Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11

Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Michael J. Balz

Published online: 21 Sep 2010.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 398

View related articles

Citing articles: 9 View citing articles

Taming the Imams: European Governments and Islamic Preachers since 9/11

YVONNE YAZBECK HADDAD* & MICHAEL J. BALZ**

*The Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, University of Georgetown, Washington, DC, USA; **Institut Français du Proche Orient (IFPO), Damascus, Syria*

ABSTRACT   *The bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 alerted European governments to their susceptibility to terrorism perpetrated by unassimilated Muslim immigrants. Whether they had pursued multicultural immigration policies or regulated their immigrant communities closely, European countries began adopting stricter measures in the attempt to contain—if not transform—'radical' Islam. There appears to be a convergence toward a rigid model that includes highly-visible deportations, demonstrations of support for pro-government Muslim leaders, and infiltration of mosques and Muslim communities, as well as sponsoring or endorsing programs to train Euro-friendly imams. This study examines the development and diversity of such policies as they affect imams in various European countries with special reference to immigration policy, domestic surveillance and education programs in France, Britain and the Netherlands.*

Muslim communities in Europe have come under increased government scrutiny and pressure since investigators discovered links between the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 and immigrant groups in Hamburg, Germany. Though European governments have monitored Muslim groups officially and clandestinely since the late 1970s, such scrutiny has intensified since the Madrid bombings of March 2004 (Sciolino, 2004), the murder of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, in November 2004 (Simons, 2004) and the London bombings of July 2005 (Cowell, 2005; Hussain, 2005, pp. 115–129). In the aftermath of these events, European governments that pursued multicultural immigration policies, as well as those that had long regulated their immigrant communities closely, have adopted stricter measures in the attempt to contain—if not transform— 'radical' Islam. These policies include highly visible deportations, demonstrations of

Correspondence Addresses: Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, 3700 O Street NW, Intercultural Center (ICC) Suite 260, Washington, DC 20057, USA; Email: haddady@georgetown.edu
Michael J. Balz, c/o Institut Français du Proche Orient (IFPO), Box 334, Damascus, Syria; Email: mikebalz@gmail.com

support for pro-government Muslim leaders, infiltration of mosques and Muslim communities, and sponsoring or endorsing programs to train Euro-friendly imams.

Noting the grievances that motivate international terrorist groups, as stated by Osama bin Laden—support for the state of Israel and autocratic Arab regimes, the American military presence in Saudi Arabia, and inhumane policies towards Muslims in Palestine and Iraq,[1] European governments saw themselves as relatively insulated from international terror since they considered their Middle East policy to be more balanced than that of the USA. And yet, what was initially perceived as retaliation against American policy in the Muslim world became a European problem following the Madrid bombings.[2] European governments were further troubled that the perpetrators of the London bombings were British-born, and were thus expected to have allegiance to their country of birth (Guthrie & Tighe, 2005).

Consequently, European governments have begun to publicly express their fear of imams resident in Europe who nevertheless teach jihad against the West, and many government officials have become particularly outspoken in stating their opposition to radical 'prayer rooms in garages and basements' funded by foreign governments.[3] Internal politics in recent years, such as post-9/11 Islamophobic political rhetoric, the French riots of 2005 and the Danish cartoon controversy of 2006,[4] have only further inflamed mutual mistrust and suspicion between governments and Muslim communities in Europe.

As part of a broader effort to construct what they perceive as a Euro-friendly Islam,[5] governments have adopted a variety of new policies aimed at dealing with the 'problem of the Muslim presence' in Europe, focusing on security[6] as well as the integration[7] of Muslims as citizens of the New Europe.[8] These policies and procedures include new legislation to regulate immigration and asylum requests on a national and/or inter-governmental European level,[9] expansion of police powers and security measures and increased restrictions on civil liberties in an effort to contain anti-Western Muslims and to prevent the proliferation of terrorist cells.[10] Governments have also seriously increased surveillance of Muslim neighborhoods and mosques in an effort to identify and expel radicals. And while individual European states pursue stronger anti-terrorism measures, the European Union has been working since 2004 to harmonize and streamline the immigration policies of its members by 2010, including the processing of asylum seekers.

Still other policies can be seen as strategies for 'religion building', as European governments are attempting to reshape the way that imams—Islamic preachers—work and are educated in Europe. These policies include state construction of Islamic schools and mosques,[11] increased efforts to create and recognize government-friendly Islamic organizations to act as interlocutors between the Muslim community and the state,[12] active promotion of a 'moderate' and 'tolerant' Islam that is more attuned to European policies and values, and efforts to create a Euro-friendly imam corps that include re-educating the imams in schools with government ties.

As European governments have historically become more aggressive in promoting an anti-terror agenda immediately following an attack on their soil, France's attempts to monitor and form imams are more developed—though not necessarily more successful—than those of other European countries, largely because Islamist groups forced France to confront domestic terrorism almost a decade before its neighbors. Given France's long attempts at forced assimilation through language, education and security policy, it appears that other European countries may be looking to the French government as a model in shaping their own integration policies. While the policies of different

European governments towards their immigrant communities formerly varied tremendously from state to state, they are now beginning to converge around a more rigid model that draws at least in part on the French experience.

This study will examine the development and diversity of such policies as they affect imams in various European countries, with special reference to immigration policy, domestic surveillance and education programs in France, Britain and the Netherlands, each of which had pursued distinct integration policies before 9/11. In the aftermath of the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, each has focused on Islamist activity on its own soil, while remaining informed by their own socio-political history and imperial experiences. Especially in the cases of Britain and the Netherlands, it appears that previous models have been discarded in favor of much more rigid and security-driven measures.

Europe's Engagement with Islam

European efforts to reshape Islam did not begin with the arrival of Muslim immigrants in Europe; rather they date to the encounter of European colonial powers and their efforts to 'civilize' the conquered Muslim world. When the French began their colonization of Algeria in 1830, they identified local religious leaders as particularly responsible for per-petuating indigenous resistance to French rule. Their view of the Algerian clerical elite or *ᶜulamā'* was further informed by the staunchly republican education of the elite French military academies that French colonial and military officials attended almost without exception: the prevailing view within the *Bureaux arabes*, the French military offices responsible for colonization in Algeria, was that the Algerian *ᶜulamā'* were comparable to the corrupt Catholic clergy of the *ancien régime*. The French also saw a special need to replace clerics in schools with instructors sympathetic to French ideals, as education was considered to be the cornerstone of the French *mission civilicatrice*. The only way to conquer Algeria completely was therefore thought to be to penetrate local religious net-works by monitoring mosques and other Islamic spaces while also regulating Islamic schools. By the mid-1850s, the *Bureaux arabes* had become engaged in monitoring Islamic activity; they brought schools under their control by recruiting and paying *qāḍi*s and Islamic teachers directly. At the same time, the French colonial administration required that no school operate without the explicit consent of the *Bureaux arabes* and that all schools be subject to regular inspections by the colonial authority.[13]

The European colonial occupation of Muslim countries fomented local resistance groups that sought empowerment in puritanical Islamic orthodoxy. This was true of the Dutch colonial bureaucracy in Indonesia, which favored syncretistic Indic Javanese culture, but whose policies gave rise to Nahdatul Ulema and the Muhammadiyya move-ments (Hassan, 1982, p. x). Similarly, British rule of India, which tolerated a Christian missionary assault on Islam, gave rise to the establishment of a chain of Deobandi schools that created a modern curriculum based on the Qur'an and the Hadith, as well as *fanni munazara* (the science of religious disputation), which empowered its graduates to contend with Christians. It also fostered new European inspired liberal interpretations of Islam, as well as other groups such as the Tableeghi Jamaat and the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam.

In a sense, the colonial venture into Muslim nations concretized an Islam that saw itself as under attack, and needing to be ready to defend itself against other ideologies (Metcalf,

1982, pp. 75–137; cf. Powell, 1993, p. 290). The championing of puritanical Islam by the middle and professional classes in Muslim nations was the result of a need to defend not only the faith, but more importantly the integrity of the self. Thus Muslim imams who have emigrated to the West preach a religion that has been tested under fire, one that seeks to be impervious to secularism.

Muslims in Europe

A century later, when Muslim immigration to Europe began on a large scale, governments in Western and Northern Europe largely ignored the needs of guest workers who were recruited to man the Old Continent's post-World War II reconstruction and industrial expansion. Guest-worker visas were generally issued to workers from countries with colonial or geographic links: in France, for example, the overwhelming majority of guest-workers came from French-colonized and French-speaking North Africa, in Britain, from the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan), and in Germany mostly from Turkey, as the two nations had maintained friendly relations for over a century (Roggero, 2002, p. 131).

Initially, they were recruited to work for short periods of time and were rotated every few years. Governments later decided it would be more cost effective if temporary work visas were extended, since migrant workers had become skilled laborers. Their stay was considered temporary while they participated in the rapid development of Europe, while at the same time helping the economy of their home countries by sending remittances to their families.

The temporary nature of their presence left European governments making only minimal efforts to incorporate them socially or politically into host societies. During this early period, European governments generally 'outsourced' the care for the religious needs of the immigrants to the governments of their countries of birth and to wealthy Persian Gulf nations (Laurence, 2006,). The religion of the immigrants was only a peripheral concern and European governments and companies that hosted guestworkers often provided them with prayer spaces in an effort to increase company loyalty and stymie their larger demands for higher pay or better living conditions. When imams were not available, factory workers led the Friday prayers during lunch breaks preaching sermons made available by Islamic groups (Kepel, 1987, pp. 145–153).

During the same period, the Saudi government established its presence among immigrant communities through the *Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique* in Brussels, which later provided logistical support and channeled funding to Islamic communities throughout Europe under the auspices of the Muslim World League.[14]

The oil boycott of 1973 slowed Europe's economic expansion, and governments began to phase out guestworker programs. Immigrant laborers became a burden rather than a necessary asset to the system. Several nations attempted to entice the workers to return to their homelands by offering them financial incentives to help them repatriate. The majority of the workers, however, opted to stay, preferring European welfare to unemployment in their home countries. European governments, who now faced a population of unemployed single men, began programs of family reunification. Workers already in Europe increasingly took advantage of these opportunities to bring their families to Europe before the window of immigration closed (Stowasser, 2002, p. 55).

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the change in immigration trends from single males to families increased the number of Muslims exponentially and began to be a burden on the education, health and welfare budgets of the European states. This reality, along with political events in the Middle East, precipitated a growing public unease with Muslim immigration.[15] Muslims recognized that, rather than being isolated pockets of migrants linked to North Africa, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, they now enjoyed a greater presence in Europe. Thus they began to establish community organizations such as mosques, Islamic schools, halal butcher shops, and Islamic cemeteries to provide for the needs of the community. As Muslim immigrant communities were largely relegated to peripheral public housing, groups of immigrants began to establish ad hoc prayer rooms and spaces for Islamic groups to meet within their public housing projects in self-contained communities.[16] Located almost exclusively on the peripheries of major cities, these immigrant communities were therefore effectively segregated from the European populations.

The 1980s marked a turning-point for Muslim communities in Europe as the children of immigrants, mostly born in Europe, came of age. Educated in Europe and fluent in European languages, they used their understanding of liberal European politics to protest against their categorical exclusion from the public sphere. They found themselves caught between their parents' countries of origin and their own countries of residence: often, they did not speak their parents' language and had only nebulous or nostalgic connections to their parents' homelands, but they nonetheless interacted very little with native European communities as they lived in immigrant neighborhoods. Often they continued to respect—even if they did not practice—Islamic values, if only as a layer in their complex minority identity.

Such phenomena were most pronounced in France, with the advent of the secular *Beur* movement,[17] the creation of groups such as SOS-Racisme[18] and the repeal of the law forbidding organizations based along ethnic/racial lines.[19] In the Netherlands, the government recognized the equality of Muslim groups with traditional Dutch religious groups and formulated policy laying the groundwork for a multicultural state. Through the 1980s, the Dutch state thus encouraged the proliferation of Islamic organizations as catalysts for multicultural assimilation and as interlocutors between the government and immigrant communities (Sunier & van Kuijeren, 2002, p. 148).

While these changes brought about more political rights in France and the Netherlands, British Muslims had an altogether different experience. After the publication in 1988 of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*, British Muslims staged public protests where they burned copies of the book and demanded that it be banned from British bookstores and that British blasphemy laws be expanded to offer protection to Islam (Vertovec, 2002, p. 23; Abdallah, 1994, p. 9; Ruthven, 1992). While Muslims saw such protests as manifestations of their right to free speech as British subjects, native-born Britons viewed the protests as evidence of the Muslim community's intolerance of dissent and—paradoxically—failure to comprehend the liberal tradition of free speech.

At the same time, European governments that could not escape persistently high rates of unemployment found a convenient scapegoat in immigrant communities. In this context, the (first) French headscarf affair, coupled with the fall out of the Rushdie affair in Britain, France, the Netherlands and in Northern Europe, opened a new period of conflict between immigrants and host societies.[20] These tensions gave rise to a first wave of immigrant organization, which was generally secular in nature and was most pronounced in France with the *Beur* movement. Since then, relations between Muslim immigrants and European

governments (and, more broadly, traditionally-European societies) have not improved. The global political climate continues to stymie most real dialogue or cooperation on integration. Fears of terrorism and talk of 'security' have dominated the discussion of Islam in the public sphere since Algerian terrorist groups organized a string of bombings in Paris and Lyon in 1995.

As governments have become more preoccupied with issues of security, they have also increased the number of associations meant to represent immigrants. In certain cases this has meant creating Islamic umbrella groups in recognition of the fact that existing groups have reflected the views of immigrant communities rather than government interests. Some European governments have imposed organizational structures on immigrant communities to act as interlocutors. Early groups, such as the French *Union des organisations islamiques de France* (UOIF), formed in 1983 by a group of foreign students with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, attempted to serve the interests of the immigrant community by defending Muslim immigrants during the headscarf affair of the 1980s. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Contact Body for Muslims and Government (CMO) has officially represented the Muslim community to the Dutch government since 2004, despite the fact that its leadership is almost exclusively Sunni. In Britain, too, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was established in 1997 to unite the many local and grassroots Islamic organizations that had existed since the early 1960s.

Such associations have, however, generally failed to represent the diversity of the Muslim community, as governments have influenced the selection of the leadership of the organizations to ensure that certain factions are excluded (Savage, 2004, p. 41). These umbrella organizations have also often been criticized for being too close to the government; particularly in the French case, Muslim councils have served as little more than a rubber stamp to legitimize the government's immigration and integration policies. Conversely, Muslim groups also criticize governments for failing to consult the established organizations and, in some cases, maintain contact before issuing deportation orders or passing new laws.

Thus, in four decades, European governments have shifted from a relatively laissez-faire policy on Islam to one that actively seeks to shape religious institutions on European soil. Blandine Kriegel, the head of a French government commission on integration, quite succinctly described the policy in 2005: 'The only problem we have is with fundamentalism, it's not with Islam. The question is, can we have a moderate form of Islam? And the answer is yes, of course' (Bryant, 2005).

Monitoring Imams: Heightened Clandestine Presence in Mosques

Part of this effort to create a moderate Islam involves monitoring imams to ensure that they are not 'inciting' or 'glorifying' terrorism. At the same time, governments across the continent have begun to deport radical imams and Muslims at an accelerated pace. Various European governments have been able to identify, arrest, and deport many immigrants because their national intelligence services have deeply penetrated Islamic communities either through cooperation between mosque leaders and police or by clandestine infiltration. These deportations are astonishing not only in their number, but also in the secretive manner in which they are conducted. Since 9/11, European governments have actually arrested over 20 times more terrorist suspects than the United States (Radu, cited in Savage, 2004, p. 33).

Yet before governments decided to deal with radicals by deporting them, they spent years accommodating them as a strategy to discourage terrorism in Europe. In France, for example, successive administrations tacitly endorsed a 'sanctuary doctrine' through the 1980s by which the French government took a non-committal, neutral posture towards states that sponsored terrorists in order not to incite their activity against French targets. At the same time, international terrorist groups and national opposition movements were allowed to operate with virtual impunity in France, provided that they maintained contact with French authorities and did not contemplate terrorism against France. Under this policy, France granted asylum to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers (in 1978), as well as certain Palestinian groups and Maghrebi opposition movements (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003, pp. 5–7).

The British maintained a similar deal with extremist Arab and South Asian Islamist groups until the 2005 attacks, allowing radical groups to proliferate and raise money in Britain (Palmer, 2006). For example, the security service MI5 continuously monitored—but never made any attempt to limit—the Egyptian Abu Hamza, who preached radical jihad in the now infamous Finsbury Park Mosque after returning from Afghanistan (Woods & Leppard, 2006). In 1993, the British even granted asylum to the Jordanian Abu Qatada, who was later accused by a Spanish judge of being 'Osama bin Laden's spiritual ambassador in Europe' (Lee, 2006). Although he was wanted in Jordan on terrorism charges, the British first imprisoned Abu Qatada between 2002 and April 2005 only to detain him again and order his deportation following the July 2005 bombings (Johnson, 2005). His deportation was the object of much debate in the European press, as his return to Jordan almost certainly meant that he would be tortured, despite a pledge by the Jordanian government that it would treat him humanely.

Since taking a harder line against radical groups on their own soil, various governments have proposed voluntary arrangements between security services and imams as a way to foster cooperation. These arrangements also inevitably serve to separate 'good' imams from 'bad' imams in the public—and the government's—consciousness, although the opinion of Muslim communities inevitably differs from that of the public at large in at least some cases. These agreements generally entail a public ceremony in which imams of Muslim associations close to the government pledge to work to promote a 'moderate' Islam that is friendly to traditional European values and to work with state security services to identify 'radicals' within their own ranks. In Denmark, for example, the government proposed such a partnership to fifteen Muslim leaders in 2004.[21] In Britain, the Home Office sent an official on a tour of Muslim communities following 7/7 in order 'to coax Muslim communities into self-policing. They were asked to spot the disenchantment of adolescents early, have greater awareness of what imams are preaching and increase liaison with the police' (Blitz, 2005). In response to the 2004 van Gogh killing, the government of the Netherlands introduced a contract for 'cooperation' with imams. This code dictates how religious leaders should detect radicals in their congregations and how to teach certain controversial passages of the Qur'an, as well as encouraging them to cooperate with the police.[22]

Mosque leaders, cognizant of the tides of domestic and international politics and eager to demonstrate that they and their communities are innocent, nonetheless approach such agreements with varying degrees of apprehension; indeed, many mosque leaders feel some sort of duty to demonstrate the divorce between orthodox Islam and terrorism, but also strongly desire to maintain their independence (Blitz, 2005). Only one influential

mosque accepted the Dutch agreement, for example, although its drafting was a cooperative effort between the government and the leading Turkish, Moroccan and Pakistani mosques.[23]

Such self-policing mechanisms are meant as a precursor—or a complement—to domestic surveillance programs. Beginning in the mid-1990s, following a string of bombings by Algerian terrorist groups, the French government used its wide-reaching intelligence service to monitor its own Muslim population closely. Other European governments have since mimicked the French predilection for domestic surveillance. In some cases, French intelligence, which boasts a large number of Arabic speakers, accesses the mosque directly, sending its own agents under cover. In situations where the police cannot infiltrate communities directly, France's domestic intelligence services often use their powers of preventative arrest and possible of indefinite detention, which are the strongest in Europe, to coax Muslims to report to them on daily activities in mosques. Indeed, the 1986 French anti-terrorism law, which was the first comprehensive law of its kind in Europe, allowed police to detain terrorism suspects without charging them for four days. Police powers were subsequently reinforced and expanded in 1991, 1995, 1996, 2001 and 2006; currently, the French police can hold terrorism suspects in jail for up to three years without charging them.[24]

Using such tactics, French domestic intelligence has drawn up a list of at least twelve imams they consider 'unacceptable' and between 60 and 80 mosques that they monitor closely because they believe them to be under the control of radical groups or clerics (Portes, 2005; Whitlock, 2004). Acknowledging how completely the intelligence services had penetrated mosques, the French government announced in December 2004 that it would expand such operations, creating a new special police force in each of France's 22 regions to monitor imams and their congregations more completely in mosques, as well as in restaurants, bookshops, halal butcher shops and long-distance calling centers. As a result of a pilot operation carried out by police squads in Paris, involving more than 100 operations, 1,000 people were questioned and fourteen were deported, including seven imams (Henley, 2004).

Using information that it gleans from its presence in Muslim communities, the French government often deports clerics that it deems 'radical'. In 2004 alone, at least twelve imams are reported to have been deported, although it is likely that the number is much higher given the secrecy (Whitlock, 2004) and the questionable legality surrounding such deportations (Mouloud, 2004). The most high-profile case is that of the Algerian imam Abdelkader Bouziane, who worked in the suburbs of Lyon. French officials, wanting to appear tough in their war on terror, deported him immediately after he gave a provocative interview to a regional magazine, in which he refused to condemn categorically polygamy or the right of husbands to beat their wives. Consequently, he was portrayed in the French media as the face of 'radical' Islam.[25] This immediate expulsion forced Bouziane to appeal against his expulsion from abroad, thus giving him a much smaller chance of returning to France.[26]

Similarly, immediately following the 7/7 London bombing in 2005, the British MI5 drew up a list of 50 'preachers of hate' who faced expulsion under Britain's new terror law; ten foreign nationals on the list were immediately detained pending deportation (Nut & Leppard, 2005). In a statement clearly directed toward foreign imams, Home Secretary Charles Clarke announced in August 2005 that foreign nationals whose presence was 'not conducive to the public good' would be deported if they created 'fear, distrust or

division' with the intention of encouraging terrorism (Hall, 2005). Following the French example, Clarke also announced plans that would force those deported to appeal their deportations within five days from their home countries rather than from Britain. These deportations were widely criticized within Britain as well as throughout Europe, as they ignored Britain's European Union treaty obligation not to deport suspected criminals to countries where domestic security and intelligence services are known to employ torture regularly. In an attempt to obviate this requirement, the British government signed contracts with Middle East governments which pledged that the deportees would be treated humanely upon their repatriation.

Also using the French interior ministry's expulsion of Bouziane as an example, other European governments have learned the value of high-profile deportations with much media attention to prove their hard line on security. The British made a point of public expulsions in the summer of 2005, expelling Abu Hamza al-Masri with much fanfare, and putting another sixteen individuals in line for expulsion after consulting for a two-week period with members of the Muslim community (McGrory & Ford, 2005; Suroor, 2005). In a move that appears to have been largely for political gain, Clarke pushed ahead with the expulsions, which, similar to those in France, were of questionable legality.[27] Clarke began deporting visible 'preachers of hate', in spite of MI5's desire to target those with proven links to terror cells (McGrory & Ford, 2005). However, because British anti-terrorism legislation remains much weaker than comparable French laws, the government was forced to scale back elements of its plans, though a strong anti-terror bill was nonetheless promulgated in 2005. [28]

In a similar vein, the Dutch government, too, has revoked residency permits for Islamic preachers for 'contributing to the [radicalization] of Muslims in the Netherlands', expelled them immediately and forced them to appeal their deportations from abroad.[29] By seeking out radical imams and then deporting them without allowing them to appeal their expulsions in Europe, Britain and the Netherlands have followed the French model in moving toward a more regulated and restrictive immigration policy. Similarly, the Italian, German, Swiss and Spanish governments made extremely visible series of arrests in the days immediately following 7/7, sometimes in cooperation with the United States (Van Natta & Bergman, 2005; McGrory & Ford, 2005). In light of recent evidence that European intelligence services participated clandestinely with the US in both extra-territorial renditions (Priest, 2005) and planning the invasion of Iraq (Gordon, 2006), there is good reason to assume that such practices have continued.

Imam Training

European governments have not limited their efforts to monitoring and regulating foreign imams preaching in European mosques. Rather, in an effort to control them, they have adopted a two-prong approach. First, they are re-examining or expanding the previously loose (or nonexistent) regulations on imams ministering in Europe. Second, they are either creating or strongly encouraging the establishment of programs that educate and train imams in Europe in order to replace the foreign leadership currently serving immigrant populations with a corps of European-born, or at least European-educated, religious leaders. [30]

At the same time, governments have linked policies governing the immigration of imams into Europe with more general trends in immigration policy that require that migrants

speak European languages and appreciate European national cultures. For example, surveys show that despite colonial linkages, very few foreign-born imams speak European languages: reportedly only 30% of France's 1,200 imams speak French fluently (ICG, 2006, p. 4), and a third do not speak French at all (Salhani, 2004). Certain countries, such as Norway in 2004 and France in 2005, have begun to require that religious leaders take language and culture classes. Furthermore, as with most imams in the Muslim world, religious leaders in Europe receive varying levels of formal training, and survive financially only by the charity and goodwill of their communities, as they are paid very little by European standards (ICG, 2006, pp. 4–5). The governments of Denmark and the Netherlands now require that imams prove that they have sufficient educational training in religious affairs. Of course, such requirements allow governments a large degree of control in choosing which immigrants are 'sufficiently' trained (Peter, 2006, p. 730).

Second, before European governments issue a visa to an imam, they now often require that the candidate prove that he will be financially supported by a mosque or community center in the host country.[31] Other countries, continuing the arrangements of the postwar period, prefer to outsource their screening of imams to Muslim countries. The governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, for example, rely on the Turkish government to send imams to minister to the Turkish immigrant populations, as they rely on Turkey's professed secularism to prepare moderate imams. As local Islamic communities are increasingly short on resources, such requirements make the entry of foreign imams much more difficult (Peter, 2006, p. 728).

In conjunction with these new efforts to regulate foreign-born and foreign-trained imams, European governments are considering establishing their own imam-training programs. In some cases, these public imam-training programs aim to compete for students and influence with preexisting privately financed institutions of Islamic education. Private programs are generally larger in scope and offer a broader curriculum in Islamic sciences, whereas public programs are designed specifically to form imams practicing in Europe. Indeed, like many of the recent developments surrounding Muslim communities in Europe, the trend towards educating imams in Europe in order to create a 'friendly' Islam began in France in the early 1990s; the government worked through the UOIF in order to 'create a European form of Islam that can coexist comfortably with Western societies shaped by Christian tradition' (Riding, 1992). The French programs try to teach imams French culture, including language and the strict tradition of *laïcité*, while encouraging them to teach the Qur'an within the context of twenty-first century France. One such institution that has been active since the early 1990s, the *Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines* (IESH), is sponsored by the UOIF. It, too, sets its goal as responding to the needs of European Muslims, and as such also operates a campus in Britain.[32] Although the IESH is a private institution, the French government has nonetheless asserted its control over the institution by denying visas to some of its potential students.

The IESH has not, however, become a major force in French Muslim communities. It graduates only about ten new imams annually, far short of its original goal, and, in 2003, only one of those students found work in a mosque as an imam.[33] Located in Burgundy, it is isolated from mainstream French society, with no television or cell phone reception. It houses approximately 150 students from France and abroad who pay the equivalent of $3,200 annually for classes and lodging. Of those 150 students, at least some are enrolled in the Institute only for a two-year Arabic language program,[34] and others, who have

mastered Arabic, can take courses by mail and sit for their final exams in any of sixteen Islamic testing centers in twelve different European countries, from Ireland to Albania.[35] Students in the imam-training program need not have passed the French *baccalauréat*, but must speak fluent Arabic.[36]

The program has recently come under intense criticism for its opacity and for the isolation that it imposes on its students. Despite its connections to the government, the sources of the IESH's funding are unclear, though they are thought to be linked to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, its curriculum is quite traditional, classes are given in Arabic and students have very little contact with wider French society. The Institute has a series of exchange programs with Islamic universities throughout the Gulf, in Malaysia and in Pakistan.[37] Critics say that such an environment conflicts with the Institute's stated goal of creating modern, French clerics (Campbell, 2004).

The IESH is not the sole institution of Islamic learning in France. The *Grande Mosquée de Paris*, which is largely influenced by the Algerian government and is a traditional ally of the French government, also has small training programs throughout the country. These courses, however, serve more to aggrandize the power and influence of the Algerian Islamic community than to train Euro-friendly imams. Other members of the French government and the French Muslim community have voiced their desire to create parallel programs to compete with the IESH and the *Grande Mosquée*'s programs, perhaps by creating an 'Islamic institute' in the fashion of the internationally-known Paris-based *Institut Catholique*. Yet the financial dilemma that the French government has created for Muslim communities renders creating new establishments nearly impossible: the government categorically refuses to provide any funding for such institutions, while it simultaneously puts heavy pressure on Muslim groups not to accept funds from foreign (i.e. Gulf) governments (Siemon-Netto, 2004). Despite recent limited state funding to friendly Muslim leaders through backdoor channels (Peter, 2006), the French government has thus effectively prevented Muslim groups from establishing their own training programs, which seems to run counter to its broader strategy (Ford, 2004).

In an effort to assume at least partial responsibility for the training of imams, however, the French Interior Ministry launched French language, culture and history courses for approximately 50 Islamic religious leaders at the Sorbonne (Paris-IV and Assas) in the fall of 2005 (Bryant, 2005). These classes lead to a university degree in 'society and civilization of contemporary France', and are to be accompanied by theological training at separate institutions. Imams wishing to enroll in such a program would, however, have to hold the equivalent of a French *baccalauréat*.[38] In light of the Abdelkader Bouziane case, the French authorities are said to be considering similar training focusing on human rights exclusively for imams (Anon, 2004, p. 21).

Following the 2005 London bombings, which demonstrated that European-born second- and third-generation immigrants are not as well integrated as European policy makers had allowed themselves to believe, European governments are now eager to follow the French model and undertake programs to train imams on their own soil. As the Secretary General of the *Comisión Islamica de España* (Islamic Commission of Spain) (CIE) said, 'We prefer that [imams] be Spanish or people that have lived in Spain long enough that they know the culture perfectly so they will be respectful of the constitution and will contextualize Islam to the society that we live in.'[39]

Such programs now exist throughout Europe in various incarnations. In Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, for example, courses exist for imams within

large, state-run universities.[40] In some cases, these university courses are meant to compete with privately-financed (i.e. foreign-financed) institutions, whose programs are not in line with government policy.[41] The Spanish courses, offered through *la Universidad nacional de educación a distancia* (National University of Distance Learning), purport to form experts in Islamic culture, civilization and religion in order to 'create the bases for a center of higher education for cultural and religious leaders'.[42] For approximately $2,100, these courses offer 500 hours of instruction in four modules: Islamic history and culture; the Prophet, the Qur'an and the *umma*; Islamic history and the mark left by Islamic law in Spain; and Islamic methodology. The Secretary General of CIE has said that, while such courses are not required for imams practicing in Spain, they provide a useful metric for local religious communities looking to hire leaders (Simon, 2005). Because these universities are public, classes are not open exclusively to imams, or even to Muslims—rather, anyone who demonstrates an interest can take them.

In Britain, where at least 25 different Islamic educational organizations exist to train imams, there have been several academic studies evaluating their curricula.[43] Most of these organizations have existed since the late 1990s, although a few, such as the Muslim College of Britain, have operated since the 1970s and have thus found their niche in the British educational system. These vary vastly in their curricula, pedagogical approach and success rates. For example, some schools employ traditional models of Islamic education generally practiced in South Asia and require their students to spend at least one year studying abroad, often in Cairo or Qom (Iran), whereas others have taken a distinctly European approach, offering British BAs, MAs and PhDs (students at the PhD level are generally those whom the school considers qualified to preach). Still others have made attempts to fuse Islamic seminary life with European-style academia. While none of these Islamic educational institutions is officially tied to the government, some are loosely affiliated with public universities, which certify the programs and lend the institutions the necessary credibility to grant degrees.

Though such affiliations seem to have worked reasonably well, two universities announced immediately after 7/7 that they would not renew their association agreements with Islamic educational programs (Tysome, 2005). In total, there are currently approximately 2,500 young men and women studying in Islamic seminaries in Britain, 140 of whom graduate each year (Brit & Lewis, forthcoming).

The Netherlands has a government-recognized university that offers an Islamic education similar to its counterparts in France and the United Kingdom. The Islamic University of Rotterdam (IUR), founded in 1997, offers degree courses in social and Islamic sciences. While the social sciences are taught in Dutch, the IUR, like its French and British counterparts, offers its Islamic sciences classes in Modern Standard Arabic. It currently has approximately 250 registered students of European, Arab, African and South Asian nationalities in its Islamic studies department. To earn the IUR's doctoral degree recommended for imams, students complete a four-year program in Islamic science, Islamic history, comparative theology, social and cultural studies and linguistics. A significant portion of each of the four modules is devoted to Islam within the European context; students take courses such as 'Nationalism and minorities in Europe', 'Muslim communities in non-Muslim states', 'Islam and the religious-cultural diversity in Europe', 'Islam in the Dutch media' and 'The Netherlands: Western tradition, citizenship and public ethics'. The IUR suggests that students who

complete this program find work as imams, spiritual guides in prisons and hospitals, or Islamic advisers to policy makers.[44]

As in other European countries, the Dutch government has nonetheless established its own program to train imams within a traditional state-run institution, Amsterdam Free University, to compete with the IUR. Though the plan to fund such a program was first conceived in 2001, it was not until 2005 that the government announced plans to give the equivalent of $1.8 million to Amsterdam Free University as part of an effort to ensure that all imams be trained in the Netherlands by the year 2008.[45] This policy implements the recommendations of a government commission that imams be given intense language and cultural training.[46] This was in addition to a 2002 law requiring all new imams to take courses in Dutch culture, which expose imams to language and liberal Dutch values such as gay marriage and euthanasia. The government pays half the cost of such classes, provided the imams pass an examination at the end of their studies (Osborn, 2002). Dutch is the official language of instruction for these classes, with exemptions for classes dealing exclusively with the Qur'an.

Despite the professed intention of these programs and the general consensus among various government officials that they are necessary, they have met with similar criticisms across the Europe. First, most such programs are relatively new, and would-be Muslim clerics are more likely to be comfortable in well-established and well-recognized traditional institutions of Islamic education. In addition, the types of programs European leaders are most enthusiastic about—those that train imams in European languages and contextualize their curricula to a twenty-first-century European society—have questionable Islamic legitimacy. Religious scholars have long been trained through traditional methods developed in resistance to European efforts to alter or modify the teachings of Islam. Many Muslims are thus wary about radically changing course.

For Muslims who have experienced what seems to them to be a European obsession with altering the teachings of Islam, these new proposals appear as warmed up versions of cultural and religious debates resolved over a century ago. They believe strongly that Islamic schools must retain their Islamic character; efforts to teach European culture or language may complement, but not supercede, Islamic training (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995, pp. 36–37.).

Second, religious education programs are quickly creating a glut of potential European clerics on the European market. While communities of Muslim origin in Europe are large, second- and third-generation immigrants in France do not practice Islam as faithfully as their parents or grandparents, although the number of Muslims in immigrant communities that frequent mosques has risen in the last decade (cited in LeQuesne, 2001). In London, one recent survey found that 80% of Muslims said that they attended mosque services regularly (Maci, 2005, p. 6), whereas other recent research shows that trends in Britain mirror those in France.

Yet even if some indicators point to increased mosque attendance, there seem to be few positions available to newly trained imams. Only one student from a recent graduating class from the French IEHS found employment as a practicing imam, and since its inception nine years ago, only twenty IUR graduates have become imams (Sciolino et al., 2004). Even those lucky enough to find a job as an imam are generally paid extremely poorly; a full-time imam in Le Havre, for example, who speaks French and Arabic and completed an imam-training program at France's *Grande Mosquée*, earns only the equivalent of $8.90 per hour (ibid.). Consequently, some religious schools have encouraged their students

to consider more pastoral careers as prison chaplains, youth ministers or government advisers. Such work, however, requires practical experience and a strong command of the immigrants' native language as well as a European language, which even many graduates of the programs detailed above do not posses.

The remote location of many of these schools compounds this problem; students in European Islamic schools often graduate *without* a comprehensive understanding of European cultures or languages, since schools are sometimes far removed from city centers and Islamic sciences are taught in Arabic. And yet it is precisely this ability to understand and live between several different cultures that is most necessary in European immigrant communities, where family and community structures are significantly different from those of Muslim countries (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995, p. 108).

Third, the more traditional Islamic schools and institutes in Europe that are inspected by government authorities sometimes have sub-standard academic requirements, and are thus viewed with further suspicion by governments. Faced with requirements, or at least heavy-handed encouragement, to give courses in European languages, Islamic schools find themselves in a dilemma: there are very few well-qualified Islamic religious scholars who speak European languages well enough to teach (FAIR, 2002, cited in Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 66). Also, in many cases, students in Europe attend Islamic institutions for socio-economic rather than religious reasons. For immigrant communities that are economically marginalized, an Islamic education represents an inexpensive way to ensure that their children are educated and fed and maintain an interest in their culture of origin (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 68). Such issues simply reinforce the misgivings of potential students about attending Islamic schools in Europe rather than in the Muslim world.

Finally, European oversight of Islamic education systems poses fundamental questions about the immigrants' constitutional rights. New state policies, such as requiring language proficiency, clearly affect Islamic preachers much more than their Christian or Jewish counterparts. The question remains whether state officials are crossing the line of neutrality when they deny entry to religious preachers or when they encourage religious officials to be educated in a specific way, as they are effectively making value judgments on their beliefs as well as those of their co-religionists. These concerns about civil liberties and unequal treatment of religious groups are especially valid in countries, such as the Netherlands, that guarantee religious groups sovereignty for their religious affairs (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995, pp. 38–39).

Conclusion

Concerned with growing radicalism at home and faced with the threat of further terrorism, European governments have expended considerable resources on deporting, monitoring, coercing and training imams. These efforts vary by country, from offering instruction in language and culture to more persistent demands that all European imams be trained in Europe. In the past, the level of government intervention in the religious affairs of mosques mirrored national immigration and integration policies, which varied significantly across national borders. Since 9/11, the terrorist bombings in London and Madrid and the van Gogh murder in the Netherlands, however, European governments are slowly but certainly converging increasingly on hard-line policies toward imams. As France was the first European country to deal with terrorism and has since adopted formidable anti-terrorist legislation, European governments have predictably turned

toward the French example when developing their own policies. The French government may even be comfortable with its role as the vanguard of European anti-terrorism. Immediately after announcing language and religion classes for imams, an unnamed French interior ministry spokeswoman said that such policies were 'part of our ambition to make France something of a model in Europe in terms of the organization of the Muslim faith and its assimilation into society'.[47]

Yet, like so much in the global war on terror, many of the policies that European governments have established to reprogram imams seem to be window dressing rather than substantive change. Imam training programs are extremely limited, and even those that have existed for the better part of two decades, such as the French IEHS, do not produce the results that inspired their creation. Such programs persistently face serious roadblocks when seeking funding and identifying instructors and a curriculum that is acceptable to both Islamic communities and the government. Moreover, even if such programs performed optimally, questions persist as to whether their education will be considered by Muslims as authentically Islamic and whether there will be a demand for their services, or whether governments are encouraging the creation of a class of unemployed religious scholars.

The considerable human and financial investment of European governments in monitoring and deporting certain religious leaders poses similar concerns. As the terrorist attacks of the last seven years have shown, there are certainly some Muslims in Europe who call for jihad against Europe and the United States. While the deportation of a few dozen people may score political points for European leaders, it ignores wider problems among immigrant communities in Europe. Governments seem to prefer quick solutions—public deportations, creating various Islamic interlocutors and establishing imam training programs with limited reach—to tackling the problems that persistently plague Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, such as unemployment, poor housing and political and social marginalization.

Finally, such governmental efforts may in fact be stifling debate within European Muslim communities. Government intervention is probably impeding the construction of an organic European-Muslim (or a French-Muslim, a British-Muslim, etc.) identity that would otherwise develop over time (Savage, 2004, p. 42). As governments continue to demonize radical Islam and to intimidate Muslim communities into cooperating with state security services, they force immigrant communities into defensive postures, making them into suspects, or even enemies rather than partners. Consequently, Muslim communities are focused on their struggle against government intimidation rather than on their internal struggle to marginalize radicalism.

Many who call for more government intervention in religion within Muslim immigrant communities point to the French model as one of success. France, they argue, with its far-reaching intelligence services, wide-sweeping police powers and rigid assimilation policies, has not been the object of successful Islamist terrorism in over a decade. Partisans of such an argument encourage other European governments to follow the French model in reforming their own immigration, assimilation and security policies. Yet the 'systemization' of violence between national security services and immigrant youth at most large public gatherings, including the 2006 Soccer World Cup Finals, the annual *Fête de la musique* and Bastille Day celebrations (Bronner, 2006), in addition to riots in Parisian suburbs and across the country in the fall of 2005 (Haddad & Balz, 2006), suggests that there may be an increasingly high cost to the French policy of heavy-handed state intervention.

Notes

1. There exists a wide body of literature on the role of US policy in al-Qaeda's development (see, for example, Cooley, 1999). For an analysis of Bin Laden's interpretation of qur'anic verses justifying jihad as war, see: Gwynne. Bin Ladin's fatwa declaring war on Jews and Christians is available at <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatwa2.htm>(cf. Kohlmann, 2004).
2. Landau, 2005; Lucassen, 2005; Marchand, 2003; Vidino, 2006; Fetzer & Soper, 2005.
3. Sarkozy—l'islam de France a besoin de toutes ses tendances, *Agence France Press*, 17 June 2003.
4. Newspapers in France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany all reprinted the Danish cartoons in early February 2006.
5. For a study of the efforts of European governments to create a Euro-friendly Islam see Haddad & Golson, 2007.
6. Such measures include new laws passed in virtually all European countries—including, but not limited to, Britain, France, Spain, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands—which create new police powers or expand security measures established by previous laws. For additional information see: Allen, 2005; Allen & Nielsen, 2002.
7. These laws are more controversial than the security laws, but generally focus on integration issues, such as education and language. Laws governing dress in the public sphere, including a ban on the burka in an Italian municipality, the French headscarf ban and a Danish court's upholding of a Muslim woman's dismissal from her job as a supermarket clerk because she refused to take off her veil, have received extensive media coverage.
8. Al-Sayyad & Castells, 2002; Favell, 2001; Lamchichi, 1999; Modood, 2005; Shadid, & van Koningsveld, 1991, 1992, 1996 and 1995.
9. The EU hopes to put a common asylum policy in place in all 27 member states by See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/asylum/fsj_asylum_intro_en.htm>. Cf. Guild, 2003.
10. There is a body of literature that treats the intersection of expanded police powers and civil liberties in the wake of post-9/11 anti-terrorism laws. See, for example, Cantegreil, 2005; Haubrich, 2003.
11. State-financed mosques are, of course, strictly illegal in France according to the 1905 law separating church and state. In the Netherlands and Germany, however, despite opposition, local governments have financed mosques in creative ways: mosques are sometimes built using funds for 'urban renewal'. In Britain, the state has partnered with the EU, private donors and local authorities to build community centers attached to mosques and to finance Islamic schools (cf. Rath et al., 1999, pp. 53–68; Fetzer & Soper, 2003, pp. 247–258; Bleich, 2005).
12. Though state-Muslim interlocutors have existed since the French *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* was founded in 1989, the late 1900s and post-9/11 periods saw a proliferation of Muslim organizations intended to create an official community to facilitate relations. The Muslim Council of Britain was established in 1997, and the French *Conseil française du culte musulman* in 2003.
13. The reports of French inspectors are especially interesting, as they lament the lack of progress of Algerian students in maths and literacy and explicitly criticize Islamic instructors for teaching their students 'nothing outside of the Qur'an' (Abi Mershed, 2002, pp. 68, 97, 121, 203–214).
14. <http://www.centreislamique.be/objectif.htm> (accessed 31 May 2006).
15. In the Netherlands, for example, the government first admitted that most immigrants would not return to their home countries in a report prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1983. This document also identified the Dutch strategy for integrating its immigrant population, 'integration with the preservation of identity' (Sunier & van Kuijeren, 2002, p. 147). In Britain, the headmaster of a largely Asian/Muslim school, Ray Honeyford, sparked a scandal in 1984 when he made allegedly racist comments in a right-wing journal, which precipitated Muslim protests throughout Britain, especially in Bradford (Vertovec, 2002, p. 23). In France, the mid-1970s saw news magazines loudly proclaiming that immigration was out of control and that the 'threshold of tolerance had been surpassed' (Bastaut, 2000, pp. 466–473).
16. *Cités* are large public housing projects built in the suburbs of French cities. They are meant to be self-contained communities, but in reality they are almost invariably marked by poor conditions and isolation from mainstream society (Kepel, 1987, pp. 159–168).
17. *Beur* is *verlan* (French slang popular in immigrant communities, formed by rearranging consonant and vowel sounds within words) for 'Arab', and it is also close to the French for 'butter'. In the 1980s, '*beur*' came to refer to the first generation of immigrants born in France to Muslim immigrant parents; the '*Beur*

movement' refers to the organization of this community to demand better integration into French society and fuller political rights during the Mitterrand presidency.

18. *SOS-Racisme* is France's most prominent and prestigious anti-racist group, itself a product of the *Beur* movement. While its original activities focused on Arab immigrant communities, it has expanded and now seeks to protect African communities and other victims of racism.

19. When the Mitterrand and his leftist coalition won the 1981 elections, they publicly proclaimed the beginning of a new policy toward integration, coined by the phrase '*le droit à la différence*' ('the right to be different'). The Mitterrand government's reforms in the early 1980s allowed immigrant communities to organize and join unions (cf. Ireland, 1996, p. 262).

20. Cf. Laurence, 2006; Sunier & van Kuijeren, 2002, pp. 150–155; Vertovec, 2002, pp. 23–28; Simonsen, 2002, pp. 126–127; Cesari, 2002, p. 37.

21. Danish Police: Islamic extremists recruit among criminal immigrant youth, BBC Monitoring Europe, 4 May 2005.

22. The text of the agreement, known as the 'Protocol for the Prevention of Extremism', is available at <http://www.baarsjes.amsterdam.nl/asp/get.asp?xdl=../views/baarsjes/xdl/Page&ItmIdt=0 0001321& SitIdt=00000002&VarIdt=00000001>.

23. Dutch mosque adopts code to root out Islamic extremism, *Agence France Presse*, 5 September 2005.

24. French terror laws are widely seen as the most wide-reaching in Europe, as they give the police power to detain suspects for days without charge for only very nebulous reasons. They have therefore become models for other countries looking to strengthen their own anti-terrorism laws (e.g. Britain, Spain and the Netherlands). French prosecutors hold such strong anti-terrorism powers that they even prosecute suspected terrorists for other European countries whose own laws have stronger safeguards for civil liberties. German law, for example, would not allow prosecutors to pursue a case against suspected al-Qaeda operative Christian Ganczarski, so the French arrested him as he was passing through Charles de Gaulle airport and held him in a jail without charge, using their anti-terrorism powers (Whitlock, 2004). For a complete discussion on France's anti-terrorism apparatus, including cooperation between domestic intelligence and the justice ministry, see Shapiro & Suzan.

25. Interestingly, Bouziane's expulsion order was approved by the popular interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, but no action was taken for several months following the expulsion order. It as only after Bouziane gave an interview to a regional magazine, *Lyon Mag*, that the government, under the direction of a new interior minister eager to prove his credentials, pursued his deportation.

26. A court later permitted his re-entry into France to fight the expulsion order, though the state ultimately succeeded in deporting him permanently.

27. Britain circumvented international law and obligations to the European Union by negotiating treaties with Middle Eastern governments, ensuring that those expelled from Britain would not be subject to torture upon their arrival. Such agreements were the object of loud criticism in Britain, Europe and the United States.

28. Under Britain's 2000 terrorism law, police can arrest imams for 'threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour' to incite racial hatred (Little & Whitehead, 2005).

29. Dutch Muslim leaders ordered out, *Agence France Presse*, 16 June 2005.

30. Approximately 90% of imams in France are North African, just as in Germany they are overwhelmingly Turkish and in the United Kingdom the vast majority are South Asian.

31. Denmark announces measure to curb immigration of Muslim clerics, *Agence France Presse*, 17 February 2004.

32. <http://www.iesh.fr/Html/C_present.htm> (accessed 4 February 2006).

33. An imam training school sponsored by the UOIF presents problems in and of itself for the French government; the UOIF is now heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which seems to obviate the French government's goal of imam training without foreign intervention (Sciolino et al., 2004).

34. <http://www.iesh.fr/Html/C_ILA.htm> (accessed 4 February 2006).

35. <http://www.iesh.fr/Html/Ccor.htm> (accessed 4 February 2006).

36. <http://www.iesh.fr/Html/C_IFIE.htm> (accessed 4 February 2006).

37. <http://www.iesh.fr/Html/C_present.htm> (accessed 4 February 2006).

38. French imams offered uni classes on French society, history, law, *Agence France Presse*, 11 March 2005.

39. 'Peferimos que sean españoles o gente que, por el tiempo que lleva en España, conozca perfectamente la cultura en que se va a mover, sean respetuosos con la Constitución y contextualicen el Islam dentro de la sociedad en la que vivimos' (Simon, 2005).

40. Denmark: university training for imams to be debated in the new year, *Financial Times*, 27 December 2004.
41. In Germany, for example, courses at Münster University are meant to draw students away from courses at the Saudi-built and maintained King Fahd academy in Bonn (Siemon-Netto, 2004).
42. 'Crear las bases para un centro superior de formación de lideres religiosos y culturales' (Simon, 2005).
43. Sophie Gilliat-Ray's comprehensive study of higher Islamic education in Britain (2006) is most impressive in its breadth. An email exchange with Gilliat-Ray suggested that similar comprehensive studies do not exist for other European countries. Though the number of British programs that Gilliat-Ray identifies is significantly higher than the number of programs that the authors of the present paper were able to identify in other European countries, there may be good reason to believe that the number of such programs is naturally much higher in Britain. In any case, comprehensive national studies would certainly be most beneficial.
44. <http://wwwm.islamicuniversity.nl> (accessed 15 January 2006).
45. Government to finance imam education at Free University of Amsterdam, *Kyodo News Service*, 2 February 2005.
46. Report: Extra integration course for foreign clerics, *Expatica News*, 13 September 2005.
47. Unidentified interior ministry spokeswoman, in Henley, 2004.

References

Abdallah, A. (1994) *Salman Rushdie: A Collection of Essays by 100 Arabic and Muslim Writers* (New York: George Braziller).
Abi Mershed, O. (2002) Domination by Consent: The *Bureaux Arabes* and Public Instruction in Colonial Algeria, 1831–1870. PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
Al-Sayyad, N. & Castells, M. (Eds) (2002) *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books).
Allen, C. (2005) Endemically European or a European epidemic? Islamophobia in a post 9/11 Europe, in: R. Geaves et al. (Eds) *Islam and the West Post-September 11th* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate), pp. 130–145.
Allen, C. & Nielsen, J.S. (2002) *Islamophobia in the EU after the 11 September 2001: Summary Report* (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).
Anon (2004) France may train imams about human rights, *Church and State*, June, p. 21.
Bastaut, Y. (2000). *L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Ve République* (Paris: Seuil).
Bleich, E. (2005) Religion, violence and the state in 21st century Europe, paper presented at conference on Migration, Religion and Secularism–a Comparative Approach (Europe and North America), June, Paris.
Blitz, R. (2005) Regulation of mosques likely to be toughest task, *Financial Times*, 25 August, p. 4.
Brit, J. & Lewis, P. (forthcoming) The pattern of Islamic reform in Britain: the Deobandis between intra-Muslim sectarianism and engagement with wider society, in: M. van Bruinessen & S. Allievi (Eds) *Producing Islamic Knowledge: Transmission and Dissemination in Western Europe* (London: Routledge).
Bronner, L. (2006) La systématisation des violences autour des rassemblements festifs inquiète la police, *Le Monde*, 13 July <http://cettesemaine.free.fr/spip/article.php3?id_article=508> (accessed 20 December 2007).
Bryant, E. (2005) To shape Islam, improve security, French government will teach French to imams, *Religion News Service*, 21 June 2005.
Campbell, M. (2004) France gets suspicious of school for friendly imams, *The Times* (London), 24 October, p. 31.
Cantegreil, J. (2005) *Terrorisme et libertés: La voie française après le 11 septembre, en temps réel* (Paris: Les cahiers).
Cesari, J. (2002) Islam in France: the shaping of a religious minority, in: Y.Y. Haddad (Ed.) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 36–51.
Cooley, J.K. (1999) *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press).
Cowell, A. (2005) Subway and bus blasts in London kill at least 37, *New York Times*, 8 July, p. 1.
FAIR (Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism) (2002) *Secure Borders, Safe Haven—Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain: A Response from the Forum Against Islamophonia and Racism* (London: FAIR).
Favell, A. (2001) *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave).

Fetzer, J.S. & Soper, J.C. (2003) The roots of public attitudes towards accommodation of European Muslims religious practices before and after 9/11, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(2), pp. 247–258.

Fetzer, J.S. & Soper, J.C. (2005) *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Ford, P. (2004) France tries to soften local style of Islam, *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 May, p. 1.

Gilliat-Ray, S. (2006) Educating the 'ulama: centres of Islamic religious training in Britain, *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 17(1), pp. 55–76.

Gordon, M.R. (2006) German intelligence gave US Iraqi defense plan, report says, *New York Times*, 27 February, p. 1.

Guild, E. (2003) International terrorism and EU immigration, asylum and borderpolicy: the unexpected victims of 11 September 2001, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8(3) Autumn, pp. 331–346.

Guthrie, J. & Tighe, C. (2005) The eerily ordinary extremists, *Financial Times*, 16 July, p. 13.

Gwynne, R. Al-Qàida and the Qur'an: The 'Tafsir' of Usamah bin Ladin, <http://web.utk.edu/~warda/bin_ladin_and_quran.htm>.

Haddad, Y.Y. & Balz, M.J. (2006) The October riots in France: a failed immigration policy or the empire strikes back? *International Migration* 44(2), pp. 23–32.

Haddad, Y.Y. & Golson, T. (2007) Overhauling Islam: representation, construction, and co-option of 'moderate Islam' in Western Europe, *Journal of Church and State* 49(3), pp. 487–516.

Hall, B. (2005) Clarke lists grounds for deportation of extremists, *Financial Times*, 24 August.

Hassan, M.K. (1982) *Muslim Intellectual Response to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia* (Percetakan, Malaysia: Dewan Bahasa dau Pustaka).

Haubrich, D. (2003) Anti-terror laws and civil liberties: Britain, France and Germany compared, *Government and Opposition* 38(1), pp. 3–29.

Henley, J. (2004) Imams to be taught French way of life: minister wants to build 'Western Islam' through education, *The Guardian*, 8 December, p. 15.

Hussein, D. (2005) The impact of 9/11 on British Muslim identity, in: R. Geaves et al., (Eds) *Islam and the West Post-September 11th* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate), pp. 115–129.

ICG (International Crisis Group) (2006) La France face à ses musulmans: Émeutes, jihadisme et dépolitisation, *Europe Report 172*, 9 March.

Ireland, P. (1996) Race, immigration and the politics of hate, in: A. Daley (Ed.) *The Mitterrand Era: Policy Alternatives and Political Mobilization in France* (New York: New York University Press), pp. 258–278.

Johnson, E. (2005) Radical Muslim cleric Abu Qatada among 10 foreigners detained in Britain, *Associated Press*, 11 August; http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-112044192.html: accessed 20 December 2007.

Kepel, G. (1987) *Les banlieues de l'Islam: Naissance d'une religion en France* (Paris: Seuil).

Kohlmann, E. (2004) *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network* (Oxford: Berg Publishers).

Lamchichi, A. (1999) *Islam et Muslmans de France: Pluralisme, Laïcite et Citoyennete* (Paris: Harmattan).

Landau, P. (2005) *Le Sabre et le Coran: Tariq Ramadan et les Frères Musulmans à la Conquête de L'Europe* (Paris: Editions du Rocher).

Laurence, J. (2006) Managing transnational Islam: Muslims and the state in Western Europe, in: C. Parsons & T. Smeeding (Eds) *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 251–273.

Lee, S. (2006) Radical Islamic cleric must wait for deportation ruling, judge tells court, *Associated Press*, 19 May. Accessed 25 May 2006.

LeQuesne, N. (2001) Islam in Europe: a changing faith, *Time*, 24 December, p. 44.

Little, A. & Whitehead, T. (2005) Labour admits: we can't deport Muslim radicals, *The Express*, 6 September, p. 11.

Lucassen, L. (2005) *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Immigrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press).

Maci, D. (2005) An uncertain road: Muslims and the future of Europe (Washington, DC: Pew Forum of Religion and Future Life), <http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=60> (accessed 20 December 2007).

McGrory, D. & Ford, R. (2005) Men cleared of poison plot are among suspects, *The Times* (London), 16 September, p. 7.

Marchand, R. (2003) *La France en danger d'Islam: entre Jihad et Reconquista* (Lausanne: Age D'Homme).

Metcalf, B. (1982) *Islamic Revival in British India 1860–1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Modood, T. (2005) *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Mouloud, L. (2004) L'imam scandaleux qui gêne le gouvernement, *L'Humanité*, 30 April, p. 9.

Nut, K. & Leppard, D. (2005) Scot quizzed on bombing boast, *Sunday Times* (London), 28 August, p. 10.

Osborn, A. (2002) Muslims told to speak Dutch in mosques, *The Guardian*, 1 October, p. 17.

Palmer, A. (2006) MI5: Mission Impossible, *Sunday Telegraph*, 14 May, p. 19.

Peter, F. (2006) Leading the community of the middle way: a study of the Muslim field in France, *Muslim World* 96(4), pp. 707–736.

Portes, T. (2005) La France expulse un imam extrémiste; Les renseignements généraux ont une liste des prêcheurs radicaux, *Le Figaro*, 25 July.

Powell, A. (1993) *Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India* (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press).

Priest, D. (2005) CIA holds terror suspects in secret prisons; debate is growing within agency about legality and morality of overseas system set up after 9/11, *Washington Post*, 2 November, p. A1.

Rath, J., Penninx, R., Groenendijk, K. & Meyer, A. (1999) The politics of recognition of religious diversity in Europe: social reactions to the institutionalisation of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain, *Netherlands' Journal of Social Sciences* 34(1), pp. 53–68.

Riding, A. (1992) Europe's homebred imams, teaching tolerance, *New York Times*, 24 January.

Roggero, M.A. (2002) Muslims in Italy, in: Y.Y. Haddad (Ed.) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 131–143.

Ruthven, M. (1992) *Satanic Affair: Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam* (Toronto: Random House of Canada).

Salhani, C. (2006) Analysis: Europe's tolerance under stress, *United Press International*, 9 December, <www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2004/400/> (accessed 6 January 2006).

Savage, T.M. (2004) Europe and Islam: crescent waxing, culture clashing, *Washington Quarterly* 27(3), pp. 25–50.

Sciolino, E. (2004) 10 bombs shatter trains in Madrid, killing 192, *New York Times*, 12 March, p. 1.

Sciolino, E., Bernard, A. & Horowitz, J. (2004) Europe struggling to train new breed of Muslim clerics, *New York Times*, 18 October, p. 1.

Shadid, W.A.R. & van Koningsveld, P.S. (1995) *Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe* (Kampen: Kok Pharos).

Shadid, W.A.R. & van Koningsveld, P.S. (Eds) (1991) *The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe* (Kampen: Kok Pharos).

Shadid, W.A.R. & van Koningsveld, P.S. (Eds) (1992) *Islam in Dutch Society: Current Developments and Future Prospects* (Kampen: Kok Pharos).

Shadid, W.A.R. & van Koningsveld, P.S. (Eds) (1996) *Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe* (Kampen: Kok Pharos).

Shapiro, J. & Suzan, B. (2003). The French experience of counter-terrorism, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/shapiro20030301.pdf> (accessed 15 December 2005).

Siemon-Netto, U. (2006) Europe's Imams 3: Training Western Imams, *United Press International*, 24 June. <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-95812767.html>, (accessed 20 December 2007).

Simon, P. (2005) La UNED inicia el primer curso en España para formar imanes, *El Mundo*, 3 October, p. 22.

Simons, M. (2004) Dutch filmmaker, an Islam critic, is killed, *New York Times*, 3 November, p. 5.

Simonsen, J.B. (2002) Globalization in reverse and the challenge of integration: Muslims in Denmark, in: Y.Y. Haddad (Ed.) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 121–130.

Stowasser, B.F. (2002) The Turks in Germany: from sojourners to citizens, in: Y.Y. Haddad (Ed.) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 52–71.

Sunier, T. & van Kuijeren, M. (2002) Islam in the Netherlands, in: Y.Y. Haddad (Ed.) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 144–157.

Suroor, H. (2005) Britain to deport more clerics, *The Hindu*, 20 August, <http://www.hindu.com/2005/08/20/stories/2005082000211500.htm> (accessed 20 December 2007).

Tysome, T. (2005) Muslims fear severing ties may fuel ill will, *Times Higher Education Supplement* (London), 19 August.

Van Natta, D. & Bergman, L. (2005) Militant imams under scrutiny across Europe; calls to back 'global jihad' are cited, *New York Times*, 25 January, p. 9.

Vertovec, S. (2002) Islamophobia and Muslim recognition in Britain, in: Y.Y. Haddad (Ed.) *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 19–35.

Vidino, L. (2006) *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad* (Loughton, UK: Prometheus Books).

Whitlock, C. (2004) French push limits on fight on terrorism; wide prosecutorial powers draw scant public descent, *Washington Post*, 2 November.

Woods, R. & Leppard, D. (2006) How liberal Britain let hate flourish, *Sunday Times* (London), 12 February, p. 12.