR is aimed primarily at the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants in an active theatre of conflict with a violent extremist group, in which such ex-combatants were involved in the past; it has become a topic of serious discussion in the United Nations (UN) since the Evolving Operational Perspectives on Armed Group Management and Violence Reduction Workshop took place in Oslo in April 2014. Nevertheless, due to a severe lack of research, and no guidelines on how to approach

third-generation DDR, almost all new DDR programs are facing various practical problems and theoretical contradictions on the ground.

This article focuses on third-generation DDR in Somalia, which is regarded as a litmus test by the UN (Felbab-Brown, 2015a). It reveals obstacles to reintegration in this country, and examines what is necessary to establish a successful reintegration in the current DDR situation there, using qualitative interviews with disengaged combatants and people in the local community. The structure of this article is arranged as follows: first, it reviews third-generation DDR, followed by an explanation of the research design, and background information on DDR in Somalia. Next, the results of the interviews are presented, pointing out the serious gap between ex-combatants and community, which will then be incorporated into an analysis of the causes, lack of knowledge, accountability, and transparency of that gap. Accordingly, this paper will widen the scope of analysis on the topic to include surrounding problems, such as severe unemployment, security and financial limitations, and distrust of the Somali government, which have a negative influence on the prospects of reintegration.

Third-generation DDR

DDR has a long history, as there have been at least 60 DDR programs in the world since the late 1980s (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). In first-generation DDR, which happened in the 1980s, former combatants were the sole area of focus, because the structure of conflict was simple, and there was a relatively firm top-down command structure. However, since around the beginning of the 1990s, modes of conflict have been changing dramatically (Duyvesteyn & Angstrom, 2005). New conflicts, known as new wars (Kaldor, 2013), are usually civil wars in which the boundaries between combatants and civilians, and conflict and post-conflict, are not clearly defined, and severe damage is inflicted upon civilians in comparison with conventional warfare. Along with such a change in modes of conflict, DDR underwent an evolution in the

second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015; Piedmont, 2015) to be more comprehensive and flexible with more diverse and different types of activities (Piedmont, 2015; Stankovic & Torjesen, 2010). Second-generation DDR emphasises communities affected by violence (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010) to deal with various problems on the ground and successfully achieve reintegration.

In such a second-generation DDR period, the study of DDR began full scale, followed by the establishment of a global guideline on DDR. In 2006, an inter-agency working group composed of 15 international organizations published the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which is the global norm on DDR, incorporating lessons learned from past DDR programs around the world. The IDDRS highlights the importance of a people-centered approach, as well as an integrated approach emphasizing reintegration, and proposes a set of conditions which should be secured before the initiation of DDR: conclusion of a peace agreement; trust in a peace process; willingness; and minimum security (United Nations, 2006a). In IDDRS, there are three different approaches to reintegration: "short-term stabilization," "reintegration focused on ex-combatants," and "community-based reintegration (CBR)" (United Nations, 2006b).

In some current DDR programs, however, the framework and reintegration approaches to IDDRS have become inadequate (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015; Piedmont, 2015). Such DDR programs are essential in an active conflict involving new types of violent extremist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and Boko Haram, to disengage and rehabilitate members, and subsequently, to achieve their reintegration into society. Currently, this new method of DDR has started to be called "new generation DDR," or "third-generation DDR." It is true that there were some violent extremist groups in second-generation DDR, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sierra Leone,

but the purpose of spoilers in third-generation DDR, such as Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, is not only to replace current authority, but also to change it to a new form that cannot exist within the current world system (Fink, 2015). Also, in previous versions of DDR, it was considered that there was only a remote possibility of realizing reintegration during a conflict, unless a whole spoiler group ceased their activities (Torjesen, 2013), but whole groups are active, and also, security is limited with no peace agreements in situations of third-generation DDR. Additionally, third-generation DDR usually puts politics at the center, and consequently, it is typically integrated with a national policy of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE), which shows that the current generation of DDR has now become established in a wider geo-political agenda than previous generations (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015).

In this context of third-generation DDR, it is difficult to use the three reintegration approaches of IDDRS, simply because they are supposed to be implemented in a post-conflict context with necessary preconditions. These approaches also regard the main problem of reintegration as the threat of ex-combatants; in third-generation DDR, however, the threat to ex-combatants and the community are further critical problems (International Organization for Migration, 2019). Moreover, while IDDRS usually requires the same content for all participants, based on the principle of non-discrimination, the content of third-generation DDR, namely rehabilitation, needs to be tailored to an individual context (Felbab-Brown, 2015b; Fink, 2015). In addition, one of the major ideas in the reintegration phase of previous generation DDR, which allowed ex-combatants to join a national army, is not an optimum solution when a conflict is active, as the purpose of DDR is contradicted by returning ex-fighters to the battlefield (Felbab-Brown, 2015a). On November 19, 2019, after more than two years of revision, the United Nations released the revised IDDRS, but it only shows the reintegration support that needs to be done without preconditions, while complementing

DDR-related peacebuilding activities: Even now a clear method to achieve this generation's reintegration is inadequate.

Research Design and Methodology

In spite of the importance of research on third-generation DDR, little study has been done on it. Essentially, there is no one size fits all approach (Fink & Hearne, 2008; Silke, 2014), so it is necessary to conduct a case study in each instance. Although reports by practitioners of DDR in Somalia, such as the International Organization for Migration (2019) and Khalil et al. (2019) have been published this year, detailed and critical case studies on new approaches to DDR in Somalia are limited to the report of Felbab-Brown (2015a), due to difficulties in security and sensitivity.

In order to obtain such information and consider the conditions necessary to accomplish successful reintegration in third-generation DDR in Somalia, the author conducted fieldwork in the Somalian cities of Mogadishu and Baidoa in July 2016 and April 2019, with the support of the DDR team of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). In the course of this project, the author conducted a total of 47 interviews with 10 disengaged combatants, 20 people from local communities, 8 UN officials from UNSOM and the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), 6 Somali government officials, and 3 private practitioners involved in the program in Mogadishu. The author, however, was requested by the Somali government's director of the program to anonymize individuals, institutions, and donors related to the rehabilitation center in Mogadishu. Accordingly, this research will not reveal the names of the individuals involved in the program, given the possible risks to them in Somalia.

In considering a concrete, detailed method of proceeding smoothly from rehabilitation to reintegration, the feelings and views of community members designated to accept ex-combatants in the reintegration phase are vital. This micro-level area has typically been ignored because many scholars, such as Humphreys and

Weinstein (2007), and Muggah and O'Donnell (2015), have adopted a macro-level standpoint, based on a statistical and socio-economic perspective.

On this point, this paper employs the grounded theory (GT) approach as its analysis framework. Grounded theory is crucial to establish a tentative theory about a social matter which is new and is not analysed with multi-tiered aspects (Glaser & Strauss, 2017). Because GT is flexible, it is suggested that a piece of research needs to arrange GT to frame a research question and a matter (Charmaz, 2014). Accordingly, this research set the research question, what are the feelings and recognitions of disengaged combatants and community members about the reintegration of Al-Shabaab disengaged combatants in Somalia?, to identify the necessities for reintegration in the third-generation DDR in Somalia. The data for this analysis was collected with semi-structured interviews with disengaged combatants in rehabilitation centers, and local community members.

The GT process in this research starts by slicing the qualitative interview data, followed by generative coding and categorizing to check the themes and variations in the data. Then, based on the codebook, this paper analyzes the matter and establishes a theory for the research question. By the nature of GT, in which the important point is to have a theoretical saturation, not just number of samples, in terms of sampling in this analysis, this paper reached saturation after interviews with 10 disengaged combatants and 20 local community members.

With regard to the disengaged combatants, given the security issue and the relationships between donors and institutions involved in DDR, five combatants were selected from a rehabilitation center in Mogadishu, which was well-regarded by the government of Somalia and donor bodies, and five from a center in Baidoa, which was well-regarded by UN authorities. Interviewees were selected by the author, based on their age and length of participation in the program. With regard to gender, almost all

participants in third-generation DDR in Somalia are male. Thus, this research focused on male participants. Given the possible problems and risks during a qualitative interview (Flick, 2009; Foddy, 1994), and the nature of rehabilitation, the author conducted interviews individually in a separate, private room. The interview began with an explanation of the purpose of the interview, anonymity, and the absence of harm to the participants; questions on sensitive areas, such as reasons for joining Al-Shabaab, were avoided, so as not to create tension. Also, with a view to encouraging the participants to concentrate on the questions and understand them, the interviews were structured in a way that kept appointments short, and avoided a completely open-ended question style. Furthermore, taking into account that building rapport is important to accomplishing a successful qualitative interview (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006; Flick, 2009), and also that only a single explanation of informed consent is insufficient (Bartunek & Louis, 1996), the author had an informal discussion in the Somali language with participants before commencing each interview, and also included an explanation of informed consent at the beginning and the end. In addition, to avoid bias by interpreters (Mehra, 2002), the author requested individuals who were not directly related to the problems under discussion to interpret each conversation in Somali.

In terms of interviews with community members, considering the fact that community as a term is an abstract concept that has been neglected in social science (Plant, 1978), and also that the places which disengaged combatants return to are diverse and dangerous, the author focused on the City Palace Hotel as an interview location. Situated in the Abdiaziz district in the southeast of Mogadishu, which is one of the most popular districts for local residents, this hotel is a popular place for local people to have coffee. Interviews were conducted in the public area of the hotel, with the security support of the government DDR team. In terms of sampling, participants were selected by the author based on their age and gender. Also, in order to gain an

accurate understanding of the feelings among community members, only those who had been resident in the district for at least three years were selected. In addition to the above-mentioned points about an interview method, the author clearly distinguished between "you" and the "community" when addressing interviewees, to enable an understanding of their feelings on issues as individuals, and as community members.

Using qualitative data from interviews with these two types of participants, this article will attempt to define the gap between disengaged combatants and community members. Subsequently, using as reference other interviews conducted under normal conditions, and relevant literature, it will consider the conditions necessary to accomplish successful reintegration through third-generation DDR in Somalia. It should be noted, however, that there are some limitations to this research methodology. First, the qualitative interviews in this research were primarily focused on feelings and thoughts about reintegration. As such, it is hard to cover macro-level points, such as overall perspectives and trends regarding DDR in Somalia. Second, due to strict security, it was not possible to visit two other centers in Belet Wayne and Kismayo, as well as to visit each of the communities that the ex-combatants were to return to; accordingly, the result of maximizing differences (Norman & Yvonna, 2005) among sample participants was not perfect. Third, in addition to current security alerts in Somalia, because the author can understand the same trends in interviews with the disengaged combatants in 2016 in recent research data of the International Organization for Migration (2019) and Khalil et al. (2019), the author did not have interviews with them in 2019. Having taken such limitations into account, fieldwork was conducted to achieve the aims of this research.

Current DDR in Somalia

With the history of DDR for warlord militias in Somalia's civil war since the late 1990s, the new generation DDR started in 2012 as the national disengaged combatants

program. The purpose of the program is the rehabilitation of disengaged combatants, and their reintegration, to thereby accelerate the further defection of members from Al-Shabaab, which is the most powerful and notorious Islamic extremist group in the conflict in Somalia (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, July 2016 and April 2019). According to government officials and UN officials on the ground, there are currently three rehabilitation centers: the center in Mogadishu is funded by a donor government and operated by a private development company which is commissioned by the donor government. By comparison, centers in Baidoa and Kismayo are operated by an international organization and regional government authorities, such as Somalia's regional intelligence agency.

The subjects of the rehabilitation program are low-risk Somali defectors, who are assessed and assigned to it by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Assessment for the program involves an interview investigation, which takes anything from one hour to one day to establish the history and content of the activities of Al-Shabaab defectors, their clan, family, personal identification details, and existence of any criminal record (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019). In 2014, some individuals of the UN and the media pointed out the fact that there were many children involved, and that Somali government intelligence authorities were utilizing them as informants to identify Al-Shabaab members (Felbab-Brown, 2015a; Sieff, 2016a). After much criticism over this issue, all children are now being sent to the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, a famous local NGO, with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019). In addition, the relationship between the rehabilitation team in Mogadishu and the UN authorities has been strained due to a confrontation over the meaning of the program and the method of its implementation, which has involved the concealment of information on the program in Mogadishu.

However, access to the center has been improving, and currently, UN workers are able to access the facility and program (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019).

The period of participation in the rehabilitation program depends on the individual and may last from one month to two years (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019). Its basic content includes vocational training in trades such as carpentry, welding, electrical and mechanical work, masonry and sewing; there is also teaching, covering primary and secondary education, including civic education, literacy, numeracy, and business; it also involves religious re-education as a deradicalizations measure, and counselling. In the exit phase, participants are comprehensively reviewed in terms of their completion of some conditions for release, such as education and vocational training, self-willing, and medical health, and are sometimes tested on proper Islam by using the Qur'an (Author, interview with Somali government officials in Mogadishu, April 2019).

Interviews with Disengaged Combatants

Interviews with disengaged combatants first showed that there was some dissatisfaction about restrictions on meeting family members, such as wives and children. For example, Abdi, 29 years old, insisted his distress that *"Here I cannot meet with family. (…). Very hard to go out and meet with family member here. (…) Of course, I miss them. I need to meet with them as soon as possible."* Notwithstanding this, all interviewees were generally satisfied with the rehabilitation program. In terms of its content, practical vocational training in particular, in areas such as mechanical fitting, sewing and carpentry, was to their satisfaction, as was basic education in areas such as literacy and numeracy. Adu, 21 years old, stated that *"I was second (school) level. I take second-level class and tailoring. (…). Now I am studying them hardly everyday."* He also said, *"Yes, Satisfy, really ok now (…) In future, I want to go to university. (…) I*

want to study Islam in university. (…) Any university is ok. I want to study more.”

It can be said that none of the interviewees had negative feelings over leaving such a complete rehabilitation facility; their feelings were rather optimistic. Based on their expression and tone of voice, they had huge expectations for leaving the center and returning to their communities. One of the examples is Saku, 37 years old, who said that *“Yes, they are ok, good. No trouble with them (…). We chat every day with them. (…) I am ready to leave already. Everything will be very ok. Now I’m just waiting that day.”* Tikniko, 22 years old, also said that *“Very good. Leave here, I feel happiness. Good life waits me. It’s better than here. I’m going to be happy. (…) No fear. It is positive. God willing! I can make it sure. (…) I can go now.”*

Disengaged combatants in the rehabilitation program firmly believed that their life after release would definitely be good; they showed a tendency to want to return to the towns and communities where they had lived before joining Al-Shabaab. Their intentions following the program were to work in businesses, or continue with further education, for example, through undertaking studies at university level. This showed that they had a tendency to want to continue with and develop their favorite areas of training in the program.

Regarding their feelings about the communities that they were to return to, all interviewees had enormous confidence and an expectation that they would be accepted, although, conversely, two interviewees expressed fear and anxiety over their treatment when returning to their communities. In their responses at the time, many interviewees used the word “believe” to express their confidence without any hesitation. Bashir, 18 years old, showed his confidence that *“Reintegration is ok. No problem. I can do reintegration. (…) There is my family, friends, many. They wait me long time. They know my return to there, and I talked with them. (…) Yeah they were happy for me.”* Additionally, words from Hussein, 22 years old, were that *“I’m not Al-Shabaab now.*

Yes, I believe. I will explain, and they will accept me." He optimistically explained that "*My community is waiting for me (…) They understand me. My bad experience is not so much. I was in that community. (…) I believe I back there soon with brothers.*"

In addition, they generally had a desire to be a part of a community, and they viewed building relationships in a community as key to returning to society. Their approaches to creating such connections were diverse, for example: to respect; to work; to make friends; to not disturb; to explain; to hold orientation; and to stay peaceful. The narrative of Jacket, 22 years old, was that "*To go back to my community, the important thing is, to work hard, don't disturb them, and to be a part of community. (…) Respect for them is key. (…) When I do such things, no way to miss my reintegration.*" His reason was that "*Because they want me as a member there. They need me. Then I am totally ok. You same in your house and community.*"

Moreover, they emphasised the importance of preventing disengaged combatants from returning to previous situations in which they joined Al-Shabaab, where they experienced stress with businesses and relationship-building in a community, in order to prevent their rejoining a violent extremist group. For instance, Hamuza, 19 years old, said that "*Alternative business to attract them is important to prevent rejoining. Then, accept and assist to join in community. If they are not in previous situation, they will not rejoin.*" Asking about himself, he comfortably replied that "*Me? I'm ok, never join them (Al-Shabaab). I don't need to do. (…) I do my business and stay with family. No Al-Shabaab now.*"

It can be noted that while the interviewees were awaiting their release from the program facilities, they were also considering various things privately. It is a fact that their responses were assertive, they expressed firm confidence and expectations based on their efforts in the program, and that they had a strong desire to become members of a community. Table 1 is the codebook of the interviews.

Table 1

The codebook of interviews with disengaged combatants

Category	Sub-category	Description	Data example
Positive feelings about the rehabilitation	Content	Satisfying with the variety of classes which covered their lack of education and skills.	*I was second (school) level. I take second level class and tailoring. (...). Satisfy, really.*
	Staffs	Having a good relationship with center staffs.	*They are ok, good. No trouble with them. (...) we chat every day with them.*
Negative feelings about the rehabilitation	Restrictions	Dissatisfied by the lack of freedom for family visit.	*Here I cannot meet with family. (...) Very hard to go out and meet with familiy member here.*
Positive feelings to leave the rehabilitation center	Expectations	Expecting life to be positive.	*Leave here, I feel happiness. Good life wait me. It is better than here. I'm going to be happy. (...) No fear. It is positive*
Optimistic feelings about reintegration	General world view	Regarding reintegration as a simple process	*Reintegration is ok. No problem. I can do reintegration.*
	Community	Expecting his community to surely accept him for sure.	*I'm not Al-Shabaab now. Yes, I believe. I will explain, and they will accept me. My community is waiting me.*
Elements of successful reintegration	Relationships	Thinking about the importance of becoming a member in a community.	*To back to community, important is, work hard, don't disturb them, and to be a part of community. (...) Respect for them is key. (...) When I do such things, no way to miss my reintegration.*
	Situation	Thinking about the importance of changing his previous situation.	*Alternative business to attract them is important to prevent re-joining. Then, accept and assist to join in community. If they are not in previous situation, they will not re-join.*

Interviews with Community Members

In general, all community members who participated in interviews were already aware of the existence of disengaged combatants. The reason why they knew about them was that their acquaintances or friends were disengaged combatants, or that they had heard about it on the radio or through rumours. As such, their feelings were basically negative, with responses such as "trouble" and "fear." Female student Jomo, 25 years old, said that *"I cannot trust them no matter which position he was in. Whether he works as a service provider, or a carpenter, or a combatant, I cannot do once he was in there. Because they have same belief (as Al-Shabaab)."* Some people simultaneously had mixed feelings as well indeed, which revealed a desire to make allowances for the

fact that the disengaged combatants had already been disengaged. Medo, male, 30 years old, living in Mogadishu for 30 years, for example, expressed that *"It is mixed emotion… Given what they did, I feel fear in fact. They could be a spy… They can attack again. I know such example!"* He carefully described that *"I know AMISOM and NISA and… will protect me. But, as personal level, I feel fear. It's tough question. Very tough."*

Regarding the question of community sentiment, community members tended to argue and express more negative feelings with a strong tone of voice, and concerns over the security of their communities. In comparison to the individual questions presented to them as about "you," and when they answered the questions presented to them as about their "community," they expressed feelings and opinions of opposition, such as a wariness of ex-combatants. Their cautiousness over the risk of being attacked by Al-Shabaab was conspicuous. Munira, female, 26 years old, stated that *"They are a problem. We are scared. If we touch Al-Shabaab member, they will come. They should not come back here."* After an explanation of the rehabilitation program, she still believed that *"Yeah, after rehabilitation, even after rehabilitation, we cannot believe them. Community will be at risk. This is true. (…). Al-Shabaab will come and kill us."* Raska, male youth, 24 years old, also explained that *"There is no chance for the community. Even if, no. (…). Can you accept the person who killed your brother? (…). Even if he is the same clan as us, no."* He further stated that *"Yes, even same age and same youth like me. Think Al-Shabaab's ideology. They kill people many ways!"*

In spite of these concerns, many interviewees felt able to accept ex-combatants if they met certain conditions. These conditions were diverse, ranging from the acquisition of skills to the making of a guarantee to their families that they would behave normally. One of example is Muna, female, 23 years old, who gave her opinion that *"If they have skills, no problem. Perfectly no problem. People join to Al-Shabaab to get money*

because they don't have skills! Not heart. It's economic! That's why if they have skills, you know something like driver skill, it's fine." Nevertheless, all interviewees understood fully that most of the members of Al-Shabaab join the group just for money such as Hassan, male, 35 years old, who stated clearly that *"They are just money first people. Main reason of joining is for money. Also, they were threatened to join by force for money."* He depicted their situation that *"They were poor in a village and that boys need to get money. Al-Shabaab is always looking for such young boys. We know it. It's clear."*

Contrary to such assumptions over reasons for joining Al-Shabaab, their evaluation criteria for whether they could believe a former combatant or not varied considerably. For example, the presence or absence of skills, voluntarism, physical appearance, employment, participation in and contribution to the community, and a minimum time from disengagement, such as five years. For instance, Arai, male, 30 years old, explained his criteria that *"We can see who is ok now or whether bad, from their face… and yes behavior! (…). Yes, it's very easy to see that. If he is Somali like me, we can do it."* On the other hand, male community worker Yusuf, 51 years old, stated that *"As long as they are voluntary defectors, I can believe them. Because they changed already. But, if they are not voluntary…like detainee…something like that…I won't believe them. I know prison quality is terrible. Non-voluntary detainees don't change their mind."* About their reintegration, his idea was that *"For reintegration, their family and clan should guarantee them. After that, reintegration will happen little by little."*

Moreover, answers to the question about necessary conditions for achieving the successful reintegration of ex-combatants were also diverse including: a complete denial of the possibility; the introduction of another rehabilitation program phase as a further buffer to occupy time; the provision of a guarantee by the disengaged combatant's family and clan; the ability to return to their clan; a discussion involving all community

members; the provision of skills and labour; and the belief in ex-combatants by their communities. As for Sarah, female, 28 years old, her idea was that *"If they do good things for the community, it's ok. But if they don't do that, not ok. (…). Do good to community show they are ok now."* She added that *"I don't care their clan and job. Important is life in community."*

In addition, opinions about how to prevent disengaged combatants from rejoining were also varied. For instance, to let them have a job, to hold them by their family and clan ties, to put them into a community, to solve environmental problems such as starvation and poor health, and to conduct monitoring. Daya, female, 25 years old, stated that *"His clan and family should care. (…) Somali lives with clan. So if his clan are, and family, with him, he cannot back to Al-Shabaab."* She also mentioned a reference person, firmly stating, *"His clan leader should take care of him. Leader need to do this for him and us."* On the other hand, Shino, female, 37 years old, said that *"They need to be a member of the community, and we need to accept them into the community."* She acknowledged that *"No one live without their community. Even me I cannot live without my community (…) So, prevention [of rejoining in Al-Shabaab], community is key, for their condition."* The most popular answer was monitoring, and there was even a suggestion of brainwashing. Dea, female, 28 years old, suggested that *"For prevention [of rejoining in Al-Shabaab], the government should monitor them. They cannot do bad actions with monitoring. (…) Their monitoring should be long term…4 years. Government needs help for that."* Regarding the rehabilitation program, only 12 interviewees were not aware of the existence of the program, and all interviewees had no knowledge of the content and system involved in it.

Community members were discerning in only accepting ex-combatants, assessing any accompanying risks, and taking steps to achieving successful reintegration; in terms of the latter especially, the feelings of community members became more cautious and

wary. Given the fact that many individuals suggested monitoring to prevent further rejoining of Al-Shabaab, it can be inferred that community members generally regard disengaged combatants as a risk. Their responses as community members, not as individuals, reflect that they are circumspect about the potential risks of ex-combatants inviting attacks by Al-Shabaab. Also, like participants in the rehabilitation program, community members spoke in a manner that was quite assertive, without pausing. Table 2 is the codebook of the interviews.

The Gap Between Disengaged Combatants and Community Members

As it is believed that most of the low-risk disengaged combatants joined Al-Shabaab for financial reasons (Author, interview with UN officials from the UNSOM office in Mogadishu, April 2019), after acquiring the skills and education that were the main cause of their financial difficulty, disengaged combatants in the program developed a confident foundation to reintegrate into the community. Of course, they also understand the need to make the effort to build relationships with community members through explanation and hard work. At any rate, however, they do not have any doubt that their future is positive, showing significant expectations and confidence for immediate reintegration (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019). This trend can even be seen in the reports of practitioners, such as the International Organization for Migration (2019) and Khalil et al. (2019).

The conditions for successful reintegration which people in a community consider, however, are not only financial and relationship matters. They also include other multifaceted points that disengaged combatants do not perceive. While it is highly likely that community members understand the reason why the combatants became members of Al-Shabaab in terms of the financial aspects, when considering the reintegration process and assessing the accompanying risk of incidents, they attach

Table 2

The codebook of interviews with community members

Category	Sub-category	Description	Data example
Negative feelings about disengaged combatants from a personal point of view	Fear	Thinking about the risk of being attacked by Al-Shabaab.	*They are problem. We are scared. They should not back to here. (…). Yeah, after rehabilitation, even after rehabilitation, we cannot believe them. Community will be at risk. (…). Al-Shabaab will come and kill us.*
	Trouble	Having negative image of disengaged combatants in general.	*I cannot trust them no matter which position he was in. Whether he works as service provider, or whether as carpenter, or whether as combat, I cannot do once he was in there. Because they have same belief (as Al-Shabaab).*
	Mixed	Having negative feelings with a dilemma.	*It is mixed emotion… Given what they did, I feel fear in fact. They could be a spy… I know such example! (…). I know AMISOM and NISA and… will protect me. But, as personal level, I feel fear. It's tough question. Very tough.*
Negative feelings about disengaged combatants from a community point of view	Fear	Thinking about the risk of being attacked by Al-Shabaab.	*There is no chance for community. Even if, no. (…). Can you accept the person who killed your brother? (…). Even if he is same clan with us, no.*
Reasons why disengaged combatants had joined Al-Shabaab	Money	Regarding disengaged combatants as mercenary people.	*They are just money first people. Main reason of joining is for money. Also, they were threatened to join by force.*
Criteria for accepting disengaged combatants	Skills & Job	Thinking about the importance of having skills and a job.	*If they have skills, no problem. Perfectly no problem. People join to Al-Shabaab to get money because they don't have skills! Not heart. It is economic! That's why if they have skills, you know something like driver skill, it's fine.*
	Voluntarism	Thinking about the importance of voluntary defection.	*As long as they are voluntary defectors, I can believe them. Because they changed already. But, if they are not voluntary…like detainee… something like that…I will not believe them. I know prison quality is terrible. Non-voluntary detainees don't change their mind. (…). For reintegration, their family and clan should guarantee them. After that, reintegration will happen little by little.*
	Looks	Thinking about the importance of physical appearance.	*We can see who is ok now or whether bad, from their face…and yes behaivor! (…) Yes, it's very easy to see that.*
	Contribution	Thinking about the importance of support to a community.	*If they do good things to community, it's ok. But if they don't do that, not ok. (…). Do good to community show they are ok now.*
Elements of successful reintegration	Skills & Job	Thinking about the importance of contribution to a community	*Having job is top. When he has a job, he will not join Al-Shabaab. (…) Because they want money… Simple.*
	Clan & Family	Thinking about the importance of supports from a clan and family.	*His clan and family should care. (…) Somali lives with clan. So if his clan are, and family, with him, he cannot back to Al-Shabaab.*
	Community	Thinking about the importance of a community.	*They need to be member of community, and we need to accept them to community. To prevention, community is key, for their condition.*
	Health	Thinking about the importance of health condition.	*If they are hungry and need money for health, they go back to Al-Shabaab for money! (…) It is easy for them for sure.*
	Monitoring	Thinking about the importance of monitoring.	*For prevention (of rejoining in Al-Shabaab), the government should do monitoring them. (…) Their monitoring should be for long term…4 years.*
	Brainwashing	Thinking about the importance of brainwashing.	*Their ideology is influenced by Al-Shabaab. So need to brainwash them. Then, it's ok now.*

importance to various points, such as the monitoring and detention of former combatants with the group. In short, the community has concerns, fears, and doubts about the many risks that the reintegration of these people could expose them to.

It is evident from these opinions that disengaged combatants fail to appreciate the emotions and views of community members. In other words, rehabilitation participants, who possess skills and education that they previously did not, regard themselves as all set for reintegration, and are unaware of the other necessities that the community expects. This fact is no less than harmful to the prospect of their achieving successful reintegration, for it means that there is the possibility of unexpected circumstances arising for both the disengaged combatants and the community members. The gap in understanding and assumption between ex-Al-Shabaab combatants and community members can generate discord between them, which could have more serious consequences than a lack of employment (Themnér, 2013), such as disillusionment among disengaged combatants, which is a very significant factor for disengagement from terrorism (Bjørgo, 2011; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Reinares, 2011), and also for reintegration. For example, in Afghanistan, ex-Taliban fighters are currently facing the double disillusionment of personal insecurity and economic challenges, and these circumstances promote their returning to such a militia (Bahman & Torjesen, 2012). This explains why the progress of reintegration in third-generation DDR in Somalia has actually been "very little," although it has made various improvements in these three years (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019).

Lack of Knowledge

There are two direct causes of the severe gap mentioned above. First, it should be noted that a lack of knowledge among disengaged combatants and the community is one of them. There has been extensive discussion globally about the process of radicalizations, as well as the causes behind members enlisting in a terrorist

organization. In terms of the causes behind members joining Al-Shabaab, they are not only financial, but also involve various emotional and religious factors, such as anger and mistrust towards the Somali government, a sense of crisis over Islam, and a desire to change the political system (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Botha & Abdile, 2014). Accordingly, in order to disengage such members from a terrorist group, some researchers, such as Horgan (2009), argue that psychological factors, mainly disillusionment, are key. Ordinary citizens in Somalia, however, do not have any access to the internet, newspapers, television, or lectures as sources of knowledge; their sources of information are typically limited to radio and small talk in daily life, which means that almost all community members have no accurate knowledge about joining or leaving Al-Shabaab. Hence, they only have their own ideas, which are formed by their personal experiences. Contrary to popular assumption, the reality is more complicated, in that there are not only combatants who join for money, but also other types of combatants in the rehabilitation program, such as those who join for reasons of clan hatred. Also, the categorization of combatants by NISA is not perfect, but rather notorious (Felbab-Brown, 2015a; Felbab-Brown, 2018). Furthermore, community members have been unaware of the macro-level systems of rehabilitation, including the system of amnesty for Al-Shabaab combatants, as well as the content of the rehabilitation program. Such a lack of knowledge in these areas among the community can be given as one of the factors that are impeding reintegration.

Simultaneously, a lack of knowledge on the part of disengaged combatants is also problematic for successful reintegration, in that they cannot conceptualize the reality of life in the community. In interviews, most of them did not exhibit doubt or anxiety, but rather had strong confidence and positive expectations based on their skills and education. Despite this, they need to know more about the views of other people, not

just their own. It is critical to be aware of mutual misunderstanding, and to prevent false

assumptions that increase the risk of reintegration being undermined after rehabilitation.

Lack of Accountability and Transparency

Second, it is clear that a lack of accountability for communities is another serious

problem. It is true that rehabilitation efforts for disengaged combatants in Somalia are

very sensitive, taking into account that Al-Shabaab has attacked such disengaged

combatants in retaliation for their betrayal, and that rehabilitation effectively amounts to

nothing less than a reduction in the power of Al-Shabaab (Author, interview with with

Somali government officials, April 2019). Therefore, it makes sense that much

information is not available to the public.

Such an inclination to hide everything can at the same time pose a risk to

successful reintegration in the context of current DDR in Somalia. This is because, as

long as community members have a negative view of disengaged combatants, it is

necessary to make efforts to improve such views; if these efforts are not made, or are

insufficient, the community is left without any measures to reconcile underlying

negative attitudes towards ex-combatants. In fact, a lack of transparency in DDR

measures in Somalia has already been pointed out (Felbab-Brown, 2015a; Felbab-

Brown, 2018). In practice, there are some representatives of civil society in a graduate

ceremony in Baidoa center, but the kind of information that such representatives

receive, and the extent to which they explain this information to their community is

unclear. Moreover, the past histories of disengaged combatants tend to remain concealed

when they are transferred to a community. Taking into account the controversial nature

of and potential risk to disengaged combatants, as well as the difficulties in monitoring

them and securing their safety, hiding information on participants in rehabilitation may

be considered reasonable. Even so, however, there is a concurrent need to deal with the

risks that this can entail. At present, a community must simply accept ex-combatants,

without any right to veto decisions, nor any sufficient support, protection, and monitoring; they are left to face the threat of Al-Shabaab on the ground. A lack of proper transparency or supplementary measures has contributed to the debate over reintegration of disengaged combatants on the scene.

<div align="center">**Further Surrounding Problems**</div>

Severe Unemployment

In reality, there are other environmental issues surrounding the current DDR in Somalia that have undermined reintegration. First of all, it can be presumed that we need to be more sceptical and cautious about the belief that participants will be able to obtain sustainable employment and income, as long as they complete vocational training in a rehabilitation program. Due to the real effectiveness of vocational and skills training, this has been one of the major problems in DDR since the second generation. For example, according to the statistical data of the World Bank regarding DDR in Sierra Leone, only 28% of DDR participants were able to attain employment in which they could utilize skills that they learned in a DDR program (International Crisis Group, 2003).

The economic situation in Somalia is far worse than in Sierra Leone. In general, the unemployment rate for 14- to 29-year-olds in Somalia is 67%, and this rate is one of the highest in the world (United Nations Development Program, 2015). It means that the number of jobs available to young people, who are the main age group that join Al-Shabaab (Botha & Abdile, 2014), is very limited. Moreover, in achieving reintegration, the important point is the number of employment opportunities in the community available to a disengaged combatant. If the number of job opportunities for disengaged combatants is insufficient, it is very likely that practical skills alone will not be sufficient to get a job. Furthermore, though some participants exhibited a desire to become a "businessman" in the author's interviews, they did not clarify their image of a

businessman. That is to say, such an image could not be of a simple job such as a carpenter; it is possible that they have a longing to be a stylish and wealthy businessman. Since the collapse of the government in 1991, such individuals have become powerful in Somalia. Moreover, the research findings of Horgan (2009), who asserts that deradicalizations does not mean returning to pre-radicalizations status, imply that a situation after disengagement could be tougher for former members of Al-Shabaab than the situation before they joined this group. In this case, although disengaged combatants may have a high degree of confidence and expectation, if they cannot attain a job in a community, the disillusionment that they will feel can be regarded as a serious risk for the process of reintegration.

Security and Financial Limitations

Second, as long as people in communities that will accept ex-combatants feel concern for them and fear of an attack by Al-Shabaab (International Organization for Migration, 2019; Khalil et al., 2019), monitoring and protection (Felbab-Brown, 2015b; Hedayah & Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2014) will be needed to realize successful reintegration, even if it is hard to access such communities due to the severe security situation. As a matter of fact, terrorists tend to be recidivists (Pluchinsky, 2008), and disengagement does not need deradicalizations and repentance (Horgan, 2009); deradicalizations can be accomplished only through the preventing of re-radicalizations. If so, this implies a need to reinforce the prevention of re-radicalizations and the rejoining of ex-combatants, more so than previous generations of DDR. As well as such measures, it is necessary to prevent retaliation attacks by Al-Shabaab, which lower morale and bias views on disengaged combatants.

Somalia remains in active conflict with Al-Shabaab. Even in big cities, such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, Belet Weyne, and Kismayo, which Somali government forces have recaptured from Al-Shabaab in the past five years, there are many Al-Shabaab spies in

the cities (Author, interview with with a UN official from the UNSOM office, April 2019), and the government and AMISOM troops cannot go out from each city as they are surrounded by Al-Shabaab (Sieff, 2016b). In brief, there is a limit to the realization of appropriate monitoring and protection, due to such a tight security situation. One example of the severity of the situation is that when it becomes difficult to access places as little as 50 km away from Mogadishu to which disengaged combatants may be designated to return, the only available way of monitoring them is by telephone check (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019). Such a physical limitation has a devastating influence on other approaches in Somalia, and on the possibility of implementing some methods for reintegration in other DDR programs.

As well as a security issue, there is a financial one. Regardless of the fact that reintegration is very long and multifaceted process, the financial difficulty of it has been decried internationally. As well as these issues, the national disengaged combatants program in Somalia has also suffered from a lack of funds; inadequate funding has a negative impact on support and monitoring activities and having a full quota of staff in the team (Author, interview with with a Somali government official, April 2019). In general, even salary payments for Somali government officials are also exceedingly unstable (Author, interview with with Somali government officials, April 2019). Hence, financial fragility in various areas is exerting a negative effect on reintegration efforts in Somalia.

Distrust of The Somali Government

Third, it can be proposed that another negative factor is citizens' distrust of the current Somali administration. Throughout the author's interviews and conversations with people in Somalia, more than a few were distrustful of their government. Many ordinary citizens on the ground claimed, in low voices, the existence of corruption with Al-Shabaab. In general, in the implementation of third-generation DDR, to ensure the

credibility of interlocutors (Fink, 2015) and to build trust are essential (Botha & Abdile, 2014). It is critical to prevent corruption in rehabilitation facilities (International Crisis Group, 2007), therefore, distrust of the government of Somalia, a main actor of rehabilitation and reintegration, could be a fatal wound for DDR efforts internally and internationally.

As a background cause of distrust is the presence of severe corruption in Somalia, which has lasted for two decades. The state has recorded the worst corruption rate in the world (Transparency International, 2019), and even now, the amount of corruption tax of the state is the highest in the world (Author, interview with a UN official from the UNSOA office in Mogadishu, April 2019). In this context, people on the street see through the façade that politicians are always glamorous, in contrast with the unchanging serious circumstances of Somalia on the ground. Moreover, all people who mentioned such corruption issues said that victims of terrorist activity by Al-Shabaab are usually political enemies of the current government, and indicated the connection between the government and Al-Shabaab. Whether such opinions are correct or not is unknown, however, in any case, the fact that many people have a distrust of the government may be linked to a feeling of doubt over the rehabilitation program as well. This will certainly be an obstacle for the reintegration of disengaged combatants into communities where there are many citizens.

Conclusion

Based on qualitative interviews in the field, this study has broadened the understanding of various obstacles to the community reintegration of disengaged combatants through third-generation DDR in Somalia. In the context of very little previous research on this topic, it has realistically examined the conditions necessary to achieve successful reintegration for these combatants. In doing so, it has revealed a

serious gap in their understanding of reintegration, and that of members of local communities.

Qualitative interviews presented a contrast between ex-combatants, who held strong confidence, high expectations, and a positive attitude regarding their reintegration, and community members, who displayed uneasiness, cautiousness and an unwilling attitude. It also showed that a diversity of feelings and opinions exists on the subject, which disengaged combatants could not possibly comprehend before being released from rehabilitation centers. The GT analysis of these findings points out that such a gap is a critical flaw in the reintegration process, and elucidates the two fundamental facts that both parties do not have enough knowledge about one another, and that the accountability and transparency of the rehabilitation program are insufficient. It can be pointed out that, given the situation on the ground of third-generation DDR in Somalia, such a gap can be more significant than previous generations of DDR, which makes the reintegration of disengaged combatants of Al-Shabaab in Somalia more difficult.

In addition to micro-level issues, the analysis indicated three macro-level environmental problems related to the gap in understanding between disengaged combatants and community members: severe unemployment, security and financial limitations, and distrust of the Somali government. These situational problems are some of the notable differences from previous generations of DDR programs, and widen the gap in understanding, consequently worsening prospects for reintegration in Somalia.

The results of this study imply that, as a matter of course, it is quite difficult to implement DDR in the context of a lack of IDDRS preconditions for it. In other words, it is necessary to direct far greater resources to third-generation DDR than previous DDR in order to accomplish disengagement, rehabilitation, and successful reintegration programs under severe circumstances. Given the situation in the international

community and Somalia, however, it is almost impossible to secure all the resources needed. Hence, on a practical level, it is better to conduct DDR on a realistic basis without any insufficiency, in that the inappropriate implementation of third-generation DDR can generate a variety of considerable risks for both disengaged combatants and the community, although it is necessary to secure resources and support to satisfactorily conduct a program to the minimum extent required.

In light of the findings in this study, for the successful reintegration in this severe condition, it is essential to let disengaged combatants be realistic for their future before their release from a rehabilitation center. On this point, a comprehensive conflict resolution skills training that especially anticipates potential difficulties in the future and thinks about measures to tackle those is necessary. In terms of training in the rehabilitation program, simple skills training is not sufficient in the situation of Somalia, and that is why more practical life skills training, linking skills to a job, is needed for them. Then after their release from the center, long-term counselling with tailormade cares, such as trauma care and activities for their sense of belonging in their reintegration life is also critical.

Also, given the importance of community for successful reintegration, efforts for people in a community should be seriously considered. It is better for the rehabilitation program to have cooperation from the side of the community, especially community representatives who can explain the situation and importance of rehabilitation to community members, such as dialogue sessions with disengaged combatants both inside and outside of the program for mutual understanding and forgiveness, which can fill the gap between disengaged combatants and community members. It can be insisted that such additional activities are necessary for the third-generation DDR in Somalia to fulfill their goals.

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