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Community-Based Counterterrorism Policing: Recommendations for Practitioners

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ABSTRACT

This article presents recommendations for practitioners of community-based counterterrorism policing. The recommendations are located and explained within two broad propositions: *recognize the implications and limitations of policing by consent*, and *respect the legitimate religious beliefs of all communities*. Highlighting tensions between high and low policing and between policing and government imperatives, the article helps illustrate how different aspects of counterterrorism policy and practice may sometimes be at odds with one another. The recommendations are aimed at recognizing and, where practicable, reconciling such tensions. They arise from the authors' engagement with the issues in London and are understood to have application in other towns and cities in the United Kingdom and the West, particularly in communities and neighborhoods where Muslim citizens are the principal recipients of this form of policing.

Recommendations for Community-Based Counterterrorism Policing: Background and Context

This article presents recommendations for practitioners of community-based counterterrorism policing. The recommendations are located and explained within two broad propositions: *recognize the implications and limitations of policing by consent*, and *respect the legitimate religious beliefs of all communities*. Both recommendations are grounded in the authors' London-based academic research, teaching, and prior careers in policing.¹ As such, the authors' police practitioner experience has been subject to critical reflection during the course of subsequent academic research and teaching. At the heart of this reflection on a cumulative and combined experience is a recognition that individuals in communities and neighborhoods where terrorist movements seek recruits and supporters are often more likely to help police identify and disrupt terrorist conspiracies if they are treated fairly. Fair treatment, in this context, entails maintaining a tight focus on the actual terrorist threat. To the extent that Contest, and Prevent in particular, has shifted from such a tight focus on terrorism and violent extremism to a wider target of "extremism"² it risks alienating potential allies in Muslim communities and affords opportunities to terrorist recruiters and radicalizers.³

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Moreover, with suicide terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016 echoing many of the features of the attacks in London on 7 July 2005 it is clear that London experience continues to have export potential. This is not to suggest that all such experience is positive but simply that negative as well as positive experience provides opportunities for learning. Nor is it to suggest that the arguments underpinning the recommendations in this article are beyond challenge. To the contrary, it is to recognize that the article represents perspectives that have largely been rejected by U.K. policymakers, security and police chiefs, and many influential commentators. In such circumstances it has the modest ambition of prompting a constructive debate among policymakers, practitioners, and academics.

At the outset it might help to ask the question: *who are the practitioners of community-based counterterrorism policing for whom the recommendations are intended?* Crucially, as a result of government policy the answer is *not just police officers* but also *civil servants operating at both national and local levels, teachers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)*. Consequently, this is to include practitioners operating under the auspices of the Prevent program,⁴ a key part of the government's counterterrorism strategy known as Contest.⁵ While some NGOs employ full-time practitioners who have a sole focus on Prevent business, others, most notably teachers, are asked to perform a part-time policing role alongside their many other responsibilities. In both instances individuals with no police training are enforcing government policy that risks conflating authentic terrorist recruiters or radicalizers—and those subject to recruitment and radicalization—with those, such as a fifteen-year-old schoolboy viewing right-wing literature on the Internet,⁶ with an innocent interest in politics and religion. That, at least, is the concern expressed in this article that prompts the two recommendations under consideration.

The case of the fifteen-year-old schoolboy is particularly relevant because his apparent interest in the politics of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the English Defence League (EDL) was not the government's prime focus when first drafting the Prevent policy. Nor has it been the prime focus for Prevent practitioners who have instead been largely concerned with cases classified as Islamist radicalization. Instead, the case serves to illustrate how a legitimate, secondary Prevent interest in far right terrorism and political violence (of the kind demonstrated by Pavlo Lapshin in the West Midlands in 2013⁷) might stray beyond a legitimate police interest and into democratic politics. Indeed, how could a teacher be expected to tell the difference between the two? In much the same way, the authors argue, Prevent practitioners risk moving beyond a legitimate policing function when they target politically active or religiously observant Muslims without sufficient focus on their capacity for or susceptibility to terrorism or violent extremism.

Broadly speaking, there are four threads that connect and underpin the recommendations: the first is a recognition that counterterrorism policing is necessarily involved in a competition with terrorist movements for credibility and legitimacy in the same communities⁸; the second is a recognition that since 9/11⁹ religiously observant and civic minded Muslim citizens have been the major recipients of this *soft* kind of policing; the third is a recognition that the same citizens have also experienced the impact of *hard* counterterrorism policing during the same period; and the fourth is an understanding that the principle of policing by consent imposes responsibilities on police that are likely to be outside the experience of civil servants and other multi-agency partners increasingly involved in community-based policing.¹⁰ Taken cumulatively, the recommendations are concerned to identify and resolve tensions that arise, in part, as a result of fundamentally different priorities and duties

that fall to police, in comparison with the priorities and duties of other public servants and multi-agency partners involved in the same work. By doing so, as well as hoping to assist practitioners, it is intended to stimulate academic debate on an understudied but important aspect of counterterrorism activity.

It is worth illustrating the significance of one key point—a broadening or shifting of police responsibility. When the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) waged a terrorist bombing campaign in London¹¹ invariably only police officers engaged with fellow Londoners to elicit support and information.¹² In contrast, since 2006 sole police responsibility for community engagement in respect of counterterrorism has been replaced by a multi-agency engagement, managed by Home Office civil servants,¹³ in which police play a significant but much reduced role.¹⁴ Therein lie fundamental tensions that have not been widely addressed in either the academic, policy, or practitioner literature hitherto. For example, at the height of the PIRA bombing campaign in London it was not uncommon for “home beat” community police officers in the Metropolitan Police to work the same beat for between five and ten years—unfettered by performance targets—thereby gaining an intimate knowledge of their “patch” and the people who lived and worked on it. As Sir Ian Blair, when Metropolitan Police Commissioner, and leading criminologist Martin Innes have both noted, it is this kind of neighborhood policing role that often affords the best opportunities for community intelligence in support of counterterrorism policing.¹⁵ Suffice to say, such longevity in this key policing role has become rare, notwithstanding the aspirations of community-based counterterrorism policing and the inclusion of civil servants and multi-agency partners.

In fact, notwithstanding the increased role of the Internet in regard to radicalization, recruitment and terrorism activities more generally, Blair and Innes are wise to focus on the ongoing value of effective neighborhood policing. While significant Internet use is often hidden from family, friends, and neighbors, the fact remains that when a terrorist conspiracy is aimed at mounting a bomb, gun, or knife attack on a target in London, opportunities for alert neighborhood policing will continue to arise. Blair’s reference to a terrorist bombmaking scenario in which a well-briefed caretaker might have understood and reported the potential significance of a large quantity of empty hair spray canisters to his local police contact¹⁶ remains relevant. This kind of scenario also serves to distinguish between community intelligence that might disrupt a violent terrorist act and community intelligence aimed at challenging the ideology or beliefs of fellow citizens. Whether community confidence in police is high or low, experience suggests the importance of the former kind of intelligence is more likely to be understood and accepted by existing and potential community partners than the latter.

Blair’s scenario also serves as one of several contexts in which the term *community-based counterterrorism policing* might be understood and applied. Without seeking to be exhaustive, it is reasonable to identify two main areas of application. First, in the academic literature, the term can be understood as a relatively new conceptual framework pioneered and articulated by Basia Spalek¹⁷ and which also serves to describe closely related literature that has not used the term explicitly but that is also concerned with the community impact of counterterrorism and the role of communities in counterterrorism.¹⁸ This literature goes some way to bridging the gap between separate literatures on community policing on the one hand¹⁹ and counterterrorism policing on the other.²⁰ Second, there is an extensive literature that surrounds the Prevent strand of the U.K. Contest counterterrorism: written by policymakers;²¹ think tanks;²² as well as by academic researchers.²³ While there is an overlap

between the two literatures, this second strand is more focused on government policy—whether explanatory, supportive, or critical. Indeed, while there is a lively debate in both the think tank and the academic literature²⁴ that fully articulates opposing perspectives about the merits and demerits of Prevent policy there is an absence of constructive criticism that might serve to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of community-based counterterrorism policing. That is a gap in the literature that this article seeks to fill.

To recognize that police officers often perform duties that are not fundamentally influenced by government policy is to illustrate the fourth thread that connects the recommendations: namely, that the principle of policing by consent imposes responsibilities on police that are likely to be outside the experience of civil servants and other multi-agency partners increasingly involved in community-based policing. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this comes in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist bombing when all elements of counterterrorism policing are geared toward supporting an emergency response and government policy plays little or no part in it. Only later will counterterrorism policing become embroiled in policy responses that might, for example, include lobbying for or against new antiterrorism measures.²⁵ Here too, whatever police might think of particular measures, they are duty bound to abide by them and to perform their roles regardless. This is similar to the role of government civil servants but also significantly distinct, in so far as the latter are tied to the implementation of policy and generally have no further remit. Given that government policy has granted increasing responsibilities to civil servants to engage in the field of community-based counterterrorism policing an important and interesting tension with policing has arisen. To help illuminate this tension the recommendations that follow highlight how the notion of policing by consent—an essential and relevant experience in policing—is likely to be alien or remote from the experience of civil servants, teachers, and NGOs drafted in to undertake specific community-based counterterrorism policing roles.²⁶

Recognize the Implications and Limitations of Policing by Consent

As Sir Richard Mayne noted in *Principles of Policing* at the founding of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, “the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behavior and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.”²⁷ Mayne did not suggest that public approval was confined to one particular community in London but rather that the principle of policing by consent was the bedrock of the relationship between the police, who were drawn from the citizens of London, and all their fellow citizens. For sure, either London’s wealthiest or its most vocal and well-organized citizens have often had the greatest influence on policing policy in London but it is when the principle of policing by consent has been seen to also take account of the city’s poorest and least vocal citizens that it has served the capital best.²⁸

Very soon after leaving training school all probationer police officers necessarily encounter situations where they ask for the help of a fellow citizen to enforce or uphold the law. A common example would be where a rookie police officer is the first to arrive at the scene of a street robbery and, having obtained a description of the assailant from the victim, asks a nearby shopkeeper if she saw the attack take place and whether she can add to the assailant’s description. This is part of a fundamental policing duty that is not fully replicated in any other public role, least of all in the day to day duties of most civil servants and their multi-agency Prevent partners. It is also what might be called a neutral duty, one that is central to a police officer’s

sworn oath to uphold the law, and which is impermeable to policy change. The point, for the purposes of this article, is to highlight the extent to which this quintessential and formative policing experience informs police engagement with the communities they police. In this sense policing is always neutral, oriented toward upholding the law. It follows that when a police officer asks a fellow citizen for help in identifying a suspected terrorist, the same basic duty is being invoked. When a fellow citizen assists a police officer in either duty—catching a street robber or catching a terrorist—they become party to the discharge of a police duty designed to uphold the law and to protect the wider community they both belong to. Moreover, Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 draws on a long established Common Law principle when stating that “a person [not just a police officer] may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.”²⁹

In both scenarios—urgent police–citizen engagement to tackle street crime and terrorism—the identity of the individual police officer and individual citizen is largely immaterial; both are discharging a duty that potentially obligates all citizens. This is the sense in which it is helpful to describe such a fundamental police–citizen engagement as neutral and unique—beyond the reach of policymakers. Notwithstanding policing imperatives that require consideration of the special needs of particular victims (victims of sexual offenses and hate crimes for instance) there remains a strong sense in which policing remains blind when seeking the immediate help of fellow citizens to prevent and detect crime and to apprehend suspected offenders. To be otherwise would be to deny certain citizens a fundamental right they share with police officers—a right to defend themselves against unlawful violence and harm, to defend fellow citizens, and to arrest individuals committing crimes. To be sure, situations will arise where these fundamental rights are exercised improperly by a citizen—just as they might be by a police officer—and sometimes by a citizen who is unsuited to the task but neither eventuality invalidates the general right. The London policing adage “communities defeat terrorism”³⁰ articulates the aspiration that citizens—either collectively as part of a neighborhood watch, or individually when going about their daily business, will assist police in tackling terrorism (and other kinds of political violence) no less than they might do in regard to more routine crimes.

Without this formative policing experience it is understandable that civil servants, teachers and NGOs entering the burgeoning business of community-based counterterrorism policing should seek to work with Muslim citizens who share the views of the government ministers they represent, about the nature of the terrorist threat to be tackled. Haras Rafiq, managing director of the Quilliam Foundation, provides an example of this kind of alliance in his article “David Cameron is Right to Tackle Extremist Ideas As Well as Behaviour.”³¹ In contrast, police officers are more inclined to allow community perspectives that differ from government policy, especially when the citizens in question display skill and aptitude for the task at hand. To recognize and appreciate the implications of policing by consent is to begin to address a necessary tension between a fundamental police duty, on the one hand, and a necessary government policy imperative on the other. In turn, this is to encourage police independence where necessary, and also to foster an understanding among civil servants of the importance of adopting a more neutral and even-handed approach to citizens who offer to help with the task of tackling terrorism and violent extremism.

To be sure, a tension—sometimes characterized as arising between hard and soft and between high and low policing³²—has at times been palpable and significant for London

policing during the last five decades³³ and remains so today. For example, when observing attempts by the Metropolitan Police to simultaneously address the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom posed by returning *jihadis* and the need to support London families whose children have left the United Kingdom to join Islamic State it is not unreasonable to suggest that the problem is now more acute than it has ever been. On the one hand, the Met's commander Richard Walton adopts an empathetic and supportive tone when addressing the departure of three London teenage girls suspected of joining Islamic State. "We are extremely concerned for the safety of these young girls," he tells Londoners, "and would urge anyone with information to come forward and speak to police." "Our priority," he explains, "is the safe return of these girls to their families."³⁴ On the other hand, the Met's commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, adopts a more hard-line approach when addressing the parallel concern that there is a serious risk of "a further rapid influx of dangerous militants into the capital as the battle with Islamic State escalates." He calls on ministers "to respond by considering the return of control orders and new legislation to strip British fighters of their passports to stop them coming back to this country." Speaking in terms of high policing, Hogan-Howe argues that "there should be an automatic legal presumption that anyone returning from Syria or Iraq had been engaged in terrorism" and "requested a major injection of extra funding to help police and intelligence agencies cope with the rise in terror suspects."³⁵

Clearly, Walton and Hogan-Howe are providing evidence of a necessary tension between hard and soft policing approaches to a gravely serious problem.³⁶ It is also worth noting how in this contemporary example of returning Islamic State *jihadis*, London policing might enjoy the support of a majority of its citizens for Hogan-Howe's hard-line high-policing approach while at the same time suffering deficits of trust and legitimacy in sections of the community most likely to be affected where Walton's soft, empathetic low-policing approach is more likely to be welcomed. That said, such a positive welcome may turn sour if it is subsequently deemed necessary by police to arrest family members. For now, these are the kinds of competing demands between high and low policing—and competing perspectives among London citizens—which London policing has to negotiate when seeking to tackle terrorist threats. No doubt it will only take one serious terrorist incident carried out by returning Islamic State *jihadis* in which numerous Londoners are killed to tip the scales firmly in favor of high policing. That certainly has often been the experience after terrorist attacks in London in the past.³⁷

The need for London policing to negotiate a path between these two critical imperatives—to police by consent while ensuring the protection of the state and its citizens—is the premise on which this recommendation is based and seems to be crucial to achieving the twin goals of legitimacy and effectiveness that underpin any successful policing endeavor. This is not to claim that London is unique in respect of such a negotiation—it has, for example, been vividly evident in the United States where "the many commissions that investigated why the US policing agencies of every stripe failed to prevent 9/11 came up with findings that stressed the gap between high and low policing."³⁸ That said, London policing is perhaps an ideal case study given that it has been required to balance the two competing requirements in the face of repeated terrorist bombing campaigns and terrorist threats over a long period.

Neither does the London experience suggest that the notion of policing by consent will always be at odds with the requirements of counterterrorism policing, merely that an important and fundamental tension exists. In fact, on countless occasions during the

two centuries since Mayne first enunciated the principle, both London's police and the capital's diverse citizens³⁹ have been beneficiaries whenever it is has been applied effectively and legitimately. For the authors of this article, the support of Londoners first became significant in a counterterrorism context during the bombing campaigns of the PIRA in the 1970s.⁴⁰ "Communities defeat terrorism" became a police maxim, premised on the aspiration that Londoners would provide information to police to help prevent acts of terrorism in the capital and to identify wanted and suspected terrorists.⁴¹ Suffice to say, even strong public approval of police would not necessarily translate into active co-operation of the kind being sought—most typically the reporting of suspicious behavior that might relate to the preparations of an IRA terrorist cell. Put simply, there is case built on extensive experience in London that effective and legitimate counterterrorism policing has to negotiate a pragmatic path between the requirements of the state and the principle of policing by consent.

To help negotiate such a path it is often helpful to recognize the interdependent and holistic nature of policing. In an example from the authors' London research experience, a civil servant was required to inform the managers of a community-based Prevent project⁴² that it was being terminated. This gave rise to contrasting responses from the police officers and civil servants involved. For the civil servants, termination signaled an immediate transition from intense daily interaction with a community-based group to an absolute absence of contact. Whereas, on the police side there was a recognition that a relationship with the community-based group would continue on a number of levels—notwithstanding the termination of a Home Office contract. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this recognition on the part of police officers was a realization that the community group would continue to undertake the same kind of work that had been the subject of the Home Office contract, on a voluntary basis, just as they had done prior to receiving state support.

In fact, that anticipation by the police officers in this case proved to be well founded. Voluntary community work aimed at helping young people resist the overtures of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda certainly continued after the cessation of Home Office interest, albeit on a much reduced scale. The fact that this voluntary "counterradicalization" youth work was also bound up with parallel community youth work aimed at helping young people avoid or leave gang crime helps to emphasize how the realities of street experience are inherently "bottom up" and therefore characteristic of police and youth workers' experience and generally less familiar to civil servants concerned to implement "top down" government policy. The same case also talks to other aspects of the interdependent and holistic nature of policing. Police officers have a crucial interest in both kinds of voluntary, community work—especially when it is effective, as in this case. Moreover, police have a responsibility to provide emergency support to community outreach work of this kind, especially when serious incidents arise. The case also helps to highlight the importance of the low policing, or community policing requirement to win the trust and confidence of alienated communities in the long term. It is no coincidence that a long serving local neighborhood police officer was responsible for first introducing the key members of this community group to specialist counterterrorism colleagues.⁴³ Notwithstanding what Brodeur calls the "problematic integration of high and low policing," during the course of the War on Terror,⁴⁴ there are examples, of which this London case is but one, of how high and low policing might work reasonably and effectively in tandem.

To be clear, the imperative to police by consent is not limited to particular citizens or to particular sections of the community. Nor is it conditional, dependant on a community or community representative supporting government policy in regard to counterterrorism or any other issue concerned with crime. This is to recognize that there is often a significant contrast and tension between the fundamental policing imperative to engage with communities as they are, and government strategy to foster significant change in communities, and in doing so to engage with community representatives who offer to help deliver that change. In regard to community-based counterterrorism policy, the first time this contrast came to the authors' attention was in 2006 when Ruth Kelly, minister for the Department of Communities and Local Government, launched a new community engagement strategy with community leaders who shared the government's policy agenda.⁴⁵ Two years later, Kelly's successor, Hazel Blears, made clear that this government policy was "designed to change behaviour."⁴⁶ In addition, in 2011 the Metropolitan Police ended a ten-year engagement with Muslim community representatives at the Muslim Safety Forum (MSF).⁴⁷ This followed the U.K. prime minister David Cameron's address to a security conference in Berlin in which he signaled that the U.K. government would come down hard on "non-violent extremism."⁴⁸

Consequently, there is a reasonable concern on the part of excluded Muslim community representatives that they are being treated unfairly and by a different criteria to that which directs police engagement with minority ethnic communities. This runs the risk that constructive Muslim community partners of police may succumb to the overtures of extremists of two kinds: Either antidemocratic, revolutionary Islamist groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir or antidemocratic, revolutionary left-wing groups such as the Socialist Workers Party. Given that both groups often organize peaceful demonstrations in London this may seem unreasonable. However, both groups—and the types they represent—are anathema to community-based counterterrorism policing for one simple reason: they are emphatically opposed to supporting or working in partnership with police. While they may often campaign legitimately in regard to instances where counterterrorism policing makes errors they are duty bound, ideologically, to diminish or dismiss counterterrorism policing successes. Indeed, in the case of the Socialist Workers Party and other Marxist groups on the far left, a carefully orchestrated antipolice agenda is a central plank of a long-term revolutionary agenda. Moreover, both far left and extremist Islamist groups also make it their business to denigrate groups that do work in partnership with police as "sell outs." In these circumstances, it is very much to the credit of Muslim groups that are simultaneously and wrongly categorized by government as "extremist" and by extremists as "sell outs" when they remain loyal to their local police partners and their principles of pro-active citizenship. It is therefore important that Prevent practitioners learn to distinguish extremist Islamists from moderate or mainstream Islamists⁴⁹—and extremist or "*takfiri*" Salafis from moderate or authentic Salafis⁵⁰—in the same way that extremist Marxists and anarchists have long been understood to be distinguishable from democratic socialists and thereby located outside the big tent of British democratic politics.

Respect the Legitimate Religious Beliefs of all Communities

At the crux of community-based counterterrorism policing in London is a need to respect the legitimate religious beliefs of all its diverse communities, not least its diverse Muslim communities. This is a vital imperative at a time when London faces a severe terrorist threat

from movements including Islamic State (otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), Al Qaeda, and their many affiliates,⁵¹ movements with a proven ability to recruit, “radicalize,” or influence young Muslim Londoners. As such this imperative is particularly important when it comes to respecting the legitimate Islamic beliefs of approximately one million Muslim Londoners.⁵² There is one key element to this requirement: if police fail to show respect for the religious beliefs of the communities where they are seeking support in their counterterrorism investigations then a serious trust deficit will arise and inhibit this prime policing purpose. Such a trust deficit not only inhibits effective counterterrorism policing but also offers sophisticated terrorist movement opportunities to exploit it in their propaganda and recruitment material.⁵³ While significant progress was made during the 10 years of the Muslim Safety Forum (2001–2011) in regard to many important issues of religious respect⁵⁴ there remain two recurring problems in need of urgent attention.

The first problem is that legitimate aspects of religious practice continue to be described as pointers toward “radicalization.” This problematic account was probably first enunciated to a London Muslim audience by Home Secretary John Reid in 2006.⁵⁵ More recently, it has been developed by Mak Chisti, a commander in the Metropolitan Police, who expresses concern about “primary school children defining Christmas as “haram.” Chisti explains that “while it may not be a police matter, parents and family needed to ask how children as young as five had come to that view, whether it be from school or their friends.”⁵⁶ “This is not about us invading private thoughts,” he argues, “but acknowledging that it is in these private spaces where this [extremism] first germinates”:

The purpose of private-space intervention is to engage, explore, explain, educate or eradicate. Hate and extremism is not acceptable in our society, and if people cannot be educated, then hate and harmful extremism must be eradicated through all lawful means.⁵⁷

Putting aside the issue of privacy, which has attracted the most media attention, there is also an important issue for policing in terms of religious belief and sectarianism. Chisti is a Muslim—seemingly a liberal Muslim—and appears to be conflating a legitimate school of Islamic belief with extremism and radicalization that leads toward support for Islamic State. At best this is a somewhat reductive analysis and one that sits at odds with a more insightful account provided by Mehmood Naqshbandi, a former advisor to the Metropolitan Police, who is at pains to defend legitimate Islamic beliefs from the simplistic distortions offered by Islamic State and others. Naqshbandi shares Chisti’s concern that young Muslim Londoners are joining Islamic State but addresses the problem from a different vantage point in explaining that “all ISIS needs to do, and has done, is to put forward more cogent arguments in their own favour, in a format and with [Islamic] sources that the recipients are familiar with.” For “young Muslims especially,” he explains “and those who are troubled by the discordant clash between their own lives, the ideals of a simple Muslim way of life, the corruption and decadence of the society they are growing up in, and especially the compromises and hypocrisy of their own parents, the ISIS message offers a resolution.”⁵⁸ Suffice to say, if Naqshbandi is right and parents are part of the problem, Chisti’s approach may have limited application.

In addition, Naqshbandi is acutely conscious of inter-Muslim sectarianism—often exploited by Islamic State—and scrupulously avoids feeding it. This runs counter to a strand of liberal Muslim thinking that often enthusiastically endorses attempts to link extremism to legitimate strands of conservative Islamic belief. Instead, Naqshbandi explained basic Islamic beliefs and practice in a guide book for London police officers—published a decade ago—

which runs counter to the perspective of some liberal Muslims and key parts of government Prevent strategy. This extract dealing with sexual relationships is a case in point: “Like most faiths that have the concept of external, objective morality, Islam is deeply antipathetic to homosexuality.”⁵⁹ Some liberal, radical Muslims might challenge this, in the same way that liberal, radical Christians and Jews might do in regard to the same issue in their religions, but inevitably socially conservative Muslims, Christians, and Jews may not. What becomes crucial, from the perspective of community-based counterterrorism policing, is whether socially conservative or traditional Muslims (no more and no less than their counterparts in the two other Abrahamic faiths)—and whether from Deobandi, Barelvi, Shi’a, Sufi, Salafi, Islamist, or any other Muslim background⁶⁰—maintain genuinely respectful relationships with gay, lesbian, Christian, Jewish, and all other Londoners. When displays of such respect occur it is noteworthy,⁶¹ not least, given that socially conservative Muslims have an innate advantage over liberal Muslims in achieving a degree of credibility when seeking to counter the narratives of violent extremists.

Two key points arise from Naqshbandi’s policing guide: first, the importance of understanding religious belief and practice on its own terms; second, recognizing that major, significant similarities and differences exist between the beliefs and practices of many Muslim Londoners and other faith communities in the capital. For example, on the one hand, many Jewish and Christian Londoners share Muslim concerns about what Naqshbandi terms “overtly sexual or lewd behaviour.”⁶² On the other hand, many Jewish and Christian Londoners would concur with liberal Muslims who prefer to challenge establish norms in their respective religions. Suffice to say, Islamic State, and other terrorist movements, will be less able to exploit community anger if London policing is seen to respect legitimate religious beliefs—which is not to endorse them—such as the teaching of the fundamental tenets of Islam to children in mosques and gender segregation in certain public settings. As well as denying terrorist movements propaganda opportunities, such an approach also facilitates community initiatives aimed at tackling radicalization.⁶³ Echoing Ian Blair’s point about doing *with* not *to* communities, Naqshbandi, argues that, “... the government must realise that there was no top-down solution to tackling radicalisation and reforming mosques.” Instead, he suggests, mosques “are the places where extremism should be debated and examined.”⁶⁴

The second urgent problem is closely related and concerns the Prevent strategy where it conflates all strands of political Islam (otherwise referred to as Islamism) and all strands of Salafism as being “extremist” and antithetical to British values.⁶⁵ Harras Rafiq, managing director of the Quilliam Foundation, typically makes the government case forcefully when he argues that “Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and their offshoots have been indoctrinating our youngsters for decades that they have to join the struggle in the creation of a Utopian Islamist Caliphate and then to expand it across the globe.”⁶⁶ Readily accepted by governments in the last decade, this blanket characterization unfairly conflates mainstream Muslim organizations with extremist groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir. In addition, it overlooks a significant amount of constructive community work carried out from within this much maligned strand of Muslim London. One well documented case study involves the work of the Muslim Association of Britain and the Muslim Welfare House in regard to the successful reclamation of the Finsbury Park Mosque from the hands of violent extremists.⁶⁷ Regrettably, Rafiq’s negative blanket assessment appears to have gained currency in the banking sector as well as government, with this success being rewarded with the ignominious withdrawal of the mosque’s banking facilities.⁶⁸

Similarly, Reverend Alan Green, chair of the Tower Hamlets Interfaith Forum, has “highlighted the value of the close partnership he has established with the East London Mosque and London Muslim Centre over a long period.” Significantly, he recalls that “when the bombs went off in London [7/7], I got the bishop down to the East London Mosque so that there could be immediate joint statements, and Dilwar [Dilwar Hussain, the mosque chairman] on the Sunday was here in St. John’s preaching with me about our opposition to bombers.” “Now that was entirely unnecessary,” he adds, “that wasn’t before TV screens, it wasn’t to get anything out of it. . . .”⁶⁹ In the past, Metropolitan Police borough commanders have spoken out in support of their partners at Finsbury Park Mosque, East London Mosque, and at other Muslim institutions, not least when they have been wrongly labeled extremist.⁷⁰ Under increased government pressure, and the impact of police training delivered by Quilliam and like-minded institutions, police chiefs currently in post are either seriously constrained or, like Mak Chisti, enthusiastic supporters of government policy and the Quilliam approach.

Once a key player in the delivery of Prevent, Abdul Haqq Baker remains committed to tackling violent extremism and does so on a voluntary basis, despite being excluded from official engagement since 2011. Condemned by the reductive analysis of the Quilliam Foundation as extremist by virtue of being Salafi, he offers a more nuanced and accurate account that helps explain the basis for his outstanding track record in tackling violent extremism in London. “ISIS (along with al-Qaida, from within which it originated),” he explains, “does indeed take much of its theology from Salafism.” Crucially, however, he notes, “Salafi Islam is as wide and varied as, say, Sufi Islam is, and there are numerous sub-trends within it, each one of which is at odds with the other sub-trends.” Baker continues by explaining:

[that] there are (as only a partial list of the political sub-trends) apolitical pacifist Salafis; politically engaged yet non-militant Salafis who eschew democracy; Salafis who wish to engage with the democratic system to change it; Salafis who believe jihad is an obligation but not at the current time and in the current circumstances; and, of course jihadi-Salafis who are actively engaged in military conflict.⁷¹

Baker acknowledges that “empowering one strand of Salafism over another will have its pros and cons” but argues that “the pros” in regard to tackling recruitment and radicalization of young British Muslims into Islamic State or Al Qaeda, “far outweigh any potential cons.” For the numerous police officers, civil servants, and other public servants who have worked with Baker in the past this analysis will be familiar and will ring true. They have certainly witnessed the “pros” and may also have been satisfied that the “cons” can be mitigated. Interestingly, the “cons”—a religious understanding that places most of their London neighbors in the category of nonbelievers and thereby destined to Hell—is shared by many socially conservative Muslims across London (and of course by socially conservative Christians and Jews), including many who are excused Quilliam’s liberal wrath. When Baker suggests he “would much rather live next to somebody who thinks I will go to Hell but still be polite with me, than someone who actively seeks to kill me” he is capturing a reality of contemporary London life.⁷² Several officers involved in community-based counterterrorism policing in London can vouch for Baker—and his colleagues—in terms of their regular engagement with their fellow Londoners with genuine respect and consideration—irrespective of gender, religion, or sexual orientation.⁷³

Conflating all London Muslims with affiliations to Islamist and Salafi institutions with extremists such as Anjem Choudhury⁷⁴ is also to ignore much positive work they have done to tackle them.⁷⁵ This aspect of Prevent strategy is ill-considered and unintentionally sends out a signal to London Muslims that sections of their community are being stigmatized in favor of others. It is also a proven target for terrorist propaganda.⁷⁶ Moreover, it has become an entrenched policing position since organizations that promote this approach were given major roles in police training and Prevent delivery.⁷⁷ Quite pointedly, while the anti-Islamist, Quilliam organization was given a key role in police training, the majority of voluntary Muslim organizations that dutifully attended the Muslim Safety Forum for a decade have subsequently been excluded from such work. Instead of exclusion, case by case judgments should be made, and individuals who have built up a positive reputation with police re-established as valuable interlocutors and trainers.

Conclusion: Provide Honest Feedback to Policymakers

London policing, as elsewhere, cannot forego a responsibility to explain the requirements and implications of government counterterrorism policy to representatives of the communities it serves. However, when it chooses to adopt a community-based counterterrorism policing model it should ensure that it listens attentively to messages from those communities and provides feedback to policymakers. Speaking truth to power is never a safe route to career advancement in policing—in London or elsewhere—but is clearly necessary on those occasions when government counterterrorism policy is unintentionally proving to be counterproductive, however well-intentioned it may be. This is especially important when terrorist movements are able to exploit weaknesses or mistakes in counterterrorism policy or practice for their benefit in terms of recruitment and support. This is the sense in which these recommendations are aimed at enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of counterterrorism responses to formidable and inventive terrorist opponents.

As Ian Blair expresses his learning from extensive experience in regard to counterterrorism policing and Muslim communities: “I just think we have to be incredibly careful, we shouldn’t be doing this to the community, we should be doing this with the community.”⁷⁸ Interestingly, this is an approach the authors first articulated as “partnership policing” with London-based Muslim organizations and groups in 2003 and continue to recommend it to practitioners of community-based counterterrorism policing—whether operating within or outside the government Prevent strategy. To do so is to ensure that an established policing approach, grounded in the notion of policing by consent, is extended to Muslim community representatives. For reasons this article has highlighted, a genuine partnership approach with Muslim community representatives has gained little traction in the last decade. Instead, where police engagement has often been *with* and not *to* Muslim communities—as in the case of the abandoned Muslim Safety Forum—it has been closed down under pressure of government policy.⁷⁹ Although that pressure has been more pronounced under David Cameron’s leadership, it was certainly evident when Tony Blair was at the helm and not wholly absent during Gordon Brown’s premiership. In truth, the partnership approach that underpins the recommendations in this article runs counter to a strand of government policy enacted by Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat Coalition and Conservative administrations during the last decade. Interestingly, in so far as this strand of government policy has sometimes treated Muslims differently than other faith communities, it is not central to

the ideologies of any of the three political parties involved. Rather, as the staunch Conservative commentator Peter Osborne observes, government policy in this arena has more to do with transatlantic, neo-conservatism than with mainstream U.K. politics of any stripe.⁸⁰ To be sure, individually, the authors of this article differ in their political allegiances, yet neither sees this issue in terms of party politics. Instead, it is respectfully recommended that police chiefs should summon the resolve to speak truth to power on this fundamental policing issue before retirement and to whichever party is in office.

Moreover, the emergence of community-based counterterrorism initiatives aimed at inhibiting London citizens—and citizens of other towns and cities in the United Kingdom—from leaving home to fight for Islamic State in Syria and Iraq highlights the topicality and potential value of the issues raised in this article when seeking to enhance counterterrorism practice in a complex and demanding arena. To the extent that policing plays a reduced role in regard to a problem that extends beyond counterterrorism and increasingly overlaps with counterinsurgency, counterextremism, counterradicalization, and de-radicalization, practitioners should reflect on how to ensure all strands of community opinion are fully understood. To misrepresent or stigmatize the religious beliefs or political opinions of Muslim Londoners either with a track record or with potential of tackling terrorism and violent extremism in the capital is to play into the hands of sophisticated terrorist movements and networks eager to drive a wedge between the communities where they seek recruits and supporters and the authorities employed by the state to disrupt them. Ian Blair argues that “we have to accept there are people who live their lives by fundamentalist rules” and that “fundamentalism in itself is not a matter for the state to interfere with” but that rather “when it slides into violent extremism it is.” He is surely right to argue, from his experience, that “if we cut ourselves off from talking to some people whose views we do not like but to whom millions of young people listen that’s a very difficult issue for us.”⁸¹

London policing still needs to listen to all strands of Muslim opinion as it previously sought to do at the Muslim Safety Forum. This is to avoid being seen to talk just to John Grieve’s “nodding dogs” in the community.⁸² Interestingly, in all other areas of London policing the imperative to engage with its most stringent critics appears to be alive and well.⁸³ The fact that it is less of a priority in relation to counterterrorism may well indicate the level of policing subordination to government policy in this arena. If that is the case, it only increases the duty of police to listen to its critics in the community in regard to counterterrorism issues—Prevent included—in exactly the same way as it does in all other areas of policing. Apart from its own intrinsic value as a method of policing by consent it has the added value of reducing the risk of bolstering sectarian divisions that are regularly exploited by Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their affiliates. At its best the Muslim Safety Forum achieved this objective and enabled police chiefs to brief government on key areas of concern in regard to counterterrorism policy and practice.⁸⁴ To be sure, there is an absence of accessible research that seeks to evaluate success and failure in this field. However, the difficulties inherent in establishing and measuring success in preventative and community policing of all kinds should not deter researchers in the future. Especially those willing and able to engage closely with community perspectives.⁸⁵

It follows that London policing should notify government when the Prevent strategy aimed at tackling extremism is unfairly targeting or stigmatizing Muslim groups and individuals who are not extremist but rather the exact equivalent of groups and individuals in other London faith communities who are recognized as representatives of conservative or

radical strands of legitimate religious belief and political opinion. Again, apart from its own intrinsic value as a method of policing by consent this also has the added value of reducing the risk of bolstering sectarian divisions that are regularly exploited by Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their affiliates. More generally, London policing should reflect on its unique learning, especially over the last two decades, and offer an honest appraisal of the successes and failures of government counterterrorism policy at the community level. This will be especially valuable for the growing number of civil servants and public and voluntary sector employees involved in community intervention strategies in London as well as in towns and cities across the United Kingdom.

Acknowledgment

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Notes

1. For details see Robert Lambert's *Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership* (London: Hurst, 2011) and see Parson's staff webpage at <http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/faculties/faculty-of-social-sciences-and-humanities/people/surnames-n-to-s/tim-parsons/> (accessed 30 March 2016).
2. Anthony Richards, "From Terrorism to 'Radicalisation' to 'Extremism': Counter-Terrorism Imperative or Loss of Focus?," *International Affairs* 91(2), pp. 371–380.
3. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 4, 16, 19, 21, 58, 133.
4. *Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (London: Home Office, 2011). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summary.pdf (accessed 22 April 2015).
5. *Prevent Strategy* (London: Home Office, 2011). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015).
6. Alexander Robertson, *Boy, 15, is Quizzed by Anti-Extremist Police after Deputy Headteacher Caught Him Looking Up Ukip's Website at School*, *Daily Mail*, 28 February 2016. Available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3468162/Furious-father-reveals-son-15-quizzed-police-tracking-extremists-looked-UKip-s-website-school.html#ixzz44O6Lz5be> (accessed 15 October 2016).
7. BBC News, "Mosque Bomber Pavlo Lapshyn Given Life for Murder," 25 October, 2013. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-24675040> (accessed 30 March 2016).
8. Robert Lambert, "Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London Counter-terrorism Case Study," *Political Science and Politics* 41(1) (2008), pp. 31–35.
9. 9/11 is recognized shorthand for 11 September 2001, the day on which Al Qaeda operatives carried out terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. For an insight into the immediate impact in London in terms of community-based counterterrorism policing see Lambert, "Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda," p. 31.
10. Interestingly, in the authors' experience in London, this diversity of individuals involved in community-based counterterrorism policing extends to academics and researchers with think tanks—a fact that adds value to this article's aim of informing and stimulating academic as well as practitioner debate.
11. For details of the PIRA bombing campaign in London, see Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), for example, pp. 278–279.

12. Bear in mind as well that until 1992 when responsibility was given to the Security Service (MI5), Metropolitan Police Special Branch was responsible for gathering intelligence on the IRA threat to London and the rest of the British mainland. See Frank Foley, *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past* (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p. 131.
13. Under the auspices of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), an “executive directorat” of the Home Office, established in 2007.
14. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, p. 252.
15. Ian Blair, *Dimbleby Lecture*, see BBC News, transcript of Sir Ian Blair’s speech. 16 November 2005. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4443386.stm> (accessed 11 September 2015); Martin Innes, “Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing,” *Annals of the American Academy* 605 (2006), pp. 1–20; see also Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 191–192.
16. Blair, *Dimbleby Lecture*.
17. Basia Spalek, *Terror Crime: Prevention with Communities*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Basia Spalek, ed., *Counter-Terrorism: Community Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
18. See, for example, Martin Innes and Darren Thiel, “Policing Terror,” in Tim Newburn, ed., *The Handbook of Policing*, 2nd ed. (Cullompton: Willan, 2008), pp. 553–579; Sharon Pickering, Jude McCulloch, and David Neville-Wright, eds., *Counter-Terrorism Policing: Community, Cohesion and Security* (London: Springer, 2010); Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*.
19. See, for example, Nigel Fielding, *Community Policing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); M. Brogden and P. Nijhar, *Community Policing: International Concepts and Practice* (Devon: Willan, 2005).
20. See, for example, Andrew Staniforth, *Blackstone’s Counter-Terrorism Handbook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David Lowe, *Policing Terrorism: Research Studies into Police Counter-terrorism Investigations* (London: CRC Press, 2015).
21. See, for example, the following three U.K. government strategy papers: (1) *Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (London: Home Office, 2011). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summary.pdf (accessed 22 April 2015); (2) *Prevent Strategy* (London: Home Office, 2011). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015); (3) *Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report for 2014* (London: Home Office, 2015). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415708/contest_annual_report_for_2014.pdf (accessed 15 April 2015).
22. See, for example, three competing reports from three distinctively different London think tanks: (1) Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, *The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism* (London: Demos, 2010); (2) Martin Bright, *When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State’s Flirtation with Radical Islam* (London: Policy Exchange, 2005); and (3) Arun Kundnani, *Spooked. How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (London: Institute of Race Relations, 2009).
23. See, for example, Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, “The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities,” *International Review of Law, Computers and Technology* 25 (3) (2011), pp. 151–181; Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, and Helen Innes with Trudy Lowe and Suraj Lakhani, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers* (Cardiff: Universities’ Police Science Institute, 2011). Available at <http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20send%202.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2015).
24. Of course there is significant overlap between the think tank and academic worlds in terms of personnel, just as there is an overlap between academia and the policy world with several academic researchers being recruited to the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), a cross-departmental strategic communications body based at the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) at the Home Office in recent years. RICU “aims to coordinate government-wide communication activities to counter the appeal of violent extremism while promoting stronger grass-roots inter-

- community relations.” Counter-Extremism.org, “Role of Research the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU).” Available at <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/413/research-information-and-communications-unit-ricu> (accessed 2 June 2015).
25. See, for example, Robert Lambert, “Counter-Terrorism and Its Effectiveness in the UK since 1969: Does It Pay to be Tough on Terrorism?,” in Marie Breen-Smyth, ed., *Ashgate Companion to Political Violence* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), p. 742.
 26. Here we have in mind roles managed by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) that fall under the remit of Prevent (a strand of the UK Contest counterterrorism strategy) including training roles where representatives of think tanks guide the delivery of Prevent programs for police and multi-agency partners.
 27. Quoted in Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1985), p. 49; also discussed in Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, p. 18.
 28. See, for example, Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, p. 9.
 29. Available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/58/section/3> (accessed 9 October 2015).
 30. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 8, 221, 239.
 31. Haras Rafiq, “David Cameron is Right to Tackle Extremist Ideas as Well as Behaviour.” *The Telegraph* 20 July 2015. Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11751259/David-Cameron-is-right-to-tackle-extremist-ideas-as-well-as-behaviour.html> (accessed 11 October 2015).
 32. The concepts derive from seminal texts by Jean-Paul Brodeur, in particular see, “High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities,” *Social Problems* 30 (5) (1983), pp. 507–520; and “High Policing and Low Policing in Post 9/11 Times,” *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 1(1) (2007), pp. 25–37.
 33. See, for example, Lambert, “Counter-terrorism and Its Effectiveness in the UK since 1969,” pp. 728–754.
 34. Martin Evans, “Three Missing London Schoolgirls “Travelling to Syria to Join Isil,” *The Telegraph* (2015). Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11424884/Three-missing-British-schoolgirls-travel-to-Syria.html> (accessed 2 June 2015).
 35. Martin Bentham, “Met Chief Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe: London is Home to Hundreds of ‘Militarised’ Jihadi Fighters.” *London Evening Standard* (27 August, 2014). Available at <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/met-chief-sir-bernard-hoganhowe-warns-of-londons-200-militarised-jihadi-fighters-9693477.html> (accessed 2 June 2015).
 36. “At least 700 people from the UK have travelled to support or fight for jihadist organisations in Syria and Iraq, British police say. About half have since returned to Britain. Most of those who went to the conflict zone are thought to have joined the militant group that calls itself Islamic State.” BBC News, “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?” 18 September 2015. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32026985> (accessed 11 October 2015).
 37. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 3–28; “Counter-Terrorism and Its Effectiveness in the UK since 1969,” pp. 728–754.
 38. Brodeur, “High Policing and Low Policing in Post 9/11 Times,” p. 29.
 39. According to the 2011 census 2,998,264 people or 36.7 percent of London’s population were foreign-born. When added to a significant number of Londoners whose parents were foreign born a sense of London’s diverse and evolving population emerges. See, for example, Sarah Kyambi, *Beyond Black and White: Mapping New Immigrant Communities* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005).
 40. The PIRA continued to mount bomb attacks in London throughout the 1980s and 1990s. From the 1970s onward Londoners also became familiar with occasional terrorist attacks carried out by organizations from the Middle East such as in June 1982 when three gunmen belonging to the Palestinian Abu Nidal group shot and seriously injured Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador outside the Dorchester Hotel in London’s West End.
 41. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 8, 221, 239.
 42. Robert Lambert, “Competing Counter-Radicalisation Models in the UK,” in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge. European and American Experiences* (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2011), pp. 215–225.

43. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 191–192.
44. Brodeur, “High Policing and Low Policing in Post 9/11 Times,” p. 29.
45. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 252–253.
46. Hazel Blears quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 252–253.
47. Robert Lambert, “Muslim Safety Forum: Senior Police and Muslim Community Engagement during the War on Terror,” in P. Daniel Silke, Basia Spalek, and Mary O’Rawe, eds., *Preventing Ideological Violence: Communities, Police and Case Studies of “Success”* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 67–90.
48. See *New Statesman*, full transcript, David Cameron, Speech on radicalisation and Islamic extremism, Munich, 5 February 2011. Available at <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology> (accessed 22 January 2017).
49. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 79–134.
50. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 155–220.
51. MI5, “Current International Terrorism Threat Level: SEVERE (UK-Wide), the Threat Comes Principally from Al Qaida and Related Networks; and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).” Available at <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/threat-levels.html> (accessed 8 June 2015).
52. Muslim Council of Britain, *British Muslims in Numbers* (London: MCB, 2015). Available at http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf (accessed 5 October 2015).
53. See, for example, Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 224–225.
54. Lambert, “Muslim Safety Forum,” pp. 67–90.
55. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, p. 5.
56. Vikram Dodd, “Jihadi Threat Requires Move into ‘Private Space’ of UK Muslims, Says Police Chief.” *The Guardian* 25 May 2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/24/jihadi-threat-requires-move-into-private-space-of-uk-muslims-says-police-chief> (accessed 7 June 2015).
57. *Ibid.*
58. Mehmood Naqshbandi, “Why a Comprehensive Theological Response to ISIS is Desperately Needed.” *Muslimsinbritain.org* blog. 19 March 2015. Available at <http://www.muslimsinbritain.org/blog/> (accessed 7 June 2015).
59. Mehmood Naqshbandi, *Islam and Muslims in Britain: A guide*. Available at <http://guide.muslimsinbritain.org/guide1.html> (accessed 7 June 2015).
60. For an overview of established strands of Islamic belief and practice in Britain, see Bowen, *Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent* (London: Hurst, 2014).
61. For positive examples involving Salafi Londoners see Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 155–220.
62. Naqshbandi, *Islam and Muslims in Britain*.
63. See, for example, Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 155–220.
64. Laura Pitel, “Out-of-Touch Imams Can’t Halt Terrorism, Says Adviser,” *The Times* 30 August 2014. Available at <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4199696.ece> (accessed [via subscription] 7 June 2015).
65. See, for example, Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 155–158.
66. Haras Rafiq, “London Has Been Primed for Decades by Muslim Brotherhood Extremists,” *The Express* 24 August 2014. Available at <http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/502795/London-has-been-primed-for-decades-by-Muslim-Brotherhood-extremists> (accessed 10 October 2015).
67. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 135–154.
68. Peter Osborne, “HSBC, Muslims and Me.” BBC Radio 4 first broadcast 28 July 2015. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0639w47> (accessed 10 October 2015).
69. Robert Lambert, “Anti-Muslim Violence in the UK,” in Max Taylor, P. M. Currie, and Donald Holbrook, eds., *Extreme Right Political Violence and Terrorism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 34.

70. See for example role of Barry Norman, former Islington Borough Commander, in Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 97, 100, 103–114, 285.
71. Abdul Haqq Baker, “Is Quietist Salafism an Alternative to ISIS?” Blog article at Abdul Haqq Baker, Ph.D. website. Available at <http://abdulhaqqbaker.com/is-quietist-salafism-an-alternative-to-isis/> (accessed 11 October 2015); for background and context see Abdul Haqq Baker, *Extremists in our Midst* (London: Palgrave, 2011).
72. Baker, “Is Quietist Salafism an Alternative to ISIS?”
73. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 155–222.
74. Jamie Grearson and Shiv Malik, “Preacher Anjem Choudary Charged with Encouraging Support for Islamic State,” *The Guardian* 5 August 2015. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/aug/05/cleric-anjem-choudary-charged-with-encouraging-support-for-islamic-state> (accessed 5 October 2015).
75. Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, pp. 287–288.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 224–225.
77. See, for example, Quilliam Foundation, “Quilliam Trains over 1,000 Public Sector Workers,” Press release, 2009. Available at <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam-trains-over-1000-public-sector-workers/> (accessed 8 June 2015).
78. Ned Simons, “Ex-Police Chief Lord Blair Questions David Cameron’s Terror Strategy,” *Huffington Post* 1 July 2015. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/07/01/ex-police-chief-questions-camersons-terror-strategy_n_7709882.html (accessed 5 October 2015).
79. Lambert, “Muslim Safety Forum,” pp. 80–83.
80. Peter Osborne, “Neoconservatives Ruined David Cameron’s Foreign Policy Realism,” *Middle East Eye* 7 May 2015. Available at <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/neoconservatives-ruined-david-camersons-foreign-policy-realism-550147284#sthash.4tSiiQf.dpuf> (accessed 10 October 2015).
81. Simons, “Ex-Police Chief Lord Blair Questions David Cameron’s Terror Strategy.”
82. In the wake of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry John Grieve highlighted the importance of listening to challenging community voices and not simply talking to “nodding dogs.” See John Grieve and Julie French, “Does Institutional Racism Exist In the Metropolitan Police Service?,” in David G. Green, ed., *Institutional Racism and the Police: Fact or Fiction?* (London: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2002), p. 19; quoted in Lambert, *Countering al-Qaeda in London*, p. 61.
83. See, for example, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Mark Simmonds of the Metropolitan Police listening to blistering criticism from “community activist” Lee Jasper at a police/ community meeting in Brixton in episode 1 of the BBC TV documentary, “The Met: Policing London,” first broadcast on BBC1 at 9 p.m. on Monday, 7 June 2015. Available (for a limited period) at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05ztwjsj/the-met-policing-london-episode-1> (accessed 8 June 2015).
84. Lambert, “Muslim Safety Forum.”
85. Spalek, *Terror Crime: Prevention with Communities*.