

Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare

The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

March 2009



The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

March 2009

Presented to Parliament
by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State
for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty

This is a corrective reprint incorporating the changes
of the correction slip provided on 8 May 2009

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ISBN: 9780101754729

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Foreword

The Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP Prime Minister



The first priority of any Government is to ensure the security and safety of the nation and all members of the public.

While recent events have shown, tragically, that the threat of terrorism in Northern Ireland is still with us, the most significant security threat to the people of the United Kingdom today comes from international terrorism.

This new form of terrorism is different in scale and nature from the terrorist threats we have had to deal with in recent decades. It is intent on inflicting mass casualties without warning, motivated by a violent extremist ideology, and exploits modern travel and communications to spread through a loose and dangerous global network.

This is the threat on which this updated strategy, CONTEST, is focused. In the six years since we first developed CONTEST, the many thousands of hard working men and women in the police, the intelligence and security agencies, our armed forces, the emergency services, local authorities, businesses, community groups and others have achieved a great deal in their work to counter this ongoing threat. I pay tribute to them.

But the threat remains, and is always evolving. We can never afford to assume that the established way of doing things is enough. We are continuing to increase investment to ensure the police, agencies and others are fully prepared, and we will make whatever changes are necessary to protect our security – as well as ensuring we have learned the lessons of recent experience to make sure we have the strongest possible response.

I believe that if people are better informed about the threat they will be more vigilant but also more assured, and I am therefore pleased that this published strategy gives a more detailed and wide-ranging account of our response than ever before.

It sets out our comprehensive approach for tackling international terrorism – from the international, through the national, to the local. It outlines how we are tackling the immediate threat through the relentless pursuit of terrorists and the disruption of terrorist plots; how we are building up our defences against attacks and our resilience to deal with them; and how we are addressing the longer term causes – particularly by understanding what leads people to become radicalised, so we can stop them becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism or violent extremism in the first place.

I believe this updated strategy leaves us better prepared to meet the terrorist threat, and to achieve our objective of ensuring that the people of the United Kingdom can go about their normal lives in confidence and free from fear.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Gordon Brown". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Gordon Brown MP

Foreword

The Rt Hon Jacqui Smith MP Home Secretary



I am very pleased to publish this new version of the UK's strategy for tackling international terrorism, known as CONTEST.

One of the primary duties of Government is to keep our citizens safe and secure, and to protect the freedoms we all enjoy. Tackling the threat we face from international terrorism remains an important challenge.

This strategy aims to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and our interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

We have had considerable success in countering the terrorist threat since CONTEST was first adopted six years ago, including disrupting a number of planned terrorist operations against the UK and bringing those responsible to justice.

But the threat is always changing. New groups emerge and terrorists continue to develop new methods and make use of new technologies. Learning from our experience over the past few years, we have updated all aspects of our strategy to take account of this changing threat.

Working across government departments, CONTEST is one of the most comprehensive and wide-ranging approaches to tackling terrorism anywhere in the world. We set out here for the first time a detailed account of the history of the threat, how in recent years a new form of international terrorism has emerged, and the impact this has had on the UK. We also describe the strategic factors that sustain terrorism, the principles that underlie our response to the threat, our key achievements to date, and the challenges that we will face in the future.

In publishing this strategy, our aim is to provide the people of the UK and our partners overseas with as full and as open an account as possible of why and how we are tackling this threat. And in setting out clearly the steps we are taking to protect the public and to prevent the rise of violent extremism, I pay tribute to the dedication of the thousands of people – police and intelligence officers, the emergency services, local authorities, businesses, and voluntary and community groups – who are working together to make Britain safe.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Jacqui Smith'.

Jacqui Smith MP

Since 2003, we have had a comprehensive strategy in place to counter the threat to this country and to our interests overseas from international terrorism. The strategy is known as CONTEST.

The aim of the strategy is **‘to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’**.

We believe that to date the strategy has achieved its intended aim.

We have now revised this strategy to take account of the evolution of the threat and of our understanding of the factors which are driving it. The strategy also reflects the lessons we have learned since 2003 and the increasing resources we have made available for counter-terrorism. These revisions will help us ensure that the strategy meets its aim in future.

This is the first time we have published this strategy in such detail: we want to be as open as possible in describing the threat we face and the responses that we believe are appropriate to address it. In a few areas only, we have had to withhold information either for legal or security reasons.

The document begins with an executive summary which is intended to highlight the main themes in the entire document.

The first part of the document then sets out how the terrorist threat to the UK has evolved, the present threat, the factors which are shaping it and our assumptions about how it may develop in future.

The second part sets out the principles which will govern the strategy. They include our commitment to human rights and the rule of law. They make clear that we need to address the causes as well as the symptoms of terrorism. And they emphasise that partnerships in this country and overseas are vital to our success. Government cannot deliver CONTEST on its own.

This part of the document also describes the four main workstreams of the strategy – known as *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect* and *Prepare* – in each case explaining their purpose, our key achievements to date, what we intend to do next, and the challenges we face. We have also described our current activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and we have summarised action we are taking to address the risk of a terrorist attack which makes use of non-conventional weapons.

The third part of the document outlines who will deliver the strategy and how we will measure its impact. For security reasons we have not been able to publish the ‘delivery plans’ which describe in much more detail how we will deliver CONTEST.

The document concludes with a section explaining the importance of communications as a part of our counter-terrorism strategy.

In March 2007 the Prime Minister made the Home Secretary accountable for coordinating CONTEST and established the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office to provide the Home Secretary with support. OSCT has led the work to update this strategy with significant contributions from the many Departments and agencies that are responsible for its delivery.

Executive summary

Introduction

0.1 This document sets out the United Kingdom's strategy for countering the threat from international terrorism, known as CONTEST. It aims to:

- set the context with a brief history of the changing threat to the United Kingdom (UK) and to UK interests overseas from international terrorism
- explain the kind of threat the UK now faces and how terrorism has changed in the UK and overseas in the past 15 years
- identify the factors that have created and are creating this threat
- set out what the Government has done about the threat to date, and
- explain what actions will be taken to address the threat in future and in particular in the next three years, and the challenges we will face.

Part One: Strategic context

International terrorism

0.2 The terrorist threat to the UK is not new. In the post-war period terrorist organisations, with a wide range of motivations, have repeatedly attacked UK interests; and between 1969 and 1998 over 3,500 people died in the UK itself as a result of Irish-related terrorism.

0.3 The international terrorist threat to the UK and UK interests overseas is more recent. In the seventies, most attacks were conducted by militant Palestinian groups. Some attacks, notably against Pan Am 103, were state sponsored.

0.4 A new form of terrorism emerged overseas in the late seventies and early eighties, initially with little connection to the UK, when terrorist organisations in Egypt tried to overthrow the Egyptian Government and establish what they regarded as a genuine Islamic state. These militant groups had an explicitly religious agenda and claimed to justify violence on religious grounds.

0.5 Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army in 1979, groups of this kind from Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world travelled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet army. The 1987 *intifadah* reflected the growing influence of militant religious groups in the Occupied Territories.

0.6 After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, groups and individuals who had fought there returned to their home countries or other areas of conflict. They caused further unrest in Egypt and also played an important part in the Algerian civil war. From the early nineties, groups with links to Egypt and Algeria began to conduct terrorist operations in third countries, including the United States (US) and France.

0.7 The organisation now known as Al Qa'ida formed in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. It developed the thinking of earlier Egyptian militant terrorist groups and from 1996 onwards called for attacks not only on some Islamic states, but also on the US and its allies, including the UK, and specifically on civilians. Subsequent Al Qa'ida attacks culminated in the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Military action in Afghanistan by an international coalition then led to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, which deprived Al Qa'ida of its training facilities and significantly reduced its operational capability.

The impact on the UK

0.8 By the early nineties some propagandists for Egyptian and other violent extremist organisations had settled in London. Some British extremist organisations began to support participation by people in this country in terrorism overseas. Al Qa'ida recruited people from the UK and established a network here. By late 2000, the UK had itself become a target: the police and Security Service disrupted an attempt to conduct an attack in Birmingham city centre (well before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, the subsequent conflict in Afghanistan, and the 2003 Iraq war).

0.9 Since 2001 the police and Security Service have disrupted over a dozen attempted terrorist plots in the UK. On 7 July 2005 four British terrorists attacked the London transport system, murdering 52 people and injuring hundreds more. A second planned attack two weeks later was unsuccessful. Those involved in these operations and many of the others were working with Al Qa'ida.

The current threat to the UK

0.10 The threat to the UK (and to many other countries) now comes primarily from four sources: the Al Qa'ida leadership and their immediate associates, located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qa'ida in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Yemen; 'self-starting' networks, or even lone individuals, motivated by an ideology similar to that of Al Qa'ida, but with no connection to that organisation; and terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as Al Qa'ida but which have their own identity and regional agenda. All these groups respond to local challenges and grievances. But Al Qa'ida has sought to bring them together into a single global movement.

0.11 In recent years, and we anticipate for some years to come, the major terrorist threat to the UK will come from these four sources and this strategy is structured accordingly. But our strategy

contains programmes relevant for tackling terrorist threats from any quarter.

How the terrorist threat has changed

0.12 The current international terrorist threat is quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past. Contemporary terrorist groups claim a religious justification for their actions and have a wide-ranging religious and political agenda; they are no longer concerned with a single issue. Many seek mass civilian casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without warning; they actively seek to recruit new members in the UK and elsewhere around the world.

Strategic factors

0.13 While particular events or individuals are often credited with a major role in the emergence of contemporary international terrorist networks, we believe it is more useful in developing our strategy to focus on the effect and impact of four deeper and longer-term strategic factors:

- Unresolved regional disputes and conflicts (particularly Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq) and state fragility and failure.
- The violent extremist ideology associated with Al Qa'ida, which regards most Governments in Muslim countries as 'un-Islamic' or apostate; claims that these governments are sustained by western states who are engaged in a global attack on Islam; and considers violent action to be a religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims.
- Modern technologies, which facilitate terrorist propaganda, communications and terrorist operations.
- Radicalisation – the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Radicalisation has a range of causes (including perceptions of our foreign policy), varying from one country and one organisation to another.

The future

0.14 Some of the factors that currently sustain international terrorism are likely to persist:

- Many of the conflicts and disputes exploited by contemporary terrorist organisations show no signs of early resolution.
- Failing states (or areas with failing governance) are likely to remain a factor for the foreseeable future.
- Evolving technology will continue to enable terrorism and in some ways make it easier.
- Some people in the Islamic world are likely to continue to support the political agenda associated with Al Qa'ida – although fewer will support Al Qa'ida's operational activities.

0.15 Other trends are likely to constrain the ability of terrorist organisations to threaten the UK and its interests overseas:

- They will continue to lose their more experienced members (including the leadership of Al Qa'ida) to multinational law enforcement, intelligence, and military operations.
- They are vulnerable to any reform and regeneration of failing states, which may deprive them of the bases on which they depend.
- They are short of money and funding.
- Their ideology – based upon a selective interpretation of Islam, contemporary politics and history – is rejected by many Muslims across the Islamic world and by the vast majority of Muslims in the UK.
- They have failed. Al Qa'ida and their affiliates have not succeeded in creating mass movements to overthrow some governments and change the policies of others. Their indiscriminate killing of Muslims has eroded their support and their credibility.

0.16 Against this background our planning assumptions set out the likely direction of the terrorist threat over the next three years. We assess that:

- Under international pressure the Al Qa'ida organisation is likely to fragment and may not survive in its current form. Networks and groups associated with Al Qa'ida will have more autonomy. They will continue to operate in fragile and failing states.
- Terrorist organisations will have access to new technology and may become capable of conducting more lethal operations.
- The ideology associated with Al Qa'ida will outlive changes to its structure.
- The extent to which the international community can reach out to those who are vulnerable to radicalisation will significantly determine the shape and extent of the future threat.
- As the structure of Al Qa'ida changes, the terrorist threat in and to the UK may diversify towards smaller 'self-starting' organisations. Continued law enforcement, security and intelligence work will be needed to contain the threat we face.
- But the ideology which sustains terrorism will be subject to greater challenge in and by communities in this country, notably but not only by British Muslims, making it harder for terrorists to operate here and to recruit people to their cause.

Part Two: The CONTEST Strategy

Aim

0.17 The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. CONTEST is one part of the first UK National Security Strategy, published in 2008.

Principles

0.18 CONTEST is based on principles that reflect our core values, the lessons we and others have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy.

- We will continue to regard the protection of human rights as central to our counter-terrorism work in this country and overseas.
- Our response to terrorism will be based upon the rule of law.
- We will always aim to prosecute those responsible for terrorist attacks in this country.
- Our strategy will tackle the causes as well as symptoms of terrorism.
- Reducing support for terrorism and preventing people becoming terrorists are vital: without popular support terrorism is unsustainable.
- Our strategy must be responsive to the threat which can be created by rapidly evolving technology.
- We recognise that partnerships in this country and overseas are essential to our success and that these partnerships depend on openness and trust.
- The threat we face crosses our borders and is international in scope. We will depend upon our allies as they will depend on us.

Strategic framework

0.19 As in 2006, when details of the strategy were last published, delivery of the strategy is organised around four workstreams:

- ***Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks***
- ***Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism***
- ***Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack***
- ***Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact***

Each workstream has objectives which reflect the assumptions we have made about the future threat and the principles to which we will hold. For each objective we have a series of supporting programmes.

0.20 The strategy now places increased emphasis on a number of issues which are common to all of the main

workstreams. They include the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) threat.

0.21 CONTEST is intended to be a comprehensive strategy: *Work on Pursue and Prevent* reduces the threat from terrorism; *work on Protect and Prepare* reduces the UK's vulnerability to attack.

0.22 CONTEST coordinates closely with our counter-insurgency work overseas, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, the purpose of which is to stop movements which aim to overthrow recognised governments by armed conflict and subversion. The UK's counter-insurgency work in support of the Governments in Iraq and Afghanistan has been led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) with our Armed Forces playing the major operational role. Like our counter-terrorism work, counter-insurgency makes a vital contribution to our national security.

Pursue – stopping terrorist attacks

0.23 The most immediate priority for the Government is to stop terrorist attacks.

0.24 Terrorists operate in secret. Intelligence is vital to detect and disrupt their activities. In the past five years there has been a rapid and significant increase in intelligence resources at home and overseas, for the agencies and the police. These resources have been organised into new structures which ensure unprecedented interagency collaboration, recognised internationally as a model for successful joint working.

0.25 In accordance with the principles set out above, the Government has introduced new legislation to respond to the evolving terrorist threat. New offences relate to the preparation of terrorist acts, receiving training for terrorist purposes, attending a place used for terrorist training and encouraging terrorism or disseminating terrorist publications.

0.26 It is not always possible to prosecute people who intelligence indicates are engaged in terrorist-related activity: for this reason the Government

has developed a range of alternative non-prosecution actions to protect the public. They include control orders (which impose restrictions on the movements and contacts of an individual who has been engaged in terrorist-related activity); the exclusion of foreign nationals from entering the UK; revocation of citizenship; and deportation. These powers directly affect only a very small number of individuals.

0.27 Powers are also available to proscribe groups involved in terrorism.

0.28 Recognising our dependence on international partners, many less experienced than we are in counter-terrorism work, the Government has provided significant assistance and capability building to over 20 countries in a range of counter-terrorism skills and techniques. This includes advice on legal structures and human rights training.

0.29 In the next three years we have the following *Pursue* objectives:

- Increase detection and investigation capability and capacity.
- Increase the effectiveness of our prosecution process, from evidential collection to post-prison supervision.
- Develop more effective non-prosecution actions.
- Improve our capability to disrupt terrorist activities overseas.
- Strengthen the coherence between our counter-terrorism work and the UK's counter-insurgency and capacity building work in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
- Improve coordination and partnership between *Pursue* stakeholders.

0.30 The protection of human rights is a key principle underpinning our counter-terrorism work at home and overseas. A challenge facing any government is to balance measures intended to protect security and the right to life, with the impact on other rights which we cherish. The Government has sought to find that balance at all times.

0.31 On a number of key issues the position of the Government will remain uncompromising: the Government opposes the use of torture in all its forms; and the Government has always and will continue to condemn the practice of 'extraordinary rendition'. UK agencies and police have not and will never engage in these practices.

***Prevent* – stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism**

0.32 To reduce the risk from terrorism – our aim – we need not only to stop attacks but also to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The Government introduced its revised *Prevent* strategy in October 2007. The strategy is based on a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation (the process by which people become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism), to each of which it aims to provide a coherent response.

0.33 In the next three years this workstream has five main objectives:

- To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices.
- Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate.
- Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists;
- Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism.
- To address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting.

0.34 The two supporting objectives are to: develop supporting intelligence, analysis, and information; and to improve our strategic communications.

0.35 The Government has allocated new funding to a wide range of agencies and Departments to develop programmes under these objectives. The cost of the key deliverables in 2008/09 alone is over £140 million. These programmes include:

- The **Preventing Violent Extremism programme**: a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism led by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) in partnership with local authorities and a range of statutory and voluntary organisations.
- The police **Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan** with 300 new ring-fenced staff being recruited in 24 forces to work alongside the national and regional counter-terrorism policing structure and with neighbourhood policing teams.
- The **Channel programme**: a community-based initiative which uses existing partnerships between the police, local authority and the local community to identify those at risk from violent extremism and to support them, primarily through community-based interventions. There are currently 11 Channel sites; another 15 are planned.

0.36 The *Prevent* strategy depends upon a unique and ground-breaking range of local, national and international partners. It needs the support of communities and community organisations in this country to protect vulnerable people from radicalisation, and recruitment to terrorism. Because the greatest threat at present is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam, much *Prevent* activity takes place in and with Muslim communities. But the principles of our *Prevent* work apply equally to other communities who may be the focus of attention from violent extremist groups.

0.37 The role of law enforcement agencies is as important in *Prevent* as it is in *Pursue*. Local government and central Departments have a vital role to play. And international partnerships are essential: people in this country can be radicalised as well as trained overseas and messages from other countries can significantly impact on opinions here.

0.38 As part of this strategy we will take action against those who defend terrorism and violent extremism. We will also continue to challenge views

which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion. Some of these views can create a climate in which people may be drawn into violent activity. We have no intention of outlawing these views or criminalising those who hold them.

0.39 The internet presents significant challenges for CONTEST in general and *Prevent* in particular. The Government has taken action here to explore ways of addressing the widespread dissemination of terrorist related material. This material is usually hosted outside this country. Further action is being taken with counterparts overseas and with multilateral organisations, including the European Union and the United Nations.

Protect – strengthening our protection against terrorist attack

0.40 To achieve the aim of our strategy we also need to reduce the vulnerability of this country and its interests overseas to terrorist attack. This is the purpose of *Protect*. A considerable amount of progress has been made on this workstream over the past five years. It covers protection of critical national infrastructure (CNI), crowded places, the transport system, our borders, and our interests overseas; and protection against threats from insiders and from the misuse of hazardous substances.

0.41 The CNI delivers essential services to the public. Damage to that infrastructure can have severe economic impact or cause large scale loss of life. Intelligence shows that terrorists are interested in attacking national infrastructure targets and recognise the potential impact those attacks can have.

0.42 The Government has put in place a comprehensive programme to protect the national infrastructure from terrorism. The programme is supported by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), established in 2007.

0.43 Crowded places are also a preferred terrorist target. Through the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) the Government has provided security advice to crowded places (including sporting venues and shopping centres). Specialist programmes have been developed for the transport network – air, sea, and rail (including underground systems).

0.44 Protecting our borders has been a key part of this workstream. The new UK Border Agency (UKBA) integrates three previous organisations into an agency of more than 25,000 staff, with a presence in 135 countries. New biometric visa and travel tracking programmes have significantly enhanced border security.

0.45 Action has also been taken to minimise and manage the ‘insider threat’: the risk of staff exploiting legitimate access to an organisation’s assets or premises for unauthorised, malicious purposes, ranging from theft to terrorism.

0.46 The Government protects UK interests overseas, including British citizens who travel or live overseas. Programmes provide accurate advice to travellers on the threat from terrorism and ensure the physical protection of British diplomatic missions and personnel overseas.

0.47 In the next three years our objectives for *Protect* will be to further reduce the vulnerability of:

- the critical national infrastructure
- crowded places
- the transport system
- and our borders.
- New programmes will improve the security of hazardous materials which might now be used in terrorist attacks.

0.48 Some terrorists use false papers to travel here and to conceal their real identity. Others have created multiple identities to avoid detection and hide their activities. The National Identity Scheme will provide a secure way to safeguard personal identities from misuse, and will

‘lock’ a person’s biographic information to their unique facial and fingerprint biometrics on a National Identity Register (NIR). This biographic and biometric information will be stored in a chip on an identity card. Identity cards do not provide a single solution to terrorism and the Government is not proposing their introduction only for counter-terrorism related reasons, but they do provide a valuable tool for authenticating identity and for that reason support counter-terrorist investigations.

***Prepare* – mitigating the impact of attacks**

0.49 The *Prepare* workstream aims to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped. This includes work to manage an ongoing attack and to recover from its aftermath.

0.50 Since 2004 the Government has put in place capabilities to deal with a range of emergencies, of which terrorism is one. Organisations have been established (notably local and regional resilience networks) and capabilities improved. This resilience work has absorbed important lessons from the 2005 London bombings. These capabilities reflect the types of terrorism attack we judge to be most likely in this country. These are identified in a National Risk Assessment.

0.51 Capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack have been enhanced by the new Police Counter-Terrorism Network, by joint programmes between policing and the Armed Forces, and by exercises to ensure all these capabilities are effective.

0.52 Specific and dedicated capabilities have been put in place in the emergency services to manage the terrorist use of chemical and biological materials.

0.53 The objectives of the *Prepare* workstream will be to ensure:

- capabilities are in place to deal with a range of terrorist incident
- there is continuity or swift recovery in our critical national infrastructure following a terrorist incident

- central, regional and local crisis management structures are appropriately equipped, competent and trained.

0.54 The Government will also conduct further planning to manage the consequences of the UK's highest impact terrorism threats as set out in the National Risk Assessment. These include the use of unconventional techniques including radiological as well as chemical and biological materials.

0.55 Many of the capabilities relevant for *Prepare* are also available to deal with the consequences of other threats and hazards. For example, the local government resilience network is configured to deal with the consequences of other local emergencies as well as the impact of an act of terrorism.

0.56 Departments and agencies are currently considering the implications of the recent Mumbai attacks for our *Prepare* strategy.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials

0.57 Contemporary terrorist organisations aspire to use chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons. Changing technology and the theft and smuggling of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials make this aspiration more realistic than it may have been in the recent past.

0.58 Terrorists have also developed new types of explosives and new ways of using them. Technology has developed in conflict areas overseas and is rapidly shared by terrorist organisations around the world.

0.59 Within CONTEST a multi-agency strategy has been developed to respond to these threats. The UK cooperates closely in these areas with the US and with other allies.

0.60 Our strategy is built around programmes under each of the four main CONTEST workstreams. The intelligence

services have a major role to play in *Pursue* aspects of CBRNE work. We will need to reflect the CBRNE threat in our work under *Prevent* to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and, specifically, the legitimacy it claims for mass murder; major *Protect*-related programmes include the provision of radiological detection systems at ports of entry to the UK, safeguarding CBRNE materials and ensuring the security of the civil nuclear sector. Preparing for a CBRNE attack has been a key feature of our broader preparedness work.

0.61 These programmes will continue, informed by a comprehensive classified review of cross-Government CBRNE activity due for completion in early 2009 and by an extensive programme of scientific research.

Part Three: Delivering CONTEST

0.62 CONTEST is overseen at Ministerial level by the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), chaired by the Prime Minister, and by the Home Secretary as the lead Minister for counter-terrorism, and involving the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, the police, and Armed Forces. Some aspects of CONTEST are also dealt with by subcommittees of NSID. NSID may also receive external advice on counter-terrorism, as on other national security issues, from the National Security Forum, an independent body of outside advisors with expertise on many aspects of national security.

0.63 Delivery of the CONTEST Strategy requires close cooperation between a wide range of organisations and stakeholders: local authorities, Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, the police, security and intelligence agencies, emergency services and the Armed Forces and international partners and multilateral organisations. CONTEST also depends on the expertise and knowledge held by communities, industry and the third sector.

0.64 For the first time, counter-terrorism work has a Public Service Agreement (PSA) intended to set targets and monitor progress. The aim of this PSA is the same as CONTEST: to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism. The PSA is based around nine intended outcomes across the four main CONTEST workstreams.

0.65 Delivery of CONTEST and the PSA in particular is overseen by the CONTEST Board, chaired by the Director General OSCT in his capacity as CONTEST Senior Responsible Owner (SRO). Representatives from key Departments and agencies attend the Board; governance arrangements are maintained by the CONTEST Portfolio Office.

0.66 Each workstream of CONTEST has a detailed delivery plan, identifying responsibility for each programme, projected timescales, benefits and costs.

0.67 The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review announced increased resources for counter-terrorism and intelligence. Security spending is planned to reach £3.5 billion by 2011. This includes, among other increases, an additional £240 million in funding for counter-terrorist policing and over £100 million to improve our ability to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists.

0.68 The 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be a celebration of sport and culture for London and the UK. The Government is responsible for ensuring that the Games are safe and secure against all types of risk including terrorism. Since December 2008, the Olympic Security Directorate in OSCT has been leading work on a multi-agency security strategy for the 2012 Games. OSCT reports to the Home Secretary and to NSID.

Part Four: Communications

0.69 Communications to the public, stakeholders and affected communities are a vital part of our counter-terrorism work. Good communications enable us to convey the reality of the threats we

face, the principles which govern our response, the choices we make and the successes we achieve.

0.70 Our communications must also respond to the propaganda directed against us by terrorist organisations, often using new media in a relentless and sophisticated way. We need to challenge the ideology and the outlook of Al Qa'ida.

0.71 Much of this work falls to the Research, Information and Communications Unit, a cross-Departmental team established in June 2007.

Conclusion

0.72 Terrorism is a major threat to the security of the UK and to the ability of British people to live their daily lives. In recent years a new form of terrorism has emerged, fundamentally different in scale and kind from international or domestic terrorist threats we have faced before. CONTEST, the Government's response to this threat, is a comprehensive and coordinated strategy and programme of delivery, involving many departments, agencies and public bodies. The Government's counter-terrorism effort has benefited from sustained increases in funding since 2001.

0.73 Our response has included changes to our laws to reflect the threat we face, but has at all times upheld the principles and values of the UK as a liberal democracy. Although there can be no guarantee of protection against a successful terrorist attack the Government believes that CONTEST is the most comprehensive and wide-ranging approach to tackling terrorism developed by any major nation. It has achieved its aim – to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. This revision to CONTEST is intended to ensure that it will continue to do so.





Summary

The terrorist threat to the UK is not new. In the postwar period terrorist organisations, with a wide range of motivations, have repeatedly attacked UK interests; and between 1969 and 1998 over 3,500 people died in the UK itself as a result of Irish-related terrorism.

The international terrorist threat to the UK and UK interests overseas is more recent. In the seventies, most attacks were conducted by militant Palestinian groups. Some attacks, notably against Pan Am 103, were state sponsored.

A new form of terrorism emerged overseas in the late seventies and early eighties, initially with little connection to the UK, when terrorist organisations in Egypt tried to overthrow the Egyptian Government and establish what they regarded as a genuine Islamic state. These militant groups had an explicitly religious agenda and justified terrorism on religious grounds.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army in 1979 groups of this kind, from Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, travelled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet army. The 1987 *intifadah* reflected the growing influence of militant religious groups in the Occupied Territories.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 groups and individuals who had fought there returned to their home countries or other areas of conflict. They caused further unrest in Egypt and also played an important part in the Algerian civil war. From the early nineties, groups with links to Egypt and Algeria began to conduct terrorist operations in third countries, including the US and France.

The organisation now known as Al Qa'ida formed in Afghanistan in the late 1980s. It developed the thinking of earlier militant terrorist groups which relied on an explicitly religious agenda and justified terrorism on religious grounds and from 1996 onwards called for attacks not only on some Islamic states but also on the USA and its allies, including the UK, and specifically on civilians.

Subsequent Al Qa'ida attacks culminated in the events of September 11, 2001. Military action in Afghanistan by an international coalition then led to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, which deprived Al Qa'ida of its training facilities and significantly reduced its operational capability.

1.01 Terrorism is not new. In the immediate post-war period UK citizens and interests were targeted and attacked by Zionist terrorists in the British Mandate of Palestine and by nationalist terrorists in Cyprus¹. Many other countries have suffered from attacks by domestic terrorist organisations; in Europe, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy and November 17 in Greece caused many civilian casualties. The Basque terrorist organisation, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) continues to operate in Spain and the Kongra Gel (formerly known as the PKK) is still conducting terrorist attacks in Turkey². Countries in every other continent have also been affected.

Irish-related terrorism

1.02 Between 1969 and the signing of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998, over 3,500 people died in the UK as a result of Irish-related terrorism³. Since then there have been attacks by dissident republican terrorist groups, including the Omagh bombing of August 1998, and most recently the murder of two Army personnel and a Police Service of Northern Ireland officer in separate incidents in March 2009.

1.03 These recent attacks show the continued intent of dissident republicans in the face of the political progress that has been made in recent years and which is supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The additional investment, increased capabilities, and improved structures we have put in place since 2001 to counter terrorism are available to respond to threats as they arise. However, this counter-terrorism strategy is specifically addressed at the recent resurgence in international terrorism, which remains the greatest current threat both in this country and to our overseas interests.

International terrorism

1.04 International terrorism is conducted primarily by organisations with a transnational capability, which aim to conduct attacks in and from a number of countries and, increasingly, claim to have an international cause. The distinction between international and domestic terrorist organisations is not exact: the terrorist threat we face now comes from an international movement which makes use of and is affiliated to some domestic groups around the world.

1.05 The first part of this paper looks at the development of the international terrorist threat to the UK, the current threat, the factors that drive terrorism, and how the threat may change in future.

1.06 The first modern international terrorist incident has been dated back to 1968, when a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) hijacked an Israeli commercial flight from Rome⁴. Two years later the same organisation took over a British commercial aircraft as part of a multiple hijacking and later destroyed it on the tarmac at an airfield in Jordan⁵. Further incidents rapidly followed, including the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Over the next 20 years other groups motivated by Palestinian issues and principally comprising Palestinians, conducted a range of attacks in the UK and against UK interests as part of a wider pattern of operational activity⁶. Among the most lethal was the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO), led by Sabri al Banna, which began operations in 1973⁷ and during the 1980s attacked Israeli and Jewish targets in London and Europe, as well as airports at Rome and Vienna. In 1986, ANO took and killed three hostages (two British and one American) in Lebanon and hijacked and destroyed a US airliner⁸.

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1.07 Some international terrorist groups and specific terrorist attacks during this period were state sponsored. ANO itself was at various times supported by the Iraqi, Syrian and Libyan Governments. In April 1986, a Jordanian national attempted to use an unwitting associate to blow up an El Al aircraft departing from London. The UK subsequently broke off diplomatic relations with Syria which had organised the operation⁹. In December 1988 another commercial passenger aircraft, Pan Am 103, was destroyed by an explosive device over Scotland killing 259 people on board and 11 in the town of Lockerbie where it crashed¹⁰. This operation, which caused greater loss of life than any other terrorist incident in the UK, before or since, was sponsored and conducted by the Libyan authorities; in 2001 a Libyan national was convicted and sentenced for his role in the incident¹¹.

Egypt and Afghanistan

1.08 From the early 1980s onwards a quite different kind of terrorism began to emerge in the Middle East in conjunction with the resurgence of militant Islamist ideology¹². In 1981 the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, was assassinated by individuals linked to two organisations, known as Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, which both aimed to overthrow the Egyptian Government and establish what they regarded as a true Islamic state¹³. These groups at first had a purely domestic agenda. Though they were acutely aware of Palestine as a political issue their first priority was not a Palestinian state. And they were avowedly religious in outlook, claiming both a religious justification for acts of terrorism and describing their objectives in religious terms. They drew upon a long history of Islamist thinking in Egypt and in particular on the work of Sayyid Qutb, who in turn was greatly influenced by the Indian-born Islamist thinker Abul-Ala al Mawdudi¹⁴.

1.09 The Egyptian terrorist organisations failed to overthrow the Egyptian Government and many were arrested and imprisoned¹⁵. Others however travelled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet army which had invaded in 1979¹⁶. They met

and began to work alongside another small group of Arabs, including Usama bin Laden, who were also intent on driving the Soviet army out of Afghanistan and re-establishing an Islamic government. Some of these organisations and others in the wider Afghan and Pakistani *mujahideen* movement received funding and support from western and Islamic states. The growing influence of radical and militant Islamism was seen elsewhere, notably in the first *intifadah* in the Occupied Territories from 1987 onwards.

1.10 After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet-backed regime in 1992, many of the groups and individuals who had fought in Afghanistan returned to their countries of origin or moved to other areas of conflict¹⁷. They played a significant part in further terrorist attacks in Egypt culminating in the murder of almost 60 tourists in Luxor (including six British nationals) in 1997¹⁸. In 1992, Afghan Arab veterans created the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, which again sought to overthrow the Government and establish what they regarded as an Islamic state; over the next six years the GIA killed many civilians and members of the security forces. Over 100,000 people died in the Algerian civil war¹⁹.

1.11 During this period terrorism from Algeria and Egypt began again to spread overseas. In 1994, the GIA hijacked a French airliner, apparently intending to crash it into the Eiffel Tower, and in 1995 conducted a series of bombings in France²⁰. In 1993, terrorists attacked and tried to destroy the World Trade Center in New York²¹. They had links not only with the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group, but also to Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who planned Al Qa'ida's attacks in the US eight years later²².

Al Qa'ida and its associates

1.12 The group now known as Al Qa'ida formed in the late 1980s from an organisation supporting Sunni Muslim foreign fighters in Afghanistan, led by Usama bin Laden²³. It had close contacts with other terrorist groups, notably from Egypt (Ayman Zawahiri, bin Laden's

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deputy was prominent in Egyptian Islamic Jihad and had been imprisoned following Sadat's assassination)²⁴. In 1989, bin Laden left Afghanistan for Saudi Arabia where he denounced coalition action during the first Gulf War and in particular the presence of coalition forces in the country²⁵. He subsequently moved to Sudan where he was tolerated by the new Islamist government and began to establish a network comprising like-minded groups and individuals, many of whom had also fought in Afghanistan²⁶.

1.13 Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and shortly after issued a statement that called for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family and Government and attacks on US interests in Saudi Arabia²⁷. This was followed in 1998 by a *fatwa* announcing the formation of the World Islamic Front (which in effect brought together the Al Qa'ida organisation and the old Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and calling explicitly for attacks on the US and its allies anywhere around the world. The statement specifically targeted civilians²⁸. Shortly after, Al Qa'ida conducted suicide bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania²⁹. An Al Qa'ida operation to attack a number of hotels in Jordan on the eve of the Millennium was foiled by the security authorities³⁰. (An operation to attack Los Angeles airport at the same time, which was not directly linked to Al Qa'ida, was also disrupted³¹.) Later in 2000, Al Qa'ida attacked a US naval vessel at harbour in Yemen³². On 11 September 2001, Al Qa'ida attacked the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington³³. In total almost 3,000 people were killed.

1.14 The subsequent military action in Afghanistan by an international coalition, including the UK, led to the fall of the Taliban Government in late 2001³⁴. This deprived Al Qa'ida of its training facilities and significantly reduced its operational capability. Al Qa'ida's aspirational programmes to create chemical and biological weapons and to develop radiological weapons (with the help of several disaffected Pakistani nuclear scientists, operating without the knowledge of their government)

were disrupted. Many of the Al Qa'ida leadership were either killed or forced to leave Afghanistan. Some went to Pakistan, where they established a base in the lawless Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Pakistan/Afghan border; some went to Iran (where many were then detained); and others returned to Saudi Arabia.

1.15 In 2003 Al Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia, operating under the title of Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, began a terrorist campaign against Saudi and foreign targets, including expatriate housing compounds and the oil industry infrastructure. A number of UK citizens living and working in Saudi Arabia were killed or injured in these attacks³⁵. Al Qa'ida-related terrorism spread elsewhere in the Gulf. In 2005 a suicide attack took place against a British-run theatre in Doha, Qatar³⁶.

1.16 Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, radical Islamist groups emerged in and travelled to Iraq to take part in what they regarded as a new *jihād* against coalition forces and the Iraqi Government. The group led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al Zarqawi (who had also fought in Afghanistan) became particularly influential, attracting many foreign fighters from North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and conducting an intensive campaign of suicide attacks and kidnappings³⁷. Al Zarqawi specifically sought out and killed many Iraqi Shia, creating significant sectarian conflict³⁸. Though concerned at his targeting of Muslims, Al Qa'ida established links to al Zarqawi and in October 2004 his organisation was retitled Al Qa'ida in Iraq³⁹. Al Zarqawi was killed in 2006⁴⁰.

1.17 After 2003 Iraq was used as a base for terrorist attacks in other countries. In November 2003, terrorists connected to the Al Qa'ida infrastructure in Iraq attacked two synagogues in Istanbul⁴¹. Days later they attacked the British Consulate and the branch of a British bank⁴². Over 50 people were killed, including the British Consul-General. Members of al Zarqawi's organisation conducted attacks in Jordan, including the bombings of three hotels in

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November 2005 which killed 60 people⁴³. Most were Jordanian.

1.18 Other Al Qa'ida affiliates subsequently emerged in North Africa, some from existing Al Qa'ida cells and others from mergers with like-minded terrorist groups. Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb was created in 2006 from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which had been formed in 1998 as a splinter group from the GIA⁴⁴. Elements of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, founded in 1995 by Afghan veterans, merged with Al Qa'ida in 2007⁴⁵.

1.19 Al Qa'ida also established connections to terrorist groups in South East Asia. Among the most important of these was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, a violent extremist group established in 1993⁴⁶. JI was responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings which killed 202 people, including 24 British nationals⁴⁷. A further Bali attack in 2005 killed 20⁴⁸. JI never became an Al Qa'ida affiliate in the same way as some other groups, but it continues to identify with Al Qa'ida's ideology.

1.20 From the early 1990s onwards terrorist attacks were also conducted in Russia and against Russian interests, in connection with the war in Chechnya. Al Qa'ida frequently referred to Russia as an enemy of the order of the US⁴⁹. Terrorists took hostages in a Moscow theatre in 2002 and at a school in Beslan in Ossetia in 2004 and, also in 2004, attacked the Moscow metro and destroyed two airliners⁵⁰. Over 500 people died in these incidents. Veterans of the Afghan war and others from across the Islamic and non-Islamic world travelled to fight in Chechnya. Some had links to Al Qa'ida. Many saw the war in Chechnya as a successor to the war in Afghanistan.

Hizballah and Iran

1.21 Hizballah was established in Lebanon in 1982⁵¹. From the outset it received significant Iranian Government financial and logistical support and was intended to advance Iranian interests. Its initial objective was to attack and

remove Israeli forces then occupying south Lebanon and try to establish an Islamic republic in Beirut. Though a Shia organisation, it resembled some other modern international terrorist groups considered here, in having an explicitly religious agenda and objective. In 1983, it was implicated in suicide attacks against the US Embassy and US and French military headquarters, killing over 300 people⁵². Hizballah subsequently developed into a large militia force, a Shia political party (with a major influence in Lebanese politics), and a security and intelligence organisation⁵³. It was extensively involved in hostage taking in Lebanon, and implicated in an aircraft hijacking and in regular attacks on Israel and Israeli interests (eg the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992⁵⁴). It has also received support from the Syrian Government.

1.22 Iranian support for terrorism was not confined to Hizballah. Islamist Palestinian organisations received financial and logistical support to conduct operations against Israeli targets. After 2003, Iranian agencies began to support Shia organisations in Iraq, sometimes using Hizballah as an intermediary. By 2006 weaponry used by Hizballah in southern Lebanon was being deployed in Afghanistan by organisations linked to the Taliban.

Summary

By the early nineties some propagandists for Egyptian and other organisations had settled in London. Some British-based extremist organisations began to support participation by people in this country in terrorism overseas.

Al Qa'ida recruited people from the UK and established a network here. By late 2000, the UK had itself become a target: the police and Security Service disrupted an attempt to conduct an attack in Birmingham city centre, well before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, the subsequent conflict in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war.

Since 2001 the police and Security Service have disrupted over a dozen attempted terrorist plots in the UK. On 7 July 2005 four British terrorists attacked the London transport system, murdering 52 people and injuring hundreds more. A second planned attack two weeks later was unsuccessful. Those involved in these operations and many of the others were working with Al Qa'ida.

2.01 The impact of militant Islamism on the UK was profound. In 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini issued a *fatwa* calling for the murder of Salman Rushdie⁵⁵. Later that year a suspected member of Hizballah was killed by his own explosive device while preparing an attack on Salman Rushdie in London⁵⁶. By the early 1990s propagandists for terrorism in Algeria and Egypt had settled in the UK. Some provided *fatwas* purporting to legitimise the activities of terrorist organisations. The GIA published a magazine here. In 1994 a media information centre linked to Al Qa'ida was established in London.

2.02 Throughout this period, emerging British violent Islamist organisations publicly encouraged participation in violent *jihad* overseas. Some of these organisations sought to take over the management of prominent mosques (notably at Finsbury Park in London) which they used as a base for radicalisation, propaganda activities and fundraising⁵⁷. British nationals and others living in the UK were recruited by Al Qa'ida when they travelled to Afghanistan and later to Pakistan. Other UK-based individuals and organisations which supported violent *jihad* in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kashmir made contact and began to work with Al Qa'ida. Overseas terrorist organisations, sympathetic to Al Qa'ida's aims and ideas, began to establish a covert presence in this country.

2.03 In November 2000, the police and Security Service disrupted an apparent attack being planned in the UK by individuals here sympathetic to Al Qa'ida: one had trained in Afghanistan. A month later a British-Pakistani killed himself in a suicide attack against Indian troops in Kashmir and two UK-based Algerians were implicated in an attempted Al Qa'ida attack in Strasbourg⁵⁸. Two others were arrested in September 2001 for supporting an Al Qa'ida-related operation

to attack US military targets in France and Belgium.

2.04 Al Qa'ida operations against the UK and UK interests continued after UK military intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001. In late 2001, a British national was arrested after trying to destroy a US aircraft over the mid-Atlantic using explosives concealed in his shoes⁵⁹. An associate withdrew from carrying out a similar attack and was later arrested in the UK⁶⁰. By 2002, Al Qa'ida had begun to plan a major set piece attack on Heathrow airport: this was subsequently abandoned⁶¹. A British national was also arrested in 2003, implicated in the planning of Al Qa'ida attacks in Europe⁶².

2.05 Attack planning unrelated to Al Qa'ida also continued. In January 2003, police and Security Service action disrupted attempts by an Algerian terrorist cell in London (some of whom had fought in Afghanistan) to make contact poisons; during the arrest of one suspect in Manchester, a police officer was killed⁶³. In April that year, a British national (with a background in the extremist organisation, Al Muhajiroun) killed three people in a suicide attack in Tel Aviv; an accomplice failed to complete his attack and was subsequently found dead nearby⁶⁴.

2.06 By 2003, Al Qa'ida had extended its connections into the UK. Facilitators here supervised the recruitment of British nationals and residents and then arranged for them to travel to Pakistan for paramilitary training. In March 2004 the police working with the security and intelligence services disrupted a major attack planned against potential targets in and around London by British nationals who had been through these training facilities⁶⁵. Another attack, led by an experienced Al Qa'ida operative, was disrupted in August 2004⁶⁶. Together

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these two plots showed the increasing ambition of Al Qa'ida's focus on the UK: in both cases, the conspirators considered using radiological materials to construct and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in London⁶⁷.

2.07 The attack on the London transport network on 7 July 2005, in which 52 people were killed, and the unsuccessful attacks two weeks later were again conducted mainly by British citizens, some of who had training in Pakistan⁶⁸. They were working with Al Qa'ida and were the first suicide attacks in the UK. Later in the year the police and Security Service disrupted an attempt by a London-based terrorist cell to buy large quantities of weapons, including machine guns and rocket propelled grenades⁶⁹. The intended use of these weapons has not been established.

2.08 By 2005 the internet was enabling international terrorist networks to be supported from the UK. In October 2005 police arrested a Moroccan born man at his home in London from where he had set up websites supporting Al Qa'ida and published violent extremist material to incite and recruit suicide bombers in Iraq and elsewhere. In July 2007 he pleaded guilty to charges including inciting terrorism on the internet (see also 'The Internet and *Prevent*', page 94).

2.09 Since the attacks in the summer of 2005, and despite repeated arrests and disruption by the police and the security and intelligence agencies, Al Qa'ida has continued to attempt terrorist operations in this country. Two people were arrested, in Manchester in August 2006 and at Heathrow in September 2007, following an investigation into alleged planning for an attack in the UK or the US⁷⁰. They were subsequently convicted of various offences relating to possession and collection of information for terrorist purposes, membership of Al Qa'ida and, in one case, the offence of directing terrorism⁷¹.

2.10 In September 2006, police arrested a number of people involved in the recruitment and grooming of young men to commit murder. Some of the group

members had attended military-style terrorist training camps in the Lake District and the New Forest, where the participants included those involved in the unsuccessful attacks on 21 July 2005. Seven men were jailed in total for more than 30 years following their conviction for offences including soliciting murder, providing training for terrorism and attending terrorist training.

2.11 In early 2007, the police and Security Service stopped a plot to kidnap and kill a British soldier in the UK⁷². On 29 June 2007 two potentially viable car bombs were discovered in London after a failed attack and the following day a burning car was driven into the terminal building at Glasgow Airport: in December 2008, a man was convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for these attacks⁷³. This individual had links to Al Qa'ida's affiliate in Iraq.

2.12 On 22 May 2008, an attempt was made to detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) at a restaurant in Exeter. The bomber suffered minor injuries and fled the restaurant. In October 2008, he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and one count of preparation of a terrorist act and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

2.13 Between 2001/02 and 2007/08, almost 200 people were convicted of terrorist-related offences⁷⁴.

2.14 As of 31 March 2008, there were over 120 people in prisons in England and Wales remanded or sentenced under the terrorism acts or for terrorism-related offences. As well as those people who have already been convicted of terrorist offences, others (about one third of those in prison in connection with terrorism-related offences) have been arrested and charged and are currently held on remand awaiting trial. The complex nature of terrorist trials means that they can often take many months to complete. Discussion of cases which have yet to come to trial or of trials which are proceeding through the courts remains *sub judice*.

Summary

The threat to the UK (and to many other countries) now comes primarily from four sources: the Al Qa'ida leadership and their immediate associates, located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qa'ida in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Yemen; 'self-starting' networks, or even lone individuals, motivated by an ideology similar to that of Al Qa'ida, but with no connection to that organisation; and terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as Al Qa'ida but which have their own identity and regional agenda.

All these groups respond to local challenges and grievances. But Al Qa'ida have sought to aggregate them into a single global movement.

In recent years, and we anticipate for some years to come, the major terrorist threat to the UK will come from these four sources and this strategy is structured accordingly. But our strategy contains programmes relevant for tackling terrorist threats from any quarter.

3.01 The current threat to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism comes primarily from four interrelated sources: the Al Qa'ida leadership and their immediate associates, located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qa'ida in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Yemen; 'self-starting' networks, or even lone individuals, motivated by the same ideology as Al Qa'ida, but with no connection to that organisation; and terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as Al Qa'ida but which have their own identity and regional agenda. All these groups respond to local challenges and grievances but Al Qa'ida have sought to aggregate them into a single global movement.

Al Qa'ida core

3.02 Despite experiencing repeated setbacks since September 2001, there remains a central or 'core' Al Qa'ida organisation, led by bin Laden and al Zawahiri, and located primarily in the FATA of Pakistan. This core organisation has a formal leadership structure, with posts responsible not only for terrorist operations in neighbouring Afghanistan but also overseas. It probably consists of a few hundred people.

3.03 Al Qa'ida core has a number of operational priorities. Survival is one: while the Al Qa'ida senior leadership continue to base their operations within the FATA, Pakistani military action and US missile strikes have degraded their ability to operate freely and effectively within that area. It will be hard for both bin Laden and al Zawahiri, and other senior Al Qa'ida members, to move to and sustain another safe haven. The Al Qa'ida core will continue to seek to work with other terrorist and insurgency groups to resist Pakistani military and security

forces, destabilise the Government in Islamabad and play a part in the insurgency in Afghanistan. It will also maintain contact with affiliated groups and aspire to conduct attacks against other countries, notably the US and UK.

3.04 The Al Qa'ida core group maintains contact with cells operating in the UK, in which British-Pakistanis constitute the single largest ethnic group. These cells look to the Al Qa'ida leadership for operational guidance and to provide training for new recruits from this country. Al Qa'ida also has cells operating elsewhere in Europe, but they are probably less numerous and capable than cells here.

3.05 Al Qa'ida has been and is presently unable to achieve its key objective – to use terrorism to inspire a mass uprising which would overturn Islamic governments and force western states to change their policies towards the Islamic world. But it continues to have the capability to conduct significant mass casualty attacks against its key targets.

Al Qa'ida 'affiliates'

3.06 Al Qa'ida inspires and advises affiliated terrorist groups around the world. These affiliates have no single format and there are significant differences in the degree of control that the Al Qa'ida core can exert over them.

3.07 The fate of the affiliates has also varied. Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb (ie North Africa) appears to be growing and absorbing smaller groups across the region. An absence of popular support together with law enforcement and military action have significantly reduced the size and strength of Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (ie Saudi Arabia) and Al Qa'ida in Iraq, but they retain some operational capability. Al Qa'ida in Yemen has grown

since its formation in 2006 and aspires to conduct operations in Saudi Arabia.

3.08 Al Qa'ida affiliates seek to destabilise specific governments in the Islamic world and attack western states or organisations which they judge are providing those states with support. Most affiliates have aspired or tried to attack UK interests overseas and some have established contact with cells in the UK. The purpose of those cells is not always to attack targets in the UK. Sometimes they aspire to support attacks in third countries.

3.09 At present, no Al Qa'ida affiliate has the capability and support required to overturn a government. But like the core of Al Qa'ida, they have the capability to conduct mass casualty attacks. This capability is extending from the countries in which they are based to neighbouring states and Europe.

Al Qa'ida inspired threats

3.10 Over the past few years 'self-starting' groups and networks have emerged which pose a terrorist threat and are motivated by Al Qa'ida related ideology, but have no connection to the Al Qa'ida organisation. The names of these groups change often, and many do not have a name at all. They often last only for short periods of time, perhaps to the point where a single law enforcement operation arrests the key members.

3.11 Such groups are capable of conducting lethal operations. The multiple bombings on the Madrid train system on 11 March 2004, which killed 191 people and wounded a further 1,755, were conducted by Moroccan, Syrian, and Algerian nationals⁷⁵ who were inspired by Al Qa'ida and had links to a Moroccan terrorist group with Al Qa'ida connections. But no direct Al Qa'ida link to the Madrid attacks has been confirmed. The leadership killed themselves to avoid arrest and the group appears not to have survived.

3.12 The film maker Theo Van Gogh was killed in November 2004 after the release of his film about violence against women in Islamic societies. Mohammed Bouyeri, 27, was jailed for life on 26 July 2005, for the murder after confessing to the killing, claiming he acted out of religious conviction⁷⁶. Bouyeri was associated with a larger Dutch organisation known as the Hofstad group, which seems to have planned a range of other terrorist attacks in the Netherlands⁷⁷.

3.13 Self-starting organisations have conducted major attacks in many other countries, notably Morocco and Egypt. In the UK, groups and individuals committed to violent extremism have been inspired by Al Qa'ida's ideology, but have no connection to it. This wider movement includes individuals who have little or no direct contact with any existing terrorist groups, but who have set out to undertake attacks largely on their own (most recently in Exeter⁷⁸).

A network of networks: other terrorist groups

3.14 The terrorist threat to the UK and UK interests overseas does not come only from Al Qa'ida. A very wide range of groups have also sought to attack UK interests overseas. Some of them predate Al Qa'ida. Many are primarily motivated by perceived and alleged grievances with particular countries or ethnic groups. Some of these groups have developed links to Al Qa'ida and have come to share parts of its ideology. On occasions, these groups may facilitate an Al Qa'ida operation.

3.15 The groups of most concern to the UK and to UK interests have a very wide geographical range: the Near East (Palestine, Israel, Lebanon); Iraq; South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India); North Africa (the Maghreb, Libya and Egypt) and the Horn of Africa; and South East Asia (primarily Indonesia).

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3.16 Many of these groups have had or still have a presence in the UK itself. Some members of these groups (notably those motivated by Kashmiri-related issues) have been implicated in Al Qa'ida-related operations in the UK.

3.17 Hizballah is a Shia organisation that has little or no contact with the Al Qa'ida movement. It receives significant funding from Iran. The UK proscribed the military wing as a terrorist organisation in July 2008 but is exploring certain contacts at an official level with Hizballah's political wing, including its MPs.

Summary

The current international terrorist threat is quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past. Contemporary terrorist groups claim a religious justification for their actions and have a wide-ranging religious and political agenda; they are no longer concerned with a single issue. Many seek mass civilian casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without warning; they actively seek to recruit new members in the UK and elsewhere around the world.

4.01 International terrorism in the UK and against UK interests overseas during the 1970s and 1980s was usually associated with the single issue of Palestine. Targets attacked or threatened in the UK were very often Israeli and/or Jewish. The groups responsible were predominantly secular and did not espouse Islamist rhetoric or objectives. They claimed no religious justification for their actions. They did not aim to cause mass casualties, which they judged would not assist in achieving their political goals. The use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons was neither considered nor a practical option. Those responsible for attacks here very often came into the country from outside for that purpose and made little or no attempt to appeal directly to or recruit British nationals or people living here.

4.02 Many terrorist groups during this period had relations with states and the most lethal attack against UK interests, on Pan Am 103, was itself conducted by state organisations. But state sponsorship sometimes acted as a constraint as well as a facilitator. Most groups saw little purpose in attempting to overthrow governments across the Islamic world and therefore did not make the transition from terrorist to insurgency organisations⁷⁹.

4.03 International terrorist activity in and against the UK since the early 1990s has been very different. Reflecting earlier international trends, it draws explicitly on the language of religion and its objectives are linked to a religious cause. Al Qa'ida is not a domestic terrorist group focused on a single political issue or geographical area, but an international network with an international agenda. It aspires to be a vanguard, provoking a violent uprising in the Islamic world which will overthrow existing political structures and establish a new world order⁸⁰. Al Qa'ida and other networks associated with it regard the UK itself as a key target and have sought to conduct operations here which would cause mass casualties. Al Qa'ida has popularised and given spurious legitimacy to suicide bombing and aspires to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.

4.04 Al Qa'ida and its associated networks also aim to recruit people in and from this country. They have a detailed public narrative that claims to justify the killing of civilians and the means to disseminate that narrative quickly and widely into homes in this country. They have consciously sought to use vulnerable institutions and public places to provide a platform for their propaganda. They have had some support, both explicit and implicit, from some domestic extremist organisations.

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4.05 At various moments Al Qa'ida and its associates have made the transition from terrorism to insurgency, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. As insurgencies they have posed a different and a wider threat to the UK and its interests than their forebears.

4.06 Contemporary international terrorist groups pose new challenges to this country and its interests. To date, their *modus operandi* has not been directly comparable to that of Irish-related terrorists or to international organisations which have threatened this country before. Their distinctive features have had a major impact on all our counter-terrorism work, including our legislation, the tactics and methods of our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, on our work with communities, and on our international partnerships⁸¹. They have also had a major impact on our military priorities. These are all described in more detail below.

Threat levels

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) is responsible for assessing the terrorist threat to this country and UK interests overseas. JTAC was established in 2003 to bring together expertise in terrorism from across Government in a multi-agency organisation. The threat level is set against a five-point scale:

- **Low** – an attack is unlikely
- **Moderate** – an attack is possible, but not likely
- **Substantial** – an attack is a strong possibility
- **Severe** – an attack is highly likely
- **Critical** – an attack is expected imminently

Ministers play no part in the decision-making process. The threat level has been publicly available since August 2006, including on the Security Service (MI5) website.

The current threat level from international terrorism is **severe**, meaning that an attack is 'highly likely'. This has been the threat level since 2006, except for two periods – in August 2006 and in June 2007 – when it was raised to **critical** in response to specific terrorist activity.

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/security_and_intelligence/community/threat_levels.aspx

www.mi5.gov.uk/output/news-threat-level-updates.html

Summary

While particular events or individuals are often credited with a major role in the emergence of contemporary international terrorist networks, we believe it is more useful in developing our strategy to focus on the effect and impact of four deeper and longer term strategic factors:

- unresolved regional disputes and conflicts (particularly Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir and Iraq) and state failure and fragility
- the violent extremist ideology associated with Al Qa'ida, which regards most governments in Muslim countries as 'un-Islamic' or apostate; claims that these governments are sustained by western states who are engaged in a global attack on Islam; and considers violent action (described as *jihad*) to be a religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims
- modern technologies, which facilitate terrorist propaganda, communications and terrorist operations, and
- radicalisation – the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Radicalisation has a range of causes (including perceptions of our foreign policy), varying from one country and one organisation to another.

5.01 Four factors have led to the emergence of the contemporary international terrorist networks that pose a threat to the UK and its interests overseas: conflict and instability, ideology, technology, and radicalisation. Each has had important effects and these effects have then reinforced one another. None of these factors on their own would create the threat we face. It is a combination of them all which has a significant impact.

Conflict and instability

5.02 Terrorism has usually been related to unresolved regional disputes and conflicts. The current wave of international terrorism is specifically connected to disputes and conflicts which involve Muslims and the Islamic world.

5.03 Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq have become focal points for terrorism over the past 20 years. In each of these areas terrorist groups have emerged and grown, as disputes have remained unresolved, conflict has persisted, and people have suffered. By participating in these conflicts, terrorist organisations have acquired operational expertise and experience; developed quickly the technology of terrorism (notably IEDs)⁸²; and attracted local and international support, often by claiming to provide the only solution to long-standing grievances.

5.04 Terrorist groups can also thrive in fragile and failed states. States become fragile and fail for a range of reasons of which conflict is itself one (of the top 20 failed states in a 2008 Failed States Index, almost all are currently experiencing violent conflict or political violence⁸³). But state fragility and failure have wider causes, including economic collapse, poor governance, the abuse of human rights, the ready availability of weapons and

breakdown of law and order, and rapid population increases.

5.05 Fragile and failed states are unable to meet the needs of their population and lack the capacity to effectively tackle violent extremism. They can provide uncontrolled spaces in which the infrastructure of terrorism may flourish, where terrorist organisations not only run training facilities but also provide material support and protection to the local population which would normally be provided by the state itself. Al Qa'ida grew under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and now depends on a safe haven in the FATA of Pakistan. Al Qa'ida affiliates exploit ungoverned areas in Yemen, the Sahel, and Somalia.

5.06 Failed states can also facilitate the transition of terrorist groups into larger and more ambitious insurgent organisations that challenge the authority of the government itself. The poorer the country, the higher the percentage of terrorist groups that reach the insurgency stage⁸⁴. And when terrorist groups become insurgency organisations they become much harder to defeat. Since 1945, successful counter-insurgency campaigns have lasted for an average of 14 years⁸⁵.

5.07 Conflict and state fragility or failure cause significant internal population displacement and migration. In the 1970s and 1980s some political refugees and others, escaping from authoritarian and repressive governments in the Islamic world, arrived in Europe and established European factions of Islamist parties⁸⁶. Since the late 1980s small numbers of people who had supported or been actively involved in terrorism in the Islamic world also fled to Europe, creating an international network of like-minded activists, providing what had been domestic terrorist groups with an

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international network. The movement of violent extremists from North Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in part because of the Algerian civil war, led directly to the development of networks in France and then the UK. A small percentage of refugees from other countries (notably Somalia and Kurdistan) have also had a significant impact on the security of a number of European states, including the UK.

Ideology

5.08 Violent extremist ideology, associated with Al Qa'ida, is the second factor which has generated the current phase of international terrorism.

5.09 This ideology considers most Islamic governments to be 'un-Islamic' or apostate. It challenges the legitimacy of Israel and claims that western states sustain 'un-Islamic' governments and are engaged in a global attack on Islam. It therefore tries to turn grievances about specific regional issues into grievances about the West. Citing historical precedent and religious doctrine, the ideology states that militant *jihād* against the so-called oppressors (be they Muslim or western governments) is a religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims and that those who follow the call will be rewarded in the afterlife. The ideology calls for the overthrow (by militant *jihād*) of Islamic governments and the imposition of *shari'a* under a new pan-Islamic Caliphate. It urges attacks on western states and civilians and seeks the removal of any western presence from the Islamic world⁸⁷.

5.10 Al Qa'ida's ideology advocates not only martyrdom in the cause of violent *jihād* but also suicide terrorist attacks. Al Qa'ida has not always supported suicide attacks (they date from 1998 but became a key theme with 9/11) and other organisations (including the Tamil Tigers, Hizballah and Palestinian groups) have done so for longer. But Al Qa'ida's support for suicide operations has made them far more common than was previously the case and some countries (notably Afghanistan) which had rarely suffered from suicide attacks now face

them regularly. Between 1981 and 1997 some 50 suicide attacks around the world caused an estimated 850 fatalities; in 2005 alone some 330 attacks caused the death of over 3,000 people⁸⁸.

"...any of the hypocrites in Iraq, or Arab rulers who have helped America in their murder of Muslims in Iraq, anyone who approved of their actions and followed them into this Crusader war by fighting with them or providing bases or administrative support...should be aware that they are apostates who are outside the community of Islam; it is therefore permitted to take their money and their blood."

Usama bin Laden, Interview, Al-Jazeera TV, 11 February 2003
David Aaron, *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p.80
available at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG602.pdf

5.11 The ideology associated with Al Qa'ida makes terrorism seem a test of faith. It cynically exploits and abuses the strong Muslim commitment to the wellbeing of other Muslims and alludes to a wide range of political 'touch points' of great historical significance in the Islamic world. Al Qa'ida often appears to offer both an explanation and a solution to grievances which Islamic states accept, but seemingly cannot resolve.

5.12 The ideology is not all new. It draws selectively on many sources, including Islamist theory from India and Egypt and the ideology of earlier Egyptian terrorist organisations. But Al Qa'ida has also issued its own *fatwas*, legitimising terrorism and validating its own ideology, and inspired others to issue *fatwas* on its behalf; *fatwas* legitimising suicide attacks by other terrorist organisations have also had a major impact⁸⁹.

Technology

5.13 Rapid technical change has had two key effects on terrorism, relating to communications and tactics.

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5.14 The communications revolution has made easier the spread of violent extremist ideology and propaganda. The number of websites related to terrorist groups or supporting violent extremism has increased from as few as 12 in 1998 to over 4,000⁹⁰. Al Qa'ida has its own media organisation, Al-Sahab, which produced just six audio and video messages in 2002 but nearly 100 in 2007⁹¹.

5.15 Contemporary terrorist organisations design, conduct and record their operations with a view to publicity. On violent extremist websites films of terrorist attacks are routinely combined with other pictures from conflict areas which record the suffering of Muslim communities. Al Qa'ida's ideology forces local events into a global narrative; technology constructs and illustrates that narrative and conveys it to a global audience.

5.16 The communications revolution also facilitates a two-way dialogue between organisations and their actual or prospective members. That dialogue enables fundraising, recruitment and some training and operational planning: to a limited extent the internet has superseded the terrorist training camp.

5.17 Technology has also enabled new tactics. Often facilitated by web-based communications, terrorists have learned how to harness and share emerging technology, making it easier to plan operations which can have a more lethal effect. Terrorists aspire to develop and use chemical, biological, and radiological weapons and look to the internet to assist them.

“...the strongest weapon which the *mujahideen* enjoy – after the help and granting of success by God – is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq and the surrounding countries... in the absence of this popular support, the Islamic *mujahid* movement would be crushed.”

Letter from Ayman Zawahiri to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, 9 July 2005
available at www.dni.gov/press_releases/letter_in_english.pdf

Radicalisation

5.18 Radicalisation in the context of this strategy is the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups. Radicalisation is the fourth key driver of contemporary international terrorism and in one sense the most important: none of the other strategic factors identified here would enable terrorism unless people were also prepared to support it. Radicalisation is partly the result of conflict, ideology and technology, but has additional causes; some of these are described below.

Causes

5.19 There is no single cause of radicalisation. The motivation of those who support violent extremism and terrorism often varies from one country and one terrorist organisation to another. Within terrorist networks the motivation as well as the background of those in leadership positions differs from those who are not.

5.20 But conflict and the failure of states create grievances which can play a key role in the radicalisation process. Many Muslims as well as non-Muslims believe that the West (notably the US and the UK) has either caused conflict, failure and suffering in the Islamic world or done too little to resolve them. Military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan (and consequent civilian casualties), perceived western inaction in Palestine and alleged support for authoritarian Islamic governments have all created controversy and anger. The treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay (and previously in Abu Ghraib) is widely felt to demonstrate an unacceptable inconsistency in the commitment of the West to human rights and the rule of law. In recent polling across four Islamic states a significant majority judged that it was the aim of the US to ‘weaken and divide the Islamic world’; a significant minority thought the purpose of the ‘war on terror’ was to achieve US political and military domination ‘to control Middle East resources’⁹².

5.21 Many people in the Muslim world also believe that these policies betray a more fundamental failure in western states to respect or understand Islam itself. Further evidence of that view is often found in western media and culture⁹³, regarded as hostile towards and uninformed about Islam and Muslims: the reactions to a recent Dutch film about aspects of Islam and to the 2005 Danish cartoons both indicate the significance of this issue.

5.22 Failing and fragile states can cause additional grievances, deriving from experiences of insecurity, the abuse of basic rights, unfulfilled economic expectations and the failure of the political process.

5.23 Grievances do not always or often lead to radicalisation and to violent extremism. But they can make people more open to the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida, support for which may then lead to acts of terrorism. It appears to be the intensity of political and economic grievances that often motivates and characterises members of terrorist networks⁹⁴; people who believe that the aim of western foreign policies is to weaken and divide the Islamic world are more likely to approve of terrorist attacks against civilians⁹⁵. In some fragile and failing states or areas and for some terrorist organisations, the experience of poverty and exclusion can create specific grievances which may then lead to radicalisation. In the FATA, recent research suggests that poverty and illiteracy as well as the conflict in Afghanistan are key factors leading to religious extremism⁹⁶. Terrorist organisations in the developing world (notably North Africa) have specifically and successfully sought members from among the urban poor⁹⁷. Others have attracted support by providing services which in the developed world would be expected of the state.

5.24 In many countries, including the UK, people are not only vulnerable to radicalisation because of political and economic grievances. A range of social and psychological factors are also

important. Radicalisation seems to be related directly to a crisis in identity and, specifically, to a feeling of not being accepted or not belonging⁹⁸. This is itself the result of a range of factors, which may include the experience of discrimination and inequalities, racism, recent migration and more generally a lack of affinity with and disconnect from family, community and state. One extremist organisation in the UK has explicitly said that discrimination and racism create conflicts of identity which make recruitment possible; those drawn to this organisation believe that lack of social mobility has stopped them realising their full potential⁹⁹. In this country, and Europe more widely, there also seems to be a link between criminality and radicalisation (the former occurring before as well as after the latter)¹⁰⁰.

5.25 There is a further factor which seems to be common to the radicalisation process in many countries and across many organisations. Radicalisation is usually a social process, involving extensive interaction with an influential and a supportive peer group, often including a charismatic role model and ideology. In some cases this group is part of a wider terrorist organisation. In other cases it is 'self-starting', perhaps initially motivated by adventurism and the lure of conspiracy as much as a clearly defined ideological commitment to violence. In many cases membership of and recruitment into this peer group precedes and then facilitates radicalisation itself. In this country, these supporting groups have been able to provide young people in particular with help and advice which may not have been available through traditional religious institutions and organisations¹⁰¹.

5.26 It follows from this very brief review that although many contemporary terrorist organisations have titles which draw on religious concepts and purport to have explicitly religious objectives, people do not join them only or often mainly for simply religious reasons. Indeed many terrorists who associate with Al Qa'ida have little or no religious understanding or knowledge.

5.27 Factors leading to radicalisation in this country and overseas are considered further in the Part Two of this strategy (see Section Nine, page 82 onwards) which also outlines the Government's intended response to this problem.

- And radicalisation can compromise the integrity of parts of the law enforcement and security apparatus, sometimes leading to complicity between terrorists and those tasked to disrupt them.

Extent and effects of radicalisation

5.28 Polling and research across the Islamic world suggests that support for Al Qa'ida, bin Laden, and suicide bombing have all declined in the last few years. But in Pakistan and Indonesia over a third of respondents in 2008 still expressed confidence in bin Laden¹⁰². In late 2006/early 2007 an average of 15% of respondents across four representative Muslim countries supported Al Qa'ida's attack on Americans – though fewer supported attacks on civilians¹⁰³. According to one of the largest polls conducted in the Islamic world some 7% of respondents thought the 9/11 attacks were 'completely justified'¹⁰⁴.

5.29 Polling indicates that much greater numbers support political goals associated with Al Qa'ida (74% favouring US military withdrawal from Islamic countries, 71% the introduction of *shari'a*, and 65% a new Caliphate¹⁰⁵).

5.30 Radicalisation has three important effects:

- Only a small proportion of those who express support for Al Qa'ida or Al Qa'ida's attacks will be prepared to participate in terrorism. But it is from among those who do hold these views that terrorist groups are able to recruit and survive. Radicalisation is thus vital to the success of the terrorist enterprise.
- Support for terrorists or their wider political agenda can also act as a constraint on some governments in the Islamic world who may attract significant domestic criticism and even cause domestic unrest if they take law enforcement action against terrorist groups or publicly challenge aspects of terrorist ideology.

Summary

Some of the factors that currently sustain international terrorism are likely to persist:

- Many of the conflicts and disputes exploited by contemporary terrorist organisations show no signs of early resolution.
- Failing states (or areas with failing governance) are likely to remain a factor for the foreseeable future.
- Evolving technology will continue to enable terrorism and in some ways make it easier.
- Some people in the Islamic world are likely to continue to support the political agenda associated with Al Qa'ida – although fewer will support Al Qa'ida's operational activities.

Other trends are likely to constrain the ability of terrorist organisations to threaten the UK and its interests overseas:

- They will continue to lose their more experienced members (including the leadership of Al Qa'ida) to multinational law enforcement, intelligence, and military operations.
- They are vulnerable to the reform and regeneration of failing states, which may deprive them of the bases on which they depend.
- They are short of money and funding.
- Their ideology, based upon a selective interpretation of Islam, contemporary politics and history, is rejected by many Muslims across the Islamic world.
- They have failed. Al Qa'ida and their affiliates have not succeeded in creating mass movements to overthrow some governments and change the policies of others. Their indiscriminate killing of Muslims has eroded their support and their credibility.

Against this background our planning assumptions set out the likely direction of the terrorist threat over the next three years:

- Under pressure from the international community, the Al Qa'ida organisation is likely to fragment and may not survive in its current form. Networks and groups associated with Al Qa'ida will have more autonomy. They will continue to operate in fragile and failing states.
- Smaller terrorist organisations will have access to new technology and may become capable of conducting more lethal operations.
- The ideology associated with Al Qa'ida will outlive changes to its structure.
- As the structure of Al Qa'ida changes, the terrorist threat in and to the UK may diversify towards smaller 'self-starting' organisations. Continued law enforcement, security and intelligence work will be needed to contain the threat we face.
- But the ideology which sustains terrorism will be subject to greater challenge in and by communities in this country, notably but not only by British Muslims, making it harder for terrorists to operate here and to recruit people to their cause.

6.01 Historically, most terrorist groups have failed to achieve their objectives. The most resilient terrorist groups have a large number of members, follow an ideology which draws upon religion, and maintain alliances with other terrorist organisations¹⁰⁶.

6.02 Al Qa'ida, its affiliates, and associates have all these features. There is a risk that significant strategic factors could continue to work in their favour.

- Conflicts and disputes exploited by contemporary terrorist organisations show no signs of early resolution. Climate change, demographic and resource pressures, ethnic conflict, and economic crises will tend to increase the risk of state failure. Of 27 countries recently identified as being at risk of conflict and state failure (against a set of 14 indicators)¹⁰⁷ half have already experienced terrorist threat or attacks. Some fragile states are already strong points for Al Qa'ida and other groups.
- Regional conflicts and state failure will continue to influence opinion among diaspora communities living in the developed world. In certain circumstances this will increase the vulnerability of some members of these communities to radicalisation.
- Al Qa'ida will continue to be able to set its own theological agenda. Western support for and at times military intervention in failing states will continue to be used as evidence in support of Al Qa'ida's ideology.
- Technology will continue to enable terrorism. Terrorists will have more scope to communicate with each other, sometimes with less chance of detection. Online communications may enable extremist messaging to reach vulnerable individuals faster than conventional media. Technology can provide terrorists

with improved surveillance and remote reconnaissance capability. And technology may provide more lethal weapons. Some may be created from tools and techniques found on or through the internet. Others may be obtained via state sponsors or by witting or unwitting release of information from state programmes.

- Grievances and other factors will continue to make people in the Islamic world vulnerable to the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida. Smaller numbers may be prepared to support attacks on civilians.
- Outside the Islamic world a very small proportion of Muslims will also be prepared to endorse Al Qa'ida's operational agenda. Polling suggests that there remains some support for Al Qa'ida and for terrorism among Muslims living in the UK and elsewhere in Europe¹⁰⁸.
- A limited number of state sponsors will have the capability to significantly increase the scale of the terrorist threat.

6.03 The very top leadership of Al Qa'ida (bin Laden and al Zawahiri) may be captured or killed. This would cause significant disruption to the organisation in the short term and lead to changes in its structure and command and control. It will not necessarily make the broader Al Qa'ida movement less lethal. Some influential members of Al Qa'ida have long favoured a more decentralised operating model and regarded the hierarchical centralised organisation developed under bin Laden and al Zawahiri as a strategic mistake¹⁰⁹.

6.04 But Al Qa'ida and its associated groups remain vulnerable:

- They are likely to continue to lose their more experienced members to law

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enforcement, intelligence, and military operations. The experience of the movement will be seriously depleted.

- They rely upon the conditions created by failed and fragile states. More effective governance in the FATA alone would be disruptive: other fragile states do not offer the same proximity to Afghanistan or comparable security.
- They need money. The motivation and loyalty of core members of Al Qa'ida are influenced by its ability to pay salaries and support families (including the families of those who have been killed). Disruption of fundraising can cause Al Qa'ida serious difficulties.
- Al Qa'ida's ideology is rejected by many Muslims worldwide and by the vast majority of Muslims in the UK. It is based upon a selective interpretation of Islam: Al Qa'ida and its associates are vulnerable to effective theological challenge. This has been demonstrated very clearly by the recent refutation of Al Qa'ida ideology by Sayyid Imam Al Sharif, also known as Dr Fadl, once a close associate of al Zawahiri, member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and important ideologue for Islamist *mujahideen*. Fadl has not only systematically identified the flaws in Al Qa'ida thinking but also exposed the harms it has caused to Muslims around the world¹¹⁰.
- Al Qa'ida has failed to meet its ultimate objectives: its indiscriminate violence, often directed against Muslims, can easily lose the popular support on which it depends. Parts of the wider radical Islamist movement (in Egypt and in Libya) have already stopped operating and sought peace. Others (notably in Iraq and Saudi Arabia) have lost popular support and have ceased to be effective.
- For Al Qa'ida, communications technology is both a strength and a weakness. It can as quickly communicate Al Qa'ida's failures, errors and shortcomings as it can convey its alleged success.

The next three years: planning assumptions

6.05 Against this background, our three-year strategy is based on the following planning assumptions:

- Assuming continued international pressure, the Al Qa'ida 'core' organisation is likely to fragment and may not survive in its current form. The core group will not be able to achieve its strategic goal (popular unrest and uprising leading to the overthrow of governments and the establishment of a Caliphate), but it will still have the capability to conduct significant terrorist attacks.
- The stability, security and prosperity of the FATA of Pakistan will remain critical in determining the future of Al Qa'ida, of Pakistan itself and of the insurgency in Afghanistan.
- Al Qa'ida affiliates will develop more autonomy. Associated networks and 'self-starting' groups will become more prominent and develop significant capabilities. They will continue to gravitate towards and to challenge fragile and failing states (notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia). They will also have the capability to conduct significant terrorist attacks, including against western states.
- It will continue to be difficult and at times impossible to conduct conventional law enforcement counter-terrorist operations in and with fragile and failing states.
- Terrorist organisations will have access to more lethal technology. Scientific training and expertise will have even greater significance for terrorist organisations because technology will be able to compensate for the vulnerabilities they will have. Terrorists will continue to aspire to develop or steal and then to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.

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- Terrorism which threatens the UK and its interests overseas will continue to depend less on state sponsorship than on state failure. But resurgent state sponsorship could significantly increase the threat we face.
- The ideology associated with Al Qa'ida will outlive any changes to its structure. It will continue to attract support. A small but significant number of people will remain committed to violent extremism. The terrorist narrative will continue to exploit political events and individual grievances.
- Our ability to reach and persuade those who already support violent extremism will be limited. But the ability of the international community to reach and persuade those who hold grievances or are vulnerable to other causes of radicalisation will be much greater. The extent to which we can collectively do so will significantly determine the future shape of the terrorist threat.
- As the core group of Al Qa'ida fragments so the threat in the UK itself may diversify. 'Self-starting' organisations, old Al Qa'ida affiliates and other terrorist groups may all become more important. Continued law enforcement, security and intelligence work will be needed to control the changing threats we may face.
- But the ideology behind violent extremism will be subject to greater challenge in and by communities in this country. This will have an impact on the support which terrorism can command and the way in which terrorists will operate.

6.06 A coherent counter-terrorism strategy, addressing both the immediate threat and the factors which drive it, can make Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups ineffective in the UK and against UK interests overseas. But the challenges will continue to be considerable.





Summary

Aim

The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

CONTEST is one part of the first UK National Security Strategy, published in 2008.

Principles

CONTEST is based on principles that reflect both our core values, the lessons we and others have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy:

- We will continue to regard the protection of human rights as central to our counter-terrorism work in this country and overseas.
- Our response to terrorism will be based upon the rule of law.
- We will always aim to prosecute those responsible for terrorist attacks in this country.
- Our strategy will tackle the causes as well as the symptoms of terrorism.
- Reducing support for terrorism and preventing people becoming terrorists are vital: without popular support terrorism is unsustainable.
- Our strategy must be responsive to the threat which can be created by rapidly evolving technology.
- We recognise that partnerships in this country and overseas are essential to our success and that these partnerships depend on openness and trust.
- The threat we face crosses our borders and is international in scope. We will depend upon our allies as they will depend on us.

Strategic framework

As in 2006, delivery of the strategy is organised around four workstreams:

- *Pursue*: to stop terrorist attacks
- *Prevent*: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism
- *Protect*: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack
- *Prepare*: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact

Each workstream has objectives which reflect the assumptions we have made about the future threat and the principles to which we will hold. For each objective we have a series of supporting programmes.

The strategy now places increased emphasis on a number of issues which are common to all of the main workstreams. They include the CBRNE threat.

CONTEST is intended to be a comprehensive programme: work on *Pursue* and *Prevent* reduces the threat from terrorism; work on *Protect* and *Prepare* reduces the vulnerability of this country to attack.

CONTEST coordinates closely with our counter-insurgency work overseas, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, the purpose of which is to stop movements which aim to overthrow recognised governments by armed conflict and subversion. The UK's counter-insurgency work in support of the Governments in Iraq and Afghanistan has been led by the FCO and MOD with our Armed Forces playing the major operational role. Like our counter-terrorist work, counter-insurgency makes a vital contribution to our national security.

7.01 The United Kingdom's strategy for countering international terrorism was established in 2003 and is known as CONTEST. Details of the strategy were published in July 2006¹¹¹. It is an integral element of the UK's National Security Strategy published for the first time in March 2008¹¹².

Aim

7.02 The aim of CONTEST is:
...to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

Principles

7.03 Our strategy for countering international terrorism is based on key principles that reflect a broader framework set out in the National Security Strategy and the lessons drawn from our experience of terrorism to date¹¹³:

- Our approach to national security in general and to counter-terrorism in particular is grounded in a set of core values. They include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all¹¹⁴.
- In support of CONTEST, the Government will take only those measures necessary to address the threat and that are proportionate to it.
- Work to stop terrorist attacks in this country will always aim to prosecute those responsible through the criminal justice system. Criminal investigations into terrorist attacks will continue to be led by the police supported by the security and intelligence agencies.
- We condemn terrorism whenever and wherever it occurs, at home or

overseas, and we will challenge those who seek to defend its perpetrators.

- We recognise that this counter-terrorism strategy must tackle causes as well as symptoms: neither conventional law enforcement, nor security or military operations will be sufficient to address the threat. We will need to continue to focus on conflict and instability, ideology, technology and radicalisation. Other Government policies which are not specifically about counter-terrorism will continue to be relevant to this broader agenda.
- Reducing support for terrorism and violent extremism and preventing people becoming terrorists are vital. They are the objectives of a key workstream of CONTEST and an important aim of counter-terrorism related communications. Without popular support terrorism is unsustainable.
- The strategy must ensure the protection of sites in this country which are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These include not only the UK's critical national infrastructure but also places where people live and work. By continually enhancing the UK's border security the Government will also seek to ensure that terrorists cannot enter this country from overseas.
- Our strategy must also anticipate the possibility that terrorists may succeed in conducting an attack here. It will ensure that we are prepared to respond effectively to any attack and to mitigate its consequences.
- The strategy must remain responsive to new technology sought by terrorists, notably chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, to changing methods of attack, and new targets.

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- This strategy recognises that partnerships are vital to success. Government cannot deliver CONTEST on its own. In this country, CONTEST depends not only on policing, the agencies, the Devolved Administrations and a wide range of Departments but in particular upon the support of communities, industry, academia and everyone who lives here. All communities need to stand up to and reject violent extremism.
- The threat faced by the UK crosses national borders. Terrorist incidents here usually have an international connection; international terrorist organisations threaten the UK's interests overseas; people from this country have participated in terrorist attacks and insurgencies in other countries. An international response is vital to the success of every part of this strategy. We will work closely with the priority countries which have the greatest impact on the threat to the UK and its interests overseas and with strategic partners and multilateral organisations. We will depend on them. But they will also depend on us.

CONTEST and human rights

7.04 The importance we attach to the protection of human rights in our counter-terrorism work, in this country and overseas, is reflected in the aim of this strategy, in its principles, in the programmes which comprise it and through the organisations responsible for its delivery.

7.05 Terrorism threatens some of our most fundamental rights, including the right to life itself. Our counter-terrorism strategy aims to 'enable people to go about their lives freely and with confidence'. It seeks to preserve and protect the rights to which we are accustomed because it is on these rights that our freedoms depend. It also seeks to promote these rights overseas. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), given domestic standing in the 1998 Human Rights Act, sets out these rights very clearly. They include the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition

against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), the right to liberty (Article 5), the right to fair trial (Article 6), as well as the right to family life and privacy (Article 8) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14).

7.06 A fundamental challenge facing any government is to balance measures intended to protect security and the right to life with the impact they may have on the other rights that we cherish and which form the basis for our society. Throughout this strategy we have explained how and where this balance has been sought, and have described the safeguards in place to ensure that individuals' rights are respected.

The strategic framework

7.07 Delivery of the strategy continues to be organised around four principal workstreams:

- **Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks**
- **Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism**
- **Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack**
- **Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact**

7.08 Each workstream has objectives which reflect the assumptions we have made about the future threat and the principles to which we will hold. For each objective we have a series of supporting programmes.

7.09 These four workstreams also combine together to deliver the overall aim. Work on *Pursue* and *Prevent* reduces the threat from terrorism; while work on *Protect* and *Prepare* reduces the UK's vulnerability to attack. Reducing the threat and reducing the UK's vulnerability combine to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism.

7.10 Details of past and planned work in each of these workstreams and an explanation of some of the issues which

they raise are given in the following four sections of this paper.

The evolution of our strategy

7.11 Although the framework remains as it was in 2003, this strategy reflects the evolving threat and its underlying causes, as well as the achievements and lessons learned to date. The revised strategy features:

- A range of programmes (some part of CONTEST but others connected to it) intended to address what we regard as the four key drivers of terrorism and to reflect our core principles. These programmes are distributed across the four main CONTEST workstreams.
- A *Pursue* strategy which makes use of the new resources available to the agencies and police to provide further capability in intelligence collection and disruption; and which covers both domestic and overseas priorities. *Pursue* also reflects new challenges, of which the management of terrorist offenders is an important priority. The strategy explains the human rights priorities we have and the challenges we face.
- A completely revised strategy for *Prevent*, based on our new analysis of the causes of radicalisation in this country and overseas and on contributions from a wide range of Departments, agencies and community organisations.
- A *Protect* strategy which extends progress to date, with new work on crowded places, alongside existing work on our critical national infrastructure. This strategy is intended to address some of the technological challenges we face, highlighted in the Part One of this document.
- A *Prepare* strategy which reflects the way we see the terrorist threat developing and the risks that this will create for us; and which will focus on responding effectively to any terrorist attack and mitigating its impact.

- A new cross-cutting strand of work on containing the threat from an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials.
- Stronger links between our domestic and international work given the seamless nature of the threat to the UK and its interests overseas. Examples include greater dialogue with communities in the UK on British foreign policy and more *Prevent* work overseas, notably in areas from which our diaspora communities derive.
- More detail on the delivery of CONTEST and on our measurement and assessment of its impact.
- A summary of our work on strategic communications regarding counter-terrorism which we regard as integral to our response to radicalisation.

The scope of our strategy

Terrorism and insurgency

7.12 Part One of this strategy we noted that some terrorist organisations have become part of larger insurgency movements, which use armed conflict to try to overthrow recognised governments.

7.13 Insurgencies have developed in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In Iraq the insurgency which followed the fall of Saddam Hussein has been significantly reduced in scale and scope and considerable progress has been made in restoring security, stability and law and order. In Afghanistan the insurgency continues.

7.14 The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have each comprised different groups and organisations, with different ideologies and aspirations, which do not operate under a single unified command. Some groups emerged to take part in the insurgency. Others were active beforehand as domestic or international terrorist groups and continue to be actively engaged in terrorism elsewhere. Alongside its other international activities Al Qa'ida has played a part in the insurgency in both Iraq and Afghanistan; in Iraq it has been significantly disrupted and has lost

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popular support and in Afghanistan it is currently not a major force.

7.15 The UK's counter-insurgency work in support of the Governments in Iraq and Afghanistan has been led by the FCO and the MOD with our Armed Forces playing the major operational role. In each case the UK has acted as part of a wider international coalition.

7.16 Counter-insurgency work, including military, political engagement, development and reconstruction strands, is closely related to and coordinated with our counter-terrorism work. Although not formally part of CONTEST, counter-insurgency contributes to reducing the threat to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism. Like our counter-terrorism work counter-insurgency therefore makes a vital contribution to our national security.

7.17 In Afghanistan, denying the Taliban territory deprives Al Qa'ida of space in which to operate freely. Our work to promote security, good governance and the rule of law, are important in extending the writ of the Government of Afghanistan, removing safe havens used by Al Qa'ida and enabling long-term sustainable governance and development.

7.18 In Iraq, counter-insurgency work to encourage militant Iraqi groups to renounce violence and participate in political processes has helped undermine attempts by Al Qa'ida and like-minded organisations to obtain support for terrorism by exploiting political and religious discord. Training and mentoring for the Iraqi Government as well as the police and armed forces have also helped build basic counter-terrorist capabilities.

Irish-related terrorism and domestic extremism

7.19 The attacks in March this year show the continued intent of dissident republicans in the face of the political progress that has been made in recent years and which is supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The additional

investment, increased capabilities, and improved structures we have put in place since 2001 to counter terrorism are available to respond to threats as they arise. However, this counter-terrorism strategy is specifically addressed at the recent resurgence in international terrorism, which remains the greatest current threat both in this country and to our overseas interests.

7.20 This strategy also does not address the threat from domestic extremism (such as the threat from animal rights extremists).

Accountability

7.21 In March 2007 the Prime Minister determined that the continuing threat from terrorism required the Government to enhance coordination and governance of the CONTEST Strategy. Accordingly he decided to:

- strengthen the role of the Home Secretary in facing the terrorist threat by giving the Home Secretary lead responsibility for the Government's strategy in relation to security threats in the UK, including their overseas dimensions, and
- strengthen the capability of the Home Office in support of this role by establishing an Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office, supporting and reporting to the Home Secretary.

7.22 As such, the Home Secretary is now the lead Minister for the CONTEST Strategy and the Director General of OSCT is the Senior Responsible Owner for the strategy.

7.23 The functions of OSCT are to:

- support the Home Secretary and other Ministers in the development, direction, implementation and governance of the CONTEST Strategy
- deliver directly those aspects of the counter-terrorism strategy which fall to the Home Office

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- manage counter-terrorism related crises through the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)
- facilitate the Home Secretary's statutory oversight of the Security Service and exercise oversight, on behalf of central Government, of counter-terrorist operations in the UK, and
- manage the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Security and Safety Strategy.

7.24 OSCT has led work over the past year to update this CONTEST Strategy, in partnership with other parts of Government. The Home Secretary, supported by OSCT, meets weekly with colleagues from a wide range of Departments and agencies to consider issues relating to the terrorist threat to the UK.

7.25 In addition, a new Ministerial Committee was subsequently established on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), to consider issues relating to national security, and the Government's European, and international development policies. This Committee oversees CONTEST at Ministerial level. It is chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Home Secretary as the lead Minister for counter-terrorism as deputy chair. NSID involves the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, the police, and Armed Forces. Some aspects of CONTEST are also dealt with by subcommittees of NSID. NSID may also receive external advice on counter-terrorism, as on other national security issues, from the National Security Forum, an independent body of outside advisors with expertise on many aspects of national security.

Summary

The most immediate priority for the Government is to stop terrorist attacks. The *Pursue* workstream of CONTEST aims to reduce the terrorist threat to the UK and UK interests overseas through the detection and investigation of terrorist networks and the disruption of their activities.

Terrorists operate in secret. Intelligence is vital to detect and disrupt their activities. In the past five years there has been a rapid and significant increase in intelligence resources at home and overseas, for the agencies and the police. These resources have been organised into new structures which ensure unprecedented interagency collaboration, recognised internationally as a model for successful joint working.

In accordance with the principles set out above, the Government has introduced new legislation to respond to the evolving terrorist threat. New offences relate to the preparation of terrorist acts, receiving training for terrorist purposes, attending a place used for terrorist training and encouraging terrorism or disseminating terrorist publications.

It is not always possible to prosecute people who intelligence indicates are engaged in terrorist-related activity: for this reason the Government has developed a range of alternative non-prosecution actions to protect the public. They include control orders (which impose restrictions on the movements and contacts of an individual who has been engaged in terrorist-related activity); the exclusion of foreign nationals from entering the UK; revocation of citizenship; and deportation. These powers directly affect only a very small number of individuals.

Powers are also available to proscribe groups involved in terrorism.

Recognising our dependence on international partners, many less experienced than we are in counter-terrorism work, the Government has provided significant assistance and capability building to over 20 countries in a range of counter-terrorism skills and techniques. This includes advice on legal structures and human rights training.

In the next three years we have the following *Pursue* objectives:

- increase detection and investigation capability and capacity
- increase the effectiveness of our prosecution process, from evidential collection to post-prison supervision
- develop more effective non-prosecution actions
- improve our capability to disrupt terrorist activities overseas
- strengthen the coherence between our counter-terrorism work and the UK's counter-insurgency and capacity building work in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and
- improve coordination and partnership between *Pursue* stakeholders.

The protection of human rights is a key principle underpinning our counter-terrorism work at home and overseas. A challenge facing any government is to balance measures intended to protect security and the right to life, with the impact on other rights which we cherish. The Government has sought to find that balance at all times.

On a number of key issues the position of the Government will remain uncompromising: the Government opposes the use of torture in all its forms; and the Government has always and will continue to condemn the practice of 'extraordinary rendition'. UK agencies and police have not and will never engage in these practices.

Pursue: key achievements

8.01 Many of the successes of the police and Security Service operations to disrupt terrorist attacks in the UK are set out in the first part of this paper (see Section Two). They have been considerable and have enabled the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to repeatedly bring successful cases through the criminal justice system. Between 2001/02 and 2007/08, almost 200 people were convicted of terrorist-related offences.

8.02 In the earlier CONTEST Strategy we set ourselves five key objectives for this workstream: improving intelligence about the domestic and overseas threat; disrupting that threat here and overseas; and improving the counter-terrorism capacity of other states to better enable them to contain threats to their security and to support our counter-terrorism work.

Intelligence

8.03 *Pursue* is intelligence led. Terrorists conduct their activities in secret; law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies depend on covert intelligence to detect and disrupt terrorist activity. Intelligence investigations into threats to the UK are led by the Security Service, working closely with the police; together they provide both a covert intelligence and overt criminal investigation capability. Given the international dimension to the domestic threat, close collaboration between the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is vital.

Enhancing intelligence resources

8.04 Since 2003, there has been a major increase in the resources available

to the police and security and intelligence agencies to deal with the terrorist threat. Between 2001 and 2008, the size of the Security Service doubled, GCHQ's Terrorist Team grew significantly and additional SIS resources have enhanced front-line counter-terrorism operations overseas. Since its formation in June 2003, the JTAC, the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of the level and nature of the threat from international terrorism, has grown by 60%. Since 2006, the number of police personnel dedicated to counter-terrorism work has grown by over 70%.

8.05 All prisons within the High Security Estate in England and Wales have enhanced arrangements for collecting intelligence relating to prisoners suspected, or convicted of terrorist-related activities or extremism. Following an internal review the new UK Border Agency (UKBA) is also enhancing its intelligence infrastructure.

Improved collaboration

8.06 The close collaboration between the UK's counter-terrorism security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies is recognised internationally as a model for successful joint working. Collaborative working is routine and includes joint operations and joint reporting, shared technical programmes and the exchange of staff.

“The most important change in counter-terrorism in the UK in recent years has been the development of the relationship between the police and the Security Service... It is no exaggeration to say that joint working between the police and MI5 has become recognised as a beacon of good practice.”

DAC Peter Clarke, (former) Head of Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command; public lecture 24 April 2007

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8.07 Collaboration between the Security Service and the police has led to the development of a new programme called 'Rich Picture', intended to provide a wider understanding of the context of terrorist activity and radicalisation in this country. Under this programme information is collected on issues related to violent extremist activity in local communities.

8.08 Overseas, the UK has counter-terrorism police officers (Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers known as CTELOs) based within foreign law enforcement agencies and UK missions. Their role is to coordinate bilateral and multilateral liaison, including on operational enquiries, requests for international legal assistance and exchange of police counter-terrorism and extremism intelligence (where appropriate in consultation with the local SIS representative).

National counter-terrorism structures

8.09 There have been major structural changes to the way in which the police and the Security Service work together.

8.10 The Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC) (SO15), in the Metropolitan Police, was created in 2006 from a merger of two existing commands: Special Branch (SO12) and the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13). The CTC coordinates regional (London), national, and international UK police work on counter-terrorism through the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations and the Senior National Coordinator Counter-Terrorism; this will be enhanced by a new national ACPO CT Coordination Centre being established by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) during 2009. Police Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) have been established in Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham. These are now fully staffed, one year ahead of schedule and will be reinforced by a fourth in Thames Valley in 2009. The CTU network is supported by smaller Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) based in the East Midlands, Eastern region, South East (to be replaced by the Thames Valley CTU), Wales and South West. These have similar functions to CTUs, but do not

have an investigative role. At the force level, Special Branches provide significant contribution to counter-terrorism work coordinated through this counter-terrorism network. Together, the CTC, the CTUs and the CTIUs make up the Police Counter-Terrorism Network in England and Wales.

8.11 This new counter-terrorism network has enabled the police to:

- better engage in the full range of counter-terrorism policing activities including intelligence collection, investigation and intervention by disruption or prosecution
- implement policing contributions across all the key workstreams of CONTEST
- combine in single units specialised counter-terrorism skills and capacity with the local expertise of regional police forces, and
- improve the dialogue with other regional partners, notably local authorities.

8.12 In Scotland, Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) has established a CTIU which coordinates all police counter-terrorism related duties. In Northern Ireland, the PSNI has a CTU capability within its Crime Operations Branch¹¹⁵. To deliver a comprehensive national approach, the new counter-terrorism resources we have created can be deployed wherever they are required and requested across the whole of the UK.

8.13 The Security Service now has offices across the UK, providing local intelligence direction through daily contact with police CTUs and CTIUs. By 2011, the Security Service expects to have 25% of its staff working outside its London headquarters.

Coverage

8.14 These changes have led to a better and deeper understanding of the terrorist threat, linkages between terrorist networks within the UK and overseas and of radicalisation. The expansion of the police and security and intelligence agencies has allowed many more intelligence investigations to be run

concurrently and has provided improved facilities and capacity to manage large scale, round-the-clock investigations.

8.15 Overseas, the Government has also increased resources available to improve intelligence coverage of those who threaten UK interests. The security and intelligence agencies and the police have strengthened relationships with partner nations through intelligence exchange and the delivery of training packages. This has enabled better support to the overseas aspects of investigation in the UK as well as an improved understanding of the global terrorist threat.

Disruption

8.16 Between 2001 and 31 March 2008, over 1,450 terrorism-related arrests took place, of which one third led to a charge with three-quarters of these for terrorism-related offences and just over half of these resulted in a conviction. Around one in 10 of these arrests resulted in alternative action being taken, for example through immigration powers. The arrest to charge ratio is similar to that for other criminal offences.

8.17 Between 2001/02 and 2007/08, almost 200 people were convicted of terrorist-related offences.

Non-prosecution (civil) executive actions

8.18 Where individuals are suspected of engaging in terrorist-related activities in the UK but it is not possible to prosecute or deport them, a range of non-prosecution (civil) executive actions have been developed to protect the public.

Exclusions

8.19 The Home Secretary has the power to exclude foreign nationals (excepting European Economic Area (EEA) nationals) from entering the UK, where their presence is judged to be non conducive to the public good. This power can be used to exclude on grounds including national security, unacceptable behaviour, public order or serious criminality. Between July 2005 and the end of 2008, 153 people have been excluded from the UK on national security grounds

and a further 87 on the basis of unacceptable behaviour.

8.20 On 28 October 2008, the Home Secretary announced changes in the exclusions policy. The key changes included a presumption in favour of exclusion where an individual comes within the terms of the unacceptable behaviours announced by the former Home Secretary in August 2005 and the disclosure of the details of those excluded where it is in the public interest to do so. A further change will enable the Home Secretary to exclude EEA nationals before they travel to the UK once EEA regulations have been appropriately amended.

Deprivation of citizenship

8.21 British citizenship can be revoked when the Home Secretary is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good but would not leave the person stateless or when it has been obtained as a result of fraud, false representation or concealment of material fact. Deprivation of citizenship on the grounds that it is conducive to the public good might be considered appropriate in cases involving national security (including espionage), war crimes; serious and organised crime; and unacceptable behaviours such as glorification of terrorism.

8.22 People deprived of citizenship may be removed, deported or excluded from the UK as foreign nationals. Three people have been served with notices depriving them of citizenship on conducive grounds (of the three: two have been deprived; one is currently appealing the decision and the third has appealed against the notice).

Deportation

8.23 In the first part of this document we explained that in this country, as in the rest of Europe, terrorist activity has often been conducted by foreign nationals who have come to live here. The Government has always sought to deport foreign nationals suspected of being involved in terrorist-related activity, or who have completed terrorist-related prison sentences, back to their countries

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of origin using immigration powers exercised by the UK Border Agency.

8.24 But many of the foreign nationals concerned come from states, which are alleged to have abused human rights. European case law (notably the Soering case¹¹⁶ from 1989) has established that Article 3 of the ECHR prevents a state from deporting a foreign national to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk the person will be tortured or suffer inhuman or degrading treatment.

8.25 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also held in the Chahal case¹¹⁷ that this applies irrespective of the conduct of the persons to be returned. And in the case of Saadi the court rejected an intervention by the UK that it should be legitimate to balance the risk posed by an individual to the community with the risk to the individual on their return. In the Saadi case¹¹⁸ the UK and other states had sought to persuade the ECtHR to reverse their position but in 2008 the Court declined to do so.

8.26 The substance of Article 3 is reflected in other international instruments. Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture prohibits the removal of someone where there are substantial grounds for believing they will face torture. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been interpreted to include a prohibition on return comparable to the ECHR.

8.27 It is against this background that since 2004, the Government has negotiated Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) or similar arrangements to protect foreign nationals whom it wishes to deport to countries where there are concerns on ECHR Article 3 grounds about safety on return. Such arrangements have been agreed with Algeria, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya. Work continues to expand this programme by agreeing similar arrangements with a number of other countries. The House of Lords has upheld the use of assurances with Algeria and Jordan in a judgement in February 2009¹¹⁹. The Government is also engaging

bilaterally with European partners to reach a common understanding and acceptance of the applicability of deportation with assurance-like mechanisms.

8.28 As at the end of 2008, eight Algerians had been deported from this country and 12 cases of other nationalities were the subject of ongoing appeals in the UK courts.

Control orders

8.29 Control orders were introduced under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 following the decision of the House of Lords on 16 December 2004 that the provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 were incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR.

8.30 Control orders place one or more obligations on an individual in order to prevent, restrict or disrupt his or her involvement in terrorist-related activities, for example a ban on some communications or restrictions on movement. They are a means of managing the risk posed by suspected terrorists in this country who we can neither prosecute (because the material about the individuals cannot be adduced as evidence or is not sufficient to enable a charge to be made) nor deport (for the reasons we have set out above).

8.31 Control orders are subject to regular and rigorous scrutiny, including mandatory review by the High Court. Cases take place in open court as far as possible, with the individual represented by a lawyer of their choice. Special advocates are used to represent the interests of the individuals in closed sessions (ie where it would be against the public interest to disclose the information on the basis of which the control order has been requested). The special advocate has access to all relevant (including sensitive and classified) information.

8.32 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 also makes provision for derogating control orders, which would allow for obligations that amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR. No derogation from Article 5 has been made in relation to control orders so only non-derogating

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control orders can be made. There are no plans to derogate at present.

8.33 The concept of control orders is a new one and the courts have examined it carefully. There have been a number of challenges on ECHR Article 5 and Article 6 grounds and in some cases the Government has had to reduce the level of control imposed on certain individuals. The Law Lords' Judgements of October 2007 confirmed that a curfew of up to and including 16 hours a day does not by itself constitute a deprivation of liberty contrary to Article 5 and considered the control order regime compatible with Article 6. The compatibility of control order proceedings with Article 6 is being reviewed again by the House of Lords.

8.34 The 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act established an Independent Reviewer to provide an annual report on the control order system. The fourth report of the Reviewer, Lord Carlile, was published on 4 February 2009. This review notes that 'control orders remain a largely effective necessity for a small number of cases, in the absence of a viable alternative'¹²⁰. Lord Carlile noted that, having reviewed all the relevant papers, he would have reached the same decision as the Secretary of State in each case in which a control order was made during 2008.

8.35 On 10 December 2008, 15 control orders were in force. As at 10 March 2009, 40 people have been subject to control orders under the Terrorism Act 2005¹²¹.

Proscription and asset freezing

8.36 Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe groups involved in terrorism, and, since 2006, also those that glorify terrorism. Membership of a proscribed organisation is unlawful, as is the provision of financial and other kinds of support to such groups. Currently (March 2009) 59 terrorist groups are proscribed under this Act. This includes 14 groups connected to Northern Ireland. The proscription of all these groups continues to be kept under review.

8.37 The HM Treasury's asset-freezing powers are exercised on the advice of the police and the intelligence and security agencies to address the risk to national security posed by those using funds for terrorism-related purposes. (Asset freezing is described in more detail within 'Financing terror' on page 74.)

Building capacity overseas

8.38 The Government conducts a range of counter-terrorism related capacity building activities to enable third countries to better address the terrorist threats they face; and to enable them to collaborate more effectively with UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies on threats related to the UK and UK interests. Capacity building is fundamental to our counter-terrorism strategy. Assistance has been provided to over 20 countries through the intelligence and security agencies, the MOD, the FCO and the police (see Section Fourteen, page 139) and is very often coordinated with international partners and with multilateral organisations, notably the United Nations and the European Union.

Legislation

8.39 The expansion of the police, security and intelligence agencies has been accompanied where necessary, by changes in legislation. The provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 consolidated earlier counter-terrorism legislation and have been further supplemented by:

- the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which provided additional powers to freeze and seize terrorist financial assets and, under Part 4, enabled the detention pending deportation, of foreign nationals suspected of terrorist-related activity, even where their removal was not immediately possible
- the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which repealed Part 4 of the 2001 Act and introduced control orders, and
- the Terrorism Act 2006 which created new offences regarding the preparation of terrorist acts; receiving training for terrorist purposes; and attending a place used for terrorist training. It also addressed the activities of those

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promoting violent extremism by making it an offence to encourage terrorism or disseminate terrorist publications. The Act also extended the maximum period for which people can be detained prior to charge to 28 days.

8.40 This legislation is designed to respond to the changing threat outlined in Part One of this strategy and is used regularly. In 2006/07, almost 20 people were charged with offences under the Terrorism Act 2006. Eleven people have been held for over 14 days' pre-charge detention, six of whom were held for the maximum of 28 days – three of the six were subsequently charged and three were released without charge. The remaining five were all charged. As at 10 March 2009 (the latest period reported to Parliament), 40 people have been subject to control orders under the Terrorism Act 2005.

8.41 The recent Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (the 2008 Act) followed a further review of the legislative framework for countering terrorism, drawing on the operational experience of the police and security and intelligence agencies. It provides:

- stronger terrorist asset-freezing powers including enabling intercept material to be used in asset-freezing proceedings
- post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects
- stronger police powers to remove documents during searches
- additional police powers of entry and search in relation to controlled individuals' properties, powers to take routinely and use DNA and fingerprints from people on control orders and a new legal framework for the police and intelligence agencies to retain and use DNA¹²²
- tougher sentences for terrorists and new powers for the courts to order the forfeiture of cash and property used for terrorist purposes
- new controls on convicted terrorists who come to the end of their sentence, including the power to impose travel

bans and a requirement to inform the police of changes in name and address, and

- powers to direct financial institutions to act against terrorist threats, including by additional due diligence, systematic reporting, and ceasing business altogether.

Pre-charge detention

8.42 The maximum period for which individuals arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 can be held pre-charge is 28 days. Consideration was given during the parliamentary passage of the 2008 Act to extending the maximum limit to 42 days subject to additional safeguards. The provisions were not proceeded with. The Government takes the view that with the increasing complexity, scale and international nature of terrorist-related investigations and the need in some circumstances, to make arrests at a very early stage of the investigation, more than 28 days may be required in future. An emergency Bill has therefore been prepared and placed in the Library of Parliament in the event that it is needed.

8.43 Some have argued that extending the maximum period of pre-charge detention in the way proposed by the Government raised human rights implications for the individuals who might be affected. The Government believes its pre-charge detention proposals are fully compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR.

Pursue: The current approach

8.44 Intelligence collection and disruption continue to be central to the success of *Pursue*. The following specific delivery objectives have been developed for the next stage of CONTEST:

- increase covert detection and investigation capability and capacity
- improve the effectiveness of UK counter-terrorism related prosecutions from evidential collection to post-prison supervision
- develop more effective non-prosecution actions

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- improve our capability to disrupt terrorist activities overseas
- strengthen the coherence between our counter-terrorist work and the UK's counter-insurgency and capacity building work in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and
- improve coordination and partnerships between *Pursue* stakeholders.

***Pursue* programmes**

Increasing covert detection and investigation capability and capacity

8.45 Detecting and investigating suspected terrorists continues to be central to the success of *Pursue*. In order to increase our capability, the security and intelligence agencies, the police and other *Pursue* stakeholders will together:

- exploit new data analysis and information sharing and management tools to provide additional capability and cost effective use of manpower
- improve technical intelligence collection and exploitation using improved systems and processes
- develop options for maintaining our ability to use communications data (CD) and through CD to conduct legal intercept operations.

Improving the effectiveness of the UK prosecution process (from evidential collection to post-prison supervision)

8.46 The security and intelligence agencies, the police, CPS, National Offender Management Service (NOMS), Office for Criminal Justice Reform, OCST and other *Pursue* stakeholders will continue to improve the effectiveness of the UK prosecution process in managing terrorist-related cases by:

- enhancing our evidential collection and case preparation processes to support prosecutions
- continuing to enhance the capabilities of prisons to manage terrorist offenders and strengthen processes to ensure the effective management

of extremist offenders post release (further detail is provided at Section Nine)

- conducting further planning work to assess potential resource requirements across the criminal justice system to deal with terrorist caseloads in future years, and
- increasing the detention capacity for terrorist suspects throughout the UK, including the capability to interact with the judicial process.

Develop more effective non-prosecution action

8.47 The police, security and intelligence agencies, OCST, HM Treasury, UKBA and other *Pursue* stakeholders will continue to develop effective and appropriate non-prosecution options to make the UK as hostile an environment for terrorists as possible by:

- negotiating DWA agreements with other countries where possible and necessary: lobbying will continue in Europe to seek a consensus on deportation strategy
- continuing to implement a stronger exclusions strategy, foreshadowed by the Home Secretary's announcement on 28 October 2008
- completing ongoing work to finalise a new Terrorist Finance strategy, addressing both *Pursue* and *Prevent*-related requirements and reflecting opportunities provided by the United Nations and European Union (see 'Financing terror', page 74), and
- continued work between OSCT, Security Service and the police to enhance the effectiveness of control orders.

Improve our capability to disrupt terrorist activities overseas

8.48 The security and intelligence agencies, the police, the MOD, the FCO and other *Pursue* stakeholders will continue to enhance our capability to disrupt terrorist operations overseas by:

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- delivering an enhanced capacity building programme in partner countries to improve the ability of other states to identify and disrupt terrorist groups and to cooperate with UK counterparts, and
 - continuing our ongoing efforts to identify and disrupt terrorist groups that threaten the security of the UK and interests overseas, making use of the additional resources made available by Government in this period.
- ensure an integrated approach to dealing with radicalised individuals and groups, and
 - share data exploitation techniques, alongside processes for coordinating data acquisition.

Strengthen the coherence between our counter-terrorism work and the UK's counter-insurgency and capacity building work in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere

8.49 The security and intelligence agencies, the police, the MOD and FCO will continue to ensure coordination and coherence between programmes under CONTEST and the UK's counter-insurgency and capacity building work overseas.

Improving coordination and partnership between *Pursue* stakeholders

8.50 *Pursue* stakeholders will:

- build collaboration in the UK, notably around the Police Counter-Terrorism Network and through a new national ACPO CT Coordination Centre (to be established incrementally from April 2009)
- introduce Service Level Agreements or similar protocols between CTUs and the forces within their regions to ensure consistency in information sharing, tasking/coordination and operational collaboration
- extend the joint Security Service/police Rich Picture programme across policing and, where appropriate, external partners
- improve the intelligence infrastructure across the prison estate to aid the management of prisoners suspected, or convicted of terrorist-related offences
- ensure continued coordination between the *Pursue* and *Prevent* workstreams of this strategy, to

Surveillance, interception of communications, safeguards and oversight

Covert surveillance

The detection, investigation and the disruption of almost every terrorist plot in this country will involve the use of covert surveillance¹²³. Hundreds of lives have been saved as a result. But surveillance and interception intrude on the right to privacy (Article 8 of ECHR) and need to be proportionate to the threat and necessary to the management of it. Independent scrutiny of the authorisation process is essential.

Interception of communications

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) sets out legal arrangements for the interception of communications. Only the security and intelligence agencies and the law enforcement agencies may apply for authorisation to intercept communications, and each interception application can only be authorised by a warrant signed by a Secretary of State. (Local authorities are not permitted to intercept communications.) The total number of warrants issued by the Home Secretary each year for all purposes is published in the annual report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (see Safeguards and oversight below). Between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2007, a total of 2,026 warrants were issued (Home Secretary 1,881, Scottish Executive 145), of which 957 were still in force at the end of the year.

Communications Data

Communications Data (CD) is the information about a particular communication, for example the number which has been dialled, from where and for how long the communication lasted. CD is currently generated and stored by communications service providers for their

own business reasons. Access to it by public authorities is also governed by RIPA.

CD is vital to the fight against terrorism and serious crime in this and other countries. It can enable the contacts of the subject of a police investigation to be quickly and reliably established and analysed. In 2007, the total number of requests for this data from the police, security and intelligence services and local authorities, for all purposes (terrorism and other crime), was 519,260. A single terrorist or criminal target with a number of mobile phones can be the subject of a large number of requests for CD. The number of people who are the subject of investigation is therefore considerably less than 519,260.

Local authorities may only apply to obtain basic CD (eg the subscriber to a mobile phone and the numbers that a phone has called) when investigating crimes such as benefit fraud and illegal trading. In 2007, 1,707 requests were from 154 local authorities, (ie on average one request per month from each council).

The security and intelligence agencies and the law enforcement agencies can obtain more detailed data that can, for example, identify the location of a mobile telephone.

Safeguards and oversight

Because interception and covert surveillance intrude on privacy it is vital that there should be strict rules governing their use and independent oversight of how those rules are applied. Equally the retention and processing of personal data about individuals, both to investigate individual terrorist suspects and to protect the general public, can give rise to concerns about the potential for misuse and abuse of data. The Government is

committed to ensuring that personal data is retained and processed only when necessary and proportionate to do so and in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Various independent Commissioners provide transparent oversight of the security and the processing of personal data, including CD, identity data and passenger data.

RIPA sets out the tests that public authorities must meet to ensure that any action they undertake is lawful. It establishes oversight bodies, independent of Government and headed by senior judges (Commissioners), responsible for inspecting how public authorities have exercised their powers under RIPA and to report their findings. These reports are published.

The independent Commissioners under RIPA are: The Interception of Communications Commissioner who oversees all use of interception and CD; the Office of Surveillance Commissioners who oversee the use of surveillance; and the Intelligence Services Commissioner, who oversees the activities of the security and intelligence agencies. An independent Investigative Powers Tribunal was also established under the Act. Made up of senior legal and judicial figures, its purpose is to investigate complaints about the conduct of public authorities in relation to individuals, their property or communications. The Government believes that this tribunal meets the requirements of Article 13 of the ECHR.

A committee of Parliamentarians, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), oversees the policy, finance and administration of the security and intelligence agencies. The ISC reports annually on its findings and each report is published and debated in Parliament. The ISC has also from time to time conducted enquiries into intelligence

issues of particular public concern, and wherever possible, these reports are also published.

Future developments

Covert surveillance techniques need to adapt to changes in technology and the threats we face. But these changes need to be lawful and a reasonable and proportionate response to the threat, and as elsewhere in our counter-terrorist strategy will continue to reflect a proper balance between the security of all and the liberty and privacy of the individual. There are two issues for the future of particular importance.

Intercept Modernisation Programme (IMP)

The ways in which people are communicating with one another are changing rapidly, with greater use of internet-based communications, including email, instant messaging, social networking sites and VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol). This trend will continue as the UK's major providers of communications services move towards more internet-based methods of communication, with Internet Protocol networks being rolled out across the country.

These changes pose a significant challenge to our ability to investigate all forms of crime, including terrorism; if we take no action, our capability to obtain CD and intercept communications will fall. The ability of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to protect national security and to prevent crime would be severely affected.

The IMP (a cross-Government programme led by the Home Office) has been set up to maintain our ability to obtain CD and conduct interception and to ensure that

law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies will still have access to the same vital information that they use today in order to prevent terrorism and to tackle all forms of crime.

On 15 October 2008, the Home Secretary announced that the Government will be consulting on proposals intended to maintain our ability to obtain CD to protect the public. The consultation will begin in spring 2009.

Intercept as evidence

At present while CD can be used as evidence in court proceedings in the UK, the intercepted content cannot be. The police and security and intelligence agencies use interception to inform and guide investigations, enabling them to obtain evidence by other means while protecting the way in which intercept is conducted in this country. The Government's position has consistently been that it will only change the law to permit intercept as evidence: if the necessary safeguards can be put in place to protect sensitive techniques, capabilities, and relationships; the existing close cooperation between law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies can be maintained; and the potential benefits outweigh the risks.

In July 2007, the Government appointed a committee of the Privy Council, chaired by Sir John Chilcot to review the use of intercept as evidence¹²⁴. They reported back on 30 January 2008 and recommended that it should be possible to find a way of using some intercept material as evidence, but that certain key conditions must first be met.

In his Statement to the House on 6 February 2008, the Prime Minister accepted this recommendation and said that the Government would 'proceed to develop a detailed implementation plan under which material might be made available for use in criminal cases in England and Wales'. The Government has established an Implementation Team based in the OSCT in the Home Office to lead work across the interception community on developing an ECHR

compliant legal model that also protects operational sensitivities and working methods.

There are connections between the IMP and the development of intercept as evidence. Unless we maintain our interception capability as technology changes, there can be no possibility of its use in evidence. Equally important is the maintenance of the capability to collect CD in which IMP will play a vital part. Whatever option is selected for collecting and accessing CD, it would need to take account of any future requirements of the courts to be satisfied of its evidential integrity.

Terrorists need finance. The sums required for an operation vary: the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 are estimated to have cost US\$500,000; the 7/7 London attacks and the Madrid train bombings cost less (c. £8,000 and US\$10,000 respectively); and an improvised explosive device in Iraq costs about US\$100.

Terrorist organisations also need money to sustain their networks, to provide financial support to terrorists and their families, including families of terrorists who have been killed or imprisoned. The sums required here may be much greater. The capability and the plans of terrorist organisations, including Al Qa'ida, have been hampered by a lack of funding.

Terrorist organisations raise funds through crime (from credit card fraud through extortion to drugs trafficking and kidnapping), from donations (often from a few wealthy individual donors) and by the diversion of funds raised for other purposes (often by and for charities). Because of the risk of detection, funds are moved less through the normal banking system, terrorists preferring to use cash couriers or the informal ('hawala') banking sector. For Al Qa'ida the flow of money is mainly from the Gulf to the core organisation in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Funding has also come from Europe.

Countering terrorist finance means not only disrupting terrorist cells but also the work of their support and facilitation networks, in particular those who radicalise people to support terrorism and violent extremism. The infrastructure for radicalisation in the UK and overseas can draw on funding from sources (eg donors and charities in and outside the UK) not otherwise involved in terrorism.

Countering terrorist finance

"The financial challenge to crime and terrorism¹²⁵" launched jointly by Home Office, HM Treasury, the FCO and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in February 2007, set out for the first time how the public and private sector would come together to deter terrorists from using the financial system, detect them when they did, and use financial tools to disrupt them. Our aim is to deprive terrorists and violent extremists of the financial resources and systems needed for terrorist-related activity, including radicalisation.

Action against terrorist finance includes safeguards to prevent terrorists using common methods to raise funds, or using the financial system to move money. Financial intelligence and financial investigation tools are used to support all counter-terrorist investigations; and asset freezing can be used to disrupt the activity of terrorists and their supporters.

The financial sector plays a significant role in preventing terrorist abuse, by carrying out 'know your customer' checks and by identifying suspicious customers or activity. In 2007, the Government implemented the European Union (EU) Third Money Laundering Directive which tightened controls on the regulated financial sectors. HM Revenue and Custom's (HMRC) mandatory registration of money service businesses introduced a 'fit and proper' test to ensure that owners and persons who direct the businesses cannot abuse those businesses for terrorist financing. These sectors are obliged by law to provide the SOCA with Suspicious Activity Reports on any financial activity they suspect may be related to terrorism. In 2006/07

SOCA referred 1,088 such reports to the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU) of the Metropolitan Police for further investigation. The Charity Commission plays an important role in preventing the abuse of charitable organisations to raise or move funds for terrorists.

The Terrorism Act 2000 created specific terrorist finance offences and there have been five convictions since 2006 including the radical preacher Omar Brooks, who was convicted of raising money to support terrorism in Iraq.

Financial tools are used to disrupt terrorists and their supporters. In October 2007, HM Treasury set up a dedicated Asset Freezing Unit to increase the expertise and operational focus that the Government is able to bring to bear in this area, enabling the UK to be more effective and proactive in freezing assets of suspected terrorists and facilitators. At the end of September 2008, a total of 252 separate accounts used by suspected terrorists and containing over £670,000 were frozen in the UK.

To combat the international financing of terrorism, we work closely with other governments and international organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force, to develop and enforce international standards and, to ensure all countries have robust systems in place for countering the financing of terrorism.

Both the EU and the UN operate asset-freezing regimes. The UN maintains a list of individuals and entities connected to Al Qa'ida and the Taliban under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267; those listed are subject to a worldwide asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. The UN also obliges member states to freeze the assets of other suspected terrorists under UNSCR 1373. The EU also designates individuals and entities who commit or facilitate acts of terrorism.

Future developments

Our strategy for tackling terrorist finance will focus on:

- preventing money being raised and used for attack planning in the UK and against UK interests
- disrupting the funding of Al Qa'ida and its affiliates and associates by targeting donors, facilitators and the terrorist financial infrastructure, and
- developing our understanding of the funding of radicalisation and disrupting the movement of funds into this country for that purpose.

The treatment of detainees

Section Seven made clear that the protection of human rights is a key principle underpinning our counter-terrorism work at home and overseas. This is particularly relevant when questions arise about the treatment of detainees and these issues are considered further here.

Intelligence from detainees held abroad who have been involved in terrorist-related activity can be vital in stopping terrorist attacks. Detainee reporting has helped save lives here in the UK and protected our interests overseas. But the way in which detainees are held in countries overseas varies significantly from the procedures to which we are accustomed in this country.

Our intelligence and security services work to make Britain more secure, often in circumstances overseas that they do not control. This creates significant challenges for our counter-terrorist work and has led to intense scrutiny in recent months of the involvement of our security services and armed forces in detention activities. These organisations operate to strict guidance, including about their duties and responsibilities regarding human rights. In March 2009, the Prime Minister announced a number of steps to provide reassurance that everything has been done to ensure that these practices are in line with UK and international law, including – for the first time – publishing guidance to personnel involved in matters of detention¹²⁶.

The UK's opposition to torture

The Government opposes the use of torture in all its forms and works hard with international partners to stop the practice of torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

The UK is party to the key international agreements which prohibit the torture of detainees, including: the Geneva Conventions, which cover situations of military occupation and armed conflict; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The ECHR, Article 3 of which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, has been incorporated into domestic law.

Intelligence from the security and intelligence services of other states is vital to our own security and has repeatedly enabled us to disrupt attacks planned against the UK or UK interests. In most cases the source or sources of this intelligence will not be disclosed to the UK. If it is clear that the intelligence has come from a detainee the service providing it will rarely volunteer the circumstances in which the detainee is being held. If it is established that material has been obtained from a detainee by torture, it would not be admissible in criminal or civil legal proceedings in the UK as part of the case against an individual, regardless of where it was obtained. But as the House of Lords recognised in judgements in 2005 any intelligence which has been received may still be used to investigate and to stop terrorist attacks¹²⁷.

Our security and intelligence agencies may actively seek intelligence from another service which is detaining an individual or interview a detainee held overseas directly if that person is believed to have information important to the security of the UK or its interests. In either case, the security and intelligence agencies will first try to establish the circumstances in which the person concerned is being held. Officials interviewing detainees are given guidance

about their duties and responsibilities regarding human rights.

The Prime Minister announced this month that, for the first time, the Government will publish guidance to intelligence officers and service personnel about the standards that we apply during detention and interviewing of detainees overseas once it has been consolidated and reviewed by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). The Intelligence Services Commissioner, Sir Peter Gibson, will then monitor compliance with the guidance and report to the Prime Minister annually. This will ensure that the public know what those involved in interviewing detainees can and cannot do, putting beyond doubt the terms under which our agencies and service personnel operate.

In order to ensure that our systems are robust and to be certain that any lessons have been understood, the Prime Minister has also asked the ISC to consider any new developments and relevant information since its 2005 Report on Detention¹²⁸ and its 2007 Report on Rendition¹²⁹, building on the follow-up work they have already undertaken.

Wherever allegations of wrongdoing are made, they are taken seriously. Some detainees have already put their allegations before the civil courts, where they can and should be tested. If any cases of potential criminal wrongdoing come to light, the Government will refer them to the Attorney General to consider whether there is a basis for inviting the police to conduct a criminal investigation. Any decisions on prosecutions will be reached only after such an investigation.

Rendition

There is no commonly accepted definition of the terms 'rendition' and 'extraordinary rendition' other than the transfer of an individual between jurisdictions outside normal legal processes such as extradition, deportation, removal or exclusion.

The UK opposes any deprivation of liberty that places a detained person outside the protection of the law. If we were asked

to assist another State in a rendition operation, and our assistance would be lawful, we would decide whether or not to assist taking into account all the circumstances. We would not assist if doing so put us in breach of UK law or our international obligations.

In recent years public debate has focused on the term 'extraordinary rendition'. This is generally understood to refer to the extra-judicial transfer of persons between jurisdictions specifically for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, giving rise to an increased risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. UK Government policy on such "extraordinary rendition" is clear: we unreservedly condemn any rendition to torture. We have not approved and will not approve a policy of facilitating the transfer of individuals through the UK to places where there are substantial grounds to believe they would face a real risk of torture.

In 2007, the ISC published a report on the issue of rendition¹³⁰. The Committee has subsequently indicated in its 2007-2008 Annual Report¹³¹, that it is revisiting some of the matters in that earlier report, as a result of a number of developments, including in relation to rendition flights through Diego Garcia.

On 21 February 2008, the Foreign Secretary reported to the House of Commons that the US Government had informed the UK of two occasions in 2002 when a flight with a detainee on board refuelled on the UK Overseas Territory of Diego Garcia¹³². This was contrary to earlier US assurances. On 3 July 2008, the Foreign Secretary informed the House that the US Government had confirmed that there had been no other instances in which US intelligence flights landed in the UK, our Overseas Territories or the Crown Dependencies, with a detainee on board since 11 September 2001¹³³. And that the US Government had underlined its firm understanding that there will be no rendition through the UK, our Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies or airspace without first receiving express permission from the UK Government.

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Pursue: future challenges

- Balancing measures intended to protect security and the right to life with the impact they may have on the other rights that we cherish is a fundamental challenge facing any government. We will continue to consider only those measures which we judge to be both proportionate and necessary to counter the threats we face; we will keep under the closest scrutiny our assessment of those threats and ensure they remain well founded.
- The existence and number of Al Qa'ida affiliates and inspired groups, the devolved nature of the planning and operations and the tendency to form transnational networks demands a much broader intelligence base than was required to understand previous terrorist networks.
- Gathering intelligence and disrupting terrorists overseas will remain a vital way of pre-empting attacks on the UK itself as well as on UK interests. This work will depend on close international cooperation and coordination and will also require the UK and other countries to continue to build the capacity and capability of some states to counter the terrorist threats they face.
- Intelligence collection and disrupting terrorist activities will pose serious operational and other challenges as terrorist networks move into states or areas of states which are failing or fragile and where the rule of law is neither imposed nor observed and where central Government may have little or no influence.
- In delivering CONTEST the Government must ensure that activities across the four main workstreams of this strategy are coherent and complementary. The most challenging area in this respect is managing the connection between *Pursue* and *Prevent*. This has three main aspects: we have to manage the negative impact that *Pursue* activity can have on communities and therefore on our *Prevent* agenda; but *Pursue* operations also need to support our *Prevent* objectives (eg ensuring that disruptive action is taken against those who engage in radicalisation); and *Prevent* interventions need to be considered for *Pursue* type problems (ie we need to be able to provide support for individuals who are getting drawn into criminal activity). The way we will address these challenges is set out in more detail in the *Prevent* Section (Section Nine).
- The severe consequences of a successful terrorist attack mean that on occasion the police will need to intervene at an early stage in the investigation of a terrorist operation to safeguard the public. There may be some false calls. And the need for early intervention, based very often on intelligence only, may result in some people being held in detention while the investigation continues, evidence is collected and charges are considered.
- Public support for our work under the *Pursue* workstream is vital. But we recognise that this depends on good communications. Unless we clearly explain the nature of the threats we face some of the measures we take may appear to be neither necessary nor proportionate. But we will have to balance the need to share information with the benefit which terrorists may receive by acquiring it.

Summary

To reduce the risk from terrorism – our overall aim – we need not only to stop attacks but also to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. The Government introduced its revised *Prevent* strategy in October 2007. The strategy is based on a better understanding of the causes of radicalisation, to each of which it aims to provide a coherent response.

In the next three years the workstream has five main objectives:

- to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices
- disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate
- support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists
- increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, and
- to address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting.

The two supporting objectives are: to develop supporting intelligence, analysis, and information; and to improve our strategic communications.

The Government has allocated new funding to a wide range of agencies and Departments to develop programmes under these objectives. The cost of the key deliverables in 2008/09 alone is over £140 million. These programmes include:

- The **Preventing Violent Extremism programme**: a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism led by the Department for Communities and Local Government in partnership with local authorities and a range of statutory and voluntary organisations.
- The police **Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan** with 300 new ring-fenced staff being recruited in 24 forces to work alongside the national and regional counter-terrorism policing structure and with neighbourhood policing teams.
- The **Channel programme**: a community-based initiative which utilises existing partnership working between the police, local authority and the local community to identify those at risk from violent extremism and provide help to them, primarily through community-based interventions. There are currently 11 Channel sites; another 15 are planned.

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The *Prevent* programme depends upon a unique and ground-breaking range of local, national and international partners. It needs the support of communities and community organisations in this country to protect vulnerable people from radicalisation, and recruitment to terrorism. Because the greatest threat at present is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam, much *Prevent* activity takes place in and with Muslim communities. But the principles of our *Prevent* work apply equally to other communities who may be the focus of attention from violent extremist groups.

The role of law enforcement agencies is as important in *Prevent* as it is in *Pursue*. Local government and central Departments have a vital role to play. And international partnerships are essential: people in this country can be radicalised as well as trained overseas and messages from other countries can significantly impact on opinions here.

As part of this strategy we will take action against those who defend terrorism and violent extremism. We will also continue to challenge views which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion. Some of these views can create a climate in which people may be drawn into violent activity. We have no intention of outlawing these views or criminalising those who hold them.

The internet presents significant challenges for CONTEST in general and *Prevent* in particular. The Government has taken action here to explore ways of addressing the widespread dissemination of terrorist related material. This material is usually hosted outside this country. Further action is being taken with counterparts overseas and with multilateral organisations, including the European Union and the United Nations.

Prevent: key achievements

9.01 Radicalisation is one of the four strategic drivers for terrorism identified in the first part of this strategy: in the context of this strategy radicalisation refers to the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist groups.

9.02 The aim of the *Prevent* workstream is to stop radicalisation, reducing support for terrorism and discouraging people from becoming terrorists.

9.03 In 2003, this part of CONTEST was the least developed. The intelligence and analytic picture was incomplete: resources in most countries, including the UK, were devoted to investigative work, in order to protect the immediate threat to life, rather than to understanding the factors driving radicalisation. Following the disturbances in northern cities in 2001, engagement with Muslim and other faith communities was largely focused on improving social cohesion and interfaith dialogue using community-based measures, such as the Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund.

9.04 After the London bombings in 2005 the Home Office led a consultation exercise with Muslim communities under the title 'Preventing Extremism Together', to develop practical recommendations for tackling violent extremism. Many British Muslims took part, and the working groups published their report in November 2005¹³⁴.

9.05 The CONTEST Strategy, published in 2006, incorporated recommendations from this report and identified four areas of work: developing campaigns to address the motivation for violence; creating an environment hostile to those who glorify terrorism and radicalise

others; addressing political and economic problems leading to radicalisation; and improving our understanding of *Prevent* to better inform future programmes.

9.06 The strategy for *Prevent* built on and led to a number of important and lasting initiatives, including:

- The publication by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) in April 2007 of *Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds*, which set out a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism. CLG launched a £6 million Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund to support priority¹³⁵ local authorities and established a range of programmes designed to build civic leadership and strengthen the role of faith leaders and institutions.
- The Radical Middle Way 'roadshows' of Muslim scholars, sponsored by the FCO and CLG, intended to challenge the global terrorist ideology.
- Work to promote the UK as a centre of excellence for Islamic studies outside the Muslim world, and the designation in 2007 of Islamic studies as a strategically important subject.
- Work to strengthen standards in mosques including working with the independent Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), an alliance of four Muslim groups, established to set standards and establish a system of self-regulation for mosques.
- The adoption of preventing extremism as a strategic theme in the National Community Safety Plan¹³⁶.
- Guidance to universities about extremism on campus.

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- A programme of work to improve the capacity of NOMS and partner agencies to manage the risks posed by violent extremist offenders both in prison and on release into the community, including strengthening intelligence gathering and sharing, increasing capability and resilience, providing training and support to operational staff, and developing appropriate offender management interventions. This work contributes to objectives across the entire strategy.

9.07 In 2007, in collaboration with other Government Departments and the Devolved Administrations, OSCT revised the earlier *Prevent* strategy. Using the intelligence and open source material, which had by then become available and working closely with international counterparts and local and community partners a new strategy was developed based on a more comprehensive understanding of the factors driving radicalisation in the UK and overseas.

9.08 The revised *Prevent* strategy was approved in principle at the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (Tackling Extremism) in October 2007 and is described in more detail below. OSCT subsequently worked with a wide range of Departments to develop a set of over 50 fully funded programmes to deliver the objectives.

9.09 The revised *Prevent* strategy is a significant development of the old: it includes more Departments; has more thoroughly integrated the significant contribution of policing; aims to link local and international delivery; is based on better metrics; and has a significantly larger budget¹³⁷, the cost of the key deliverables in the *Prevent* Delivery Plan for 2008/09 alone totals over £140 million.

Prevent: The current approach

Key principles

9.10 The revised *Prevent* strategy is based on an assessment that support for violent extremism in the UK is the result

of a combination of factors, summarised in Section Five of this document:

- A persuasive ideology which draws upon an interpretation of religion and a view of history and contemporary politics to legitimise terrorism.
- Ideologues and social networks who promote that ideology and help those prepared to support it; and who often operate in open institutions in this country, making extensive and effective use of new media.
- Individuals who are vulnerable to violent extremist messaging for a range of personal reasons, variously relating to issues of identity, faith, frustrated ambition, migration and displacement.
- An absence of resilience (and in some cases tacit support) in vulnerable communities.
- Real or perceived grievances, some international and some local, including in particular: a perception that UK foreign policy in the Muslim world (notably military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) is hostile to Islam; the experience of wider conflict in the Muslim world and conflict involving Muslims (often attributed either to western intervention or to western indifference); and a range of domestic issues, including racism, inequalities and the experience of criminality and migration.

9.11 The new *Prevent* strategy has been developed to address each of these causes and seeks to:

- challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices
- disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate
- support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists
- increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, and
- address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting.

These five objectives are supported by:

- developing intelligence, analysis and information, and
- improving our strategic communications.

The role of communities, local authorities and statutory partners

9.12 The Government and the Devolved Administrations cannot deliver the *Prevent* agenda on its own. This programme depends on collaborative work alongside the vast majority of people across all communities in this country who reject violent extremism and are determined to challenge it. Strong and empowered communities are better equipped to effectively reject the ideology of violent extremism, isolate apologists for terrorism and provide support to vulnerable institutions and individuals. CLG has a central role in ensuring that communities are at the centre of our response to violent extremism, that individuals and groups of all faiths and all diaspora communities understand the Government's strategy and that they are given support to take a stand against violent extremism.

9.13 *Prevent* is closely coordinated with work in three other policy areas: community cohesion; community empowerment; and race equality.

- Building community cohesion is about creating strong and positive relationships between people of different backgrounds, including those from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds and from different faith communities. By focusing on what people have in common as well as on the value of diversity, community cohesion can foster a shared vision of the future and sense of belonging. Experience has shown that violent extremism can emerge from even the most cohesive communities; but extremist messages are less likely to find support and are more easily isolated in a cohesive environment. A community which isolates extremism of all forms is likely to be one where

people have more confidence to build relationships with one another and increase community cohesion.

- Community Empowerment means giving communities a real say over the decisions and services which affect them. Citizens need to know that public bodies are committed to understanding their views and concerns. This is particularly the case in times of uncertainty. Empowerment initiatives connect people to the decision-making of democratic institutions. The Empowerment White Paper: *Communities in control: real people, real power*¹³⁸, launched by CLG on 9 July 2008, set out the Government approach to passing power to local communities and giving real control and influence to more people. It promotes a sense of how individuals are able to influence the democratic process and raise issues through democratic routes. This supports *Prevent* by giving people the confidence and opportunities to air their grievances through legitimate channels.
- Race equality means building an equally free and fair society for all people regardless of their racial or ethnic background. The Government's approach is based on: a strong legislative framework to tackle discrimination and promote equality between different racial groups; closing the gaps by integrating measures in Departmental public service agreements and programmes; and targeted work to address particular areas of inequality. This is important in its own right, as part of our vision for a free and fair society, but can also help *Prevent* efforts to tackle grievances arising from racism and inequalities.

9.14 The greatest terrorist threat we currently face is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam and who seek to recruit people to their cause from Muslim communities around the world. In the recent past terrorist groups operating in this country have sought

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members from other communities and interest groups here and some domestic violent extremist organisations (not all within the scope of this strategy – see page 57) still do so. At this stage much *Prevent* activity takes place with Muslim communities. But the principles which are the basis for this work can apply to different contexts too.

9.15 The *Prevent* programme depends not only on communities but on local authorities, education, health, cultural and social services, UKBA and those responsible for offender management. Coordination across these agencies, departments and communities (both through statutory and third sector bodies) is vital and most of the local areas receiving *Prevent* funding¹³⁹ have already established appointed *Prevent* partnerships. Many of these organisations are new to CONTEST and to counter-terrorism and in June 2008 the Government published the *Prevent* 'Guide for Local Partners'¹⁴⁰ intended to provide further background; this was followed in July 2008 by Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps for Communities which updated CLG's April 2007 action plan and outlined future priorities, based around the themes of community, civic and faith leadership.

The role of policing in *Prevent*

9.16 The role of law enforcement agencies is as important to *Prevent* as it is to *Pursue*. A major new police *Prevent* Strategy and Delivery Plan was launched in 2008 with 300 new ring-fenced staff being recruited in 24 forces to work alongside the national and regional counter-terrorism policing structure. The new staff will also work very closely with the neighbourhood policing teams which have been established over the past few years¹⁴¹. The police will identify and take action against individuals who are promoting violence and are intent on recruiting often vulnerable young people into terrorist networks. The police can also identify places where radicalisers may operate and where vulnerable individuals may be located and provide

assistance to them. And policing can provide essential support to communities and community organisations.

The international perspective

9.17 *Prevent* work in this country has to be part of an international strategy. The sources and, to a large extent, the inspiration for much of the terrorist ideology are overseas. Terrorists from or resident in the UK have at times been radicalised as well as trained overseas and some communities here are closely connected to their countries of origin. The FCO will lead international *Prevent* work with other countries, notably Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the US. The Government will also engage more with diaspora communities in the UK, to better understand the links with their countries of origin, and how they can better enable us to tackle the shared threat.

9.18 The first part of this strategy argued that conflict and failed states have both played a key role in the evolution of the international terrorist threat. Conflict prevention, though an important foreign policy objective in its own right and not formally part of CONTEST, is therefore critical to our work to counter-terrorism and radicalisation. A summary of Government work in this area is included in 'Conflict prevention and resolution' on page 98. Also included below is a short account of programmes managed by the Department for International Development (DFID). The primary purpose of DFID's work is poverty reduction overseas and is again not formally part of CONTEST. However, in addressing aspects of poverty overseas such as poor access to justice and education, DFID's programmes can make a significant contribution to CONTEST's overarching objectives by addressing the underlying social and economic grievances that can make communities vulnerable to extremist messages.

Measuring progress

9.19 We need to be able to measure progress with our *Prevent* strategy. We have established a target, included in a National Indicator Set which for the first time sets out the role and objectives for local authorities in England¹⁴² in delivering *Prevent* (see Section Thirteen, page 138). We have agreed related targets for policing. And we also assess progress against three outcomes in Public Service Agreement 26: Reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from International Terrorism¹⁴³; these focus on building resilience in domestic communities, counter-radicalisation work in key domestic sectors and services; and interventions in overseas priority countries.

Promoting our shared values

The purpose of our *Prevent* strategy is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.

As part of this strategy we will take action against those who defend terrorism and violent extremism. The Government will continue to take action outside this strategy against those who try to defend the use of violence to further other causes (for example animal rights).

As Government, we will also continue to challenge views which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion – the strong and positive relationships between people of different ethnic, faith and cultural backgrounds in this country. Some of these views can create a climate in which people may be drawn into violent activity.

We have no intention of outlawing these views or criminalising those who hold them. Freedom of thought and speech are rights which are fundamental to our society. But we will not hear these views in silence. We should all stand up for our shared values and not concede the floor to those who dismiss them.

The duty on all of us – Government, citizens and communities – is to challenge those who, for whatever reason or cause, reject the rights to which we are committed, scorn the institutions and values of our parliamentary democracy, dismiss the rule of law and promote intolerance and discrimination on the basis of race, faith, ethnicity, gender or sexuality.

We already have a long tradition of building strong, empowered and resilient communities, tackling all forms of hate crime, and promoting equal opportunities. Our challenge to those who dismiss our

shared values will continue to be reflected in the groups we support and the projects we sponsor.

We will ensure that local authorities understand the risk to community cohesion posed by some organisations. We will develop ways to help communities challenge those who want to work against our shared values.

We want to make it harder for violent extremists to operate in our country and win support for their activities and ideologies. But we also need to be clear about the kind of country which we want for ourselves.

Prevent programmes

9.20 Over the next period the Government and local partners will continue to deliver an ambitious range of programmes against the objectives set out at 9.11 above¹⁴⁴.

Challenging the ideology behind violent extremism and supporting mainstream voices

9.21 Working alongside Muslim scholars, faith groups and many other credible and influential voices the Government and Devolved Administrations will challenge the ideology that supports violent extremism and support those who develop positive alternatives. Priority programmes will provide advice on communications regarding terrorist ideologies, sponsor the wider teaching of Islam and religious education and develop citizenship education in mosque schools.

- RICU¹⁴⁵ and its sponsoring Departments will provide advice on challenging ideologies behind violent extremism.
- FCO and RICU are also working on a project to ensure that clear and credible counter-radicalising theological advice is prominent and accessible on the internet in a variety of languages (see 'The Internet and Prevent', Section Nine, page 94).
- Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) continues to work with the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the university sector to address the gaps in Islamic studies teaching and research; HEFCE has committed £1 million to start this work.
- CLG are supporting a project with universities to work with Muslim scholars, leaders and academics to lead thinking on contextualising Islam in Britain.
- CLG and Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) support the development of citizenship education in mosque schools through

the Islam Citizenship Education Project being supported by the Schools Development Support Agency and a number of community-based organisations.

- Published in October 2008, the DCSF toolkit for schools on preventing violent extremism, 'Learning together to be safe'¹⁴⁶ gives practical advice on how schools in England can use the curriculum to equip young people with the knowledge and skills to be able to challenge extremist narratives. In addition, DCSF is investing £1 million to strengthen the teaching of Religious Education and 'identity and diversity' was introduced as a new strand in the citizenship curriculum in 2008.
- The Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) and South Wales Police have jointly funded 'Getting on Together', a pilot project in three Cardiff schools. This challenges extremist ideology and is taught to year 10 pupils as part of their Personal and Social education lessons.
- CLG and FCO continue to support the Radical Middle Way series of scholars' roadshows and events in the UK and overseas.
- NOMS work includes further training for Muslim Chaplains and other front-line staff.

Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the places where they operate

9.22 Evidence and intelligence suggest that the ideology of violent extremism gains influence through individuals and groups who actively promote it: the messenger is as important as the message. Radicalisers exploit open spaces in communities and institutions, including mosques, educational establishments, prisons, youth clubs and a wide range of private venues. The Government will work with communities to disrupt these radicalisers using the full range of legislative powers and with those responsible for the places they use to ensure it is much harder to operate.

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- Using the new legal powers under the Terrorism Act 2006 the police will prosecute those who encourage or glorify terrorism and take action against the places where they operate.
- DIUS has published two sets of guidance¹⁴⁷ to enable higher and further educational institutions to reduce the risks of radicalisation on campus and are targeting their implementation work in the highest priority¹⁴⁸ establishments.
- NOMS future work includes developing effective intelligence infrastructures in prisons; developing a better understanding of risk and motivating factors behind violent extremist ideology; delivering practical support and training for staff and increasing understanding of how to manage extremist offenders both in custody and in the community, and ensuring that partner agencies are appropriately involved in those strategies.
- CLG are supporting the development and implementation of a set of standards and recruitment framework for all chaplains engaged in public service (including universities, prisons, hospitals, police forces and immigration centres).
- OSCT are working closely with industry to reduce access to illegal content on the internet and providing tools for parents and other users to restrict access to such material online. (Details of this work are set out in 'The Internet and *Prevent*', Section Nine, page 94).
- Government Departments will support a wider range of venues that may be exploited by radicalisers, including colleges, universities, prisons, youth clubs and community centres. There is a key role here for the police in providing both information and advice.
- CLG are supporting the Charity Commission's Faith and Social Cohesion Unit and working with the independent Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board to raise standards in mosques.
- As the Home Secretary announced on 28 October 2008, UKBA will make enhanced use of the power of exclusion to ensure that those who promote violent extremism and stir up hatred in the community are excluded from entering the UK. UKBA will also make all possible use of the power to deport such people where they are UK residents, if necessary following removal of their British citizenship.

Supporting individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists

9.23 Apologists for violent extremism very often target individuals who, for a range of reasons, are vulnerable to their messages. Vulnerability is not simply a result of actual or perceived grievances. It may be the result of family or peer pressure, the absence of positive mentors and role models, a crisis of identity, links to criminality including other forms of violence, exposure to traumatic events (here or overseas), or changing circumstances (eg a new environment following migration and asylum). The Government will continue to prosecute those who commit criminal offences but it is also our intention to provide early support to those who are being drawn into offending.

9.24 Priority programmes will support those who are believed to be vulnerable to radicalisation (by providing peer mentoring, diversionary activities and leadership programmes and by equipping people with the knowledge and skills to challenge extremist narratives); more intensive interventions will focus on people who have already been drawn into violent extremist networks. This work builds on existing multi-agency support mechanisms at a local level to support vulnerable adults and early intervention work with at-risk young people as part of Every Child Matters¹⁴⁹.

- Over £7 million has been made available over two years to new projects run by the Youth Justice Board to develop counter-radicalisation projects for young offenders or those

at risk of offending. Practitioners in the 51 Youth Justice Board areas are being trained now to support these new projects.

- The Government has put in place the Channel programme¹⁵⁰, coordinated by the police and local authorities, which aims to identify those at risk from violent extremism and provide help to them, primarily through community-based interventions. There are currently 11 Channel sites; another 15 are planned.
- The DCSF toolkit for schools encourages staff to support pupils who may be vulnerable to being drawn into extremism as part of their wider safeguarding responsibilities.
- UKBA will develop a strategy for supporting vulnerable individuals in immigration detention centres through a programme of guidance and training for detention staff, managers and the chaplaincy. UKBA will also improve its ability to identify and refer for support individuals at risk of radicalisation in the asylum system and, through the 'Earned Citizenship' programme, will support the integration of migrants into UK society.
- NOMS will build upon a detailed programme of research, trial and evaluations to develop intervention approaches for extremist offenders.
- OSCT has established an international practitioners and research network to develop and share tools and techniques to help those who have already become radicalised turn away from violent extremism. Sponsorship for this network will continue with the objective of providing and informing new 'deradicalisation' programmes in this country.

Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism

9.25 The overwhelming majority of people in all communities in this country reject violent extremism but they may not have the capacity and information to effectively challenge it. The Government will support individuals and networks across all sectors (voluntary, faith, public and private) that are able to do so and provide positive alternatives to those who may be drawn to violent extremist activity.

- CLG will continue to fund local authorities (£45 million over three years) to work with local partners and communities to deliver across all the objectives of the *Prevent* strategy. This is now core business for local authorities. Projects are funded across a very wide range of areas, including, mentoring, training and education, sport, culture and volunteering, and in providing forums for debate and discussion on politics and theology. In Wales, the WAG is working with local authorities in Cardiff, Swansea, Newport and Wrexham on local projects which support *Prevent*.
- During 2008/09, CLG are funding over 30 national projects through the Preventing Violent Extremism Community Leadership Fund that will build the capacity of communities and key groups such as Muslim women, young people and faith leaders. This funding will continue until 2010/11.
- Young people themselves can be the most credible voices and strongest advocates against violent extremism. A Young Muslims Advisory Group has been established to advise the Government on their role in tackling violent extremism and will now take forward a programme of work to engage young Muslims across the country, including holding a National Youth Conference in March 2009.
- A National Muslim Women's Advisory Group has been established with three priority areas for further work: civic participation; theological understanding; and the identification of role models.

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- CLG are supporting a range of training programmes for Muslim faith leaders and facilitating an independent community-led review of training for Muslim faith leaders which will report in 2009.
- CLG and RICU are developing a communications 'toolkit' for local delivery partners to build their capacities to implement effective communications around the *Prevent* agenda.
- The police will continue to roll out Operation Nicole, a table top exercise intended to bring mainly Muslim communities and police officers together to work through a hypothetical counter-terrorism incident, and explore the issues which it raises.
- Several police powers which are important to the *Pursue* workstream have attracted negative comment from some communities. They include Section 44 (police stop and search powers) and Schedule 7 (stop and search powers at ports). The Government is engaging in community consultation about these powers, which need to be retained but in a way that commands support. A small number of responses from community groups on Schedule 7 powers have been received. These have been reviewed and incorporated where possible into the draft Code of Practice for Parliamentary approval.
- Government Departments and the Devolved Administrations are working together to explore where there may be productive links between long-established programmes to address inequalities (such as in employment, welfare or health-care provision) and the *Prevent* strategy. For example, the DWP managed Cities Strategy, which tackles worklessness, is targeted at the most disadvantaged communities in the most disadvantaged areas. 13 of the 15 pathfinders have local ethnic minority targets and many cover large concentrations of Muslim communities; work is being undertaken to identify where these programmes overlap with *Prevent* priority areas.
- CLG works with other Government Departments to reduce race and faith inequalities in education, health, housing and the criminal justice system, as well as the labour market. The Department leads effort to reduce perceptions of race discrimination, creating more cohesive communities, tackle racism, extremism and hate and promote inter-faith activity and a shared sense of belonging.

Addressing grievances

9.26 Apologists for violent extremism both exploit and create grievances to justify terrorism. Some of these grievances reflect the experiences of individuals living in this country: racism, discrimination, inequalities, lack of social mobility, under employment, the experience of criminality. A wide range of well established Government policies and measures are already addressing these issues. We also recognise that actions taken in support of the *Pursue* agenda can be exploited by apologists for violence and indirectly facilitate radicalisation.

9.27 Other grievances are based on a perception of this country and Government policy, notably foreign policy. Many of these perceptions are misinformed. We will explain and debate our policies and refute claims made about them by those who support terrorism.

9.28 There are therefore a very wide range of programmes under this part of *Prevent*, both in this country and overseas:

- The police have published guidance to ensure that senior officers have the knowledge to deal with community grievances arising from operations to disrupt and control terrorism in this country. Work will continue to build links to community leaders and institutions and to ensure that they are fully briefed on police priorities and concerns.

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- The FCO, leading on *Prevent* overseas, has an £87 million programme intended to build the resilience of governments and communities in *Prevent* priority countries needed to prevent extremism, for example by improving governments' capacity to tackle radicalisation and supporting communities to tackle extremism.
- The mission of DFID is to reduce poverty in developing countries. Ongoing programmes to ensure access to more and better education will also help, over time, to increase the resilience of communities overseas (see '*Prevent* action overseas', Section Nine, page 96). DFID will continue to work with other Government Departments to ensure that wherever possible its country programmes are coordinated with *Prevent* objectives. The DFID Pakistan programme developed in 2008 was an early example.
- The FCO is undertaking a major programme of foreign policy outreach to domestic Muslim communities. Led by the Foreign Secretary, 'Bringing Foreign Policy Back Home' is a campaign to debate and explain foreign policies to challenging audiences.
- DFID's development programmes aimed at particular aspects of poverty, eg tackling corruption overseas, can over time also address some of the underlying grievances that can lead communities to support violent extremism (see '*Prevent* action overseas', Section Nine, page 96). As part of its wider efforts to increase development awareness DFID will explain, consult on and present the Government's development agenda to local audiences, including Muslim communities, via media and community engagement channels. DFID's Pakistan Country Plan was launched in September 2008 through events in London, Birmingham and Bradford, targeted at Pakistani community leaders, MPs, non-governmental organisations and local and diaspora media. The key messages from the event were

reinforced with ministerial interviews with diaspora radio and the Islam Channel, and features on the DFID website. This model will be applied to the forthcoming launches of the Bangladesh and Somalia Country Plans.

Developing intelligence, analysis and information

9.29 The Government's understanding of radicalisation and its causes is growing, but we need more open source and classified material, better analysis of it and a much wider distribution of our reporting to a new range of readers.

- The police, security and intelligence agencies all have new *Prevent*-related intelligence requirements, building on their existing programmes.
- The major counter-terrorism policing units will be sharing information with local authorities to provide them with a more comprehensive assessment of areas at risk from terrorism and radicalisation and enable authorities to better target *Prevent* related interventions. This will be a major piece of work for the police counter-terrorism community, and a significant step in sharing information with the wider police establishment and through complementary work to receive such information, with partners.
- To build the Government's analytical capability a cross-Whitehall central *Prevent* unit has been created. This team will collate information from a wide variety of sources to develop a clearer understanding of radicalisation in the UK and to share that information with local partners.
- The social science research team within OSCT is leading a multimillion pound cross-Government programme of work to research the causes of radicalisation, identify appropriate interventions and evaluate the impact of existing counter-radicalisation projects. A significant proportion of this work relies on open source material and academia.

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- *Prevent* research work in the UK is being complemented by comparable international studies, initiated by FCO and DFID. International work is focused on understanding the causes and in DFID's case, the social and economic drivers of radicalisation, for example in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Somalia.

Strategic communications

9.30 This part of the *Prevent* strategy is addressed in Section Fifteen on Communications. Work on *Prevent* and the internet is described in more detail within 'The internet and *Prevent*', Section Nine, page 94.

Part One of this paper identified technology as one of the strategic factors driving terrorism and noted that the communications revolution in particular had enabled the wider and faster dissemination of violent extremist propaganda as well as fund-raising, recruitment and operational planning. Tackling terrorist use of the internet is therefore a key part of both the *Pursue* and *Prevent* strategies.

The security and intelligence agencies and police have worked to address terrorist operational use of the internet for many years.

In July 2007, Younis Tsouli pleaded guilty to charges including incitement to commit acts of terrorism via the internet and later that year he was sentenced to 16 years in prison. From his home in London, Tsouli set up websites which were uploaded with videos from Al Qa'ida in Iraq and established and administered a chat forum on which suicide bombers were recruited¹⁵¹. Facilitating contacts between thousands of individuals, he also posted tutorials on making suicide vests and explosive devices. Tsouli became the main distributor of video material from Al Qa'ida in Iraq after establishing an online relationship with an associate of Abu Musab al Zarqawi¹⁵².

In September 2008, Hammaad Munshi was convicted of making a record of material likely to be useful for terrorism after he downloaded information about bomb-making from the internet. Munshi was sentenced to two years in a young offenders' institution¹⁵³.

As the *Prevent* strategy has evolved, the OSCT in the Home Office has developed work to disrupt use of the internet for extremist messaging and increase use of the internet to promote alternative views, with the overall aim of making the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists.

The legal basis for removing unlawful terrorist-related material from the internet (whether or not the source of it can be or has been arrested) is Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This allows a police officer to issue a notice on an Internet Service Provider (ISP) requiring it to remove or modify unlawful terrorist-related material within two working days. In practice close cooperation with industry in this country means that, to date, the police have been able to secure the removal of content without the need for notices to be served under Section 3.

The greater problem is that most of the material of concern is hosted on web servers overseas. Section 3 notices can be issued to ISPs outside the UK but cannot be enforced. Multilateral cooperation and coordination are therefore essential. Most other states face challenges similar to our own. We are actively engaged in a significant EU project with Commission support in this area. We are also assisting with the development of a Europol hosted web portal – the 'Check the Web' project – which is available to investigating agencies across the EU, to share information on open access terrorism related websites and content. And we are cooperating with a UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on terrorist use of the internet, which has recently published its first report on the subject, evaluating options for the future¹⁵⁴.

Work has also been undertaken in the UK to identify ways in which the dissemination of material from web sites hosted overseas can be limited.

One option is to make wider use of filtering or parental control software. Following the announcement by the Prime Minister in November 2007 Home Office Ministers and officials have engaged with filtering companies to ensure that their products provide a high level of protection against unlawful material that promotes or encourages terrorism. With effect from November 2008, filtering companies have begun to restrict access to additional terrorist-related web addresses in their products. One of these companies alone reaches over 170 million end users, and several of them provide filtering to schools and educational facilities in the UK.

The Protection of Children Act 1978 and subsequent legislation makes it an offence to make, own or distribute indecent photographs of children under the age of 18 and the 'making' of such images includes downloading a copy of a child abuse image on a computer. While recognising that the legal framework around radicalising material is different the Government continues to explore options relating to restricting access to such material with industry.

Communities also have an important part to play in tackling terrorist use of the internet. In October 2008, a Home Office sponsored seminar brought together members of communities with representatives of Government, the police and academia to discuss this. A network of community practitioners is now being formed to share best practice, develop new ideas to tackle the threat of radicalisation on the internet and work to increase positive messaging; OSCT and other Departments will provide assistance where it is sought.

Separately, organisations such as Radical Middle Way, an established Government partner organisation, are promoting debate within UK Muslim

communities, and using the internet to reach audiences in the UK and overseas. Radicalmiddleway.co.uk saw 65,000 unique hits in October 2008 (a figure that has risen steadily since April 2008 when the site received 40,000 hits).

Radical Middle Way International is now organising a series of high-profile tours by mainstream Islamic scholars overseas and will develop a specific website for each pilot country in the local language. Projects like this demonstrate how the internet can be used to promote debate and to challenge extremist ideologies.

As Part One of this strategy makes clear, the terrorist threat that we now face is international. In seeking to stop people becoming or supporting violent extremists, we therefore need to work overseas, just as much as at home, in order to understand the process of radicalisation, to reduce the vulnerability of our diaspora communities and the countries and regions from which they come, to strengthen the voice of mainstream Islam to counter the propaganda of the extremists, and to tackle the grievances which are exploited by those extremists. Our commitment to protecting and promoting human rights underlies all *Prevent* overseas efforts.

Our response has increased significantly in scale over the last two years: FCO spending alone on *Prevent* overseas has more than doubled and will have trebled by 2010. It has also widened in scope, with support from DFID and the British Council, and more international work by the Home Office and CLG. And it has changed in character, with Ministers and senior officials talking more to communities in the UK about their concerns – notably regarding the role of the UK in Iraq and Afghanistan – and working with those same communities to challenge perceptions overseas of life as a British Muslim in the UK.

As well as building our engagement with global centres of Islamic ideology, the FCO network of posts also work with other governments and key non-governmental organisations to strengthen their capacity to combat the effects of violent extremism. We seek to multiply the impact of this work through coordinating work with international organisations such as the UN and the EU.

Although formally not a part of CONTEST, our success in preventing conflict, and building a sustainable and just peace

where it has occurred, be it in Iraq, Palestine or Somalia, is also vital to our long-term effort to address grievances and stem the radicalisation of vulnerable communities, as well as being an important foreign policy objective in its own right.

Overseas *Prevent* work connects to all objectives of the new *Prevent* strategy:

Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices

Mainstream Islamic scholars and grassroots organisations, rather than governments, are often best placed to counter the impact of extremist ideology on vulnerable populations. Many of the most influential figures and organisations are based overseas. We have provided media and English language training, notably for an English Language Centre at Al Azhar University in Cairo, a major centre of Sunni Islamic learning. We support visits by Islamic scholars to Britain and other countries; we fund The Radical Middle Way programme (see 'The Internet and *Prevent*', Section Nine, page 94).

Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate

We run programmes in North Africa and South Asia that strengthen the resilience of institutions including prisons, schools and universities, which are vulnerable to violent extremism building on programmes in this country.

Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists

We fund programmes aimed at vulnerable young people, including work in some 700 schools across Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Sharing Futures Strand of the

British Council's Intercultural Dialogue Programme, which focuses on the Middle East and South Asia, also helps to counter radicalisation and youth alienation, build trust and inter-cultural understanding around shared values, and to tackle the obstacles that young people face which make them vulnerable to recruitment by extremists.

Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism

We support communities in building resistance to violent extremism by strengthening civil society, enhancing economic opportunities, and providing education that equips young people with marketable skills. For example in Iraq, the FCO fund a programme to train youth advocates and social workers to work with young people who are about to be released from detention, and to provide vocational training, small loans and business development services. The objective is to ensure young people are successfully reintegrated into families and communities and to reduce the risk of their recruitment by extremist militias.

Addressing grievances

The FCO leads a significant overseas programme of work to build the resilience of governments and communities in *Prevent* priority countries, for example by improving governments' capacity to tackle radicalisation and supporting communities to tackle extremism.

Through its core objective to reduce poverty overseas, DFID can also have an important *Prevent* impact by helping to address the national and local grievances which make communities susceptible to extremist messages – by reducing inequalities, improving local governance and access to security and justice for ordinary people.

The FCO seeks to better inform people in Britain and abroad of UK foreign policy; a programme of visits by British Muslims are intended to explain life in

Britain for British Muslims: delegations have travelled to Pakistan, Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Foreign Office Ministers and officials have also conducted regular outreach events in Muslim communities in 2008.

DFID is also working to build greater awareness of the UK aid programme among domestic audiences and to establish concern for development as a shared national value. As well as using traditional communication tools, DFID is using more innovative approaches to reach out to local communities and increase awareness of the full scope of the UK's international priorities.

Conflict prevention and resolution

The first part of this strategy explained how terrorism has emerged and flourished around unresolved regional disputes and conflicts. The National Security Strategy identifies global instability, conflict, and failed and fragile states as one of the main security challenges that we face¹⁵⁵.

The National Security Strategy explains that our response to these challenges will always favour early engagement and a multilateral approach, ideally through international institutions. Our aims will be to:

- prevent conflict, by ensuring that its causes are addressed early
- manage conflict and its impact, by helping the development of local and national solutions and conflict resolution capacity
- stabilise conflict prone environments
- consolidate peace, by enabling the conditions leading to an effective, capable and accountable state and broad-based economic growth.

Interventions designed to achieve progress towards one particular outcome will nearly always have implications for others. Some interventions can be pursued in parallel. In Sudan we are working with the international community to prevent, manage and stabilise conflict, and to support both the Darfur Peace Process and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In Yemen our work to reduce tribal conflict focuses on issues like land and water resources, supporting broader development and counter-terrorism objectives. In Somalia we work with the international community to support the Djibouti Process, facilitating political dialogue and a peaceful transition to

the new government. We have also contributed to the building and equipping of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with headquarters in Mogadishu.

The resources available for interventions to prevent and respond to conflict are primarily controlled by the FCO, MOD and DFID and include funding for stabilisation and reconstruction in conflict zones, currently Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2009/10 £627 million will be available to support stabilisation, conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities (working alongside the United Nations, NATO, the European Security and Defence Policy, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the African Union), up from £511 million in 2006/07.

Overall funds available for conflict prevention and stabilisation were increased in the current Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR).

These Departments and the Cabinet Office jointly deliver the Government Public Service Agreement for this area. The aim of this is to reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts. Indicators for this PSA include a downward trend in the number of conflicts globally in particular in sub Saharan Africa, Europe, central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa; reduced impact of conflict in specific countries and regions (Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, Middle East, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa, Nigeria and Sudan); more effective international institutions; and more effective UK capability to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and build peace.

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Prevent: future challenges

- We need to continue to improve our understanding about the drivers for radicalisation, in this country and overseas.
- Much of the *Prevent* strategy is new to this country and to governments overseas. There is a shortage of proven best practice in certain key areas, notably in programmes to identify and support vulnerable individuals. Developing international best practice will be vital.
- We need to continue to incorporate *Prevent* into more national, local and regional policy areas and to ensure *Prevent* is a familiar and well understood issue for front-line services.
- Departments, security and intelligence agencies and the police will need to address all our *Prevent* objectives, balancing work to support vulnerable individuals and enhance the resilience of communities with operations to disrupt propagandists and their networks.
- *Prevent* depends on a shared understanding of the threat. We need to develop a consensus about this, often by encouraging more discussion about it. We need to build further trust and confidence between police and Muslim communities.
- Some Muslim communities believe *Prevent* encourages the association of Islam with terrorism. The Government has made it clear that it does not hold this view. But these attitudes underline the need for very clear communications about counter-terrorism in general and *Prevent* in particular.
- We will need to coordinate work under *Pursue* and *Prevent* and ensure they do not undermine one another (see page 78).
- This strategy will depend upon international cooperation and on work with and by other governments. The counter-terrorism priorities of other states may encourage radicalisation; unresolved conflict and disputes can also quickly undermine our domestic *Prevent* strategy. Developments in Pakistan, Bangladesh or North Africa can all have a significant impact on respective diaspora communities here.

Part One of this strategy explained that the threat faced by the UK crosses national borders and an effective international response is critical to every part of CONTEST. Most terrorist incidents in the UK have an overseas connection and international terrorist organisations threaten the UK's interests overseas. Few countries around the world are as important to CONTEST and to our broader National Security Strategy as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The principles set out in Section Seven, on which CONTEST is based, are the basis for our work in and with these two countries. We will address the causes as well as the symptoms of radicalisation and terrorism, notably by tackling conflict, poverty and poor governance and the absence of rule of law. Many of these underlying causes span the Pakistan-Afghan border and demand a coordinated approach across both countries, the wider region, and the different elements of our engagement. We will ensure that our counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan, Afghanistan – as with other countries – is based on the rule of law and fundamental regard for the protection and promotion of human rights.

Pakistan

Most significant terrorist investigations in the UK have links to Pakistan and for this reason cooperation with Pakistan is critical to our delivery of CONTEST.

More broadly, we want to see a secure, stable, prosperous and democratic Pakistan. The Pakistani Government faces challenges in reaching these goals, including poverty, poor governance and extremism.

During 2008 terrorist and insurgent attacks in Pakistan killed over 2,000 people. The great majority of the victims

were Pakistani. Violent extremist organisations, including Al Qa'ida and groups affiliated to the Taliban, have a very significant presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Their influence is spreading rapidly in areas of the North West Frontier Province. A separate long-running separatist insurgency in Baluchistan continues. In some areas extremist organisations have considerable freedom of movement and local control.

This matters not just to Pakistan, but also to the UK. In some cases cells in this country have received tasking, direction and training from Pakistan-based groups, principally Al Qa'ida. In many of the important attempted operations here conspirators travelled to and from Pakistan preparing operations.

The investigation of these operations requires very close cooperation between agencies in the UK and their counter parts in Pakistan. Contacts have developed significantly in the last five years, reflecting the scale of the shared threat. Our counter-terrorism programme with Pakistan, worth approximately £10 million in 2008/09, includes assistance with forensics, crime scene management, crisis response and civil aviation security (further funding has been directed towards counter-narcotics projects). This will enhance the capacity of civilian law enforcement to tackle the terrorist threat through the proper legal process.

Prevent is an important part of our work in Pakistan. We are working with the media, civil society and others to build resilience to violent extremism and tackle the grievances that drive radicalisation. The Government of Pakistan has the key role to play in this – effectively countering extremism will require strong political leadership and long-term commitment.

Tackling both the causes and the symptoms is particularly important in our efforts to counter the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Pakistani support on this is essential. We recognise the efforts Pakistan has made to tackle violent extremism in the border areas, but the challenge is very considerable. A comprehensive strategy, combining security, governance and development measures is needed. We are working with the Government of Pakistan to support their efforts to improve the rule of law in the border areas.

Grievances associated with poor governance, poverty and lack of access to services, alongside a number of contributory factors (including perceptions of Western foreign policy) make communities vulnerable to extremist messages.

The Government of Pakistan faces significant economic and social challenges. 36 million Pakistanis (22% of the population) live below the poverty line. Two out of every five children are malnourished and many have no education. The UK is committed to the fight against poverty in Pakistan, in partnership with the Government of Pakistan, the international community and civil society. The UK is the second largest bilateral donor to Pakistan and has doubled aid to £480 million during 2008–11. Key aims of this programme will be to give people access to better health and education. Alongside national programmes development aid will be focused on Pakistan's poorest provinces: Baluchistan, Punjab and the NWFP.

The UK is also committed to wider support for the democratically elected Government of Pakistan. We have helped develop the 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan' group to support Pakistan in tackling the problems it faces. We will support the economic reform programme and Pakistan's collaboration with the IMF. We will advise on good governance.

Afghanistan

We intervened, as part of an international coalition, in Afghanistan in 2001 because the country had become a safe haven for terrorist organisations, which threatened this country and the region. Coalition action destroyed much of the terrorist infrastructure within Afghanistan. This significantly disrupted the operational capabilities of terrorist groups and dispersed the Al Qa'ida leadership. The coalition action also created the conditions for elections, first for a President and then, in 2005, for a National Assembly (when 51% of Afghans voted).

The focus for the UK now is to work with the elected Government of Afghanistan to build a secure and stable country. This will require a significant ongoing security commitment as part of an international coalition – focused on the continued development of Afghan police and military capacity to a level where they can take the lead in dealing with the insurgency and maintaining security – to stop violent extremist organisations regaining the bases which they lost in 2001 and using those bases to again threaten the security of this country. There are currently almost 8,500 British soldiers in Afghanistan. As part of our wider work training and supporting all the Afghan security forces, we work with their security services on counter-terrorism. We have already played a major role in building the capacity of both the Afghan National Army and the security organisations to tackle terrorism and insurgency and will continue to do so.

We recognise that in Afghanistan counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics work must be coordinated with and be part of a broader strategy to build stability and security. In Afghanistan, as in parts of Pakistan, poverty and deprivation create circumstances conducive to radicalisation.

Since 2001 the Government has committed over £1.65 billion to aid reconstruction and development. Although the challenges remain considerable a great deal of progress has been made. Infant mortality has been significantly reduced; access to healthcare and education have sharply increased; average income per head has increased by over 70% since 2002; the economy grew 42% from 2002/03 to 2005/06 and the IMF forecast 12% growth in 2007/08. Three million Afghans have benefited from rural water and sanitation projects. Five million refugees have returned home.

Promoting respect for human rights is essential for a stable and democratic Afghanistan. The UK is sponsoring a Human Rights Support Unit in the Afghan Ministry of Justice. And we have provided support to the Afghan Human Rights Commission which has over 500 staff working across the country. A large part of its work focuses on women's rights.

Afghanistan currently supplies over 90% of the world's opium used for heroin supply and the trade generates billions of pounds of revenue for global organised crime and for terrorist and insurgency groups. We are therefore also working to increase the Afghan Government's capability and capacity to tackle the narcotics trade and we support the Afghan poppy eradication programme. During 2008 poppy cultivation in Afghanistan declined by some 19%.

Pakistan's tribal areas continue to provide both a safe haven for Al Qa'ida and a base from which it can support the insurgency in Afghanistan. Security in Afghanistan depends in large part on success across the border in Pakistan and a strong working relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital for regional stability. The Governments of both countries have taken positive steps to improve their bilateral relationship and the UK is committed to supporting them.

Summary

To achieve the aim of our strategy we also need to reduce the vulnerability of this country and its interests overseas to terrorist attack. This is the purpose of *Protect*. A considerable amount of progress has been made on this workstream over the past five years. It covers protection of critical national infrastructure, crowded places, the transport system, our borders, and our interests overseas; and protection against threats from insiders and from the misuse of hazardous substances.

The critical national infrastructure delivers essential services to the public. Damage to that infrastructure can have severe economic impact or cause large scale loss of life. Intelligence shows that terrorists are interested in attacking national infrastructure targets and recognise the potential impact those attacks can have.

The Government has put in place a comprehensive programme to protect the national infrastructure from terrorism. The programme is supported by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, established in 2007.

Crowded places are also a preferred terrorist target. Through the National Counter Terrorism Security Office the Government has provided security advice to crowded places (including sporting venues and shopping centres). Specialist programmes have been developed for the transport network – air, sea, and rail (including underground systems).

Protecting our borders has been a key part of this workstream. The new UK Border Agency integrates three previous organisations into an agency of more than 25,000 staff, with a presence in 135 countries. New biometric visa and travel tracking programmes have significantly enhanced border security.

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Action has also been taken to minimise and manage the ‘insider threat’: the risk of staff exploiting legitimate access to an organisation’s assets or premises for unauthorised, malicious purposes, ranging from theft to terrorism.

The Government protects UK interests overseas, including British citizens who travel or live overseas. Programmes provide accurate advice to travellers and the private sector on the threat from terrorism and ensure the physical protection of British diplomatic missions and personnel overseas.

In the next three years our objectives for *Protect* will be to further reduce the vulnerability of:

- the critical national infrastructure
- crowded places
- the transport system
- and our borders.

New programmes will improve the security of hazardous materials which might now be used in terrorist attacks.

Some terrorists use false papers to travel here and to conceal their real identity. Others have created multiple identities to avoid detection and hide their activities. The National Identity Scheme will provide a secure way to safeguard personal identities from misuse, and will ‘lock’ a person’s biographic information to their unique facial and fingerprint biometrics on a National Identity Register. This biographic and biometric information will be stored in a chip on an identity card. Identity cards do not provide a single solution to terrorism and the Government is not proposing their introduction only for counter-terrorism related reasons, but they do provide a valuable tool for authenticating identity and for that reason support counter-terrorist investigations.

Protect: key achievements

10.01 Strengthening protection against terrorist attack is the third workstream of CONTEST. Considerable progress has been made against the *Protect* objectives set by the Government in the initial CONTEST Strategy: to mitigate the risk of attacks on the critical infrastructure, crowded places and on transport systems; by strengthening our border to make the UK more resilient to terrorist attack; to develop a personnel security framework; and to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist attacks of UK interests overseas.

10.02 The effect of our *Protect* work has been to make it much harder for terrorists to get into this country and then to attack the targets which experience indicates they may prefer. Our *Protect* work has also reduced the risk to people who may be of interest to terrorist organisations.

Critical national infrastructure

10.03 The critical national infrastructure (CNI) includes the many organisations that deliver essential services to the public. For the purposes of our *Protect* work it is divided into nine sectors: communications; emergency services; energy; finance; food; government; health; transport and water. Intelligence suggests that terrorists are interested in attacking national infrastructure targets with the aim of causing disruption as well as loss of life. Protecting the CNI is therefore a key part of our counter-terrorism strategy.

10.04 The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)¹⁵⁶ supports the delivery of this programme. Established in 2007, from the merger of the National Security Advisory Centre and the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre, the CPNI provides integrated security advice across the

national infrastructure on physical, personnel and electronic security. CPNI works in close partnership with a range of Government Departments, with the Devolved Administrations and with public and private sector partners who own or operate infrastructure.

CPNI has provided security advice, training and threat briefings to over 200 CNI organisations and 2,000 people from public and private sector organisations across the national infrastructure. Topics addressed have included hostile vehicle mitigation; detection systems; barriers and access control; CCTV; and pre-employment screening.

10.05 CPNI has developed a new approach to identifying and categorising infrastructure which has led to a more comprehensive understanding of what needs protecting. This takes into account the threats, the ‘criticality’ of the infrastructure in question and its vulnerabilities. In partnership with industry, CPNI has undertaken research and development into science and technologies to develop protection and detection measures, and evaluated over 200 security products to inform security measures recommended at CNI sites.

10.06 The private security industry is a key partner of Government in the development of protective security measures and capabilities for the national infrastructure, for crowded places and for other sites assessed to require heightened security (paragraphs 14.40 to 14.51 provide more information about the contribution of the private sector to CONTEST).

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Crowded places

10.07 Crowded places are also preferred terrorist targets. The police National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO)¹⁵⁷, established in 2002 and co-located with the CPNI, provides expert security advice to those responsible for crowded places and for storing chemical, biological, radiological and explosive material. Advice is delivered through a network of more than 250 Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) around the UK, including 70 recruited in 2008/09 to support the delivery of the Government's crowded places programme.

Since May 2006 CTSAs have provided **comprehensive protective security guidance** and given advice to over 500 sports stadia, over 600 shopping centres and over 10,000 city and town centre bars and nightclubs. Since January 2007, CTSAs have also run over 700 **Project ARGUS** scenario-based training events to city and town centre businesses to help them identify measures they can take to protect themselves, and their customers, and recover from a terrorist attack.

10.08 The National Barrier Asset was established in 2004 providing police forces with a capability to deploy temporary specialist protective security barriers to protect high profile locations or temporary events, such as political party conferences, from vehicle borne suicide attacks. In 2008 the size of the National Barrier Asset was tripled to meet expected demand.

Transport systems and their users

10.09 The transport system contains both crowded places and elements of the CNI. Transport can be an attractive target for terrorists because of its visibility and because a successful attack can cause significant loss of life. Protective security measures for transport systems must reduce the risk of attack, increase resilience to attack, have minimal disruptive impact and retain the confidence of people who are travelling.

10.10 Building on existing and well-developed programmes, which are subject to Government regulation and enforcement action, the security of the transport sector has been further strengthened since 9/11, the 7 July 2005 bombings on London's public transport system, the alleged plot against aircraft in August 2006 and the attack on Glasgow Airport on 30 June 2007:

- **Aviation** – Although this is the most mature of the Government's transport security programmes, both in-flight security and measures on the ground have been strengthened in response to changing terrorist techniques and developments in protective security; new measures have included an in-flight armed policing capability; strengthened flight deck doors; restrictions on liquids that can be taken through search areas into aircraft cabins; and guidance for airports on the security of landside areas.
- Since 2003 Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessments have been produced jointly by all security stakeholders at airports, the regulatory authorities and industry. These assessments identify the threats to airports from terrorism and crime, and the roles and responsibilities the different agencies have for addressing them.
- Since 9/11, a small and highly effective network of aviation security experts has advised British airlines on the security of their overseas operations and worked with those overseas governments to develop their aviation security capability and to share best practice.
- **Maritime** – Before 9/11 the UK was one of the few countries that had a maritime security programme in place. Since then, the Department for Transport (DfT) has introduced further measures and implemented international requirements for both ships and ports, many of which have built on UK best practice. The Government played a leading role in the adoption by the International Maritime Organisation in 2004

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of its International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which details security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies¹⁵⁸; and by the EU in Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security.

- **Railways** – Protective security programmes for the rail network were developed during the 1970s and 1980s in response to Provisional IRA attacks in conjunction with the work of a dedicated police force, the British Transport Police (BTP). DfT took responsibility for railway security from Railtrack in 2000 and introduced a National Railway Security programme in 2001. These programmes were reviewed and expanded following terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, with an emphasis on staff and public awareness.
- Building on trials in 2006 of equipment and dogs to detect explosives or traces of explosives on people and bags, the BTP has expanded its passenger screening programme. Successful trials of vehicle access controls at major railway stations have led to an installation programme for permanent vehicle barriers.
- **Underground** – Security arrangements for the London Underground network were also developed to counter the threat from Irish-related terrorism, particularly through the extensive deployment of CCTV in stations and on platforms. DfT assumed responsibility for the security of the London Underground in 2003 and security arrangements were reviewed following the attacks on London in 2005.
- Passenger screening trials to test explosive detection took place on the London Underground in 2006. These trials showed that screening equipment and dogs can be effective in an underground environment and BTP now carries out highly visible and regular dog patrols in underground stations. DfT is continuing to work with the BTP and London Underground to assess the effectiveness and impact of explosive detection capabilities;

vehicle access controls are being delivered at key London Underground stations.

UK border security

10.11 The Government has strengthened counter-terrorism protection at the UK Border through:

- **New, more effective organisational structures:** on 14 November 2007, the Prime Minister announced a wide range of counter-terrorism measures including the creation of the UK Border Agency (UKBA)¹⁵⁹. The new Agency integrated the work of the Border and Immigration Agency, UK visas and HMRC operations at the border to create an Agency of more than 25,000 staff with a presence in 135 countries. Within UKBA, a new unified UK Border Force presents the primary face of Government at the border and comprises almost 9,000 staff.
- **Strengthening UKBA/police partnerships:** the UKBA and the police work closely at ports. It is UKBA's role to ensure people and goods seeking to enter or exit the UK are entitled to do so. When people of particular counter-terrorism interest or with connections to serious organised crime are identified, UKBA officers will refer, where appropriate, to police Special Branch officers operating at the ports. The police have three roles at the border: intelligence collection (primarily relating to national security issues); protective security; and uniformed general policing, including management of major incidents. In April 2008 a high level framework on cooperation between ACPO and UKBA at UK ports and airports was published¹⁶⁰, followed by more detailed plans on a range of issues.
- **Substantially improving our knowledge about movements across the UK Border:** checks by UKBA staff here and overseas, using watchlists where necessary, allow individuals and goods that could cause harm to the UK to be identified and stopped from travelling or entering the country. An electronic borders system (e-Borders) enables UKBA and police analysts

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to screen, check and risk assess passenger details in advance of travel so that persons of interest can be identified prior to their arrival in or departure from the UK. The £1.2 billion e-Borders system has screened over 80 million passengers travelling to the UK, using data received from approximately 105 carriers on over 185 routes. This has led to over 32,000 alerts and over 2,800 arrests for all crimes, not specifically terrorist charges, and has allowed police and immigration resources to be targeted better on those intending harm to the public in the UK or to deceive the UK authorities.

- **Effective border controls:** the UKBA is trialling new facial recognition gates which use scanning equipment to compare the faces of UK and EEA passengers with their biometric passports, providing high security with quicker times at immigration control.
- **New biometric visas:** UKBA delivered global roll-out of a visa biometric programme in December 2007. All visa applicants, other than those benefiting from a limited number of exemptions and exceptions, are now required to provide their fingerprints and a digital photograph as part of the application process. The prints are checked against the police biometric dataset. Biometric technology is proving to be a useful tool in informing the visa decision-making process. To date, over 3.2 million enrolments have generated over 23,000 matches to data recorded in connection with an immigration matter in the UK and have revealed over 4,400 cases of identity fraud.
- **Radiological detection:** ongoing roll-out of the Cyclamen Programme is providing both a fixed and mobile capability to detect, deter and intercept smuggled radiological material operated by UKBA at UK ports and airports. The mobile capability is able to identify the material immediately (more information on Cyclamen can be found in Section Twelve, page 129).

10.12 To provide oversight of the UKBA, the Home Secretary appointed John Vine as the first independent UKBA Chief Inspector. Mr Vine, a former Chief Constable of Tayside Police, took up his post in July 2008. As Chief Inspector he is assessing the performance of the UKBA, including the operation of safeguards to protect personal data held on the e-Borders system.

10.13 Access to e-Borders information is restricted to authorised staff and only when necessary for legitimate border security and border control business. That access is controlled, monitored and audited through a combination of technical safeguards and operational procedures. All information highlighted by the e-Borders system must be analysed by trained and security cleared UKBA officers. Alerts are issued only following investigation by an analyst.

Personnel security

10.14 Personnel security seeks to minimise and manage the risk of staff exploiting legitimate access to an organisation's assets or premises for unauthorised, malicious purposes from theft to terrorism. Perpetrators of this kind of activity are referred to as 'insiders'.

10.15 CPNI provides personnel security advice across the national infrastructure on how to protect against hostile insider action, including terrorism. To raise awareness and improve personnel security standards, CPNI has produced and disseminated evidence-based guidance and advice to organisations in the national infrastructure on a wide range of issues including:

- pre-employment screening
- personnel security risk assessment, and
- ongoing personnel security.

10.16 In December 2007 the Government commissioned an independent review of personnel security across the transport sector, which was completed in July 2008. In the light of its findings, a summary of which has

been published¹⁶¹, the Government in partnership with the transport sector is taking action to strengthen personnel security. The DfT held a cross-sector conference with the transport industry in October 2008 to build commitment to the principle of personnel security and address the practicalities of raising the profile of personnel security.

UK interests overseas

10.17 The Government protects UK interests overseas, including British citizens who travel or live overseas. The FCO aims to reduce those individuals' vulnerability to terrorist attacks through the provision of accurate advice to travellers on the threat from terrorism, the physical protection of British diplomatic missions and personnel overseas, and advice to other British interests overseas. Assistance is provided to foreign governments to develop their own protective security capability.

10.18 FCO travel advice, informed by JTAC assessments, is the primary platform for raising awareness of the terrorist threat to British citizens travelling and living abroad. The FCO launched a new travel advice website¹⁶² in March 2008.

10.19 Developing capacity building projects for countries overseas is as vital in this workstream as it is for our *Pursue* and *Prevent* work. Assistance worth £4.7 million was approved in 2008 and focused on aviation and maritime security.

Protect: The current approach

Key principles

10.20 Following the incidents in London and Glasgow in June 2007, the Prime Minister asked Lord West, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Security and Counter Terrorism at the Home Office, to review further measures necessary to protect against terrorist attacks on crowded places, transport infrastructure and the critical national infrastructure and to consider how to protect the public from terrorist access to hazardous substances.

10.21 The outcome of these reviews has enabled the Government to develop a new *Protect* strategic framework based on reducing vulnerability in eight sectors: the critical national infrastructure; crowded places; transport; the UK Border; hazardous sites and substances; hostile insider action; individuals at risk of being targeted by terrorists; and UK interests overseas.

10.22 The Government's new approach is based on the following principles:

- **Risk and proportionality:** at a national and local level the Government will reduce vulnerabilities where the public face the greatest risks, minimising interference to the public and business community.
- **National and local partnerships:** the Government will foster a shared understanding of risk between a wide range of public and private stakeholders; involve regulated industries in the development and implementation of security planning; and continue to provide professional expertise on protective security.
- **The long-established presumption that the 'user pays':** costs of protecting the public will continue to be borne only by those parts of society that benefit from the service (eg gas consumers, airline travellers and football fans).

10.23 *Protect* objectives over this three-year period will include a reduction in the vulnerability of:

- critical national infrastructure
- crowded places
- aviation, rail and maritime transport
- border security.

A new objective will be to improve the security of hazardous substances which may be used by terrorists to conduct an attack.

Critical national infrastructure

10.24 Government Departments, supported by CPNI, will continue working closely with operators in all the sectors to improve security awareness and practices and to mitigate significant vulnerabilities. Key programmes include:

- Delivery of an extensive programme of security enhancements at critical energy sites working with operators such as National Grid.
- Security enhancements across the water sector to improve physical security at critical sites and prevent malicious access to the water network¹⁶³.
- A programme of security reviews and advice by CPNI to critical infrastructure in the finance, communications and emergency services sectors.
- Work to understand and mitigate vulnerabilities in systems controlling infrastructure processes.

Crowded places

10.25 The Government is taking forward the following priorities for protecting crowded places:

- The Government and NaCTSO have developed a new standard risk framework to enable national, regional and local partners to identify the highest risk crowded places around the UK. CTSA's are currently applying this new framework in conjunction with public and private sector partners. OSCT will shortly issue new guidance on 'Working together to protect crowded places'.
- To encourage architects and planners to take into account the risks of a terrorist attack when designing major new developments for crowded places, recommended by Patrick Mercer MP in his contribution to the review of the protective security of crowded places, the Government will consult on new planning guidance with advice on how to 'design in' improved protection against terrorist attack.

- The principle of 'user pays' is already applied to some crowded places: football stadia and nightclub owners are responsible for meeting security costs at their sites. The consultation on the guidance 'Working together to protect crowded places' will seek further views on how best to apply this principle more widely.

Transport systems and their users

10.26 The Government will continue to enhance the security of the transport sector in the UK:

- DfT is collaborating with industry and police stakeholders on a new regulatory framework for taking robust and accountable risk-based decisions at airports that will ensure effective security and joint working, particularly between industry and the police. Proposed legislation is being taken forward in the Policing and Crime Bill.
- Taking forward the recommendations of the independent review of personnel security (paragraph 10.16 above) DfT is considering a mandatory requirement for overseas criminal record checks for those posts which present the highest risks, notably those with specific security responsibilities which are already subject to a counter-terrorism check. DfT will enhance the personnel security elements of current training programmes and develop the capacity of industry partners to carry out risk assessments.
- Multi-agency port security authorities are being established to undertake joint agency threat and risk assessments at sea ports similar to those carried out at airports.

UK border security

10.27 The National Identity Scheme will make it more difficult for people to cross the UK border under a false identity by providing second-biometric passports and identity cards (see 'Identity cards and counter-terrorism', page 114).

10.28 UKBA will continue to extend the e-Borders programme to check international air, maritime and rail passengers and crew against watchlists in advance of travel. This means that people known to pose a threat or most likely to pose a risk can be stopped from travelling or from entering the country if required. The e-Borders will check over 95% of all passenger and crew movements (including UK and EEA citizens) by the end of 2010. The new e-Borders National Border Targeting Centre in Manchester will become fully operational by October 2009. Analysts from the police, SOCA and UKBA will share information and intelligence, and process alerts generated by checks against watchlists. This will allow the border security agencies to focus their resources on passengers who are suspected criminals or have broken immigration rules and allow the vast majority of passengers to cross the border more quickly.

10.29 UKBA is continuing to develop and embed counter-terrorism improvements in its visa operations and in the Border Force, by:

- ensuring all visa applicants and arrivals are checked against counter-terrorism watchlists
- robust procedures to identify and refer to police and security and intelligence agencies applicants or travellers who might present a terrorist threat
- rolling out the Cyclamen radiological screening programme at UK ports and airports (see Section Twelve, page 129), and
- counter-terrorism awareness training and information packages to all front-line staff delivered in cooperation with the security and intelligence agencies.

10.30 UKBA is also implementing a programme within in-country immigration, asylum and citizenship processes to:

- improve capability to detect and refer to the relevant authorities individuals who potentially pose a terrorist threat as they are encountered within UKBA processes, and

- enhance counter-terrorism awareness for all front-line staff.

10.31 The Green Paper, *From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing our Communities Together*¹⁶⁴, issued by the Home Office in July 2008 included proposals for enhancing policing at the border. A number of options were presented and comments on these and variations on them were submitted in response.

10.32 In light of comments received, the Home Office, in conjunction with ACPO and as a priority, will seek a significant enhancement of the existing collaborative arrangements between police forces, and between the police and the UKBA, and will agree a set of practical proposals for improvements. These proposals will build on the changes announced in April 2008 to develop closer working arrangements between the police and UKBA (see paragraph 10.11); the investment in technology through the e-Borders and biometric visas programmes; and the further development of counter-terrorism policing.

10.33 Other initiatives for strengthening police and immigration work at the borders include:

- Changes to the Common Travel Area (which includes the Republic of Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man) are planned with the introduction of risk-based intelligence-led immigration controls, using the e-Borders system, on routes between the UK and the Republic of Ireland.
- Developing a memorandum of understanding for deeper collaboration between ACPOS and the UKBA at ports and airports in Scotland, establishing principles for closer working and setting strategic direction for intelligence sharing and delivery of front-line operations.
- Developing plans with our closest EU neighbours in Northern Europe for our police to use their own counter-terrorism powers at the ports where there is most traffic to and from the UK.

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- New police powers to collect advance passenger data on some domestic air and sea journeys and international freight movements are currently planned and subject to consultation. Announcements on these powers will be made during the course of 2009.

Personnel security

10.34 The Government will progress work on personnel security by:

- producing further good practice guidance, informed by research and development led by CPNI in partnership with industry, on issues such as ongoing personnel security and security culture
- considering the applicability of the conclusions and recommendations in the independent review of personnel security across the transport sector to other sectors in the national infrastructure, and
- continued training and advice to national infrastructure organisations in order to raise awareness and improve personnel security standards.

Identity cards and counter-terrorism

Terrorists aim to operate in secret, concealing their intentions and their activities. They often need to disguise their real identity, for example when they are travelling. They therefore make regular use of false or stolen papers and passports.

It is a key part of our counter-terrorism work, and that of our international partners, to develop systems and procedures which make it harder for terrorists to acquire and use false papers and passports and to maintain false identities. This was one of the main recommendations made by the official US enquiry into the attack by Al Qa'ida on the US on 11 September 2001¹⁶⁵.

Biometric technology enables us to take a digital image of an individual's unique fingerprint or iris, to store that image in a passport, visa or other document, and then to 'read' or scan it when the document is presented as proof of identity. Biometrics can very significantly reduce the ability of terrorists to use false papers and identities.

We have already introduced biometrics into our visa system to ensure that the visa is used by the person to whom it was issued and that the biometrics for that person are not already held in criminal indices here, perhaps in conjunction with another name (paragraph 10.11 above).

The National Identity Scheme (NIS), plans which were published in March 2008, will extend the use of biometrics by creating an identity register and identity cards. It is not our intention that identity cards should be mandatory for UK nationals.

During 2009 a new statutory independent regulator, the National Identity Scheme Commissioner, will be appointed. The Commissioner will oversee the operation of the NIS and report annually on the

accuracy and security of the identity register and on the uses to which identity cards are put.

The NIS will store a person's biographic information and unique facial and fingerprint biometrics on a National Identity Register (NIR). This biographic and biometric information will also be stored in a chip on that person's identity card.

The first identity cards were issued in November 2008 to foreign nationals applying to extend their stay in the UK on student, marriage or spouse grounds. All new entrants to this country and those extending their stay will have a card within three years and it is estimated that by the end of 2014/15 about 90% of all foreign nationals living in this country will have an identity card.

“Of all the pre-employment screening checks, identity verification is the most fundamental.”

CPNI's Good Practice Guide on Pre-Employment Screening

available at www.cpni.gov.uk/Docs/Good_practice_guide_-_Pre-employment_screening_edn2.pdf

From 2009, initially for an 18-month evaluation period, the Identity and Passport Service will begin rolling out identity cards to critical workers in sensitive roles or locations, beginning with airport staff working airside. The independent review of transport personnel security (see paragraph 10.16) emphasised that identity is a key factor in personnel security regimes and concluded that identity cards are a useful addition to identity assurance.

Identity cards will provide employers equipped with biometric card readers with a flexible and reliable means of

verifying the identity of their staff. At airports, for instance, the identity card will provide airport operators with a single, consistent, robust and verifiable form of identity replacing the wide range of passports and other photo documentation with which airport operators are currently provided. The NIS will help ensure all those using airports are confident about their safety.

From 2010, identity cards will be issued on a voluntary basis to young people to assist them in proving their identity. From 2011/12, the Scheme will start to enrol people at high volumes, offering them a choice between an identity card, a passport or both. From 2012, passport renewals will require enrolling facial and fingerprint biometrics on the NIR.

Counter-terrorism investigators in EU member states which have identity cards regard them as an integral part of all counter-terrorism and criminal investigations. Identity cards and the data they hold authenticate an identity and enable investigations to progress more quickly.

Identity cards do not provide a single solution to terrorism and the Government is not proposing their introduction primarily for counter-terrorist related reasons. But they do provide a valuable tool for authenticating identity and for that reason support counter-terrorist investigations.

CBRNE hazardous sites and substances

10.35 This is a new objective, following a review in early 2008 of what more could be done to improve the security of legally held chemical, biological, radiological and explosive substances, and the facilities where they are stored. This work reflects our assessment in Part One of this strategy of the challenge posed by new technology coming into the hands of terrorists (see paragraphs 5.13 and 6.05).

10.36 Building upon these existing initiatives, OSCT together with CPNI, NaCTSO and BERR are delivering against an action plan for enhancing the safeguards for these substances. This includes taking forward work to reduce the accessibility of high-risk substances, awareness-raising measures for specific sectors (such as the academic community), and action to address identified gaps in our regulatory regime: more information on this work is included in Section Twelve.

Individuals at risk of being targeted by terrorists

10.37 The UK has long-established procedures for protecting high profile individuals at risk of being targeted by terrorists. Protective security measures can include armed personal protection officers, static armed policing, technical measures, and advice on best practice.

Priorities include:

- Staying ahead of any emerging threats and responding quickly and effectively to any changes.
- Delivering technical, protective security measures and advice which reflects best practice and the latest technological capabilities.

UK interests overseas including the public and business community

10.38 The Government will continue with *Protect*-related capability building projects overseas, including projects to build capabilities in aviation and maritime security, border security, crowded places and to protect against terrorists using

chemical, biological, radiological and explosive substances.

10.39 JTAC constantly reviews the threat of international terrorism so that Government can advise UK citizens travelling and living abroad. The Government will continue to help UK citizens understand threat levels and learn how to minimise risk.

***Protect*: future challenges**

- Part One of this strategy argued that technology will continue to facilitate terrorism, enabling terrorists to better plan operations and to use techniques which may have more lethal effects. The main challenge for our *Protect* strategy is to take account of these possible developments.
- This will require a sophisticated and well-informed risk-assessment capability to make the best-informed decisions about how to prioritise resources to protect the public. Our understanding of those risks will need to be shared with those responsible for sites and public safety. The Government will need to strike the balance between the familiar ‘need to know’ and the ever more important ‘requirement to share’.
- The Government will also need to improve its engagement with industry and wider stakeholders on future requirements for research and technology to ensure the protective security capabilities are developed which address the evolving threat (see Section Fourteen, page 147).
- The Government will continue to monitor and assess the risk of ‘cyber terrorism’ – an electronic attack by terrorists on our information and communications infrastructure. Currently that threat is not assessed to be great. But this may change.
- In a more challenging economic climate the Government will need to secure continued commitment from the private sector to invest in protective security measures; this will put a premium on

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ensuring that business operators, planners, architects and designers think in terms of 'designing out' vulnerabilities.

- The UK border will remain critical to our security. Enhancing technical systems to track incoming and outgoing movements; and upgrading our programme to identify radiological substances will both be very challenging in their own right. Enhancing collaborative arrangements at the border between police forces, and between the police and the UKBA, and delivering a coherent programme of counter-terrorism improvement across the whole of the diverse UKBA business, will all be vital.
- Striking and maintaining the right balance between effective border security and protecting personal data about passengers will remain a priority. Over the next 10 years a further challenge for Government will be to focus the resources of the border security agencies on the minority of passengers who pose a threat or are a potential risk to the public, and to enable the vast majority of passengers to complete their journeys with minimal disruption.

Summary

The *Prepare* workstream aims to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped. This includes work to manage an ongoing attack and to recover from its aftermath.

Since 2004 the Government has put in place capabilities to deal with a range of emergencies, of which terrorism is one. Organisations have been established (notably local and regional resilience networks) and capabilities improved. This resilience work has absorbed important lessons from the 2005 London bombings. These capabilities reflect the types of terrorism attack we judge to be most likely in this country. These are identified in a National Risk Assessment.

Capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack have been enhanced by the new Police Counter-Terrorism Network, by joint programmes between policing and the Armed Forces, and by exercises to ensure all these capabilities are effective.

Specific and dedicated capabilities have been put in place in the emergency services to manage the terrorist use of chemical, biological and radiological materials.

The objectives of the *Prepare* workstream will be to ensure:

- capabilities are in place to deal with a range of terrorist incidents
- there is continuity or swift recovery in our critical national infrastructure following terrorist incidents
- central, regional and local crisis management structures are appropriately equipped, competent and trained.

The Government will also conduct further planning to manage the consequences of the UK's highest impact terrorism threats as set out in the National Risk Assessment. These include the use of unconventional techniques (eg chemical, biological and radiological materials).

Many of the capabilities relevant for *Prepare* are also available to deal with the consequences of other threats and hazards. For example, the local government resilience network is configured to deal with the consequences of other local emergencies as well as the impact of an act of terrorism.

Departments and Agencies are currently considering the implications of the recent Mumbai attacks for our *Prepare* strategy.

Prepare: key achievements

11.01 The aim of the *Prepare* workstream is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped. This includes work to manage an ongoing attack and to recover from its aftermath. *Prepare* ensures that lives are saved, fewer injuries sustained, that the impact on the economy, property and the environment is minimised and normality restored as soon as possible.

11.02 The Home Office is the lead department, and the Home Secretary the lead UK Minister, for ensuring that this country is well prepared in the event of a terrorist attack, or other terrorist-related crisis. The Home Office also has specific responsibility for ensuring that capabilities are in place to deal with a chemical, biological or radiological incident. The police service has a dual role as emergency responder dealing with the incident and its consequences and as a law enforcement agency dealing with the criminal investigation. Other emergency services and the military may be required in a supporting role.

11.03 The resilience component of the *Prepare* workstream is one part of the much larger national Resilience Programme which includes planning for natural hazards and major accidents. The Resilience Programme is led by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), created within the Cabinet Office in response to lessons learned from the major emergencies of 2000 (serious flooding and the Fuel Crisis) and 2001 (the Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak).

11.04 Our earlier CONTEST Strategy work had five *Prepare* objectives:

- Identification of the potential risks the UK faces from terrorist threats, through a National Risk Assessment (NRA).

- Assessment of the potential consequences of an attack, set out in National Resilience Planning Assumptions.
- Development of a Resilience Capabilities Programme to provide the basis for specific contingency planning to deal with the terrorist threats which pose the highest risk to the UK.
- Enhancing business continuity management in essential services to ensure continuity or recovery as quickly as possible following a terrorist attack.
- Developing crisis management capabilities to ensure those with leadership roles in an emergency, including in the emergency services and local authorities, have the skills and expertise to respond effectively.

11.05 The work to build national resilience and implement the *Prepare* strategy has delivered a number of significant achievements:

- The NRA assesses both the impact and likelihood of a range of possible terrorist attacks against the UK. This data has been compiled in association with JTAC and the Security Service.
- Since 2004, a cross-Government programme based on the NRA has put in place more effective nationwide capabilities to respond to a range of foreseeable emergencies, including terrorist attacks.
- The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act and its associated non-legislative measures provided the basis for our response to all emergencies, notably new multi-agency partnerships at local and regional levels (Local Resilience Forums and Regional Resilience Forums respectively). The Act set out the duty of the responders in

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these partnerships to assess risks in their areas and to prepare, test and exercise plans to deal with those risks.

- Professional competence has been developed through National Occupational Standards for those in the emergency planning profession, the British Standard for Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery¹⁶⁶ and Central Government Emergency Response Training for individuals with roles in crisis management at the national strategic level¹⁶⁷.
- Progress has been made in providing capabilities for responding to a chemical, biological or radiological attack. This is set out in Section Twelve of this strategy (see paragraph 12.22).

Responding to a terrorist attack

11.06 The Home Office works with the Cabinet Office in convening and running the COBR to provide strategic direction of the Government response to ongoing terrorist incidents. The national Police Counter-Terrorism Network (see paragraph 8.10) has become the basis for the policing response to terrorist attacks.

11.07 ACPO's Terrorism and Allied Matters Business Area (TAM) has nominated a *Prepare* National Coordinator to support the police service in developing the counter-terrorism policing capability to provide a comprehensive and coordinated policing response which manages the consequences of a terrorist attack alongside an effective investigative response.

11.08 Where intelligence indicates that a terrorist attack is imminent the Government possesses the capability to intervene by air, sea or land to disrupt it. The MOD has developed niche capabilities which can be deployed in support of the police if required, including specialist counter-terrorism capabilities in the land, maritime and air environments. Procedures for using military resources in support of police counter-terrorism operations have been developed and rehearsed.

11.09 The Government works with the police, the security and intelligence agencies and the Armed Forces to devise, maintain and regularly exercise those capabilities and responses which would be used in the event of an imminent terrorist incident. The National Counter-Terrorism Exercise Programme improves the abilities of the police service and other key stakeholders to prepare for, respond to, and manage terrorist investigations and incidents. Overseen by a Programme Board chaired by OSCT and comprising key stakeholders, the programme delivers three national-level live-play exercises annually. An ACPO-led Lessons Development Group monitors the implementation of lessons and issues arising from the exercises.

11.10 Foreign partners are invited to observe and take part in counter-terrorism exercises where the simulated incident affects the UK and other countries, for example an attack on shipping in the Channel or in the Channel Tunnel. The FCO, as part of its capacity building programme, provides support to key international partners aimed at minimising the impact of any terrorist incident in their country likely also to affect British nationals overseas and the UK.

Managing the consequences of a terrorist attack: Lessons learned from 7 July 2005

11.11 Preparedness work has absorbed lessons from the London bombings, including providing better support to the bereaved and survivors, timely information to the public and more resilient telecommunications capabilities between responders.

11.12 Drawing on lessons identified in the response to the bombings, in September 2005, the Cabinet Office issued updated guidance to all emergency responders, 'Emergency Response and Recovery'¹⁶⁸, on the management of emergencies. It included guidance on setting up and publicising family assistance centres and on the role of Family Liaison Officers.

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11.13 In 2007 the Department of Health produced guidance on planning for mass casualty incidents¹⁶⁹ which emphasised that hospitals, in association with the police, should establish mechanisms for getting information out quickly to those affected by any emergency.

11.14 Police casualty bureau arrangements have undergone a thorough review since July 2005 and new procedures, systems and training have been put in place. The new 'National Mutual Aid Telephony System' and mutual aid telephony protocols between police forces will enable a future casualty bureau to handle more calls than was the case on 7 July.

11.15 New plans have been put in place for incidents that result in mass fatalities; other initiatives have enhanced resilience in responders' telecommunications systems. London Underground has introduced a £2 billion resilient digital radio system across the whole of its network. Known as 'Connect' it serves both London Underground and BTP staff, enables communication between above and below ground, and is interoperable with the emergency services 'Airwave' digital radio system.

11.16 In an emergency, the rapid distribution of clear and accurate information to the public is essential. Clear information relieves public anxiety, helps the public to take steps to protect themselves from danger and inconvenience, assists responders, and supports the subsequent criminal investigation. Communications strategies have been developed to better ensure the right information can reach the right people at the right time.

Prepare: The current approach

Key principles

11.17 The four objectives of the current *Prepare* strategy are to ensure that:

- capabilities are in place to enable emergency services to respond effectively to most kinds of terrorist attack, both during and after any incident

- the UK critical national infrastructure continues to deliver essential services following a terrorist incident; or, where services are disrupted, recovers as quickly as possible
- central, regional and local crisis management structures are appropriately equipped, competent and trained, and
- plans are developed and capabilities improved to respond to a terrorist incident and to deal with the consequences of the UK's highest impact terrorism threats as set out in the NRA.

11.18 The *Prepare* workstream will continue to be based on the annual NRA, setting out the highest risks to the UK over the next five years, and on the National Resilience Planning Assumptions which set out the potential consequences of the full range of risks and the planning required to deal with them. Improved capability to respond to the highest impact threats identified in NRA will increase the capability to respond to lower order risks, most of which pose similar challenges on a lesser scale.

11.19 The *Prepare* objectives and the NRA reflect the greater emerging threats posed by terrorism as set out in Section Five and Six of this strategy (on the strategic factors affecting terrorism and the planning assumptions we are making for the next three years). Some of these threats go beyond current counter-terrorism capabilities and our *Prepare* planning will be adapted accordingly.

11.20 The roles and responsibilities for *Prepare* are unchanged. In the Home Office, OSCT is responsible for oversight of the management of an ongoing terrorist incident in close coordination with the Cabinet Office, through the COBR mechanism. OSCT is also responsible for continued development of capabilities to respond to a CBRN incident and for working with the police to test and maintain their overall preparedness for a terrorist incident. And OSCT is tasked to collaborate with the MOD to ensure that military assets are available in the event of a terrorist incident. The dual role

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of the police as emergency responder and lead investigator continues. The military will continue to provide supporting capabilities when required. Overseas the FCO provides consular assistance to British nationals affected by terrorism and coordinates capacity building.

11.21 CCS continues to coordinate overall delivery of work by the Government and other stakeholders on resilience planning.

11.22 There are two measures of success for our *Prepare* work:

- Capabilities for Major Emergencies: the Government will continue to ensure that by 2010/11 all or most of the capabilities will be in place to enable responders across the country to effectively handle major emergencies.
- Capabilities for Catastrophic Emergencies: the Government will continue to build the capabilities to respond to catastrophic risks, defined as those with the very highest impact in terms of loss of life and disruption to the social fabric and the economy.

Prepare programmes

Build capabilities

11.23 The CCS will lead work to:

- improve the capability of emergency responders to deal with casualties and fatalities arising from most kinds of terrorist attacks; ensure that every local area has in place a multi-agency plan for the recovery phase of emergencies; and expand capacity for evacuation and shelter, including improved arrangements for mutual aid and humanitarian assistance at local and regional level
- complete the full roll-out over the next two years of the CBRN preparedness programme to equip 18 centres nationwide with staff and facilities to improve multi-agency response to a CBRN attack (see paragraph 12.22)
- continue building the resilience of emergency responders' telecommunications systems through

updated privileged access schemes for mobile and fixed telecommunications systems, and a national resilience extranet providing a web-based planning and crisis management tool for responders, and

- develop the concept of community resilience, as described in the National Security Strategy¹⁷⁰, enabling communities to enhance their own safety by putting in place their own emergency plans for all kinds of risks, including natural hazards and terrorist incidents – for their village, ward or estate. Local groups and networks can identify people who may be vulnerable; local places of safety; transport and equipment; and those with first aid training.

11.24 OSCT will lead work to:

- review the National Counter-Terrorism Exercise Programme to ensure that it fully reflects requirements to disrupt an imminent terrorist attack by air, land or sea, and
- ensure that counter-terrorism capabilities and the procedures for their use are developed coherently with existing procedures for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities¹⁷¹.

11.25 The police have a key role in preparing for the immediate and sustained response to an ongoing attack, and also in managing the return to normality including any subsequent investigation.

Implications of the Mumbai attacks

On 26 November 2008 10 terrorists working in pairs struck at the heart of India's financial capital and largest city with automatic weapons, grenades and IEDs. Using a novel mixture of tactics combining 'hit and run' attacks with 'seize and hold' hostage taking, they attacked various locations in the city simultaneously including two hotels, a railway station, a hospital and a café. The attacks were carefully planned and the terrorists well trained and equipped. When their three-day assault was ended at least 160 people had been killed and over 300 injured.

Agencies and Departments have begun to look at the implications of Mumbai for the protection of people and critical infrastructure and for our response capability.

Following the Mumbai attacks NaCTSO accelerated the roll-out of its protective security guidance for hotels and restaurants¹⁷². Project ARGUS training exercises have been developed by NaCTSO for night-time economy businesses, airport and railway terminals and one will be developed for the hotel sector. ARGUS uses a simulated terrorist attack to prompt discussion to identify the measures service providers can take to prevent, handle and recover from a terrorist attack.

The initial response to any terrorist incident will be managed by the police service but there are tried and tested arrangements for providing military support to the police in a range of areas where it might be required. Bomb disposal teams and advanced search and survey teams are used to support police forces regularly throughout the year. Other specialist capabilities, including Special Forces, are held at high readiness and regularly exercise their response to potential threats and incidents.

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11.26 ACPO will lead work to:

- develop police capacity and capability to respond to the scale of the evolving threat
- improve interoperability between police and other emergency responders
- broaden police counter-terrorism training and exercises to identify lessons learned and improve organisational learning and development, and
- embed police work in wider UK planning and resilience programmes.

11.27 FCO will lead work to ensure British nationals caught up in terrorist incidents overseas receive effective consular assistance, and provide support to increase the capacity of priority countries to manage the consequences of terrorist incidents.

Improve CNI preparedness

11.28 The CCS, together with CPNI, will support and encourage CNI sectors to adopt effective business continuity management planning which also addresses a wider range of threats and hazards, and to ensure resilient telecommunications, particularly at critical energy sites.

Maintain crisis management structures

11.29 The CCS will:

- undertake, in 2009, a Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme to assess the impact of its provisions; draw from experience over the past three years; define and provide a set of minimum standards and performance targets for the higher-performing organisations; and to raise standards of resilience activities over three years. Commitment to this review was given in the National Security Strategy¹⁷³
- improve central, regional and local crisis response structures, upgrading national facilities in COBR and alternative government crisis management headquarters,

implementing recommendations of recent crisis incident reviews for regional tiers of crisis management and completing the roll-out of a standardised peer review system for local resilience forums

- build better logistics support capabilities at local, regional and national levels, addressing a gap identified last summer and the subject of recommendation made by Sir Michael Pitt in his independent review¹⁷⁴ of the flooding emergency that took place in June and July 2007. These capabilities apply to the full range of emergencies, including terrorist emergencies, that can disrupt critical public services, and
- develop a new high integrity telecommunications system providing communications between all levels of local, regional and national crisis coordination structures, which will be piloted in 2009.

Improve capabilities to deal with highest impact threats

11.30 The CCS, OSCT and others will:

- build capacity over and above that needed for most terrorist incidents to improve the response to catastrophic emergencies: those threats – mainly CBRN-related – may present challenges beyond those posed by current terrorist capabilities. Our *Prepare* planning will be adapted accordingly, and
- work with international partners to agree arrangements for sharing capabilities in the event of a terrorist incident.

Prepare: future challenges

- Changing terrorist tactics and access by terrorists to new technologies pose as great a challenge to our *Prepare* work as they do for *Protect*. But the challenges are different. For *Protect* the challenge is to evolve our protective security and to harden potential terrorist targets; for *Prepare* the challenge is to develop contingency

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plans in the events that a terrorist incident occurs which may make use of new technologies and techniques.

- Specific contingency planning will need to address the threat from CBRN, using improved capacity to model and predict potential impacts.
- As in other CONTEST workstreams, success here will depend on the sharing of information with a wide range of stakeholders including Local and Regional Resilience Forums, the Wales Resilience Forum, Strategic Coordinating Groups in Scotland, the public sector resilience community; with the broader community of partners in the private and voluntary sectors; with small and medium-sized enterprises whose resilience is valuable to communities, and with the public, building on the National Risk Register¹⁷⁵.
- Learning from counter-terrorism exercises, from real life operations, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary inspection reports and other sources needs to be integrated to improve the operational response of the police and other agencies to terrorist incidents and to inform wider policy and programme development. OSCT and ACPO (TAM) have already begun to address this with proposals to develop a more systematic approach to organisational learning.

Summary

Contemporary terrorist organisations aspire to use chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons. Changing technology and the theft and smuggling of CBRNE materials make this aspiration more realistic than it may have been in the recent past.

Terrorists have also developed new types of explosives and new ways of using them. Technology has developed in conflict areas overseas and is rapidly shared by terrorist organisations around the world.

Within CONTEST a multi-agency strategy has been developed to respond to these threats. The UK cooperates closely in these areas with the US and with other allies.

Our strategy is built around programmes under each of the four main CONTEST workstreams. The intelligence services have a major role to play in *Pursue* aspects of CBRNE work. We will need to reflect the CBRNE threat in the *Prevent*-related work we do to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and, specifically, the legitimacy it claims for mass murder; major *Protect*-related programmes include the provision of radiological detection systems at ports of entry to the UK, safeguarding CBRNE materials and ensuring the security of the civil nuclear sector. Preparing for a CBRNE attack has been a key feature of our broader preparedness work.

These programmes will continue, informed by a comprehensive review of cross-Government CBRNE activity due for completion in early 2009 and by an extensive programme of scientific research.

CBRNE: key achievements and current approach

12.01 This section considers the specific challenge of terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and of explosives (E). This threat is addressed in part through the main CONTEST workstreams. But the scale and complexity of the threat means that the Government has brought its response together in one CBRNE cross-cutting workstream and strategy, led by OSCT. This ensures that separate initiatives under *Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare* are coherent, coordinated and together address the threat.

12.02 A wide range of stakeholders are involved in forming and delivering policy in this area, including: Government Departments and agencies; Devolved Administrations; emergency services; local emergency planners; utilities and the private sector. This workstream also connects with other Government policies including, for example, work on counter-proliferation led by FCO and supported by MOD and Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), which leads on nuclear safety elements.

The CBRN threat

12.03 Al Qa'ida is not the only terrorist organisation which has tried to develop CBRN weapons. Between 1993 and 1995, the Japanese cult organisation Aum Shinrikyo tried to manufacture nerve agents, including sarin and VX, and biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin. In 1995 Aum members released sarin on the Tokyo metro killing 12 people. Shortly after Aum also tried to release cyanide gas in a key Tokyo station.

12.04 But Al Qa'ida is the first transnational organisation to support the use of CBRN weapons against civilian targets and to try to acquire them. That interest reflects their broader wish to cause mass casualties, often using suicide attacks. In an interview with Al Jazeera in 1998, Usama bin Laden, when asked if it was true that he was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, said "...there is a duty on Muslims to acquire them, and America knows today that Muslims are in possession of such a weapon, by the grace of God Almighty"¹⁷⁶.

12.05 Al Qa'ida established facilities in Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban to research chemical, biological and radiological weapons and training in the use of contact poisons was provided to large numbers of Al Qa'ida members. In 2001 Al Qa'ida held talks with two disaffected Pakistani nuclear scientists about acquiring or developing radiological weapons¹⁷⁷. By 2003 Al Qa'ida had developed a device to produce hydrogen cyanide gas, intended for use in crowded urban spaces¹⁷⁸. In 2004 Al Qa'ida associated cells in the UK considered the use of radiological devices¹⁷⁹ and in 2006 the leader of Al Qa'ida in Iraq appealed for nuclear scientists to join his group and to attack US bases in Iraq using non-conventional weapons¹⁸⁰. In 2007 Al Qa'ida in Iraq deployed a number of explosive devices utilising chlorine gas cylinders¹⁸¹.

12.06 The evolution of the Al Qa'ida's CBRN weapons capability, and of intelligence about it, was described in some detail in the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction conducted by a committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by Lord Butler, in July 2004. That review quoted extensively from Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) conclusions about these programmes and noted that many JIC judgements

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were confirmed by discoveries made in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban¹⁸².

12.07 Three other factors have increased the risk that terrorists may acquire CBRN weapons:

- There has been a significant increase in the trafficking of material which can be used in radiological weapons as well as potentially in nuclear weapons. This is a relatively recent phenomenon directly related to the end of the Soviet Union. Since 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recorded over 1,300 incidents of smuggling, theft, loss, illegal disposal and possession, and sales or attempted sales of nuclear or radioactive materials¹⁸³.
- The internet has made information widely available on the technology of CBRN devices and the materials which might be used to develop them.
- CBRN materials can be used for legitimate purposes, notably in nuclear energy, medical science and biotechnology, and the production and use of these materials significantly increases the risk that they may be used by terrorist organisations.

12.08 There remains the further risk that the deliberate or unwitting release of information from state programmes reaches terrorists and terrorist groups. The activities of the AQ Khan proliferation network highlighted the damage that compromise of this kind can cause (although there is no evidence that AQ Khan talked directly to any terrorist organisation¹⁸⁴).

The changing threat from explosives

12.09 Alongside the potential threat from CBRN, there have been significant developments in the more traditional threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas from IEDs – in particular, the use of novel home-made explosives and the detonation of devices by suicide bombers.

12.10 Section Five of this strategy noted that the technology of IEDs has evolved rapidly in a series of conflicts over the last 15 years. Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and groups inspired by Al Qa'ida have demonstrated intent to experiment with novel explosives to maximise their capability and, in some cases, to deliberately circumvent protective security measures. The Government needs to constantly update and improve understanding of and ability to detect explosive compounds of all kinds. Section Five of this strategy also outlined the development of the suicide attacks. These have also led to new defensive security requirements and counter measures.

Pursue

12.11 The security and intelligence agencies have a key role to play in this area. Intelligence (supported by forensic techniques) provides an early indication that a terrorist organisation is developing or deploying a new CBRNE capability; that CBRNE-related material or designs are being traded and sold; or that the security of a national chemical, biological or nuclear programme has been compromised.

12.12 Intelligence not only enables the disruption of a specific threat but also informs and improves the effect of the interventions made under the *Protect* and *Prepare* workstreams.

Prevent

12.13 The ideology of Al Qa'ida (and organisations associated with it) has sought to justify the use of weapons which can cause very large numbers of civilian casualties. As part of our CBRNE work and in conjunction with other *Prevent* initiatives, we need to be able to challenge that justification. This is not something which Government can do on its own; as for all of our *Prevent* work the key role will be played by communities and, in this case, also by scholars of Islam who are best able to demonstrate the flaws in Al Qa'ida's argumentation.

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Protect

12.14 Our aim here is to deny terrorist access to CBRNE materials, whether produced and stored in the UK legally or imported (legally or illegally), and to screen for CBRNE materials entering protected areas, for example at airports. Work with European and other partners is particularly important. Tighter controls on the movement of CBRNE materials in Europe and beyond reduce their availability to terrorists, directly increasing UK security. European standards are being developed for explosives screening in commercial aviation, building on the measures initiated by the UK and put in place for liquids in August 2006, which seek both to improve explosive detection capability and to reduce disruption and inconvenience to the travelling public.

12.15 The MOD has developed many and varied tactics and techniques for assuring the safety of personnel in operational theatres, particularly from explosive devices. We are working to ensure those lessons and experiences are reflected in domestic counter-terrorism work.

12.16 The multilateral Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP)¹⁸⁵ plays an important role in denying terrorists access to CBRN materials. The aim of the GTRP is to improve the security of fissile materials held around the world; reduce the number of sites containing nuclear and radiological material; contribute to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks; and provide sustainable employment for former weapon scientists whose expertise could otherwise be acquired by terrorist organisations. It is the UK's largest cooperative counter-proliferation assistance programme, and is coordinated with other key donors, notably the US.

12.17 The UK is a leading participant in international multilateral regimes and instruments designed to combat not only the illicit transfer of CBRN material, but also their means of delivery; these include the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,

the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

12.18 The Cyclamen Programme was established in 2002 as a joint programme between the Home Office and the former HM Customs & Excise to deter or detect the illicit importation of radiological materials into the UK that could be used for terrorist purposes. Cyclamen involves the development and roll-out of a suite of radiological detection systems at ports of entry to the UK, now operated by UKBA. An initial set of fixed detection portals was installed in 2004, ahead of time and under budget.

12.19 Substances with legitimate industrial or domestic uses can be exploited by terrorist groups for the purposes of creating a CBRN or improvised explosive device. Much work has already been undertaken to minimise the opportunities to do so. NaCTSO and the CPNI liaise with industry to provide specialist advice on the security of hazardous substances and the sites which handle them. The 'Know Your Customer' campaigns raise awareness about the 'dual-use' nature of certain products and encourage suppliers to be more enquiring of new customers and to report suspicious enquiries to the police. Through its network of CTAs, NaCTSO has delivered bespoke security advice to almost 2,000 sites storing hazardous material.

12.20 The Government is delivering an action plan for enhancing the safeguards in respect of CBRNE materials. This includes work to reduce accessibility to hazardous substances posing the highest risk, based on their threat, vulnerability and impact across their life-cycle (from their precursors through to their disposal). The Government is working with its international partners to improve the security of hazardous substances and potential radioactive sources and to ensure that the UK's measures are not taken in isolation. Awareness-raising measures for specific sectors, such as the academic community, are beginning and action is being taken to address identified gaps in the regulatory regime.

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12.21 OSCT is working with DECC, the Office of Civil Nuclear Security and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary to ensure that the security of the UK's civil nuclear sector is sufficiently robust to mitigate the threat from a terrorist attack¹⁸⁶.

Prepare

12.22 To address the CBRN threat, OSCT leads the cross-cutting CBRN Resilience Programme (part of the Cabinet Office's Capability Programme) which seeks to build and improve the UK's ability to respond to and recover from a terrorist attack using CBRN devices. It does this through the delivery of a model response at major cities and transport hubs. Achievements of the CBRN programme since 2001 include:

- An agreed multi-agency national response to CBRN terrorist incident.
- Training and equipping of over 7,000 police officers to deal with CBRN incidents.
- Development of facilities within the Fire and Rescue Service for managing mass public decontamination and training for disaster victim identification teams to work with contaminated fatalities.
- Creating specialist teams within the Ambulance Service to work in hazardous areas and improve survival rates of victims.
- Establishing a National Network of Laboratories to improve the early identification of a possible chemical or biological incident.
- Establishing the Government Decontamination Service¹⁸⁷ to provide expertise and guidance to authorities regarding contaminated buildings and areas.

12.23 The Police National CBRN Operational Response Programme was established in 2006 to: develop and broker a standard national police doctrine for tackling CBRN events; set up a national Operations Centre to provide a single source of advice for police forces on CBRN matters; coordinate any major

incident response; develop and procure new equipment designed to increase the speed of the response and free up officers for the most critical tasks; and to increase the numbers of CBRN trained officers (with a target of having over 10,000 by 2010).

CBRNE Science and Research

12.24 In Government a dedicated CBRN Science and Technology Programme prioritises, targets and coordinates CBRN research to address key requirements which will strengthen our response. Successes to date include the production of guidance on residual levels of contamination for the purposes of public health advice and decontamination; the evaluation of detection equipment; advice on medical treatment; and development of novel detection technologies. The Government is working closely with industry to improve our exploitation of the outcomes of research.

12.25 There is a substantial cross-Government programme of explosives research coordinated and meeting strategic requirements determined by the CONTEST Explosive Research Working Group.

12.26 The Government is also working closely on research with our international partners, of whom the most important is the US. The UK plays an active role in building the capacity of partners overseas under initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. UK experts attend international workshops and seminars, sharing information and expertise with partners to help raise awareness of CBRN terrorism and mitigate the risks to such an attack being developed or taking place overseas.

CBRN review

12.27 In 2008 Ministers commissioned a review of CBRN-related activity across government. The review, the report of which is classified, considered our state of preparedness to deal with the consequences of a CBRN attack.

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- Some of the key challenges regarding CBRN have been noted above under *Protect* and *Prepare*. We need to be able to understand how this threat is evolving to better ensure that we can, wherever possible, build in protection against it. We need to work closely with industry to develop protective measures and to ensure full exploitation of each new area of research. We need to model and predict the impact of possible attacks and better plan for their consequences. Our classified strategic review will identify specific areas for further action.
- Based on the classified review OSCT will produce a new single cross-Government and cross-CONTEST CBRN strategy, setting a common direction and goals for all partner Departments and agencies.
- The challenges here are compounded by uncertainties about the pace of technological developments which might help terrorism; and the extent to which hitherto specialised information and knowledge might be spread via the internet or other means.



UK/EU Passports

Including Switzerland and the European Economic Area

UK Border





ea

Use of mobile phones is allowed while queuing but not at desks

UK Border

UK/EU Passports Including Switzerland and the European Economic Area

Some busy current and high arrivals

currently by schedule facility

Summary

CONTEST is overseen at Ministerial level by the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), chaired by the Prime Minister, and by the Home Secretary as the lead Minister for counter-terrorism, and involving, as required, the heads of the security and intelligence agencies, the police, and Armed Forces.

Some aspects of CONTEST are also dealt with by subcommittees of NSID. NSID may also receive external advice on counter-terrorism, as on other national security issues, from the National Security Forum, an independent body of outside advisors with expertise on many aspects of national security.

Delivery of the CONTEST Strategy requires close cooperation between a wide range of organisations and stakeholders: local authorities, Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, the police, security and intelligence agencies, emergency services and the Armed Forces and international partners and multilateral organisations. CONTEST also depends on the expertise and knowledge held by communities and citizens, industry and the third sector.

For the first time, counter-terrorism work has a Public Service Agreement (PSA) intended to set targets and monitor progress. The aim of this PSA is the same as CONTEST: to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism. The PSA is based around nine intended outcomes across the four main CONTEST workstreams.

Delivery of CONTEST and the PSA in particular is overseen by the CONTEST Board, chaired by Director-General OSCT in his capacity as CONTEST Senior Responsible Owner (SRO). Representatives from key Departments and agencies attend the Board; governance arrangements are maintained by the CONTEST Portfolio Office.

Each workstream of CONTEST has a detailed delivery plan, identifying responsibility for each programme, projected timescales, benefits and costs.

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The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review announced increased resources for counter-terrorism and intelligence. Security spending is planned to reach £3.5 billion by 2011. This includes, among other increases, an additional £240 million in funding for counter-terrorist policing, and over £100 million to improve our ability to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists.

The 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be a celebration of sport and culture for London and the UK. The Government is responsible for ensuring that the Games are safe and secure against all types of risk including terrorism. Since December 2008, the Olympic Security Directorate in OSCT has been leading work on a multi-agency security strategy for the 2012 Games. OSCT reports to the Home Secretary and to NSID.

The West Midlands: delivering CONTEST

Arrangements for the delivery of CONTEST in the West Midlands are representative of the steps we have taken across the country.

CONTEST in the West Midlands is coordinated by a regional CONTEST Board chaired by the Government Office for the West Midlands (GOWM) and attended by: Home Office representatives, West Midlands Police, Regional Offender Managers, UKBA, Youth Justice Board, Public Health, representatives for Children & Young People and the Regional Resilience Forum.

Pursue

With the recent expansion of the Police Counter-Terrorism Network, some 400 dedicated police officers are now working in the West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit (WM CTU). This has enabled more resources to be devoted to more effective counter-terrorism operations. The CTU works in close association with the police Senior National Coordinator Counter-Terrorism, with the security and intelligence agencies and with JTAC.

In line with national practice the CTU provides background material on the regional threat (including material relating to radicalisation) for local authorities.

Prevent

Regional understanding of *Prevent* has increased significantly since CLG launched the Pathfinder Fund in Spring 2007 and the revised *Prevent* strategy was developed by OSCT in 2008¹⁸⁸. GOWM is taking a leadership role in delivering *Prevent* across the region, recruiting dedicated staff and hosting *Prevent* Peer Support Network meetings to help effective communications and information sharing. GOWM takes the national *Prevent* strategy and

programmes as the starting point for its work and then aims to develop local projects within that framework.

The West Midlands has rolled out the Channel Project in Birmingham and Coventry, run in a partnership between the WM CTU, local authorities, statutory and community partners. Building on the *Prevent* action plans and existing multi-agency relationships, Channel will provide a focus for public sector professionals and members of the community to refer individuals of concern to a multi-agency risk assessment and case management system bringing to bear a variety of resources and expertise to counter radicalisation.

GOWM and ACPO are also coordinating projects under the 2008 *Prevent* strategy, notably:

- The successful Black Country Imams project developed by Dudley Council (one of the CLG-funded Pathfinder projects) to build the capacity and skills of Imams through the provision of a range of training.
- The DCSF Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) toolkit for schools and the 'Watch Over Me: Living Together' DVD and lesson plan which will be delivered by the GOWM, local education authorities and the WM CTU.
- The work of Youth Offending Teams (YOT) in Coventry, Sandwell and Birmingham. Each has developed proposals aimed at young offenders or those at risk of offending. Coventry for example will be including an interactive counter-terrorism exercise in YOT group sessions and will run a theatre project in schools and colleges in the area.

An additional 23 *Prevent* police officers are now in place in the West Midlands as a result of £1.25 million funding. These Security and Partnerships Officers (SPOs) are overt, uniformed counter-terrorism officers based in the community, one in each of the 21 Operational Command Units, who will be directly involved in making, and facilitating from the community, referrals to *Prevent* programmes.

A UKBA West Midlands pilot project has been implemented to embed counter-terrorism in the work of UKBA in-country casework teams, with a view to identifying and referring to relevant authorities cases of interest from *Prevent* and *Pursue* perspectives. The UKBA regional office is working closely with the CTU.

Protect

The West Midlands now has more specialist security officers delivering new *Protect* programmes such as crowded places, better transport security and border controls. Twelve Project ARGUS Exercises (see Section Ten, Crowded places, page 107) have been delivered to 356 Birmingham retail businesses and crowded places security advice to 26 high risk sites (including, for example, the Bull Ring Shopping Centre).

Prepare

The West Midlands is now better prepared for a terrorist attack. Local resilience forums have coordinated with GOWM to identify vulnerable critical infrastructure sites, address issues identified in the National Capabilities Survey and develop stronger local partnerships, including with business.

Performance management

13.01 OSCT is responsible for measuring the effectiveness and impact of CONTEST. Alongside the work to revise CONTEST, significant changes have been made to the overall performance management arrangements for the UK's counter-terrorism effort.

13.02 For the first time, the UK counter-terrorism effort has a Public Service Agreement (PSA)¹⁸⁹. The aim of PSA 26 is the same as that of CONTEST – to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism.

13.03 The PSA indicators are further reflected in the Departmental Strategic Objectives of key participating agencies and Departments. They are also reflected in the police performance management framework, the Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS), and, for the first time, in the National Indicator Set for local authorities (see Section Fourteen on policing and on local delivery).

Governance

13.04 Delivery is overseen by the CONTEST Board, chaired by Director-General OSCT in his capacity as Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for CONTEST. Stakeholders from key Departments, agencies and the Scottish and Welsh Devolved Administrations are represented on the Board at Director-General level and governance arrangements for CONTEST as a whole are maintained by the CONTEST Portfolio Office, reporting to the SRO. Each of the four workstreams in CONTEST has a subsidiary-SRO who chairs the respective sub-Boards for *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect* and *Prepare*.

13.05 Each workstream of CONTEST has a detailed delivery plan, identifying responsibility for each programme, projected timescales, benefits and costs. For security reasons these are not published in this document.

13.06 The governance arrangements for CONTEST also include specialist groups overseeing a range of 'cross-cutting' issues, such as the Police Counter-Terrorism Board, the Overseas CONTEST Group (OCG) and the CONTEST-NOMS Board. These boards, reporting directly to either the CONTEST Board or the relevant sub-Board, help to:

- coordinate work that affects more than one workstream or is of relevance to the strategy as a whole, or
- facilitate delivery of a discrete, time-bound cross-cutting task (eg Identity Management Board).

13.07 Tactical coordination of CONTEST is facilitated by a Weekly Security Meeting (WSM) to discuss the current threat and our response to it. This is chaired by the Home Secretary with senior representatives from the intelligence and security and intelligence agencies, the police, key Whitehall Departments and the Cabinet Office. Departmental roles and responsibilities are set out in Annex B.

Resources

13.08 The single security and intelligence budget, which includes government spending on counter-terrorism and intelligence, was announced as part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review. It is forecast to rise from £2.5 billion in 2008/09 to £3.5 billion in 2010/11.

Working locally

14.01 In key areas, CONTEST is dependent on local delivery for success. Local delivery requires a range of partners from across a range of sectors, some new to counter-terrorism. Police authorities, local authorities, courts, offender management services, primary care trusts and NHS Boards, fire services and many others have a role to play, together with non-governmental organisations.

14.02 Local delivery structures are most mature in the *Prepare* workstream. Regional Resilience and Local Resilience Forums (RRF and LRF) have been instrumental in the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (which deals with resilience to both natural hazards like flooding as well as terrorist attacks) and have taken responsibility for disaster response planning in their respective localities. They include representation from the Government Offices (GOs), police, fire and health services, local authorities and utility companies. Equivalent arrangements are in place in the Devolved Administrations. These various forums have helped drive improvements in dealing with the impact of CBRN attacks.

14.03 Our revised *Prevent* strategy puts local delivery at its heart: the national strategy sets a framework, overall objectives and standards but we recognise that the way in which the objectives are met and the type of programmes that are required must reflect specific local circumstances.

14.04 GOs and Devolved Administrations are more closely involved, with the local authorities and policing, leading local partnerships to implement the strategy. They all work closely with

other partners from the statutory and voluntary sector and with community organisations (see also Section Nine, page 80). Local areas are expected to have a joint action plan and arrangements in place to monitor its progress and impact. The GOs, local authorities and police are in regular contact with Departments in London.

14.05 Close working at the local level is also well established in the CNI strand of the *Protect* strategy which has for some years been delivered through partnerships between Government security advisers at CPNI, infrastructure operators at the local level from both the private and public sectors and local police CTsAs. Work on crowded places, which falls under *Protect*, is just beginning: local partners are considering how best to work in partnership together. The 2007 review of crowded places, recommended that engagement build on existing local partnerships, such as CDRPs, LRFs or other local bodies. Details on the Crowded Places strategy are in the *Protect* Section (Section Ten).

14.06 Responsibility for coordinating this range of local delivery priorities falls to the GO network, made up of nine Offices, one in each of the English regions. They help central Departments in England to develop policies and translate them into effective delivery through knowledge of the local environment and dialogue with local authorities and others. GOs play an important facilitation and coordination role in ensuring and supporting effective local delivery of CONTEST.

14.07 There is a well-established structure of Resilience Directors in the GOs, funded by the CLG. Since 2007, OSCT has funded additional posts to improve delivery of *Prevent*.

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14.08 The Government Office Network is represented on the CONTEST Board, the *Protect* and *Prevent* sub-Boards, and participates in numerous working level groups reporting to the sub-Boards.

14.09 GOs act on behalf of central Government in negotiating Local Area Agreements (LAAs) with local authorities in England. LAAs are the main delivery contract between central government and local government and its partners. Signed in June 2008 with all 150 upper tier local authorities, each LAA contains up to 35 improvement targets specific to each Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) area. These 35 targets are based upon indicators drawn from the National Indicator Set of 196 indicators, the performance framework for local authorities and local authority partnerships.

14.10 For the first time there are now two counter-terrorism indicators included in the National Indicator Set: NI 35: 'Building resilience to violent extremism' and NI 36: 'Protection against terrorist attack'. Currently, 19 local authorities have included NI 35 as a priority indicator (Barnet, Birmingham, Buckingham, Calderdale, Derby, Dudley, Gloucestershire, Haringey, Harrow, Hounslow, Lambeth, Leicester, Peterborough, Reading, Redbridge, Sandwell, Slough, Tower Hamlets and Westminster). Four have included NI 36 (City of London, Greenwich, Kingston-upon-Thames and Surrey).

Devolved Administrations

14.11 CONTEST is a UK-wide strategy and counter-terrorism is a reserved matter (meaning that powers relating to counter-terrorism are retained by the UK Parliament). But many of the local delivery mechanisms are devolved. Delivery of the strategy requires close cooperation between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations.

14.12 This is particularly important during terrorism incidents. As lead Minister for counter-terrorism, the Home Secretary's responsibilities include incidents in Scotland and Wales. The Devolved Administrations in Scotland and Wales are responsible for coordinating wider consequences within their territories. Scottish Ministers are also responsible for policing and criminal investigations in Scotland. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has responsibility for security, policing and justice in Northern Ireland. When policing and justice are devolved, the Secretary of State will remain the lead minister for national security in Northern Ireland. In relation to international terrorism, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) is fully involved in the broader CONTEST programme.

14.13 The role of the Senior National Coordinator Counter-Terrorism, which covers all major terrorism investigations, has been important in coordinating operational police activity across the whole of the UK. In fulfilling this role, the Senior National Coordinator liaises with all relevant police forces, including, where appropriate, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Scottish Forces and with the ACPOS Coordinator of Counter-Terrorism. OSCT works collaboratively with the Devolved Administrations in the response to, and resolution of, terrorist incidents.

14.14 The Devolved Administrations and corresponding territorial departments have engaged in CONTEST mainly through a new cross-cutting group which considers implementation of CONTEST in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Devolved Administrations in Scotland and Wales are also now represented at the CONTEST Board. At present the NIO has a seat, but not the Northern Ireland Devolved Administration. Representatives also participate in a number of the working level groups on specific aspects of CONTEST: the Crowded Places Programme Board and

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the Cross-Sector Working Group (covering the critical national infrastructure) under *Protect*; NSID(PSR)(R)(O), the official level committee covering resilience (where relevant) under *Prepare*; the Devolved Administrations *Prevent* Delivery Group under *Prevent*.

14.15 Within each Devolved Administration, counter-terrorism activity is organised as follows:

Scotland: coordination of the delivery of CONTEST in Scotland takes place between the Resilience Advisory Board (Special) and Scottish Guardian Group. The Scottish Preventing Violent Extremism Unit (SPVEU) is a joint initiative between the Devolved Administration in Scotland and ACPOS to lead on the national coordination of the delivery of *Prevent*.

Wales: a Board to coordinate implementation of CONTEST has been established with senior representation from the Welsh Assembly Government, the Association of Chief Police Officers Cymru, the Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit, the Home Office and others.

Northern Ireland: policing and justice have not yet been devolved. There are long-standing arrangements for coordinating the counter-terrorism strategy in Northern Ireland, chiefly through the Security Policy Meeting, chaired by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In addition, the Northern Ireland Office chairs a local CONTEST group, comprising the NIO, PSNI and CPNI. The Group looks at CONTEST as a whole, and in particular at the delivery of the eight objectives within the *Protect* programme. A focused working group has been established to concentrate on Crowded Places.

Working internationally

14.16 The UK will not successfully counter the threat from international terrorism alone. Close cooperation with international partners across CONTEST is essential for our success.

14.17 Terrorist threats cross international borders. Terrorist incidents in this country usually have an overseas connection: the term ‘home-grown’ terrorism, though often used, can be misleading. Planning for attacks in the UK takes place overseas as well as at home. Extremist narratives draw inspiration from overseas and have been influential in driving radicalisation in the UK. Perceptions of UK foreign policy can become a grievance which is exploited by extremist networks. Overseas, British citizens have been killed and injured in attacks; others have engaged in terrorist activity.

14.18 The work of Departments and agencies overseas on counter-terrorism is coordinated through the OCG (chaired by the FCO) and focused on countries which have direct impact on the threat to the UK and UK interests; and on countries which are critical allies in our counter-terrorism work. The Government’s network of overseas posts is used as a platform for the cross-Whitehall effort. More than 14 Departments and agencies, including those traditionally with a domestic focus, contribute to the delivery of CONTEST overseas.

14.19 The OCG is responsible for agreeing, and keeping under review, the priority countries and regions which pose the greatest threat to the UK and UK interests overseas. UK Government officials working in priority countries report to the OCG and are responsible for developing and delivering country-specific counter-terrorism strategies which set out their contribution to CONTEST. These strategies set out a long-term vision for our overseas CONTEST work and articulate objectives against each of the four workstreams. Each strategy is based on the threat to the UK and its interests overseas, and linked to rigorous assessments of key capabilities in our priority countries and regions.

14.20 A wide range of interventions underpin each country and regional strategy, including capacity building assistance, lobbying and public diplomacy campaigns. A range of Departments and agencies, including the MOD, DfT and the

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Metropolitan Police Service are involved in capacity building work overseas. This work focuses on improving key capabilities identified in individual country and regional strategies, and includes the following areas: putting in place effective counter-terrorism legislation; improving forensics, crime scene management and bomb disposal capabilities; action to disrupt terrorist financing; border security training; and improving aviation and maritime security. Work on *Prevent* overseas is outlined in more detail in Section Nine. DFID's work on poverty reduction, good governance and conflict prevention and British Council work on education are both vital to this effort.

14.21 The Government also works with strategic partners to counter the terrorist threat, notably the US, Commonwealth partners and European allies. The European Union and the United Nations also provide significant capabilities in a range of areas, including capacity building, identification of best practice and common standards and in specific policy areas such as asset freezing. The Financial Action Task Force is the international organisation responsible for combating the financing of terrorism, and plays an important role in ensuring all countries have effective financial safeguards against terrorism.

14.22 The Government has made clear its view that the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay should be closed. The US Government has also stated that it wishes to close the facility and has stepped up efforts to reduce the number of those detained there, in particular engaging with third countries over the transfer and resettlement of individual detainees. These are steps that we very much welcome and we will continue to work with the US Administration to close the facility. To date, the UK has accepted 14 detainees released from Guantanamo Bay, nine of whom were British nationals; the rest had been lawfully resident in this country at some period prior to their detention. The UK has accepted more people released from Guantanamo Bay than any other country in Europe.

14.23 With our strategic partners and multilateral organisations we are seeking five key benefits, all of which apply across CONTEST:

- Intelligence sharing and operational collaboration on law enforcement and intelligence channels.
- Political will to work with us on tackling terrorism and violent extremism.
- Shared effort to help build capabilities in third countries.
- Improved Government capabilities across the four CONTEST workstreams.
- Joint work on *Prevent*-related interventions.

Policing

14.24 Policing is a key factor in all aspects of CONTEST. Parts One and Two of this document outline the successes which policing has had in containing the terrorist threat and the role of policing in the main CONTEST workstreams:

- *Pursue*: the police lead the executive phase of counter-terrorism, including arrest and criminal investigation.
- *Prevent*: neighbourhood policing teams operating in conjunction with specialised counter-terrorism police units are important to the aim of stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism.
- *Protect*: policing is vital to the security of our borders, critical national infrastructure and transport systems; and the protection of the public from terrorism.
- *Prepare*: the police lead the immediate response to an ongoing terrorist attack, provide one part of the recovery resilience infrastructure and would play a specialised role if an attack included a CBRNE component.

14.25 This section deals with other aspects of counter-terrorism policing that relate to CONTEST: the increase in resources available for policing; how the police service is held accountable;

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governance and oversight, and policing performance management.

Resourcing

14.26 The Government continues to invest in capability enhancement for counter-terrorism policing, which has been funded by specific grants. The Police Counter-Terrorism Specific Grant for England and Wales totalled more than £529 million in 2008/09 and consists of three main components:

- Metropolitan Police Service Counter-Terrorism Specific Grant (£176 million).
- Local and Regional Counter-Terrorism specific funding (£128 million).
- Dedicated Security Post funding (£225 million).

14.27 The first two components deliver enhanced counter-terrorism policing capability including the Police Counter-Terrorism Network, new *Prevent* officers, some protective measures at ports, a number of national units and programmes, and funding for forces when an operation places a strain on their existing resources. In 2006/07, £248 million was allocated to these areas (comprised of £142 million to the Metropolitan Police Service and £106 million elsewhere) which was increased to £299 million in 2007/08 (£161 million to the Metropolitan Police Service and £138 million to other forces). The third component of the Police Counter-Terrorism Specific Grant is specifically for specialist protection functions at ports, and royalty and VIP protection.

14.28 In 2007/08, the Scottish Executive provided £12 million from the Police Central Government funds to pay for specialised counter-terrorism policing posts, which has continued in 2008/09. This included funding to establish an additional 55 specialised counter-terrorism posts across the Scottish Police Service. On top of that, in 2008/09 the Scottish Executive has provided over £1.5 million additional funding for counter-terrorism purposes to ACPOS.

Accountability

14.29 Counter-terrorism policing is overseen by a tripartite arrangement comprising:

- The Home Secretary – who is responsible for overall funding and setting strategic priorities.
- Chief Constables – who have operational responsibility for policing in their geographic area and who are collectively represented at the national level by ACPO.
- Police Authorities – who are responsible for ensuring that an effective and efficient police service is in place in their area.

Governance and oversight

14.30 A new governance framework has been developed to support counter-terrorism policing:

- The Police Counter-Terrorism Board is the key forum for senior tripartite partners to consider the policing contribution to CONTEST, policy and investment matters. It reports to the Home Secretary chaired National Policing Board and to the CONTEST Board.
- A programme management team has been established within the ACPO's Terrorism and Allied Matters Business Area (TAM), responsible for agreeing a strategy for the police service's contribution to CONTEST and overseeing its coordination and delivery through a Strategic Programme Board, which is also attended by the other tripartite members.
- The ACPO (TAM) Finance and Workforce Planning Board offers advice to the Home Office on the onward allocation of relevant counter-terrorism grant monies.
- A Joint Counter-Terrorism Oversight Group has been established comprising relevant authorities for the Metropolitan Police Service and lead forces within the Police Counter-Terrorism Network.

Performance management

14.31 In 2008/09, six counter-terrorism indicators have been incorporated in the APACS. The results are not published but will provide police forces, authorities and Government with vital counter-terrorism information. They will cover: the extent and quality of local police counter-terrorism related intelligence; the disruption of potential threats; an evaluation of police *Prevent* programmes; and vulnerabilities around hazardous sites and crowded places.

14.32 This is complemented by work led by ACPO(TAM) to develop a performance framework specifically for the Police Counter-Terrorism Network; and wider guidance being produced by the Association of Police Authorities for the scrutiny of all protective services¹⁹⁰.

Defence

14.33 Former Defence Minister, Adam Ingram MP, has completed a study into the role of the MOD in counter-terrorism and resilience. The study concluded that the focus for Defence's counter-terrorism contribution should continue to be overseas with any UK role restricted to niche capabilities in times of emergency. MOD has a range of capabilities which can be used across the four CONTEST workstreams:

Pursue

14.34 Part Two of this strategy (page 51) explained the close connections between counter-insurgency work overseas, in which our Armed Forces play a key role, and our counter-terrorism work. Counter-insurgency work is not formally part of our CONTEST Strategy. But in both Iraq and Afghanistan some international terrorist organisations (notably Al Qa'ida) have come to play a part in insurgencies alongside other organisations. In these circumstances our Armed Forces will pursue elements of Al Qa'ida in order to reduce the threat they pose.

14.35 MOD is more routinely engaged in a substantial programme of military capacity building in a range of priority countries around the world. The aim is

to develop the ability of those nations to counter and disrupt terrorist activities and, in concert with Whitehall partners, to develop their self-sufficient, self-sustaining and fully capable counter-terrorism forces. The Armed Forces' contribution to Conflict Prevention and peace support operations elsewhere in unstable regions also helps to prevent terrorism by tackling some of its underlying causes.

Prevent

14.36 MOD, alongside other Departments and civilian organisations, help to stabilise fragile or failing states which could create the conditions to motivate or facilitate terrorist activity or provide terrorists with safe havens within which to operate, as set out in the Strategic factors Section (Section Five, page 38). MOD also assists others across Government in building the capacity of states to increase their own counter-terrorism capability.

Protect

14.37 Protection of potential terrorist targets is led by the police and the owners of such sites. The MOD plays a supporting role both as owners of some of the UK's CNI and through capacity within the MOD Police (MDP). The MDP's core role is the protection of defence assets, but they also bring capabilities, such as armed policing, which are in high demand. Overseas, the Government is committed to protecting UK interests and the MOD provides specialist support to the UK's missions in high threat countries. The MOD has also invested heavily in the protection of our deployed forces.

Prepare

14.38 Within the UK the MOD provide the police with appropriate assistance, when requested, to stop terrorists carrying out attacks. This means having some specialist air, land and maritime capabilities available if needed.

14.39 The Armed Forces are not designated as specified responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

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The Government instead plans to use the Armed Forces to augment the response of others if this becomes necessary. Niche capabilities for responding to attacks include scientific expertise and analysis and the ability to operate in high threat and hazardous environments. Defence holds some of the country's leading expertise in CBRN and explosive materials. Building on this, a counter-terrorism centre has recently been established at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (Dstl), Porton Down, which is leading counter-terrorism research across a range of areas.

Working with the Private sector

14.40 The Private sector has a key role to play in the local, national and international delivery of the CONTEST Strategy. This role extends beyond science and technology and the supply of goods and services and requires Government and the Private sector to work closely to align commercial opportunities with CONTEST priorities.

Pursue

14.41 Government needs to communicate with industry the generic nature of the terrorist threat and specific threats to sectors or locations. There are a wide range of ways in which this is managed, involving, in the UK, the police, CPNI and overseas, the FCO.

14.42 We rely on the private sector for access to information on which *Pursue* operations depend. Specific industrial sectors (notably finance and communications) play a key role in this area and their activities are supported by well-developed regulatory and statutory regimes. For example, investigations leading from Suspicious Activity Reports to SOCA provide information about terrorist financing and data from Communications Service Providers, obtained under UK legislation (see 'Surveillance, interception of communications, safeguards and oversight', Section Eight, page 70), is vital to the identification and investigation of *Pursue* targets. Cooperation with Internet Service Providers is important

in identifying and dealing with terrorist-related content on the internet (see 'The internet and *Prevent*', Section Nine, page 94).

14.43 The security and intelligence agencies, the police and MOD are dependent on a wide range of private sector partnerships to develop and maintain operational capabilities. These range from significant information technology requirements to the application of specialist technologies in the most sensitive circumstances in the UK and overseas. Across this spectrum of activity private sector staff work alongside their public sector partners in the operation and maintenance of capability.

Protect

14.44 Under *Protect* the private sector are key partners in delivering security enhancements across our national infrastructure, transport system, crowded places and hazardous sites. With the majority of the sites and assets that we are seeking to protect in the ownership of the private sector, it is vital that Government works in close partnership to identify proportionate programmes of security enhancements. Government will continue to invest in developing and facilitating these partnerships. CPNI has developed a range of information exchanges which bring together stakeholders in the private and public sector to discuss infrastructure protection issues and to allow industry representatives to discuss the common security issues they face.

14.45 Across a range of protective security technologies UK industry has world class capabilities. They include:

- Detection – the UK is a world leader in the manufacture of security detection technologies such as x-ray and explosives detection systems. UK companies provide over 60% of airport security systems to the US Government through the Transportation Security Administration. Over 9,000 'Explosive Trace Detection' systems are deployed worldwide for counter-terrorist applications.

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- Systems Integration – the UK possesses world leading systems integration capability. Innovative command and control systems facilitate multi-agency responses to emergency scenarios by integrating complex information quickly and effectively.
- CBRN – the UK is a world leader in CBRN defensive equipment and supporting technologies. Industry provides complete fixed, mobile and portable defensive systems and provides CBRN defence to other countries supplying a high percentage of world capability.
- Security barriers – including the innovative use of barriers to keep vehicle borne devices at a safer distance from potential targets and the use of new materials resistant to damage or removal. The recent delivery of new protection to buildings in Westminster is an example of their application.

14.46 National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), utilising local police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) provide training to businesses, and other local partners, via Project ARGUS – a scenario-based training exercise for businesses located in crowded places. NaCTSO has also developed training for local authority planners and architects. Since January 2007, CTSAs have delivered over 700 ARGUS exercises to the private sector.

14.47 NaCTSO have also published guidance on protective security for a wide range of business sectors including: sports stadia; pubs, clubs and bars; shopping centres/high streets; visitor attractions; cinemas and theatres; and restaurants and hotels.

Prepare

14.48 The private sector has a key role to play in the national and local resilience infrastructure. Category two responders as defined under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004¹⁹¹ – for example utility and telecommunications companies – are engaged in the mitigation of risks identified in the NRA. Resilience

forums, including representation from local companies and the Chamber of Commerce, meet to consider preparedness for significant terrorist and other critical incidents.

Structures for further engagement

14.49 The Government has a long track record of working with the science and technology industry across the military, security and intelligence markets. However, the emergence of the current threat and the development of CONTEST have required new thinking about the ways in which this engagement should be managed. In March 2007, industry established the Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community (RISC) to provide a focal point for Government to liaise with industry on counter-terrorism requirements. RISC is an alliance of suppliers, trade associations and academics, comprising over 2,000 companies ranging from prime contractors and global leaders through to small and medium enterprises and start-ups.

14.50 Through RISC five joint Industry Advisory Groups have been established in areas of particular importance to this strategy:

- CBRN
- CNI
- Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
- Detection of suicide bombers
- Olympic security

14.51 The purpose of these five groups is to better exploit Government-funded research, develop Government requirements, focus private sector investment and enable access to innovation. They will establish partnerships between Government and industry to exploit CBRN research and look at developing standards for detection equipment, bring key parts of the security industry together with the providers of the CNI to accelerate the provision of appropriate security solutions, harness the benefit of the commercially driven ICT industry to support Government security and counter-terrorism requirements and

explore how industry can best help with the timely detection of suicide bombers.

Science and Technology

14.52 The Security and Counter-Terrorism Science and Innovation Strategy was published in June 2007¹⁹². The main objectives remain relevant: to establish a stronger cross-Government approach to identification of counter-terrorism requirements and research priorities; to improve horizon-scanning for future threats and new scientific developments; to increase collaboration with international partners allowing increased sharing of knowledge and technology; and to cultivate a strong and innovative counter-terrorism market.

Cross-Government approach to science and technology

14.53 OSCT leads a network of cross-Departmental working groups bringing together policy leads, end users, and scientific experts to identify research priorities and address key capability requirements. This is managed by the Science and Technology Board, its associated sub-Boards and by a framework that maps science and technology against CONTEST priorities.

14.54 It is supported in this work by several centres of expertise in science and technology within Government. The MOD Science and Technology Counter-Terrorism Centre plays an important role in ensuring MOD investment in a range of research and technologies assist wider counter-terrorism requirements. The Home Office Scientific Development Branch provides high-quality advice, innovation and support in policing, crime reduction, counter-terrorism, border security and identity management. And Her Majesty's Government Communications Centre¹⁹³ provides expert, covert capabilities for the security and intelligence agencies.

Horizon-scanning and innovation

14.55 In collaboration with Dstl, MOD's research arm, OSCT has conducted a review of future science and technology developments that may have an impact

on terrorism out to 2020, which is being used to help shape future research requirements.

14.56 Considering these trends, the study identified that the key science and technology domains relevant to CONTEST are ICT, biotechnology (including synthetic biology), military sciences, nanotechnology, robotics, engineering and manufacturing. This work has significantly informed Part One of this document.

14.57 OSCT is also leading on work to ensure the Government has the ability to respond effectively, and with pace, to developments in technology and the terrorist threat. A recent study explored the potential of the Government using venture capital style techniques to draw through innovation for counter-terrorism. This work used regional searches, competitions and investor networks to access innovative ideas to protect crowded places and to understand developments in online ICT. The Government will build on this to enable greater understanding of the innovation community, smarter influence over external innovation and better coordination of investments in innovative ideas and solutions.

International collaboration

14.58 The Government has strengthened partnerships with the international science community, notably in the US (through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and, through MOD, the Department of Defence) and in Europe. There is also close working with partners in Canada and Australia.

14.59 Our international work is wide-ranging. There has been work with the European Union on explosives-related projects which have informed policy on hazardous substances. There is collaborative working with the DHS in the development and evaluation of their fixed site, wide area, biological detection system (the only one of its kind in operational use worldwide). And the Government is benefiting from the US's direct practical experience in the clean-up and remediation of biological contamination of public areas resulting from the Anthrax letters of 2001.

The 2012 London Olympics

The 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be a celebration of sport and culture for London and the UK. The Government has a responsibility to ensure that the Games are safe and secure against all types of risks, including terrorism.

The 2012 Games will pose significant challenges:

- The scale and duration of the Games is much greater than previous events in the UK: nine million ticket sales; over 30 Olympic venues; over 200 competing nations; around 14,000 athletes; 250,000 accredited personnel, 20,000 media representatives, and unprecedented numbers of VIP visitors requiring protection.
- Events will be taking place across the UK, not just in London.
- Planning is taking place in the context of the current 'Severe' threat assessment of terrorism in the UK. The level and nature of the terrorist threat may change over the course of the planning process, and our plans will be flexible enough to respond to this.
- Counter-terrorism measures will need to be an integrated part of a much larger security operation encompassing a wide range of other potential risks to the 2012 Games including public order, crime (volume crime, violent crime, and serious organised crime) and non-terrorist incidents such as flooding.

The Home Office made a commitment to 'coordinate all matters of security and the emergency services for the Games' as part of the London 2012 Olympics Host City Contract signed in late 2004 with the International Olympic Committee. Since London secured the 2012 Games, security planning has been taken

forward by the police, the Home Office and a range of other Departments and agencies.

Since December 2008, multi-agency Olympic security planning has been led by the Olympic Security Directorate in OSCT.

OSCT is responsible for developing the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy ('the Olympic Security Strategy') approved by the NSID Ministerial subcommittee in February 2009 and for monitoring progress of its associated programmes. OSCT reports on Olympic Security issues to the Home Secretary and to NSID.

The Olympic Security Strategy involves other Government Departments, the police service, the security and intelligence agencies, other emergency services, local authorities, the private sector and a wide range of other key stakeholders including the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), which is responsible for venue construction, and London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG), which is responsible for staging the Games.

Development and implementation of the strategy will be closely coordinated with CONTEST, drawing on CONTEST programmes and principles. But it will also include significant programmes to manage risks relating to public order, crime and natural hazards.

The five key workstreams of the Olympic Security Strategy are aligned with but where necessary go beyond CONTEST; they are to:

- **Protect** Olympic and Paralympic venues, events and supporting transport infrastructure, and those attending and using them.

- **Prepare** for events that may significantly disrupt the safety and security of the Games and ensure capabilities are in place to mitigate their impact.
- **Identify and disrupt** threats to the safety and security of the Games.
- **Command, control, plan and resource** for the safety and security operation.
- **Engage** with international and domestic partners and with communities to enhance security and ensure the successful delivery of the Olympic Security Strategy and a safe Olympic and Paralympic Games. This includes a significant and developing *Prevent* programme which links specifically to the broader *Prevent* workstream in CONTEST.

Operational delivery of the strategy in 2012 will be the responsibility of a senior officer in the Metropolitan Police (but with nationwide policing responsibilities) in conjunction with other delivery agencies.

Our aim is to ensure there will be significant legacy benefits from the Olympic Security Strategy, from new systems and technologies, which will also support the security arrangements for the Commonwealth Games to be held in Glasgow in 2014, through to *Prevent*-related programmes which have lasting benefit within communities.





Summary

Communications to the public, stakeholders and affected communities are a vital part of our counter-terrorism work. Good communications enable us to convey the reality of the threats we face, the principles which govern our response, the choices we make and the successes we achieve.

Our communications must also respond to the propaganda directed against us by terrorist organisations, often using new media in a relentless and sophisticated way. We need to challenge the ideology and the outlook of Al Qa'ida.

Much of this work falls to the Research, Information and Communications Unit, a cross-Departmental team established in June 2007.

“...I say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma. And that however far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us.”

Letter from Ayman Zawahiri to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, 9 July 2005
available at www.dni.gov/press_releases/letter_in_english.pdf

15.01 Communications are a vital part of our work on counter-terrorism. CONTEST depends for its success on partnerships. In the principles we set out earlier in this document (paragraph 7.03) we said that these partnerships depend on openness and trust: both depend upon accurate communications about the threat we face and the responses we believe we have to make. This document reflects the priority we put on this part of the strategy.

15.02 Communications are also vital to our work to refute the ideology of Al Qa'ida and the propaganda which they and other terrorist organisations direct towards this country. In the first part of this document we identified ideology as one of the four key drivers of contemporary terrorism. We also noted that terrorist organisations have made use of communications technology, using new media to ensure that their ideology and propaganda reach a wider audience than has been possible for terrorist groups before. But history has shown us that ideologies and propaganda can be attacked and weakened. It is vital that we use the tools of the new communications age to refute the claims made by contemporary terrorism and by that means to reduce the threat to the UK and UK interests overseas.

15.03 The review in 2006/07 of Government arrangements for counter-terrorism recognised the key role of communications and recommended

not only the formation of OSCT but also the creation of a new team to work on communications issues. This became known as the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) which was established in June 2007 and is staffed and directed by CLG, FCO and the Home Office. The unit forms part of OSCT.

15.04 The purpose of RICU is to ensure that the UK Government communicates effectively to reduce the risk of terrorism, by:

- advising CONTEST partners on their counter-terrorism related communications
- exposing the weaknesses of violent extremist ideologies and brands, and
- supporting credible alternatives to violent extremism using communications.

15.05 RICU is therefore at the centre of the Government's efforts to communicate the Government's counter-terrorism strategy and to use messaging to disrupt the Al Qa'ida narrative. It plays a central strategic coordinating role to support other Departments and Agencies, police and local authorities in delivering their own Departmental *Prevent* communications strategies. RICU also carries out its own campaigns and media work.

Understanding audiences

15.06 Effective communications requires a comprehensive understanding of intended audiences including their attitudes, ages, locations, influences and media consumption. RICU provides critical judgements about the context and effect of counter-terrorism communications, explaining what should be said to whom, through which channels and with what effect. RICU draws together specialists in audience insight and communications; marketing; digital media; anthropology; research methodology and knowledge management; and pan-Arab media.

15.07 Overseas, RICU and the FCO are coordinating work on audience research. The FCO is progressively rolling out the Overseas Prevent Communications System (OPCS), a framework for collating research and generating influence maps of the Government's overseas target audiences, and channelling messages through credible individuals and institutions. RICU are developing research projects on audiences with the Government of Pakistan and have also developed direct links with creative agencies, and state and private broadcasters, to create programming for the Pakistan audience and UK diaspora.

The language we use

15.08 The language Government uses to describe the threats we face and our response to them needs to be carefully chosen. It must be accurate. But it must also be sensitive to history, culture and interpretation and avoid creating, or exacerbating existing grievances in a way which will ultimately undermine the strategy itself.

15.09 RICU has carried out specific research into the impact of language on Muslim communities in the UK because it is these communities which, above all, are being targeted by Al Qa'ida ideology and propaganda. The research indicated how easy it is to create misunderstandings and confusion. Terms like Islamist and *jihad* are not always understood and need to be used and explained with care.

15.10 The first part of this strategy argued that contemporary terrorism is driven by an ideology and not a theology. It is vital to make a clear distinction between violent extremist ideologies and the religion which violent extremists often and falsely claim to represent. Terrorists and violent extremists use exclusive messages about a 'War on Islam' and concepts of 'them and us' to drive division between British Muslims and mainstream society. Echoing such language simply reinforces it. Describing terrorists as criminals and murderers deglamorises terrorism. It is of course also important to talk about the ideology of contemporary terrorism and we have sought to do so in this strategy.

15.11 Language and communications are international. What we say and do about countering terrorism in this country will have repercussions elsewhere. But the opposite is also true: what we say overseas, or what is said by our allies and partners, will have an impact here and we may be associated with it. We have therefore worked hard to share the conclusions of RICU's research with overseas partners. The European Union Counter-Terrorist Coordinator has established a number of workstreams to coordinate aspects of our counter-terrorism research and best practice in member states: RICU leads the workstream on communications. RICU has separately worked closely with the US Government.

Message delivery

15.12 The effect a message will have on its intended recipients is strongly influenced by the method of delivery. Government voices and Government messaging will not always reach and change attitudes or behaviours in our key audiences. So RICU also works to promote credible alternative voices who may often be better able to challenge aspects of the ideology of contemporary terrorism.

15.13 RICU is developing projects that will use all forms of media to help communities challenge violent extremism. These projects will focus on the UK but (as we have said above) the messages

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have international impact. In this area RICU's work is aligned with CLG, whose work puts communities at the centre of the response to violent extremism and supports them to deliver local solutions for local challenges.

15.14 CLG's *Prevent* communications strategy aims to build communities' resilience, empowering them to speak out against and reject violent extremism. This includes work to promote Muslim voices and positive Muslim role models.

15.15 Examples of existing or projected RICU work include:

- internet forums where individuals are encouraged to debate issues within safe environments in order to undercut the violent extremists' distorted narrative of oppression and victimhood
- use of specialist press targeting specific audiences
- developing documentaries on delegations showcasing British Islam to overseas audiences, streamed over the internet through community organisation websites, and through text messaging
- use of social media sites by community organisations to personalise the varied nature of victims of terrorism, and
- communications support and capacity building for local champions and delivery partners (including local authorities and community organisations).

15.16 Research suggests that many communities in this country are sceptical about media reporting on terrorism. RICU also seeks to raise the overall standards of media coverage of counter-terrorism issues and works with the media to inform and advise on projects that impact on the counter-terrorism agenda. A priority now is to strengthen links with South-Asian (particularly Pakistan) and pan-Arabic media channels which impact on priority overseas audiences and are influential on UK diaspora communities.

Conclusion

International terrorism is a threat to the security of the United Kingdom and to the ability of British people to live their normal lives. This strategy has outlined the origins of this threat and how, in recent years a new form of terrorism has emerged, fundamentally different in scale and kind from international or domestic terrorism threats we have faced before.

In recent years there has been a succession of attacks and plots against the UK, initiated by Al Qa'ida or by like-minded groups and individuals, who aim to cause mass casualties in pursuit of their political agenda.

The contemporary terrorist threat is rooted in conflicts overseas and the fragility of some states, in an extremist ideology based on the use of violence, in the opportunities created by modern technologies, and in the process of radicalisation that generates popular support and violent extremism and terrorist groups.

Our response to the threat we face is based on stopping terrorist attacks, preventing people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism, strengthening our protection against attack, and limiting the impact of any attacks that do occur. It is intended to address immediate threats and longer term causes.

Our response must be local, national and international. It must include and will depend upon communities, local authorities, Departments, agencies, Devolved Administrations, and overseas partners. This will continue to require a very high degree of coordination.

CONTEST must also coordinate with other Government policies that are essential to its delivery. They include conflict reduction, our international aid programme, our work in Afghanistan and Pakistan and our support to communities here, building cohesion, empowerment and race equality in this country.


Our response has included changes to our laws to reflect the threat we face, but has at all times upheld the principles and values of the UK as a liberal democracy. Our approach to national security in general and to counter-terrorism in particular is grounded in a set of core values. They include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all.

We believe that CONTEST is one of the most comprehensive and wide-ranging approaches to tackling terrorism developed by any major nation. We judge that to date it has achieved its aim – to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. This revised strategy is intended to ensure that it will continue to do so.

Annex A: PSA outcomes

Public Service Agreements (PSAs) set out the key priority outcomes the Government wants to achieve in the next spending period (currently 2008–11). For the first time, counter-terrorism work has a PSA. The aim of PSA 26 is the same as that of CONTEST – to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism.

PSA 26 is based on the four main workstreams of CONTEST. Under each one, there are a number of outcome measures designed to monitor and assess aspects of the cross-Government counter-terrorism effort. The outcome measures are in turn underpinned by a number of specific indicators (not shown).



Annex B: Departmental roles and responsibilities

Cabinet Office: provides direct counter-terrorism advice to the Prime Minister, provides the secretariat for the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development and facilitates the coordination of the Government's response via the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. The Cabinet Office oversees the Single Intelligence Account and also services the Joint Intelligence Committee, which sets strategic intelligence gathering priorities and delivers strategic intelligence assessments. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office coordinates the national Resilience Programme for dealing with civil emergencies, which encompasses coordination of the *Prepare* strand of CONTEST.

Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI): provides protective security advice across the national infrastructure.

Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): the Government Department responsible for prosecuting criminal cases investigated by the police in England and Wales. As the principal prosecuting authority in England and Wales, the CPS is responsible for: advising the police on cases for possible prosecution; reviewing cases submitted by the police; determining any charges in all but minor cases; preparing cases for court; and presenting cases at court.

Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF): leads work with partners across children's and youth services and schools in order to raise awareness and capability to prevent violent extremism. DCSF also engages directly with young people to encourage them to take a lead in rejecting violent extremism, building long-term resilience to violent extremism.

Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG): leads the community-based response to violent extremism, and works with the Devolved Administrations to build the capacity of UK Muslim communities and wider society to resist and challenge the activities and ideas of violent extremists. CLG is the central government sponsors of local authorities and the local delivery framework (Government Offices (GOs), Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Agreements (LAAs)). CLG is also the sponsoring Department for the Fire and Rescue Service (owned by the 46 local Fire and Rescue Authorities). Through its Resilience Programme CLG provides the Fire and Rescue Service with resilient communications, and enhanced capabilities to respond to national scale emergencies. CLG also coordinates the work of the regional GOs on preparing for major emergencies through the Regional Resilience Teams, working in partnership with Regional Resilience Forums and responder organisations.

Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS): the cultural, creative and sporting sectors supported by DCMS can play an important role in giving people opportunities; in developing a common sense of shared values and identity; and in presenting a modern and progressive image of British society.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA): responsible for dealing with the disruption to the water supply, sewerage system and food supply that might occur as a result of a terrorist attack. The consequence management phase of a CBRN incident would be led by DEFRA.

Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS): provides guidance to higher and further education sectors on tackling violent extremism. They help

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student bodies to support students against violent extremism and help them to work closely with the police. DIUS also supports improved provision of Islamic studies to help counter certain violent extremist ideologies.

Department for International Development (DFID): is required to use its resources for the purpose of poverty reduction overseas. Its activities can contribute to *Prevent* by addressing the underlying social and economic causes of radicalisation, helping Governments in key countries to deliver basic services and improve governance. In the UK, DFID is working to make concern for development a national value around which the UK's diverse communities can come together.

Department for Transport: aims to protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those employed in the transport industry from acts of terrorism while retaining public confidence in transport security without imposing requirements that unnecessarily impact on the way they travel.

Department of Health (DH): provides medical services in the event of a terrorist attack. DH is also a strategic partner for *Prevent* particularly in relation to the potential role of health professionals in contributing to the support of individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation.

Devolved Administrations: are responsible in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales for the functions which have been devolved to them according to their different devolution settlements. All three Devolved Administrations are responsible for health, education and local government, and the Devolved Administration in Scotland is also responsible for policing and justice.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): has overall responsibility for the delivery of CONTEST overseas, working closely with partners across Government. The FCO chairs the Overseas CONTEST Group which sets counter-terrorism strategies for priority countries. The FCO leads the Government's response to terrorist attacks overseas which affect British

nationals or British interests overseas and is responsible for preparations and contingency planning for any such attack and leads on the overseas delivery of *Prevent* and on outreach to UK Muslim communities on British foreign policy.

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ): leads on the collection of signals intelligence and provides information security advice and equipment to help protect Government information.

Government Offices (GOs): the network of nine regional GOs manages the strategic relationship between central government and localities across the full spread of government work, including across CONTEST. On *Prevent* issues, GOs work to ensure good communications between central government and local authorities, build capacity, facilitate cross-boundary working and identify and disseminate good practice. *Prepare* activities are led by Regional Resilience teams, who are supported in their work by Local Resilience Forums.

Government Office for Science (GO-Science): headed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, the GO-Science is responsible to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet for the quality of scientific advice used within Government, including that relating to counter-terrorism. GO-Science is engaged across CONTEST to ensure it is underpinned by robust science, including peer review.

HM Treasury: leads on terrorist financing and asset freezing. HM Treasury's asset-freezing powers principally derive from UN Security Council Resolutions, which are implemented in the UK through Orders in Council and EC Regulations. In 2007, HM Treasury set up a dedicated Asset Freezing Unit to handle counter-terrorist and other asset-freezing work. HM Treasury's Financial Crime Team, with OSCT, coordinates the delivery of our strategy for tackling terrorist finance.

Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC): the UK's centre for the all-source analysis and assessment of international terrorism. JTAC sets threat levels and

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issues analytical reporting to Government Departments and agencies.

Ministry of Defence (MOD): contributes to all workstreams of CONTEST using its military capability. It supports *Pursue* through operations overseas to detain terrorists and deal with insurgencies, as well as through intelligence collection and counter-terrorism capacity building for partner nations (which together with conflict prevention work, also supports *Prevent*) and support to overseas law enforcement and security agencies. MOD supports *Protect* by encouraging improved domestic security and cooperation between the Armed Forces and the UK civilian Emergency Services. In the event of a terrorist attack that exceeds the capability or immediate capacity of the UK civilian response, the MOD can provide support to *Prepare* through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities.

Ministry of Justice (MoJ): responsible for ensuring there is sufficient capacity in the criminal justice system to deal with terrorist cases, and that they are dealt with efficiently, effectively and securely. Through the work of the National Offender Management Service and in partnership with the police and security and intelligence agencies, the MoJ manages the risks posed by offenders who are violent extremists. The Youth Justice Board, which is jointly accountable to both MoJ and DCSF, is responsible for delivering a range of prevention programmes designed to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists.

Northern Ireland Office: the Government Department that supports the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT): has four main roles: to support the Home Secretary and other Ministers in developing, directing and implementing CONTEST across Government; to deliver aspects of CONTEST directly eg legislation and protective security policy; to facilitate oversight of Security Service/police counter-terrorism operations in the UK and manage counter-terrorism related

crises; and to manage the Olympic Safety Strategy.

Police: the police service is responsible for disrupting or responding to terrorist incidents in the UK with Security Service support.

Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU): located within HM Treasury, PMDU works with OSCT to ensure effective delivery of the counter-terrorism PSA.

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS): collects intelligence overseas to promote and defend the national security and the economic well-being of the UK. It supports Security Service work in the UK.

Security Service: leads the investigation of terrorism in the UK.

UK Border Agency (UKBA): an agency of the Home Office, UKBA is responsible for making policy on immigration and asylum, and managing and enforcing the UK's border and immigration controls. UKBA supports the police and security and intelligence agencies across CONTEST.

Annex C: Acronyms and abbreviations

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACPOS	Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland
ACPO (TAM)	Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) Business Area
ANO	Abu Nidal Organisation
APACS	Assessments of Policing and Community Safety
BCU	Base Command Unit
BTP	British Transport Police
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CD	Communications Data
CLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure
CTC	Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism Command
CTIU	Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit
CTSA	Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor
CTU	Counter-Terrorism Unit
DCSF	Department for Children, Schools and Families
DECC	Department of Energy and Climate Change
DFID	Department for International Development
DfT	Department for Transport
DHS	US Department of Homeland Security
DIUS	Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills
DH	Department of Health
Dstl	Defence Science and Technology Laboratories
DWA	Deportations with Assurances
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
EEA	European Economic Area
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GO	Government Office
GOWM	Government Office for the West Midlands
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GTRP	Global Threat Reduction Programme
HEFCE	Higher Education Funding Council for England
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMP	Intercept Modernisation Programme
ISP	Internet Service Provider
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
LAA	Local Area Agreement
LOCOG	London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games
LRF	Local Resilience Forums
LSP	Local Strategic Partnership
MDP	Ministry of Defence Police
MINAB	Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NaCTSO	National Counter-Terrorism Security Office
NIR	National Identity Register
NIS	National Identity Scheme
NOMS	National Offender Management Service
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
NRA	National Risk Assessment
NSID	Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development
OSCT	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
OCG	Overseas CONTEST Group

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OPCS	Overseas <i>Prevent</i> Communications System
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PMDU	Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RAG	Red Amber Green
RICU	Research, Information and Communications Unit
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RISC	Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community
RRF	Regional Resilience Forums
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
SO15	Specialist Operations Branch 15 – an internal police service designation for Counter Terrorism Command.
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPO	Security and Partnerships Officer
SRO	Senior Responsible Owner
TACT	Terrorism Act 2000
UKBA	United Kingdom Border Agency
VIP	Very Important Person
VOIP	Voice Over Internet Protocol
WM CTU	West Midlands Counter-Terrorism Unit
WSM	Weekly Security Meeting
YOT	Youth Offending Team

These end notes are intended to indicate where further open source information may be found about details included in the text. HM Government does not necessarily endorse all the views expressed in literature cited below.

Part 1 Strategic context

Section 1 – International terrorism and the United Kingdom: background

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2. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism – Understanding The New Security Environment Readings and Interpretations* (Dubuque: McGraw Hill/Contemporary Learning Series, 2006), p.535 and 542
3. Statistics provided by the NIO
4. Bruce Hoffmann, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press rev. ed, 2006), p.63
5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/12/newsid_2514000/2514929.stm
6. The RAND terrorist incident database indicates that between 1968 and 1980 Palestinian terrorist organisations were responsible for 331 terrorist incidents, considerably more than other groups. See *RAND – MIPT Terrorist Incident Database (2007)* and *RAND Terrorism Chronology (1997)*; available at www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase
7. www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,4484907-103684,00.html
8. Con Coughlin, *Hostage: The Complete Story of the Lebanon Captives* (London, Little, Brown and Company, 1992) pp. 154, 259-62 and 285-6. In December 2003 Zaid Hassan Abd Latif Safarini pleaded guilty in the United States to his role in the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 at Karachi in September 1986 and admitted his membership of the Abu Nidal Organisation. See: www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Victim_Witness_Assistance/03386.html
9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/24/newsid_2478000/2478505.stm
10. www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_503158.pdf
11. www.scotcourts.gov.uk/library/lockerbie/index.asp
12. Islamism is a political philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic principles to modern governance. See for example Montasser Al-Zayyat, *The Road to Al Qa'ida, The story of Bin Laden's Right Hand Man* (London: Pluto, 2004), preface p.xiii by Ahmed Fakry and Sara Nims. The term 'Militant Islamism' is used here to specify an ideology which argues for the use of violence to achieve this objective. There are no commonly agreed definitions of 'Islamism' and 'Islamist'. They do not refer to a single unified movement; and individuals and groups that define themselves using these terms or may be described by others using the terms can hold widely differing views. Most Islamists do not condone the use of violence to achieve their aims.
13. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower, Al-Qaeda's Road to 9/11* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp.48–57
14. For further background see Malise Ruthven, *A Fury for God: The Islamist attack on America* (London: Granta, 2002) and Montasser Al-Zayyat *The Road to Al Qaeda* (London: Pluto, 2004). Zawahiri's debt to Qutb was explicitly acknowledged in his work entitled *Knights Under the Prophets Banner*; see Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds) *Al Qaeda in its own words* (Cambridge Mass and London: Harvard, 2008), pp.149–150.
15. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p.34
16. *Ibid*, p.34
17. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co, 2002), p.300
18. www.mi5.gov.uk/output/other-groups.html
19. Colin Robinson, *In the spotlight: Armed Islamic Group (GIA) a.k.a. Groupement Islamique Arme* (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information, 2003) available at: www.cdi.org/terrorism/gia_020503-pr.cfm See also www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/algeria?profile=politics&pg=7

20. Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p.205
21. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2004), p.71 available at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>
22. *Ibid*, p.145-150
23. *Ibid*, p.56
24. *Ibid*, p.56-57
25. Bin Laden has written repeatedly on Saudi Arabia. See for example "The Invasion of Arabia" and "The Saudi regime" (1996) in Bruce Lawrence (ed), *Messages to the World: the statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), p.15 and p.31
26. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2004), p.57 available at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>
27. "Declaration of Jihad" in Bruce Lawrence (ed), *Messages to the World: the statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005), p.23. An annotated version is available in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds), *Al Qaeda in its own words* (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard, 2008), p.47
28. "The World Islamic Front" in Bruce Lawrence (ed) *Messages to the World: the statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005) p.58 and Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds) *Al Qaeda in its own words* (Cambridge Mass and London: Harvard, 2008), p.53
29. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2004), p.115 available at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>
30. *Ibid*, p.175
31. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) p.99-103
32. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2004), p.190 available at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>
33. *Ibid*
34. www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/asia-oceania/afghanistan?profile=history&pg=3
35. Attacks took place in Riyadh in February 2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2784977.stm "Briton killed in Saudi Arabia"); in Riyadh in May 2003 (www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/dozens-killed-in-riyadh-suicide-bombings-745127.html "Dozens killed in Riyadh suicide bombings"); in May 2004 in Yanbu (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3675891.stm "Westerners killed in Saudi Arabia") and in Alkhobar (29 May 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3762423.stm "Gunmen 'killed 22' in Saudi city").
36. "Car bomb targets theatre in Qatar" (March 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4365039.stm
37. Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p.274-275
38. Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), p.47
39. Washington Post, "Death Could Shake Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Around the World" (10 June 2006) available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060902040_2.html
40. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p.63
41. Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda* (London, Penguin Books, 2007), p.263
42. *Ibid*, p.263
43. "Al-Qaeda claims Jordan attacks" (10 November 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4423714.stm Reference detailing Jordan Hotel bombings is being researched for this endnote.
44. www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Salafist_Group_for_Call_and_Combat
45. www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm
46. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p.44 and 114

47. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (eds), *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (Oxon: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), p.198
48. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_918.html
49. See for example extracts from Ayman Al-Zawahiri "Knights Under the Prophets Banner" published in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds), *Al Qaeda in its own words* (Cambridge Mass and London: Harvard, 2008), pp.193–194.
50. "Many dead in Moscow metro blast" (February 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3464545.stm> and "Chechen Terror Haunts Russia" (September 2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3605252.stm>
51. www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm
52. www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=7059
53. The "Military Wings" of Hamas (izz-zl-Din al Qassem) IDZ) and Hizballah (Hizballah External Security Organisation (ESO)) brigades (IDQ) were proscribed in March 2001. In July 2008 the Government laid an Order in Parliament (approved as Statutory Instrument 2008/1931) to proscribe the entirety of Hizballah's military wing including the Jihad Council and all units reporting to it (including the Hizballah External Security Organisation) in substitution for the existing entry "Hizballah External Security Organisation". This means that it is a criminal offence to belong to, fundraise and encourage support for the military wing of Hizballah however the legitimate political, social and humanitarian role Hizballah plays in Lebanon is unaffected by the ban.
54. www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/imad-moughnieh-elusive-hizbollah-leader-783070.html and Augustus R. Norton, *Hezbollah, A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp.42, 73, 77, 79 and 116

Section 2 – The impact on the UK

55. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/14/newsid_2541000/2541149.stm
56. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article531110.ece
57. "The battle for the mosque" (February 2006) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4639074.stm>
58. "Pair plotted 'terrorist' explosions" (January 2002) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/1766233.stm> and Eliza Manningham-Buller, "The International Terrorist Threat to the UK" in Peter Hennessy (ed), *The New Protective State* (London: Continuum, 2007), p.67. Kashmiri guerrilla fighters Jaish-e-Mohammed named Bilal Ahmed, 24 from Birmingham, as the bomber that packed a stolen car with explosives before blowing himself up outside an Indian army barracks in Srinagar, see "British Muslims take path to Jihad" (December 2000) at www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/dec/29/kashmir.race Four Algerians were convicted by a Frankfurt Court in March 2003 of offences relating to a planned attack on the Strasbourg market on New Year's Eve 2000, see "Four convicted of Strasbourg bomb plot" (March 2003) at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/10/germany.france
59. Richard Reid was arrested in Boston, USA on 22 December 2001, after his flight from Paris to Miami was diverted there; in early 2003 he was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempting to destroy a commercial airliner in flight.
60. Saajid Badat was arrested in November 2003, still in possession of an own explosive device; in February 2005 he pleaded guilty to conspiring to place a device on an aircraft in service and was sentenced to 13 years in prison.
61. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), p.132
62. In September 2005, Andrew Rowe was sentenced to 15 years, reduced to 10 years on appeal, for possessing articles for use in terrorism.
63. In June 2004, Kamel Bourgass was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of DC Stephen Oake. In April 2005, he was also convicted of conspiracy to cause a public nuisance by the use of poisons and/or explosives to cause disruption, fear or injury and sentenced to 17 years in what became known as the Ricin case.
64. Asif Hanif carried out a suicide attack on Mike's Place, a beachfront bar in Tel Aviv, on 30 April 2004; the body of Omar Sharif was found in the sea off a Tel Aviv beach on 12 May.
65. Operation CREVICE, which took place between 2003–04, was an investigation into a plot to cause explosions in London. At the time, Operation CREVICE was the largest counter-terrorism operation ever seen in the UK. On 30 April 2007, five individuals were found guilty of conspiracy to cause explosions. On 23 July 2008, the Court of Appeal published their judgement upholding the convictions of these five individuals.
66. Operation RHYME was an investigation into an alleged cell planning attacks on buildings in the UK and the United States. Possible targets included the IMF and World Bank buildings as well as the New York Stock Exchange. The cell also considered using a radioactive bomb and had plans to blow up three limousines packed with gas cylinders and explosives next to or under targets in the UK. Their leader, Dhiren Barot, pleaded guilty on 7 November 2006 and was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment, later reduced to 30 years on appeal. In 2007, six other defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions and received sentences of between 15 and 26 years. A further defendant was convicted of conspiracy to murder and received a 15-year sentence.

67. "Our shared values – a shared responsibility" a speech by the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, at the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence (January 2008); available at <http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/sp-hs-terrorism-keynote-jan-08>
68. *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* (London: The Stationery Office, 2006); available at www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf
69. "Missile plot Briton sent to jail" (April 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6206886.stm>
70. "Terror mission 'aborted' by death" (September 2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7636214.stm>
71. www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/187_08.html
72. The Birmingham based network in Operation GAMBLE purchased and supplied items for use in acts of terrorism abroad. The principal defendant, Parviz Khan, was also suspected of engaging in conduct to give effect to his intention to kidnap and kill a member of the British Armed Forces. The trial ended in February 2008 when four men pleaded guilty and one individual was found guilty. Two of the individuals pleaded guilty to offences relating to the plot, the others with other terrorist-related offences.
73. London/Glasgow incident June 2007: In the early hours of 29 June 2007 two Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) were found in Central London and subsequently made safe. The following day there was a VBIED attack on Glasgow Airport. One of the attackers later died as a result of injuries sustained in the attack on the airport. On 11 April 2008, Sabeel Ahmed pleaded guilty to failure to disclose information in relation to a terrorist attack. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment but due to time spent on remand, was handed to UKBA for administrative removal to India. On 16 December 2008, Bilal Abdullah was convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions and conspiracy to murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommended minimum tariff of 32 years.
74. The Government will shortly be publishing a Statistical Bulletin which will provide further details relating to the numbers arrested for terrorism-related offences in the UK and the outcome of those arrests. The statistics have been compiled using administrative data collected by the National Coordinator of Terrorism Investigations, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Prison Service and OSCT.

Section 3 – The current threat to the UK

75. "Madrid Bombings: Defendants" (July 2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4899544.stm>
76. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack – The Globalisation of Jihad* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2005), p.88
77. Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) , *Salafism in the Netherlands* (The Hague: The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2008), p.39 available at http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Salafism%20UK_tcm51-120948.pdf; the Dutch Ministry of Justice website has further details: www.om.nl
78. www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5619151.ece

Section 4 – How the terrorist threat has changed

79. The NATO definition of Insurgency is 'An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict'. See NATO AAP-6 (2006) available at www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm
80. For example, extracts from Ayman Al Zawahiri "Knights Under the Prophets Banner", published in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds) *Al Qaeda in its own words* (Cambridge Mass and London: Harvard, 2008), p.193.
81. See the 2007 lecture by Peter Clarke, formerly Assistant Commissioner Special Operations and National Coordinator for Terrorist Investigations at the Metropolitan Police; available at http://cms.met.police.uk/news/major_operational_announcements/terrorism/dac_peter_clark_s_speech_on_counter_terrorism

Section 5 – Strategic factors

82. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack – The Globalization of Jihad* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2005), pp.42–43.
83. Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, "Failed States Index 2008", *Foreign Policy*, August/September 2008; available at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350
84. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End, Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p.99; available at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
85. Ibid, p.138
86. Amel Boubekeur, "Political Islam in Europe", in Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (eds.), *European Islam Challenges For Society And Public Policy* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), p.19; available at http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1556
87. See Bruce Lawrence (ed), *Messages to the World: the statements of Osama bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005) and Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds) *Al Qaeda in its own words* (Cambridge Mass and London: Harvard, 2008).

88. The Interim Report of the IPPR Commission on National Security in 21st Century, *Shared Destinies, Security In A Globalised World* (2008), p.63; available at www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=636 and *RAND – MIPT Terrorist Incident Database* (2007) and *RAND Terrorism Chronology* (1997); available at www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase
89. Gilles Keppel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom* (Cambridge Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.89
90. Daniel Benjamin and Stephen Simon, *The Next Attack – The Globalization of Jihad* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2005), pp.59-65; and Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: the New Arena, the New Challenge* (US Institute of Peace, 2006); and The Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism *Jihadis and the internet* (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007).
91. Bernard Finel and Holly Gell, *Are we Winning?: Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism*, (American Security Project Report, 2008), p.11; available at www.americansecurityproject.org/files/ASP_AWW2008.pdf
92. Stephen Kull, *Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda* (University of Maryland: World Public Opinion.org, 2007) pp.5–6; available at www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf
93. John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think* (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), p.91
94. Ibid pp.73–98; and *Studies in Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*, University of Maryland.
95. Stephen Weber, *Perceptions of the US and Support for Violence against America* (University of Maryland START, 2006), p.2; available at www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/20061120_pipa.pdf
96. Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, *Understanding FATA, Attitudes towards Governance, Religion And Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas* (Pakistan: Community Appraisal And Motivation Programme, 2008), p.43 available at www.understandingfata.org/files/CHAPTER%203.pdf
97. For example in Egypt, Algeria and Palestine; see Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: On the Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2002), pp.154–155, 159, 166–167 and 289.
98. Tufyal Choudhury, *The Role of Muslim Identity and Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)* (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007), p.6; available at www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628.pdf; and on recent classified UK Government research.
99. Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising, Muslim Extremism in the West* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p.91; the reference is to Muhajiroun.
100. Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study* (Clingendael Security Paper, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2006), p.40; available at www.clingendael.nl/publications/?id=6480&&type=summary
101. Tufyal Choudhury, *The Role of Muslim Identity and Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)* (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007), p.6 and 29; available at www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628.pdf Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising, Muslim Extremism in the West* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p.99
102. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Unfavourable views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe* (2008), p.4 available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/262.pdf>
103. WorldPublicOpinion.Org Program on International Policy Attitudes, *Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda* (University of Maryland, 2007), p.14; available at www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf
104. John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, *Who Speaks For Islam? What A Billion Muslims Really Think* (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), p. 69. This polling was conducted between 2001 and 2007.
105. WorldPublicOpinion.Org Program on International Policy Attitudes, *Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda* (University of Maryland, 2007), pp.7 and 21–22; available at www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf

Section 6 – The future

106. This paragraph draws on Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End Lessons For Countering Al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), pp.xiv–xv; available at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
107. The Interim Report of the IPPR Commission on National Security in 21st Century, *Shared Destinies, Security In A Globalised World* (London: IPPR, 2008), p.57; available at www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=636

108. For example: BBC World Service Poll, *US 'War on Terror' Has Not Weakened al Qaeda* (2008), p. 16; available at www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep08/BBCAlQaeda_Sep08_rpt.pdf and Pew Global Attitudes Project, *The Great Divide: how Westerners and Muslims view each other* (2006), pp.23–26; available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/253.pdf>; and ICM poll for the Sunday Telegraph (2006); available at [http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2006_february_sunday_telegraph_muslims_poll.pdf#search="telegraph 2006"](http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/pdfs/2006_february_sunday_telegraph_muslims_poll.pdf#search=)
109. See Gilles Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp.160-171.
110. For further background see Lawrence Wright, 'The Rebellion Within', *The New Yorker*, 2 June 2008 available at www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright.

Part 2 The CONTEST Strategy

Section 7 – The UK strategy for countering international terrorism

111. *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy Cm6888* (London: The Stationery Office, 2006); available at www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm68/6888/6888.pdf
112. *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world Cm7291* (London: The Stationery Office, 2008); available at www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm72/7291/7291.pdf
113. *Ibid*, pp.10-11
114. *Ibid*, p.6, paragraph 2.1

Section 8 – Pursue

115. ACPOS CTIU is supported by the Strathclyde Police Major Crime and Terrorism Investigation Unit, formed in 2008 to investigate proactively counter-terrorism matters in the force area.
116. European Court of Human Rights; Plenary Court judgment (Strasbourg, Jul 1989): Soering v. The United Kingdom [1989] (Application no. 14038/88) 11 EHRR 439
117. European Court of Human Rights; Grand Chamber judgment (Strasbourg, Nov 1996): Chahal v. The United Kingdom [1996] (Application no. 22414/93) 23 EHRR 413
118. European Court of Human Rights; Grand Chamber judgment (Strasbourg, Jul 2006 and Jan 2008): Saadi v. The United Kingdom [2006/2008] (Application no. 13229/03)
119. House of Lords Judgment (House of Lords, Feb 2009): RB (Algeria) and another v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; OO (Jordan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10
120. Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, *Fourth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* (London: Home Office Publications, Feb 2009) available at <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevention-terrorism-act-2005/lord-carlile-fourth-report.pdf?view=Binary>
121. As at 10 December 2008, 23 individuals had been at some point, but were no longer, subject to a control order. Of these: six have been deported, three were held in custody or granted bail having been served notices of intention to deport; four individuals had their control orders revoked and two individuals did not have their orders renewed as our assessment of the necessity of those orders changed; one individual absconded after the Court of Appeal confirmed the quashing of his order but before a new order could be served; two individuals had their control orders quashed by the High Court; the control orders of five individuals expired but those five individuals had absconded.
122. The Act does not cover acquisition, retention and use of forensic data for devolved purposes in Scotland; Scottish Ministers do not favour the permanent retention of forensic samples for non-convicted persons.
123. Covert surveillance is investigative conduct likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person, such as their movements, conversations and other activities.
124. Privy Council Review, *Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence; Report to the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary* (London: The Stationery Office, 2008), available at www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7324/7324.asp
125. HM Treasury, Home Office, and Serious and Organised Crime Agency and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *The financial challenge to crime and terrorism* (February 2007), available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_challengecrime_terrorism.htm
126. See Hansard HC Col 55WS (18 Mar 2009) www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090318/wmstext/90318m0001.htm

127. House of Lords Judgement (House of Lords, Dec 2005): *A (FC) and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent)* (2004); and, *A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2005] UKHL 71; and, The evidence of the RtRT Hon Jack Straw MP to the Foreign Affairs Committee, *Minutes of Evidence taken before Foreign Affairs Committee on 13 December 2005: Question 28* (London: UK Parliament Publications and Records, December 2005) available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmcaff/c768-i/c76802.htm
128. Intelligence and Security Committee, *Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq Cm6469* (London: The Stationery Office, 2005) available at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/special_reports.aspx
129. Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into Rendition Cm7171 (London: The Stationery Office, 2007) available at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/special_reports.aspx
130. Ibid
131. Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2007-2008 Cm7542 (London: The Stationery Office, 2009) available at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/special_reports.aspx
132. See Hansard HC Col 547 (21 Feb 2008) www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080221/debtext/80221-0007.htm
133. See Hansard HC Col 58WS (3 Jul 2008) www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080703/wmstext/80703m0002.htm

Section 9 – Prevent

134. www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/communities/preventingextremismtogether/ 216937/
135. In order to build the resilience of communities where it is most needed, the distribution of funding to local authorities has been based on the size of local Muslim communities.
136. The National Community Safety Plan (NCSP), 2006-2009, set out the Government's three-year community safety priorities, and explained the Home Secretary's priorities for the police service. A revised National Community Safety Plan, 2008-11, has now been published and is available at www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/activecommunities/activecommunities088.pdf
137. Scotland Ministers have also identified funding to progress the ACPOS *Prevent* Delivery plans.
138. www.communities.gov.uk/communities/communityempowerment/communitiesincontrol/
139. As identified and funded by CLG through the Pathfinder fund.
140. HM Government, *The Prevent strategy: A guide for Local Partners in England* (2008); available at <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/>
141. Neighbourhood Policing Teams work in partnership with other local agencies and with members of the community to address local priorities in respect of crime and anti-social behaviour. Further information is available at www.neighbourhoodpolicing.co.uk/
142. Similar indicators and associated guidance has been developed in Scotland and work is under way to integrate these into Single Outcome Agreements.
143. www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa26.pdf
144. In Scotland the Scottish Preventing Violent Extremism Unit is taking forward delivery of equivalent objectives against the *Prevent strategy*.
145. Jointly owned by the Home Office, FCO and CLG, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) forms part of OSCT; its role is explained further at Section 15.
146. DIUS, *Learning Together to be Safe* (February 2009) available at www.dius.gov.uk/consultations/~media/publications/17132_DIUS_Learning_Be_Safe and DIUS, *The Role of Further Education Colleges in Preventing Violent Extremism: Next Steps*, (February 2009) www.dius.gov.uk/consultations/~media/publications/17193_DIUS_Next_Steps1
147. http://www.dius.gov.uk/news_and_speeches/press_releases/~media/publications/extremismhe and http://www.dius.gov.uk/consultations/~media/publications/17132_DIUS_Learning_Be_Safe
148. In order to build the resilience where it is most needed, priority establishments are determined by the size of local Muslim communities.
149. www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/
150. The Channel Project is a multi-agency approach to support vulnerable individuals. It is a local and community-based initiative, which utilises existing partnership working between the police, local authority and the local community. The project takes referrals from a number of sources on individuals that may be vulnerable to becoming involved in violent extremism. A joint risk assessment of each individual case is then made by project members and any issues of concern are identified. A programme of intervention tailored to the needs of the

individual is then developed and implemented. Involvement of community partners is key. They will have expertise and insight into the process of assessment, referral and intervention.

151. "Longer sentences for al-Qaeda men" (December 2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7150641.stm>
152. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, *Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe* (London: ICSR, King's College London, 2008), p.52 available at http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1234516791ICSRREUResearchReport_Proof1.pdf
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154. http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/wg6-internet_rev1.pdf
155. *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, Cm 7291* (London: The Stationery Office, 2008) pp.14- and p.15 available at www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm72/7291/7291.pdf

Section 10 – Protect

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157. www.nactso.gov.uk
158. www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897#what
159. Prime Minister's National Security Statement (14 November 2007) available at www.number10.gov.uk/Page13757
160. www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/managingourborders/Policeandukbaengagement/
161. www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/crc/transportreviewsummary
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163. Water is a devolved matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland. CPNI is working with the Devolved Administrations of both Scotland and Northern Ireland on all aspects of water security.
164. http://files.homeoffice.gov.uk/police/policing_green_paper.pdf
165. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 2004), p.389 available at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf>

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167. www.ukresilience.gov.uk/response/ukgovernment/cgert.aspx
168. www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ccact/errpdfs.aspx
169. www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_073395
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171. www.ukresilience.gov.uk/media/ukresilience/assets/defencecontribution1.pdf
172. www.nactso.gov.uk/hotelsandrestaurants.php
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177. Prime Minister's Speech on the threat of global terrorism (5 March 2004) www.number10.gov.uk/Page5461
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Part 3 Delivering CONTEST

Section 13 – Managing delivery

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189. www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa26.pdf

Section 14 – Delivery partnerships

190. Protective services include: counter-terrorism; serious and organised crime; civil contingencies and emergency planning; critical incident management; major crime; public order; strategic roads policing and protecting vulnerable people.
191. Part 1 of the Act applies to Scotland, with the powers it sets out residing with Scottish Ministers in line with the devolution settlement. While civil protection in Scotland is largely a devolved matter and therefore the responsibility of the Scottish Ministers Executive, certain responders in Scotland are subject to Part 1 of the Act. Civil protection in Northern Ireland is largely a devolved matter, with functions being exercised by the Northern Ireland departments. Some functions are not devolved and are delivered in Northern Ireland by bodies that fall within the remit of the UK Government.
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