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To cite this article: Anna Halafoff & David Wright-Neville (2009) A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in Countering Terrorism, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32:11, 921-932, DOI: [10.1080/10576100903262740](https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903262740)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100903262740>



Published online: 23 Oct 2009.



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A Missing Peace? The Role of Religious Actors in Countering Terrorism

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Despite the surge of scholarly interest in terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 world, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of religious actors (especially faith communities and faith leaders) in combating the threat of terrorism. However, the resurgence of religiosity in contemporary politics should not be viewed as an inherently dangerous force. As Appleby has argued, a new secular-religious model of inter and intra-state diplomacy looms as a development with significant potential to resolve conflict and deny terrorist groups access to communities of support. By drawing on an Australian example, we argue that in societies that have a strong multicultural and multifaith character secular-religious diplomacy pitched at the national and sub-national level can play an important role in the formation of a flexible long-term counterterrorism strategy.

Excluding Religiosity from Counterterrorism Praxis

Amid the surge of scholarly interest in terrorism and counterterrorism in the post-9/11 world surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of religious communities or community leaders in combating terrorism.¹ For instance, in the recent call by Katona et al. for a *global counterterrorist network*, including experts from medical, health, economic, policy, law enforcement, military, and intelligence sectors, notably religious communities, theologians, and sociologists of religion were excluded.² Given that Katona et al. also stated, “[t]errorism has been evolving as a political, religious and criminal tactic for thousands of years” this seems a somewhat gross omission.³ However, it was not a mere oversight but is rather a reflection of the resilience of the post-Westphalian focus on separating religion and state, a practice that has led to the general exclusion of religion from most modern security discourses.⁴

There is a significant irony to this reluctance to pay greater attention to religion and religiosity in the crafting of counterterrorism praxis. The irony rests in the reality that like it or not, religion has forced its way into local and global security agendas through the role it plays as a key organizing principle for an emerging generation of disenfranchised

Received 15 December 2008; accepted 8 February 2009.

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individuals who are linked through a combination of shared parochial and international concerns. Indeed, it is our contention that the failure to pay closer attention to the positive roles that religion and religious figures can play in counterterrorism practices is a significant reason for why, in the words of Katona et al., “we are no safer now than before 9/11” and that there has been “little done to break the backs of the various terrorist organizations.”⁵ In short, the expenditure of many billions of dollars, the progressive hardening of state powers of surveillance and arrest, and the extensive use of conventional and unconventional military power against actual and assumed terrorist targets around the world, has yielded few results that are likely to generate long-term benefits in terms of public safety and community cohesion.

There are many reasons for the resilience of contemporary terrorist groups and the failure of counterterrorism policies to stem their activities, among the most important of which is reluctance by policymakers to acknowledge the “root causes” of the anger that inspires the violence.⁶ However, similarly important is the terrorists’ use of networks, or more accurately “networks of networks,” which have the capacity to confound traditional state-based security responses.⁷ Recognizing the centrality of both formal and informal networks of the angry and disenfranchised in sustaining contemporary terrorist movements, many writers have observed (correctly in the present authors’ view) that dealing with the threat requires the development of more extensive and proactive counterterrorism networks. For example, Katona et al. observe that, “partnerships are now needed that were previously uncalled for or unnecessary and, in many cases, never even considered. . . . Success in countering global insurgency requires not only top-down national security intelligence, but bottom-up local and peer-to-peer intelligence and coordination.”⁸ Yet once again, the definition of networks adopted by Katona and his co-authors is limited to state-based actors. Moreover, even when they speak of “bottom-up local” coordination they are referring only to those institutions whose authority rests overwhelmingly on covert activities and/or the use of hard power; namely police and intelligence agencies. They make no mention of the valuable contribution that networks forged from civil society groups, such as inter-faith initiatives, can play as adjunct networks capable of working in parallel with state-based agencies and that, if effective, can attenuate the social costs that are sometimes imposed through the injudicious use of hard power.

Juergensmeyer’s chapter, included in the volume by Katona et al.,⁹ picks up on this point when he argues that any effective response to religiously motivated terrorism must recognize that for the terrorists the violence is justified in terms of a “cosmic war,” wherein the world is bifurcated into forces of absolute good and absolute evil and where “the absolutism of cosmic war makes compromise unlikely, and those who suggest a negotiated settlement are as excoriated as the enemy.”¹⁰ Once the world is looked at through such a lens, standard political and military responses are almost always rendered inadequate as either deterrents or modes of punishment. Because the state and its agents are already perceived as agents of evil, the application of hard power is seen simply as conformation of their malevolence. At the same time, the potential for hard power to inflict damage on innocent bystanders, either through the erosion of basic human rights or through cases of mistaken identity of simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time, can also work to the advantage of the terrorists by providing them with examples of the wicked and hostile intentions of the state.¹¹

A large part of the problem therefore stems from the crafting of counterterrorism problems that ignore the resurgence of interest for what Juergensmeyer (among many others) has called a “desire for a renewed role for religion in public life.”¹² Against this background

there is a tendency among many in society to see the overtly secular and heavy-handed nature of counterterrorism as an assault on them and their religiosity. Juergensmeyer's insights are not new. Since Johnston and Sampson's *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* was published in 1994,¹³ there have been numerous studies of the efficacy of religious leaders in post-conflict resolution and peace-building¹⁴; however, surprisingly little of this scholarship has translated into counterterrorism theory or practice. The imbalance between effective "soft" and ineffective "hard" power practices remains wide and there is a pressing need to bridge this divide by incorporating insights gained from religious, interreligious, and secular-religious peace-building research and praxis.

Post-Secular Security

Western modernity's skepticism toward religion is widely understood as having its roots in the Reformation but reaching fuller intellectual maturity during and after the Enlightenment.¹⁵ Within the file of international politics and security, the principles of the Enlightenment were embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which recognized previously warring states as equal and therefore invoked the concept of sovereignty, which as Münkler points out "became the basis for Europe's international laws of war, according to which only sovereign states had the right to wage war," a situation that forced even the Pope and the Emperor to situate themselves on a level footing with other sovereign powers.¹⁶ According to Thomas the so-called Westphalian presumption in international relations, derived from fears arising from the European religious wars, was that ultimately religion threatened security and therefore religion "must be disciplined by the state" and "overcome by a global or cosmopolitan ethic."¹⁷

While recognizing the existence of multiple modernities and that religion and state have never truly been separate in Western societies, a detailed discussion of the actual variety of state-religion relationships in and beyond Australia is outside the scope of this chapter.¹⁸ However, in the case of security discourses one can safely say that *realpolitik*, the hardnosed human instinct that the realist approach to politics and international relations assumes, has historically excluded religion based, at least in part, on lingering Westphalian fears.¹⁹ Yet since the 1980s the global rise of religious "fundamentalist" movements and studies examining religion's role in globalization, civil society, conflict, and peace-building have challenged this exclusion.²⁰ In addition, the spread of ethnic, religious, and communally based conflicts in the post-Cold War period has in some people's opinion presaged the need for a new form of faith-based diplomacy whereby traditional diplomatic practices are infused with a greater recognition of the importance of religion and faith in the modern world.²¹ Although this article is not arguing that such an approach is a panacea for the world's ills, the success of such initiatives in the few instances where they have been trialed provides significant scope for optimism in the post-9/11 environment. The events of 9/11 provided an especially dramatic example of the diminished utility of conventional Realism as a heuristic device for understanding international politics. As Robert Keohane observed, "the attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation. They ignore the impact of religion, despite the fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fueled by religious fervor."²² It is for this reason that writers such as Keohane and Johnston²³ have called for a new realist perspective, one that acknowledges both the negative and positive influences of religion in an increasingly interdependent global society.

For Johnston, the failure to make this perceptual adjustment imposes significant constraints on policymakers and security experts.²⁴ Because they remain trapped within analytical paradigms that are traditionally hostile or ambivalent to the role of culture and religion in shaping human agency, or because the innate sensitivity of the issue militates against comfortable public comment and action, counterterrorism practitioners are disadvantaged by the constraints they have been placed under to ensure the separation of religion and state. Indeed, as will be argued shortly, a better understanding of the role of religion (and other identity-based markers) in shaping political agency in the contemporary world carries the promise of substantial analytical and practical returns. In particular, there is a need to re-examine and adjust conventional assumptions about the role of religion as a phenomenon that is neatly compartmentalized within the private realm. The use of religion as an organizing principle for political action is not inconsistent with rational behavior, despite what is commonly believed. As Hoover notes, “national security and foreign policy practitioners must begin to treat religion as a serious variable in the conduct of international relations.”²⁵ At the same time there is a parallel need to recognize the potential that religious leaders and authorities can play in the contemporary world in helping to avoid or reduce the risk of conflict, particularly that which involves terrorism.²⁶

Yet, despite the growing recognition of the need to pay closer attention to the role of religion in the mediation and settling of conflict, or in Johnston and Sampson’s words, to “bring faith-based voices” into the international relations conversation, few scholars have been prepared to challenge secular orthodoxies while others have struggled to find a way to put into action what remains a largely theoretical construct. This is despite the growing weight of empirical evidence underscoring the urgency of such an agenda. The world is becoming more violent as the Westphalian notion of the state as the only body with the sovereign right to use force erodes in the face of new patterns of transnational identity and new types of grievances that are simultaneously local and global.²⁷

But is the future as bleak as some writers suggest? Appleby describes the emergence of a new secular–religious model of diplomacy as a promising recent development and attributes “the building of strong secular and religious networks and coalitions” as the key to its continued success.²⁸ Religious actors are well networked within their own local and global religious communities and are increasingly well positioned to offer cultural and religious insights to secular officials that are vital for the establishment of new discourses and dialogues. The efficacy of religious–secular peace-building and conflict transformation depends on the fostering of fluid and malleable partnerships between secular agencies (including nongovernmental organizations) and government agencies that create operational synergies that ensure “technical expertise, media connections, financial means, intelligence data, logistical capabilities, and other resources” flow more freely between and within different segments of the community and between these community groups and different segments of the state.²⁹

An example of how this model works is the manner in which authorities in Victoria have responded to global crisis events, such as 9/11, and the London and Bali bombings. Following these events, the state government worked closely with Victoria Police to develop an inclusive approach to counterterrorism management. Aware of the dangers posed to social harmony in a highly multicultural city such as Melbourne should the terrorist attacks provoke anti-Muslim vigilantism, a number of initiatives were put in place designed to calm the community, militate against the spread of crude cultural stereotypes, and include religious leaders from across the spectrum of faiths in initiatives designed to buttress community resilience. These initiatives have proven to be highly successful, particularly as preventative strategies promoting social inclusion and post-conflict reconstruction.³⁰

Inclusive Counterterrorism Networks in Victoria

Even though religion and religious leaders have played a significant role in the construction of social capital in Australia through contribution to: the formation of values, education, health care, welfare, aid, philanthropy, social justice, multiculturalism, and family cohesion, research indicates that Australia's social capital could be destroyed by: exclusion promoted by religion, religious extremism and intolerance, gender inequity, and anti-Islamic views.³¹ More ominously, several recent Australian studies have documented a rise of discrimination toward Arab and Muslim Australians following the events of 9/11.³² These have been matched by the phenomenon of *misplaced Islamophobia* whereby "non-Muslim Arab, Lebanese, Indian, Sikh, Pacific Islander, and African communities" are targeted for attack. Increases in migrantophobia, xenophobia, racism, and religious vilification have also been reported.³³

Recent events in Australia provide a pertinent illustration that despite the rise in discourses of exclusivist and discriminatory sentiments in the post-9/11 period, particularly evident in the Australian context in the "Values Debate" fostered by the Howard government and the 2005 riots at Sydney's Cronulla beach, religious communities have been far from passive. In particular, they have actively sought to resist disempowerment by initiating dialogues and a variety of community and educational activities designed to dispel negative stereotypes and attitudes. A multiplicity of initiatives aimed at building secular-religious networks between the state and its key agencies (such as the police) and on the other hand religious and ethnic communities have been launched in an attempt to rebut the claim made by the former Treasurer in the Howard government, Peter Costello (and echoed by many of his fellow conservatives) that "mushy, misguided multiculturalism" is in fact "part of the problem."³⁴ Against this knee-jerk hostility to cultural diversity and a priori assumption of its inherently dangerous character, culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse (CRALD) Victorian communities have reported the success of a wide range of initiatives in advancing social inclusion and genuine security. Alternately, rising narrow nationalism and assimilationist strategies promoted by the former Howard government have been reported as exacerbating feelings of exclusion and thereby security risks.³⁵

Despite national and international debates and critiques of multiculturalism, the "resilience of multiculturalism" reported by CRALD communities in Victoria is worthy of mention.³⁶ A significant rise in educational activities promoting awareness and understanding of Muslim culture and of multi-faith engagement has been reported in Victoria following 9/11.³⁷ Community-led initiatives, such as mosque open days, inter-faith educational programs and symposia, and multi-faith festivals have at times been funded by state and federal governments. Muslim communities have been active in addressing the negative effects of divisive and ill-informed media reporting through positive media engagement.³⁸ Muslim public intellectuals have countered negative stereotypes and promoted understanding of their communities through commercial and independent media.³⁹ The success of *Salam Café*, a Muslim current affairs and comedy program, which appeared initially on independent TV Channel 31 and has been picked up by SBS, the mainstream Australian multicultural TV channel, further indicates the pro-active responses of young Muslims in promoting understanding of Muslim culture and religion.⁴⁰

State governments and local councils in Victoria have also initiated a plethora of multi-faith activities in partnership with local communities. Notable examples include: The Victorian Government's *Community Accord*, *Celebrate our Cultural Diversity Week*, *Multifaith Leaders Forum*, and the *Multifaith, Multicultural Youth Forum*.⁴¹ These initiatives aim to foster an inclusive Victorian community where religious diversity is welcome,

religious traditions and practices are respected as long as they are consistent with the law and human rights, good relations between diverse communities and state actors assist new communities with settlement and in managing old and new tensions should they occur. In this way these initiatives contribute to building genuinely secure communities and form a significant part of preventative counterterrorism strategies.

The Victorian government and former Premier of Victoria Steve Bracks in particular have been praised for their commitment to multiculturalism as a strategy for promoting security through social inclusion.⁴² This is hardly surprising considering that the State Government of Victoria's counterterrorism policy declares that a long-term view to attacking the causes of terrorism includes "re-affirming Australia's commitment to multiculturalism."⁴³ The former Premier of Victoria also stated,

Governments must take a long-term view to address the causes of terrorism. The Victorian community gains great strength from its long history of democracy, diversity and harmony. The Government believes that an effective approach to terrorism must include measures to prevent, at its roots, the rise of radicalism that advocates terrorism. This can only be achieved through cooperation and partnership with faith and community leaders together with their communities.⁴⁴

In addition to expressing support for the Victorian Government, CRALD Victorians have expressed an overwhelmingly positive view of Victoria police and community policing, notably for their high level of community engagement and willingness to work in partnership with communities to address critical issues⁴⁵ while simultaneous research has demonstrated that community policing operates as a highly effective counterterrorism strategy in Victoria.⁴⁶ It is important not to lose sight of this point. A defining feature of terrorism throughout history has been the ability of key organizers and recruiters to prey on feelings of marginalization and alienation to either attract new recruits or, more subtly, solicit financial and other forms of logistic support from sympathetic communities.⁴⁷ In the contemporary world, this has changed only to the extent that grievances and feelings of alienation are being disembedded from their parochial roots and reconfigured within a global milieu.⁴⁸ In other words, the key drivers of terrorism are becoming internationalized, a reality that is most dramatically revealed in the transnational character of groups such as Al Qaeda and the mix of domestic and international issues that inspired the four men responsible for the attacks on London's public transport system on 7 July 2005.

Terrorist recruiters have developed a range of sophisticated techniques designed to exploit low levels of social capital and correspondingly low levels of self-esteem and feelings of powerlessness—especially among young males—as a way of attracting fresh waves of volunteers for their cause.⁴⁹ As part of this strategy they have been especially adept at manipulating the negative experiences of individuals who have experienced the strengthened hand of the state, especially as it has been applied against Muslim communities in the post-9/11 period. Quoting Anthony Oberschall, Parker warns that,

... democratic states that find themselves confronting terrorist groups are facing an enemy which, like the giant Antaeus in Greek mythology, draws strength from its connection to its environment. Any defensive or offensive action taken by a state is likely to have ramifications for the hospitableness of that environment which may go beyond those intended or initially perceived: "Episodes of violent actions and confrontations should be analyzed as strategic interactions.

The strategy of the target is as important as that of the terrorists. The bloody drama is played before an audience, and its reactions are important for the outcome.”⁵⁰

Against this background the importance of building counterterrorism strategies that rob the terrorists of their narrative and symbolic power is made all the more obvious. Community-based programs that involve the police and other agencies building a reservoir of social capital have the potential to go a long way to creating a hostile operating environment for terrorists and their supporters. Such programs need to be sustained over long periods of time and directed at audiences that transcend generational, religious, and gender divides. They also need to reflect greater levels of cultural, historical, and political literacy among police officers and other government officials, and to this end religious and other cultural leaders must be critical players. The inclusion of religious and community representatives in counterterrorism networks establishes trust by sending the message that counterterrorism policing occurs on behalf of the entire community rather than being an exercise directed against a particular segment of society. But networks of trust can have further benefits; the arrests of more than twenty men in Melbourne and Sydney in late 2005 on suspicion of terrorist-related activities is reported to have resulted from a “tip-off from an Australian Muslim,” a piece of evidence that triggered the subsequent investigation.⁵¹

Terrorism as a Process

Writers such as Gilligan and Elias have noted that almost all people who kill deliberately hate their own lives as well as those of others.⁵² Recognizing the nexus between ontological insecurity and terrorism therefore looms as an important step in the crafting of better counterterrorism policies. However, while there is no shortage of scholars prepared to pay homage to such a focus, the need to develop more inclusive policies that reduce feelings of marginalization are yet to play any significant role in the counterterrorism policies of most Western states. Instead, as noted earlier, socioeconomic marginalization remains an issue confined to the periphery of counterterrorism policy; a soft option foisted on to social workers and community leaders while the bulk of state resources are dedicated to hard power initiatives that, ironically, seem to be intensifying the very feelings of alienation that soft power initiatives are designed to reverse. A significant part of the reason for this curious state of affairs is that the idea of terrorism as a process appears to have been grasped only tenuously by policymakers. In other words, the nexus between alienation and violence in the evolution of a terrorist is still under-appreciated.

To paraphrase Horgan, terrorism is a “process comprising discrete phases.”⁵³ These phases work at the individual, group, and social psychological levels. More importantly, this mix of psychological, social, and political forces is symbiotic. Neither the psychological, the social, nor political influences should be considered as discrete in that personal psychologies also influence the way in which an individual interprets and responds to wider social conditions.⁵⁴ In short, all these forces conspire in differing ways on different people. In the case of terrorists, these dynamics merge to create an existential framework within which violence looms as a rational and logical choice for addressing perceived injustices against the self and against one’s fraternal unit. Put more simply, the causes of terrorism are rooted mainly in what Richardson has called “subjective perceptions, in a lethal cocktail containing a disaffected individual, an enabling community and a legitimizing ideology” all of which can be facilitated by the patterns of socioeconomic and political exclusion documented earlier.⁵⁵




Figure 1. The alienation process.

This conception of terrorism as a dynamic phenomenon that involves a transitional psychological state before reaching the point of “acting out” is represented in Figure 1. Admittedly, capturing the array of emotions and vast repertoire of personal histories and experiences that have led different individuals to embrace terrorism as a legitimate form of political action remains extraordinarily difficult. Even so, as argued earlier, there remain some useful reference points that appear regularly across the variegated life histories of terrorists motivated at different times by a range of different political and ideological goals.

It is understandable that police and security agencies—as well as many terrorism scholars—pay particular attention to the extreme right of the diagram, which is the point at which an attack is immanent. However, there is a need to avoid the temptation to perceive counterterrorism as a largely reactive exercise that involves little more than detecting and hunting down those individuals who have already crossed the violence threshold. As discussed earlier, if this perception is permitted to shape policy there is a real danger that hard-power-based initiatives will prevail over more subtle measures designed and implemented to the left of the alienation threshold with the intention of choking off the number of individuals who make the transition to violence. In other words, recognizing religious and cultural diversity, creating greater social spaces for the expression of different forms of piety, and forging coalitions of community and religious leaders, police and security agencies and policymakers offer the best chance of identifying the social pathologies that feed alienation and marginalization and as such a more immediate mechanism for the implementation of remedial initiatives.

It is therefore not difficult to understand how inclusive counterterrorism strategies can have beneficial effects in countering alienation and thereby possible radicalization and violence. However, there is a need to avoid the trap of a “one-size fits all” approach. Diverse strategies are required at different stages of the alienation process, although at all stages, in the contemporary world, there is a high likelihood that religious actors can and should play an important role.

Strategies such as promoting a multicultural and multi-faith society can assist in social inclusion and stem processes of alienation. Furthermore, responsible statements by political leaders, public intellectuals, and the press encouraging inclusive, diverse, respectful, and law-abiding communities can contribute to genuine security. In contrast, divisive rhetoric and Islamophobic and migrantophobic discourse by leaders and journalists can exacerbate feelings of alienation.⁵⁶ Free press and free speech, the right to voice concerns publicly and to air a diverse range of opinions need not be threatened by such statements; the emphasis here is on *responsible speech*, not on regulation of speech. Indeed, in order to provide nonviolent outlets for grievances the right to voice concerns and to nonviolent dissent needs to be encouraged. In this way, multi-faith initiatives, mosque open days, op-ed pieces, TV shows such as *Salam Café*, Multifaith Leaders, and Youth forums all form part of an inclusive counterterrorism strategy. Such initiatives operate most effectively at the left of the “alienation wedge”; they are obviously not effective strategies once a person has crossed over the “alienation threshold” and emotionally detached themselves from mainstream society and its institutions. Other initiatives, based on similar principles and also calling on the expertise of religious actors, are required in these cases.

This is a noteworthy point as policymakers and the general public frequently do not see the benefit of multi-faith engagement or educational activities; they are perceived as “soft” options. However, placing them in this context they are clearly not “soft” but rather the most effective methods to address a particular set of issues. When viewed in this way “hard” options such as promoting a narrow nationalism, citizenship testing, and a return to discourses that promote the unquestionable supremacy of Judeo-Christian values can be seen as exclusive and thereby dangerous—aggravating grievances instead of alleviating them.

Community policing initiatives operate most effectively at the large, middle, and narrow sections of the “wedge.” Police, through encouraging positive community relations, such as playing soccer with youth, attending community events, and offering assistance to newly arriving communities, foster mutual confidence, thereby lessening the risk of alienation. At the middle end of the “wedge” when states and police protect and uphold the right to nonviolent expressions of dissent, grievances can be aired safely. Religious communities have historically played a significant role in critiquing states. If consultative bodies such as multi-faith and youth councils are established and individuals and communities are encouraged to air their concerns, and even more so when they genuinely feel they have been heard and are acted upon, again the risk of alienation decreases.

At the narrow end of the wedge, even after an individual has crossed the alienation threshold and retreated into small groups of detached and disenfranchised fellow travelers, religious communities are still well-equipped to play a role by identifying individuals within their communities who are most at risk, providing guidance, counseling, and if necessary, alerting the authorities. However, all of this is dependent on the preliminary establishment of networks of trust.

A shift from narrow national security approaches to multilateral, global security approaches is clearly necessary if one is to deal with the changing nature of conflict and violence.⁵⁷ As Katona et al. have stated, for this to occur successfully there is a need for “a change in attitudes, shifting from a go-it-alone to a more global cooperative approach.”⁵⁸ This is true, but such a shift is unlikely to yield the expected returns if new participatory models of counterterrorism practice fail to account for greater religious diversity and facilitate more input from multi-faith networks and initiatives.

Notes

1. Notable exceptions being several publications co-authored or authored by members of the Global Terrorism Research Centre, Monash University discussed throughout this article. See also R. Lambert, "Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study," *PSOnline* (January 2008), pp. 31–35.

2. P. Katona, M. D. Intriligator, and J. P. Sullivan, eds., preface to *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. iii.

3. P. Katona, M. D. Intriligator, and J. P. Sullivan, eds., introduction to *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 1.

4. An obvious exception to this is the Christian Realism most often associated with the work of the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr's application of Augustinian observations on the nature of humankind to the world of the late 1930s and 1940s, especially the rise of fascism and communism, prompted him to argue that malevolent forces sometimes required forceful (violent) resistance if they are to be vanquished and humans saved from their brutalizing effects. See R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation: Volumes 1 and 2* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1964 [1943]).

5. Katona, Intriligator, and Sullivan, preface to *Countering Terrorism and WMD*, p. xxiii.

6. D. K. Gupta, "Exploring Roots of Terrorism," in T. Bjorgo, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).

7. J. P. Sullivan, "Fusing Terrorism Security and Response," in P. Katona, M. D. Intriligator, and J. P. Sullivan, eds., *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 285; M. Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); M. Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

8. Katona, Intriligator, and Sullivan, preface to *Countering Terrorism and WMD*, p. xxiv.

9. M. Juergensmeyer, "Responding to Religious Terrorism on a Global Scale," in P. Katona, M. D. Intriligator, and J. P. Sullivan, eds., *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

10. M. Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, Third Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 154.

11. T. Parker, "Fighting an Antaeon Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements they Oppose," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19(2) (2007), pp. 155–179.

12. Juergensmeyer, "Responding to Religious Terrorism," p. 133.

13. D. Johnston and D. Sampson, eds., *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

14. D. R. Hoover, "Introduction: Religion Gets Real," in R. A. Seiple and D. R. Hoover, eds., *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p. 3.

15. J. Esposito and M. Watson, "Overview: The Significance of Religion for Global Order," in J. Esposito and M. Watson, eds., *Religion and Global Order* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000). 18. See also C. Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2007).

16. H. Münkler, *The New Wars*, translated by T. Camiller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005 [2002]).

17. S. M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 54–55.

18. See V. Bader, *Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007).

19. D. Johnston, ed., foreword to *Trumping Realpolitik: Faith-Based Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. xi.

20. See M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, *The Glory and the Power: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); P. Beyer, *Religions and Globalization* (London: Sage, 1994); J. Casanova, *Public Religion in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1994); Johnston and Sampson, eds., *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*; Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*; J. A. Beckford, *Social Theory of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); R. S. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield, 2000); R. S. Appleby, "Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in the Service of Peacebuilding," in D. Johnston, ed., *Trumping Realpolitik: Faith-Based Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 231–258.

21. Johnston, *Trumping Realpolitik*, p. 7; Johnston and Sampson, eds., *Religion, the Missing Dimension*.

22. R. O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 78.

23. Johnston, *Trumping Realpolitik*, p. xi.

24. D. Johnston, foreword to *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, R. A. Seiple and D. R. Hoover, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers), pp. xi, x.

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26. *Ibid.*

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