EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE SECURITY MEASURES IN ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN MOMBASA COUNTY, KENYA

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A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY AND PEACE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN LEADERSHIP AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

MAY, 2021

DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been presented in any other institution, or university for any academic credit or any other award.

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SUPERVISOR

This is to confirm that the work reported in this project was carried out by the candidate under my supervision as the University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this project to my beloved wife Esther, son Aaron and daughter Terry for their understanding and support as I was writing the project.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank the Almighty God for granting me the strength to write this project. Further appreciation goes to my supervisor for the tireless effort and sacrifice, my loving wife Esther, son Aaron and daughter Terry for their endless love, support and encouragement. Not forgetting all the respondents who gave vital information hence enabling me to write this research project, May God bless them.

ABSTRACT

Violent extremism is the root cause of terrorist attacks on civilian and security apparatus alike. The violent extremists cause fear and disrupt the tranquillity in societies across the world. Despite several hard measures taken by various security agencies across the world, the acts of violent extremism have not decreased. This study examined the measures taken by the police to address violent extremism and its effectiveness in Mombasa County, Kenya. The main objectives of the study were to establish the causes of violent extremism and the effectiveness of measures adopted by the police in curbing the same; to discuss the challenges the police are facing in curbing violent extremism; and finally, to determine the approaches that the police can use to improve counter violent extremism measures in Mombasa County. This study was guided by Program Evaluation Theory by Chen which was used to scrutinize the theoretical background as well as discuss the findings. The conceptual framework showed that acts of violent extremism are dependent on the countermeasures the police take against violent extremism. The study adopted a survey design where both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection were used through the application of questionnaires and personal interviews. The targeted population was total of 1693 comprising of police officers, prisons officers, and religious and civil society leaders in Mombasa County. A sample of 10% was picked from the group using simple random, snowballing and purposive sampling techniques. Qualitative data were analyzed using thematic and content review of the literature gathered while Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive frequencies, pie charts, bar graphs and mean determined with the aid of the Statistical Program for Social Sciences (SPSS). The findings were presented in a scientific report for examination. The physical security measures were established to be only suitable for short term preventions, whereas non-physical security measures provided more accurate and long-lasting solutions to the problem of violent extremism. Radicalisation by radical clerics who take advantage of the poverty challenges facing the members of the communities in Mombasa County was established as the main driver towards violent extremism. Engagement of local communities by the authorities counter-narratives and rehabilitation of surrendered terrorists were established to be the most convenient countermeasures. However, lack of adequate resources, training and poor police-community relations were found to be the major challenges. The study concluded that police actions against violent extremists had both direct and indirect impact on the levels of terrorism and recommended the use of intelligence in the countermeasures. The study recommended further research on the effectiveness of the police measures in addressing violent extremism over a different time frame and place in and outside Kenya.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AP	Administration Police
APS	Administration Police Service
AQIM	Al Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DCIO	Divisional Criminal Investigation Officer
DRR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
IC3	Integrated Communication and Control Centre
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KPS	Kenya Police Service
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCS	Officer Commanding Station
ODPP	Office of the Director of Prosecutions
SOB	Staffing Officer Branch
SOP	Staffing Officer Personnel
TPU	Tourist Police Unit
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VE	Violent Extremism

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Violent Extremism: Violent extremism entails advocating, engaging in, supporting, financing, recruiting, propagating, and radicalizing individuals into violence to further social, economic, political or religious Ideology. It is a more elaborate synonym for terrorism. It is more inclusive than 'terrorism' however, it's quite often used interchangeably with terrorism. (Glazzard & Zeuthen 2016).

Terrorism: The systematic use of violence or threat to violence by combatant groups targeting non-combatants and other combatants alike to achieve ideological, religious, political or economic gains.

Radicalization: - This is the process in which individuals are taken through extremist literature in order to adapt to ideological, political or religious ideals and aspirations that reject contemporary ideas and freedom of choice. It focuses on violent extremism where there is a personal call to carry out some form of violence where innocent people are killed (Liht & Savage 2008).

Security Measures: The proactive and reactive actions which security agents such as the police undertake to curb violent extremism and other security concerns.

Security: A stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and fear of such disturbance or injury (Fischer & Green).

Security Preventative Measures: The actions that are undertaken by the police or other security agents to improve public security and to combat crime to prevent offences, public disturbances and accidents and to solve problems in collaboration with the general public, other authorities and organizations (Braga, 2008).

Soft security approach: To protect life and property from terror threat in unobtrusive and quite ways, often unseen rather than physical noticeable measures that may be perceived as harassment

Counter measures: Proactive actions taken by security agencies aimed at forestalling terror related threats

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Violent extremism is a more elaborate synonym for terrorism activities, it is a process. Which refers to advocating, radicalizing, and engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically, religiously motivated or justified violence to further social, economic, political or religious activity (Hermens 2016). In the context of this study, the end product of violent extremism is usually a terrorist attack of devastating magnitude where people lose lives, and those who come out alive have been fatally injured or maimed and properties destroyed.

Botha (2013) observed that Violent Extremism and radicalization are linked to Islamic extreme religious beliefs. However, for this research and to avoid bias, the researcher examined both the religious aspects and other linked issues. USAID report (2013) refers to violent extremism as advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated violence to further social, economic, religious and political objectives. A study by Vidino, Pantucci, & Kohlmann, (2010) noted various violent extremist groups around the world; one of them is Al Shabaab meaning 'the boys' operating in Somalia and the larger East African region.

According to Buluma (2013), the Al Shabaab have two objectives, the religious being to create an Islamic caliphate under the rule of the Islamic Sharia laws; and the elimination of foreign influence in Somalia. Buluma identified the regions the Al Shabaab seek to cover to include Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, North-eastern Kenya, the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia and Djibouti. He further stated that the other political objective by the extremists is that they want the African Union Mission in

Somalia (AMISOM) peace soldiers to depart from the country. The AMISOM troops are from Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi.

Kenya has been the biggest victim of violent extremism experienced through various attacks by the Al Shabaab thus a threat to her national security. In 2013 during an attack on West Gate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, 67 people lost their lives; in 2014 during an attack in Mpeketoni trading centre, 60 people lost their lives, and in 2015 at Garissa University College, 148 students lost their lives. Furthermore, in all the incidences several people were also injured. Meanwhile, in Uganda, there was only one major attack in 2010 in Kampala city where 76 people lost their lives while the rest of the countries that contribute troops to AMISOM, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia reported nil attack within their territories (Mair, 2017).

A USAID report (2011) documents that some of the factors that lead individuals to violent extremism originate from social shortcomings such as poverty, lack of employment to the youths and other community members who are offered money by the violent extremist groups to join in those activities, victimization by security agencies during operations and misleading religious teaching by radical preachers to their congregants. Violent extremism calls for very effective security measures by the state and other stakeholders. According to Jaatun et al (2009), effective security measures are those actions that are taken to ensure that an individual or individuals are free from threats, danger, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty against attacks, harm and destruction of their properties by criminals.

 In the wake of the attack on the United States' twin towers of New York, the Pentagon, and a passenger airliner on the 11th of September 2001, the United States President George W Bush responded by initiating what he referred to as the Global

war on terror (Schimid 2014). The immediate security measures they applied were to seek allies and take military action against the Taliban terror group which was reported to offer support and a safe haven for terrorists (Vidino 2015). Nevertheless, the US military actions overseas and within their territory did not end violent extremism, in fact, there has been an emergence of lone-wolf attackers converting easily available items such as kitchen knives, motor vehicles into lethal weapons to attack the public in the western countries (Eby 2012).

According to Heydmann (2015), the US government opted for alternative measures after a realization that military actions alone cannot end the vice. The US took to tackling the drivers of violent extremism which are social problems such as poverty, lack of education and misleading religious interpretations by radical preachers. The efforts to address the problem can be done by engaging communities in selected locations through solutions such as offering public education against violent extremism through civil societies and community members. To address the problem of violent extremism a multidisciplinary approach may be required whereby security agents, members of local communities, civil society organisations and any other interested stakeholders would work together to address the root causes of the vice.

According to Saucier et al (2009), a soft approach in mitigating violent extremism may be aimed at the emancipation of the minds of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism, from accepting misleading interpretations of religion that teaches violence as an accepted way of handling non-believers. The soft approach discourages violence and at the same time addresses other societal problems that may push individuals to join violent extremist groups. This could be why the US also opted to give a special focus on the social aspect of handling violent extremism. Dealing with the root cause

of a problem would be good as it would deter it from growing therefore, this may be an option worth attempting to curb violent extremism from societies.

In West Africa, Nigeria has experienced an exponential rise in violent extremism over the past nine years. A majority of these attacks are attributed to Boko Haram terrorist group. The group seeks to overthrow the Nigerian state and establish a caliphate governed by sharia laws. In response, a joint of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin military pressure was established under the auspice of the Multinational Joint Task Force on Boko. This saw a decline in the attacks by the terror group (Institute for Economics & Peace 2016). Despite the joint military measures, there is limited evidence that violent extremism has also reduced and security effectively restored. Military action can suppress but may not end the activities associated with violent extremism.

In the Horn of Africa region, terrorist groups have continued to mount deadly attacks with civilians in Kenya and Somalia bearing the brunt. According to Ahmed (2017), the first terror attack in Kenya was at the OTC Bus stage in Nairobi Central business district on 1st march 1975 where three bombs exploded killing 27 people and injuring 100 others, no terror group claimed responsibility, however, it remained an unsolved act of terror. The second terror attack was again in Nairobi on the 31st December 1980 at the Fairmont Norfolk Hotel where a bomb was detonated killing 20 people and injuring another 80. The attack was linked to Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Libya. Another devastating terror attack by the violent extremists in East Africa was executed on the 7th of August 1998, when suicide bombers simultaneously detonated bombs in the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam respectively (Ploch, 2010). In the Nairobi attack, 224 people were killed and over 5000 injured (Botha 2013), while in Dar es Salaam, 11 people were killed. Somali capital Mogadishu bore the

deadliest suicide attack in its history on civilians in October 2017 where 500 civilians were killed in a market bomb truck attack (Anderson, & McKnight, 2014).

Kenya stands as the regional hub of commercial, international enterprises and houses UN bodies within the eastern Africa region. People from all walks of life throng Kenya for daily economic and social activities hence make it a cosmopolitan society. This has made it easy for terror groups to carry out their activities unnoticed and become a threat to the security of the country. The attacks by violent extremist groups continue to grow despite the region having established security services. Therefore, the effectiveness of any measures taken by those agencies charged with dealing with violent extremism is a determining factor to preventing attacks hence the safety of a region. The attacks have extended to other regions of the country including the Kenyan Coast. According to Lind, Mutahi, & Oosterom (2015) on the 28th November 2002 Al Qaeda terrorists again bombed the Paradise Kikambala hotel in Kilifi and at the same time, there was an attempt to shoot down an Israeli passenger plane that had just dropped tourists to the same hotel and was just taking off from Moi International Airport Mombasa.

Kenya has responded to the attacks in various ways. According to Anderson, & McKnight, (2014) Kenya sent the military across neighbouring Somalia to pursue and tame Al Shabaab terrorists who had made the habit of making insurgency into the Kenyan territory by abducting tourists and killing civilians in 2011 where western tourists in Lamu County were abducted then taken to Somalia and grenade attacks in crowded places mainly in Nairobi and Mombasa cities.

The extremist group has launched a series of bombings and shooting attacks believed to be retaliatory attacks because of Kenya's military intervention in Somalia. These

attacks have been aimed at the non-Muslim population, churches, learning institutions, police stations, police officers, government institutions as well as communication installations in the major cities such as Nairobi, along the coast and North Eastern region leading to loss of lives and property (Kimutai and Ouma 2014). Therefore, the security agencies have made attempts to deal with the menace through several physical and non-physical security measures such as arrests and prosecution of terror suspects and intelligence-led countermeasures have been put in place. However, cases of young men being lured into violent extremism have been on the rise.

Ndung'u, Salifu & Sigworth (2017), observed that due to several incidences of terrorist attacks in Kenya between 2012 -2016, Kenya was forced to launch the Kenya national counter violent extremism strategy. The researchers noted that in this strategy the several measures against violent extremism (VE) by the police are only through securitisation. This is mainly through various countermeasures such as investigations, arrests and prosecution of persons suspected to have links and involvement in extremists' activities which is done by the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU). The military and intelligence services also take up the measure of monitoring the hotspots and providing the police with intelligence reports on terrorism activities. There is also a multi-agency security operation that targets mosques offering radical preaching. The operation is aimed at arresting the radical attendants of those sermons and their radical clerics who are delivering those sermons all intending to curb their activities. Despite the countermeasures, violent extremist activities have continued in North Eastern and Coastal regions especially in Mombasa County.

Mombasa has been the hub of recruitment and radicalization of youths to Violent Extremism. According to Mwangi (2017), this activity was being carried out by a

renowned Islamic cleric the late Sheikh Aboud Rogo from 2005 up to 2012 before he was killed by unidentified persons. The cleric spread extreme ideology to the youth at the town's Musa mosque situated in Majengo area. He urged them to join Jihad fight in Somalia leading to several youths joining Al Shabaab militia training in Somalia and some came back home after 2011 even more boldened towards violent extremist activities.

Several media reports indicate that radicalization in Mombasa is carried out secretly despite arrests of several radicalized youths in the County (Daily Nation newspaper reports Walloga 3/3/2014, Bocha, Ahmed 12/9/2016, Cherono 9/1/2008). Thus, this is a time bomb since the students of the process may be lethal to the security of Mombasa County and the rest of Kenya once they commence their ultimate objectives which are to carry out violent terrorist attacks on members of the public and security apparatus. Therefore, an effective security measure by the police in conjunction with other stakeholders to prevent violent extremism is of utmost importance for the safety and future of the County and beyond. This study, therefore, seeks to examine how the security measures by the police address violent extremism in Mombasa County.

1.2. Statement of the Problem.

An ideal effective security measure against violent extremism should ensure security and safety of life and properties of ordinary citizens are achieved. Despite various efforts by Police to curb violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya, radicalisation and other terror activities have continued to increase. This calls for an evaluation of those measures taken by the police.

Cross-sections of members of the public have continued to be radicalised, recruited and engaged in terror activities. The police have further carried out indiscriminate

security operations that have victimised both innocent and victim individuals alongside the terror suspects. Arrests, detentions and interrogation have been collectively directed on sections of the society who are perceived by the police to be involved in terrorist activities. This may have further deepened the problem by creating a disconnect between the police and even the innocent members of society. Terror suspects reside and operate amongst many innocent members of the public. Those members could hold vital information that would assist the police to single out the violent extremists, then take necessary legal actions against them. If those members of the public are treated the same as the suspects they may fear giving out information to the police and others may even go ahead and sympathise with those terrorists. This would cause an increase in violent extremist activities thus decrease in safety and security of the general public.

Despite the efforts by the police to curb violent extremism, there is a gap between the measures they take and levels of violent extremism in Mombasa County. This informs the need for this study to evaluate the measures in order to fill that gap for an effective counter-terror action that would ensure safety and security.

1.3. The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of security measures by the police to address Violent Extremism in Mombasa County.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

1. Establish the nature and causes of violent extremism in Mombasa County.

2. Analyse the nature and effectiveness of the measures adopted by the police in curbing violent extremism in Mombasa County.

3. Establish the approaches that can be used to improve measures used by the police to address counter violent extremism in Mombasa County.

4. Examine the challenges the police faces in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County.

1.5. Research Questions

1. What is the nature and cause of violent extremism in Mombasa County?

2. How effective are the security measures by the police in curbing violent extremism in Mombasa County?

3. What approaches can be used to improve measures used by the police to address violent extremism in Mombasa County?

4. What challenges do the police face in addressing Violent Extremism in Mombasa County?

1.6. Justification and Significance of the Study

Terrorism attacks are currently the most significant threat to the security of any country or specific region, which widely disrupts every aspect of the social-economic sphere hence an emerging challenge to the development and welfare of mankind. As such, therefore, there was a need to carry out a study on the countermeasures against the vice.

This study will hopefully benefit the security agencies in identifying violent extremist activities and adopt appropriate countermeasure approaches. The findings and recommendation of the study might help the public in general through better police-public engagement against violent extremism activities where members of the public may not be indiscriminately targeted by security swoops, but the police would be

enabled to deal specifically with the terror operatives. Members of the public would have confidence in providing information to the authorities about violent extremist activities within themselves and this will allow the police to plan better on how to secure those communities. It would also benefit parents whose children get lured into violent extremism and bring them back to normal life. Apart from generating additional literature in the field of violent extremism, other scholarly researches will also be referenced from this study especially in the field of terrorism in general.

The findings from this study will hopefully assist the police and other security agencies to analyze the possible positive ways of interacting and engaging members of the public in addressing violent extremism.

1.7. Scope and Limitations

The study was carried out in Mombasa county. The targeted respondents were police officers working in the Anti-Terrorism unit, correctional service officers who interact with inmates who have violent extremist backgrounds within their facilities, county administrative officers, county government security officials and former members of the extremist groups.

1.8. Assumption of the Study

1. Individuals are led into violent extremism by radical preachers who impart violent ideology into them.

2. The measures adopted by the police to curb violent extremism in Mombasa County have not been effective.

3. There is a lack of cooperation between the police and members of the public in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County.

4. The police can engage clerics with moderate standings to bring members of the public closer to them and robust intelligence sharing among security agencies to address violent extremism in Mombasa County.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter covers the theoretical perspective related to the study. The theory identified to guide this study is the Program Theory. The literature review covers several studies and articles related to the objectives of the study.

2.2. Program Theory

According to Chen (1990), Program theory is defined as a set of explicit or implicit assumptions by stakeholders about what action is required to solve a societal problem and why that problem will respond to this action. The purpose of the theory is not only to assess whether an intervention works or not but also how and why it does so. The outcome is essential for the stakeholders to improve their existing or future programs. The key idea of the theory is the influence of the context of the program has on the results. These approaches allow evaluators to better examine the link between the intervention measures and different levels of outcomes. They may also assess whether the desired results occurred and whether those measures played a role. This study evaluated those measures taken by the police in curbing violent extremist activities in Mombasa County against the desired results which are safety and security.

This theory indicates that external factors such as social, political or economic context may negatively affect the level of effectiveness of any program's ability to achieve the intended results. Some of the security measures by the police may be targeting people based on specific profiles. These measures include indiscriminate security swoops in identified locations, road checks, proactive arrests, interrogations and

surveillance on suspected terror operatives. The mitigating measures if viewed by some members of the public as victimisation against individuals and their communities, their religion and economic well-being, may slow down efforts by the security agencies to stop violent extremism as they would not be willing to provide vital information against violent extremism. The use of the theory in this study was specifically aimed at allowing the evaluator to examine the link between those measures to address violent extremism against levels of security and safety within the members of the public then advocate for the stronger measure to be used more in curbing violent extremism in the County.

2.3. Nature and Characteristic of Violent Extremism in General

To counter violent extremism countries, need to fully understand the causes and how they influence each other to create a conducive environment for violent extremism to grow (Ucko,2018). Counter violent extremism programs should, therefore, focus on measures aimed at pre-empting radicalization through mitigating specific drivers of violent extremism. This study aimed at identifying the causes of violent extremism for the purpose of formulating effective countermeasures to mitigate the spread of violent extremism.

Choi (2016), identifies the causes of violent extremism to emanate from two factors; pull and push factors. The Pull Factors are those inducements that attract potential recruit to those violent extremist groups. These could be offers for employment or source of getting income, outlets for airing their grievances, outlet for getting spiritual comfort and experiencing a sense of belonging. The Push Factors were identified as the socioeconomic and political conditions that make the individuals vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist groups. These include factors such as poverty, lack of education, marginalization, denial of civil and liberty rights and historical and

socioeconomic injustices. The literature does not link these factors to countermeasures by law enforcers. This study tries to establish how the countermeasures can link best to the two factors to deal with violent extremism.

A study by Magogo (2016) only focuses on the push factors and finds that unemployment and poverty were the leading causes of violent extremism in Eastleigh, Nairobi. Most studies have focused on either pull factors or push factors separately thus creating an interface between the two factors. This study filled this gap by concurrently examining both factors and try to suggest effective countermeasures that the security agencies would apply in the fight against terrorism.

According to Jones (2017), most studies about violent extremism have been done in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and it has been established that there is not a single condition that drives individuals into violent extremism. Other underlying conditions such as politics, religion, geographical location and socioeconomic diversities played varying roles in violent extremism therefore each location had different causes from others. This means that there is a dearth of knowledge about violent extremism and countermeasures in sub-Saharan Africa. This study would help to fill this gap by providing some knowledge on counter violent extremism outside the MENA region.

According to Onuoha & Oyewole (2018), the Boko Haram group was an uprising group in Northern Nigeria that was protesting against underdevelopment in the region in 2002. The security forces then brutally suppressed the uprising by killing hundreds of its members. Their leader Muhamed Yusuf was captured and extra-judicially killed by the police. The group was taken over by Abubakar Shekau and hundreds of sympathetic youths joined in as it became more dangerous. The terror group shifted

its agenda towards Islamic religious extremism and has caused the deaths of thousands of innocent people and the abductions of civilians. The brutal security operations against civilians by the security forces in Nigeria contributed immensely to the birth of the Boko Haram group. The study by Onuoha & Oyewole focused only on Northern Nigeria and also there is limited study on how security operations in Kenya could lead to sympathy to terror groups. Therefore, this study endeavoured to fill this gap.

According to Hassan (2012), the factors that drive the Kenyan youth to join violent extremist groups are; biological and physiological needs, safety needs, love and belongingness, esteem needs, cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, self-actualization and transcendence needs. The groups mostly target vulnerable youths who come from poor families and are unemployed. They lure them into their ranks and ideologies with promises for a better life through monetary gains and employment opportunities. If the basic needs are not fulfilled in rational ways, then the vulnerable youth may easily be swayed into joining the violent extremist groups hence engaging in their activities and eventually commit acts of terror to others. The argument was further strengthened by Kenrick et al., (2010), who states that each individual is unique; the motivation for self-actualization leads them in different directions. However, according to Abraham Maslow's upgraded model of human needs, self-actualization is not the limit but there is an extra level of need, that is the transcendence – an individual is motivated by values that transcend beyond the personal self-actualization and this may include the attachment to extremists' religious beliefs by those individuals from wealthy backgrounds who join violent extremism. Despite achieving self-actualization, the individual who is in need of the transcendence need may seek to acquire that extra need of attachment to extreme religious beliefs that may eventually

lead to violent terrorist acts. The studies were explicit on the role social factors play in leading individuals into violent extremism however, they did not cover the counter-measures by the security agencies or any other body or institutions. This study attempts to interlink the social factors with measures by the security agencies to come up with possible ways of addressing violent extremism.

2.4. Security Measures to Counter Violent Extremism

According to Wille (2017), several attacks by terrorists in Europe in recent years have drawn the attention of political leaders and civil society on how violent extremism may be countered in Europe. Most of the perpetrators of those attacks were found to have been the local European citizens who were members of the very societies they attacked. The study by Wille only focused on the European continent. Contrary to the study, violent extremism may be perpetrated by other persons outside the European continent. The gap in the study is that it did not cover countering violent extremism as an international societal problem. This study intended to examine the aspects of violent extremism outside Europe.

According to Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, & Jarvis (2014), the United Kingdom's (UK) coalition Government's measure against violent extremism is based upon four 4 Ps strategies. The Ps stands for Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. The researcher dwelt on the Preventing 'P' which is aimed at physical prevention measures. The study found out that the 4 Ps made some contribution towards tranquillity however, they were discriminatory against British Muslims because they were constantly profiled and their right to privacy infringed. This bred distrust from the British Muslims on the authorities and sympathy to the violent extremists. The study did examine the link between tranquillity and distrust that was realized at the same time.

Therefore, this study aimed to fill this gap by identifying the most effective measure that would at the same time maintain the trust of the people.

El-Said (2012), posits that owing to dynamism in cultures, mores,traditions, history, and rules and regulations diverse locations there is no single measure that can deal with all cases of violent extremism, even within a single region, as each region is slightly different from each other. There is also limited literature on the effectiveness of the counter violent extremism measures Mombasa as a unique location; therefore, study was necessary to fill this gap.

According to Miyandazi (2012), Kenya sent its military to Somalia in 2011 to pursue Al Shabaab terrorists after they made several incursions into Kenya and kidnapping several tourists along the Kenya-Somali border. However, to coerce Kenya to withdraw its military from Somalia the terrorists intensified attacks inside Kenya, causing the loss of hundreds of lives and damage to property. Nevertheless, the study only dwelt on reasons why Kenya sent its military to Somalia and its consequences, however, it did not explore the effectiveness of the measure to send the military to Somalia. This study aimed to fill this gap by examining the effectiveness of measures taken by security agencies against an expected outcome.

According to Glazzard, Jesperson, Maguire and Winterbotham (2018), governments across the world are increasingly looking for new measures to address the drivers of violent extremism rather than wait and deal with the downstream consequences. They further indicate that the issue opened up a new field of mitigation known as countering violent extremism (CVE) which has come into existence as a non-coercive, softer approach to countering violent extremism. The study, however, was not specific on the soft approach to be adapted to countering violent extremism hence

left an opportunity to evaluate in detail the counter-measures by law enforcers. This study aimed at filling this dearth of knowledge.

2.5. Challenges in Addressing Violent Extremism

According to McGaghie, Issenberg, Petrusa, & Scalese (2010), training and equipping individuals with the necessary and relevant skills is aimed at ensuring that they work efficiently and effectively. In relation to this study Bundotich (2013), posits that most security agencies in sub-Saharan Africa are not adequately trained to deal with violent extremism problem within their territories. However, Bundotich's study does not specify which security agency and the type of training needs required. Different security agencies play varying roles in countering violent extremism and the training needs may not be the same across the agencies. Therefore, this study intended to fill the gap by investigating whether lack of relevant training specifically within the National Police Service is a challenge to the execution of the countermeasures.

Onuoha & Oyewole (2018), postulates that Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria has proved difficult for the Nigerian conventional army to defeat. This is because the terrorists keep on shifting agendas, ideas, tactics, and leadership and operation bases from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad and beyond. They also received training and assistance from Al Shabaab in East Africa and Al Qaida and Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa hence making it difficult to easily pursue across the borders. This makes the group hide within the civilian population and survive operations by the security forces. The study only looked at the problem as a military challenge; with no focus on the social impact that the operations have on the communities living in the affected areas. Thus, to fill this knowledge gap, this study has analysed the social impact of security operations in counter violent extremism security operations.

According to Botha (2013), the lack of specific information on the operations of violent extremists is a serious challenge to the fight against terror. It is not possible for security agencies to identify the time, place and method of attack by terrorists in sufficient time so that they can put the necessary preventative measures. The study was general about lack of information and did not provide solutions on how security agencies may be able to analyse the available information and come up with precise intelligence about a planned attack by terrorists. This study intends to fill this gap on how the security agencies would be able to cooperate with each other to have actionable information on the violent extremism operations.

2.6. Approaches to Counter Violent Extremism

According to Fink (2014), United Nations Resolution 2178, 2014 emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to curbing the spread of violent extremism. One aspect of such an approach has come to be known as countering violent extremism (CVE). The resolution encourages Member States to engage with relevant local communities and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in adapting strategies to counter violent extremist narrative that can incite acts of terrorism. The member states are also called upon to address the causes of violent extremism. The gap is that Fink only emphasizes social solutions in the engagement of the communities and Non-Governmental Organizations with nothing touching on law enforcement measures. This study intended to fill the gap by evaluating the measures taken by a law enforcement entity and linking them to the social approaches of countering violent extremism.

According to McQuaid, Asfura-Heim, Mak, & Powell (2015), expanding counter violent extremism approaches beyond law enforcement interventions allows a broader operational space in the social domain with multiple actors and expertise. The role of

local government is to solidify a collective vision, to assemble and enable a network of public sector and civil society stakeholders to lead culturally appropriate intervention services. The authors suggest the creation of counter-narratives, rehabilitation of ex-terror operatives, and non-generalization of Muslims as terrorists by the media and sensitization of the public against violent extremism. The study was general and the suggestions may not be actionable in divergent circumstances and that is why this study intended to investigate a specific location and circumstance.

According to Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia developed a soft approach to countering violent extremism. The Saudi government instituted programs that integrate both civilians and former violent extremist combatants into post-conflict societies through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) and rehabilitation programs. These strategies target those individuals, who are determined to be at risk segments to joining violent extremist groups and terror convicted suspects who were already in jail serving sentences. The study reveals that although the program realized 80% success the remaining 20% of the program subjects returned to the battlefield with more commitment to deadlier violence than before. The study does not evaluate why the program did not succeed in stopping those who reverted back to violent extremism. This study tries to fill the gap by evaluating the measures in countering violent extremism that may cause recidivism to terror activities.

2.7. Summary of Literature Review

The theory-based evaluation approach is intended to evaluate the outcome of a programme upon an expected outcome. Thus this study assessed the countermeasures by the police against violent extremism

The drivers of violent extremism are categorized into two factors; push and pull factors; The Pull factors are those inducements that attract potential recruits into violent extremism. The push factors were identified as the socioeconomic and political conditions that expose individuals to recruitment into violent extremism. Most of the studies did not examine how countermeasures by law enforcement impact countermeasures and this is the gap this study expected to fill.

Security countermeasures vary from one region to the other. Therefore, there is no single measure that fits all areas. Some measures may record immediate successes but with negative consequences in the end. Therefore, this study evaluates the effectiveness of security measures the police take against violent extremist.

There are several challenges in countering violent extremism, from lack of relevant training and skills for security forces in sub-Sahara Africa. The clandestine manner of operations by violent extremist is a challenge for security forces to detect easily. The United Nations, therefore, calls for member states to devise counter violent extremism approaches which are mainly non-physical confrontations with immediate successes but devastating ends. In Saudi Arabia, soft counter approaches realized immediate success in rehabilitating some terror suspects, however, ended up producing few but more hardened violent extremists from the suspects. The studies did not examine why those challenges produced some negative results. This study is aimed at filling this gap.

2.8. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework diagrammatically presents the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The study has the acts of violent extremism as the dependent variables and security measures by the police as the independent

variables. There were also the intervening variables that moderated the other two variables. This study intended to evaluate the measures the police in Mombasa take to address violent extremism against the expected outcomes.

From the figure below, acts of violent extremism which includes radicalization, recruitment into those groups, violent terrorist attacks, propagation of extremist ideas may increase or decrease depending on security measures taken by the police to prevent the vice. The police measures are categorised into physical preventative and non-physical preventative measures. As seen in the literature review different countermeasures in diverse locations produce positive and negative outcomes alike or both. The conceptual framework concurs with the theoretical perspective in that the increase or decrease of violent extremist activities depends on the measures the police take on those groups. The intervening actions are those extra efforts the law enforcers and other interested parties are supposed to add to police actions to effectively address violent extremism. These include; moderate clerics to spread counter-narratives against violent extremism, the authorities disengage, rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees from violent extremism back into the communities, police and community partnership in countering violent extremism in building capacities to shield vulnerable individuals from being lured into violent extremism groups. Political goodwill is an important aspect of intervening variables as the politicians would be able to draw special attention to support the efforts of addressing violent extremism. Such efforts include the formulation of policies that would enhance social intervention programs of counter-narrative approaches, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Independent Variables   Dependent Variables

SECURITY MEASURES	VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Preparedness	Radicalization
Protection of vulnerable targets	Recruitment to terror groups
Pursue terror suspects	Terror attacks
Capacity Building	Propagation of extremism

Engagement of local communities

Police-public partnership

Counter-narratives

Intervening Variables

Source: *Author (2018)*

In figure 1 above, the levels of violent extremism activities in Mombasa County depends on the counter security measures that the police use, therefore, violent extremism stands as the dependent variable and the security measures by the police maintains as the independent variable in the study. The security measures are actions that the police use in preparation to mitigate terrorism incidents such as an attack, protective actions such as guarding vulnerable targets such as places of worship and crowded locations. The other measure the police put in place include carrying out thorough investigations and taking legal actions against perpetrators of acts resulting in terrorism incidents, and last but not least, is the building of capacity of the police in terms of training and equipment that assists in dealing with the element of terror.

23

Meanwhile, Violent extremism encompasses all the activities that result in terrorist attacks which include radicalization, recruitment into terror cells, propagation of extremist ideas and eventually terror attacks on innocent citizens and property.

The intervening measures come in to bridge the gap between violent extremism and security measures. The intervening variables are the possible counter approaches the police may deploy to counter violent extremism and these include re-integration and rehabilitation of reformed terror suspects, improvement of police-public relationship through social interactions, organising counter-radicalisation narratives by non-extremist Muslim clerics, engagement of the local communities through community policing and championing for political goodwill through those interaction forums.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the procedures and designs that were used in the study. It covers the research design, site of the study, target population, sampling size and sampling procedures. In addition, it also covers the research instruments, reliability and validity measures, the type of data that was collected, sampling frame table, data collection methods, data analysis methods and finally Ethical considerations. In the study, the researcher examined the effectiveness of the measures taken by the police against violent extremism (Kothari, 2004).

3.2. Research Design

The study adopted a survey research design. However, the main approach used was both qualitative and quantitative in nature. The reason for the use of this design is that the measures against violent extremism cannot be quantified therefore it was given Likert scale levels designed from 1-5, the lowest (1) being the least effective and the highest (5) being the most effective (Fink, 2015). Another reason is that this design was only going to narrate a phenomenon that already exists and not create any new ones. They were graded accordingly to establish the most effective measures against violent extremism (Creswell, 2013).

3.3. Research Study Area

The study area was Mombasa County. Mombasa city-county lays on the south eastern part of the Coast region of Kenya and is indexed county number 001 of the total of 47 counties. The county has a population of about 2 million people, the majority being the Swahili who are also mainly Muslims. It is the smallest county in

Kenya, covering an area of 229.7 km^2 excluding 65 km^2 of water mass. It borders Kilifi County to the north, Kwale County to the southwest and the Indian Ocean to the east. Administratively, the county is divided into seven divisions, eighteen locations and thirty sub-locations. Politically it's divided into six political constituencies being Changamwe, Jomvu, Kisauni, Nyali, Likoni and Mvita. It's the biggest port of entry in Kenya where commercial sea vessels offload and pick cargo for import and export to the larger East African region (Johnston, 2015).

Mombasa County was selected for this study because of its proximity to the terror-prone neighbouring Somalia where violent extremism activities are common in which the extremists find it easy to access the county in and out while luring individuals to their groups. Another reason why Mombasa was picked for the study is that it is an economic hub and centre for tourist attraction. Due to targets by violent extremist groups, it is noted that ineffective measures may cost Kenya its economic income in case the violent extremists cause a terror attack that would make it insecure and almost halt daily business activities (Hassan, 2017).

Figure 2: Map of Mombasa County

Source: *Google Maps Mombasa Kenya-National Online project* (2018)

Figure 3: Map of Constituencies of Mombasa County

Source: *Mombasa Political Boundaries Map* (2010)

3.4. Target Population

The study targeted public officers and clerics who from the government records were found to be a total of 1693 persons (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics-KNBS report 2013, National Police Service Headquarters Registry, 2018). This target population comprised 1510 police officers, 100 prisons officers, 55 Mombasa County administration officials, 18 civil society officers, 6 prosecutors from the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and 6 religious leaders. It was to cover both male and female members of the National Police Service and Non-Governmental organisations leaders within the County of Mombasa, however, due to limitations, not all categories were reached. They were purposively selected using, random and snowballing

27

techniques to obtain the required sample size. The targeted populations also comprised officers from various stations clerics, and various specialized units which are the ATPU, Directorate of Criminal Investigation officers (DCI), Crime Branch Officers section, Crime Scene Officers, Prisons Officers, County administrative officials, religious and Civil Society officials.

3.5. Sampling Technique and Sample Size

Purposive sampling technique (non-probability) was used to identify individuals who hold leading roles in the various organizations of focus. Snowballing technique was used to identify specific respondents whereas, probability simple random sampling was used to select the generally available category. The mixture of the sampling techniques was used because the nature of the study matter needed both general and special knowledge on the relationship between violent extremism and the mitigating measures. Mugenda & Mugenda (2003), posits that if the targeted population is less than 10,000 items, then a sample size of between 10% to 30% is a good representation and may be considered sufficient. This study used 10% of the 1693 individuals which is 169 and was an adequate representation of the targeted population. The respondents were selected based on the nature of work they perform, position, and status in the County. The sample size was also picked using a formula of 10% of the total number per category of the respondents.

Table 1: Sampling Frame

Category of Correspondent	Desired sample	Sampling Technique
Assistant Superintendent of Police and above	4	Purposive
Chief Inspector of Police	5	Simple Random
Inspector of Police	10	Simple Random
Police Seargent	14	Simple Random
Police Corporal	42	Simple Random
Police Constable	70	Simple Random
Kenya Prisons officer	10	Snowballing
Religious leaders	6	Snowballing
Civil Society officials	2	Purposive
County administrative officials	5	Purposive
Total	**169**	

Source: *Author (2018)*

In sampling table 1, purposive sampling was used to identify categories of the assistant superintendents and above as they are the overall heads of their sections and held more precise information in their respective areas. Therefore, it was very specific to go for their responses to get key information for the study. For other categories in the ranks of Chief Inspector, Inspector, Seargent, Corporal and Constable simple random sampling was used because they were the majority and had most contacts with violent extremism suspects. Snowballing was preferred for prisons officers and religious leaders because there are only specific members of this sample who handle violent extremists and they referred the researcher to each other as they might be

knowing one another. This was to elude open search for those prison officers and religious leaders as this might consume time and expose the researcher to the uncooperative respondent.

3.6. Methods of Data Collection

The research relied on both primary and secondary data. To gather primary data, the research used both interviews and questionnaire methods which were conducted in person with the respondents. Interviews were mainly qualitative in nature. They were done by use of an interview guide whereby leading questions were asked during the introduction and followed by in-depth open-ended questions and more probing as the interview progressed.

The self-administered questionnaires were prepared and dispatched to the respondents with the help of research assistants. The responses were analysed through quantitative methods by assigning numerical values on a scale of 1-5. This scaling made the results easier to analyse than in qualitative techniques.

To supplement the primary data collected, the researcher also reviewed various documents and data records on terrorism. This involved examining existing data in the form of databases, meeting minutes, declassified and unclassified records of violent extremist suspects. The data obtained through this review helped in counterchecking and verifying data obtained through interviews and questionnaires.

In addition, the researcher collected secondary data by reviewing relevant data concerning the police operations against terrorism in Mombasa County. These were obtained from the internet, archival sources, reports, researches, books, journals articles and documents in Mombasa ATPU offices.

3.7. Reliability and Validity

A few selected individuals were used during a pilot study in Nairobi to ascertain the validity of the key interview guide that was used during the real data collection. The instruments used during the piloting period produced the expected results and was proof that they were valid for the study. Those selected for the pilot test were not involved during the data collection period. It is also about sampling the right people to participate in the research, and as such this study focused on people who were strategically placed to handle matters related to violent extremism in Mombasa County. When the tool for measuring is valid, it's likely to collect the right information that would help in responding to the research questions.

According to Taherdoost (2016), reliability in research is the ability of a measure to provide a similar result each time it is applied. If the scaling of responses against the effectiveness of measures against violent extremism was applied in different locations and with different people, then the results would be similar and reliable. This was achieved by the piloting done in Nairobi and the actual study was done in Mombasa and the results were close. According to Markle, Olivera Aguilar, Jackson, Noeth, & Robbins (2013), reliability refers to the stability of a measure. This means that measures should yield similar results each time the measure is used and this study managed to do so.

3.8. Methods of Data Analysis

The data was both quantative and primarily qualitative based, the right choice for the researcher was content analysis. The data and information collected from the Key Informant Interviews were easily synthesized and categorized using a coding system that is based on the research questions of the study.

The coding system helped in placing respondents in various categories depending on their answers to the questions asked. The data was summarized and presented using graphs, charts, figures and table illustrations. The qualitative data was examined and analyzed to check on a flowing trend in terms of usefulness, completeness, and accuracy. The data was broken down systematically into manageable units and methodically placed into certain patterns using the themes of the study as the basis.

3.9. Ethical Consideration

Due to the sensitivity of the study questions that were asked during the interview, the researcher obtained proper authorization and approval from Kenyatta University, the National Police Service and NACOSTI to conduct the study. This guaranteed the respondents that any material or information sought was purely academic and not for any other purposes. It is important for a researcher to be transparent to the participants. Therefore, the respondents were informed in good time about the interviews and given adequate time to prepare. Immediately before the start of the session, the respondents were also given to read and sign an informed consent form. Thereafter, the researcher also signed the form in front of the interviewee. The interviewee was also informed that they could leave mid-way or ask for breaks if they wished to do so (Seidman, 2013).

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter covers data presentation and interpretation in relation to the objectives of the study. Violent extremism has not ended in the county despite several measures by the police to address the vice. The aim of the study was to evaluate those security measures by the police meant to address violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya. The specific objectives were to establish the causes of violent extremism, evaluate police countermeasures, ascertain the challenges faced by the police, and determine possible improvements on the countermeasures. The questionnaires were designed as per the objectives of the study. The respondents were made to understand the significance of the study and those who could not easily comprehend the study were assisted accordingly. As per the study sample, 169 questionnaires were administered and 80% were duly filled and returned. Mugenda and Mugenda (1999), posits that a response rate of over 50% is adequate and over 70% is excellent for analysis. Therefore, a response rate of 80% was sufficient for this study. The data is presented in tables, pie charts, graphs and conceptual content analysis narratives in this chapter.

4.2. Demographics Information of the Respondents

This section summarizes the demographic characteristics of the respondents in terms of departments and services, stations, ranks, age, gender, highest education level, role and duration in the service. It is important to understand the relationship between the various characteristics of the respondents and violent extremism in order to identify the most appropriate measure against the terrorists.

4.2.1. Department and Service

The study was conducted in Mombasa County with a sample size of 169 respondents a total of 136 responses were received back. The respondents were picked for the reason that they were the key handlers of violent extremism individuals and related matters. The DCI officers are the main investigators of violent extremism activities and therefore, the manner in which they handle those suspects is crucial in determining the levels of violent extremism. The KPS and APS officers are mainly deployed in executing physical security measures such as patrols, security swoops and guarding of vital installations. The ODPP is the department that advises the police and prosecutes arrested, violent extremist suspects. It was vital for this study to obtain views from this category, because of the importance of their directives' to the actions police take against violent extremism. The prisons department hosts the convicted violent extremists and the way the terror inmates are handled in the process of rehabilitating the suspect may influence their relationship with the authorities and more specifically with the police.

Figure 4: Respondents' Distributions as Per Department and Current Services

Source: *Author (2018)*

Figure 4 Illustrates the DCI having the highest response rate at 37.5% and the ODPP having the lowest at 2.9%. The KPS was second highest with 34.6%. The arrested terror suspects are either held in police stations or posts during the initial arrest or initially handled by the officers from the department. This is owing to the fact that the KPS has the most widespread and versatile facilities within the chosen geographical area. The prisons department came in third with 21.3%. All terror suspects who are still on trial but not out on bail and already convicted suspects are incarcerated within the prisons facilities until the conclusion of their sentences or cases. The ODPP and the APS were rated the least with 3.7% and 2.9% respectively. These two departments have the least interaction with violent extremism. They play peripheral roles in the handling of the terror suspects. The ODPP only does the prosecutorial and legal advisory role to the officers of the DCI and KPS, meanwhile, the APS occasionally assists the KPS or DCI officers during arrest or physical confrontation with the terror suspects and does minimal thereafter.

4.2.2. Respondents Work Station or Formations

In Table 2 below, the security officers' station during the interview duration was summarised and presented below. According to policy terror suspects are mainly handled by officers stationed in different stations depending on where the first report is received or where those suspects are found. It was important to collect the views of the officers based on the diversity of the stations as they may be having diverse experiences in respect of their respective stations. This objective was aimed at giving an overview of handling violent extremism cases in the stations all over Mombasa County. Each category was picked based on the perceived level of interaction with violent extremist suspects.

Table 2: The Stations Served by the Respondents

	Frequency	Per cent
ATPU Mombasa	26	19.1
DCI Mombasa	23	17.0
IC3 Mombasa	3	2.2
Kilindini Police	18	13.2
Likoni Police Station	9	6.6
Shimo la Tewa Prisons	31	22.8
AP Mombasa	2	1.4
TPU Mombasa	24	17.6
Total	**136**	**100.0**

Source: *Author (2018)*

Table 2 depicts that the officers stationed at the ATPU had the second-highest response rate while those at the AP office Mombasa had the lowest response rate.

The ATPU is a subsection within the DCI that is specifically mandated to protect members of the public in Kenya against threats emanating from terrorism in Kenya. Unlike other units, the officers of this Unit were all found at the Coast DCI Regional Headquarters Complex in Mombasa City making it easy to locate them. Their area of specialisation is to protect, prevent, pre-empt and pursue suspects who are engaged in violent extremist activities. They discharge their mandate through the enforcement of the prevention of terrorism act of Kenya of 2012 and all other related laws. All the terror-related cases initially reported in other stations are eventually referred and handed over to officers from this specific unit for expertise processing and disposal.

Therefore, their actions and reactions play a very significant role in shaping the levels of violent extremism in Mombasa County. In this study, the unit was rated second highest by the respondents at 19.1%.

The other station that interacted with terror suspects for longer periods was the prisons department.The prisons officers undertake the task of correcting and rehabilitating the terror inmtes during their long jail terms and were important to the study owing to better knowledge of the behaviour of those inmates than the police.This category had a frequency of 31 which constituted 22.8% of all respondents. This was also due to the fact that the prisons officers are also stationed in one location at the Shimo La Tewa main prisons and were easier to find compared to officers from most of the police stations. Third in the level of interacting with terror suspects was the TPU Mombasa with 24 respondents standing at 17.6% of the respondents and was followed by the DCI Mombasa with 23 respondents standing at 17.0%, Kilindini Police with 18 respondents standing at 13.2%, Likoni Police Station with 9 respondents standing at 6.6%, IC3 Mombasa with 3 respondents standing at 2.2% and last was AP Mombasa with 2 respondents standing at 1.4%.

This section of diversity of the stations of the respondents was objectively captured within the location of the study through the inclusion of the various stations in the area of the study.

4.2.3. Respondents Ranks

The officers were categorised in the various ranks and the distribution calculated in percentage as shown in figure 5. The rank was included in the demographics because it had the biggest percentage of respondents, and had the most contact with violent

extremists. The findings informed which ranks to be targeted for policy changes and implementation to the handling of violent extremism cases.

Figure 5: Distribution of Respondents' Ranks

Source: *Author (2018)*

Figure 5 represents the officers who were interviewed ranging from the lowest being the constable to the highest, which is the Gazetted officers rank. The Gazetted officers are the senior commanders within the disciplined services and they are largely engaged in management to ensuring policy implementation. They had the least respondents at 7.4% and have minimal interaction with violent extremists. Therefore, they may only be utilized in suggesting policy changes in handling violent extremists. The next category is the Inspector. This is the rank of officers who are mandated with middle-level management. They head the respective stations; from Figure 5, they constituted 20.2% of the respondents and play the role of overseeing the implementation of counter-terrorism measures. This was followed by the Non-commissioned officers who were 23.2%. They specifically supervise the junior-most rank in the implementation of the countermeasures. The last is the constable category which is the rank that is mainly mandated to implement counter-terror measures. Officers of this rank formed the majority of the respondents at 49.3% because they

38

largely have the actual interaction with the violent extremism suspects and therefore, had a lot of relevant information. They are also the majority in each of the selected stations.

4.2.4. Age Bracket of the Respondents

The ages of the respondents were captured to indicate the age groups of those who participated in the study. The relevance of the age demographic in this study is to help in the planning of training, placements, recruitment and projection of human resource required based on the respondents' ages. The study intended to establish whether the various counter-terrorism measures are perhaps better implemented depending on the varying ages of the officers handling the issues. The findings would be vital for different counter terror trainings that require specific age sets and experinces through length of service among the officers who are in the forefront of handling those operatives. It would also help in identifying officers to be assigned specific counter terror operations based on given age sets and experiences. To this end, the respondents were asked to indicate their ages.

Table 3: Distribution of Respondents' Age Bracket

	Frequency	Per cent
Below 20 years	1	.7
20-25 years	8	5.9
26-30 years	22	16.2
31-35 years	28	20.6
36-40 years	25	18.4
41-45 years	16	11.8
46-50 years	14	10.3
51-55 years	12	8.8
56-60 years	10	7.4
Total	136	100.0

Source: *Author (2018)*

Table 3 shows that the majority of respondents were aged between 31-35 years at 20.6%. This was followed by those who were between 36-40 years at 18.4%. The rest were rated as follows; 26-30 years at 16.2%, 41-45 years at 11.8%, 46-50 years at 10.3%, 51-55 years at 8.8%, 56-60 years at 7.4%, 20-25 years at 5.9% and below 20 years of age at 0.7%. Therefore, to succeed in fighting terrorism in Mombasa County, any long time counter strategies should consider the age group of below 40 years as at a total of 61.8 % of all the respondents. They are eligible to work for at least 20 years in the security services before the retirement age of 60 years. Furthermore, they are considered energetic enough to undertake some rigorous counter-terrorism training to prepare well for confrontation with the terrorists. Those above 40 years of age may only be considered for training that may be less rigorous. Such training should prepare them for non-confrontational assignments that would suffice the handling of contemporary challenges in counter-terrorism operations. These may include intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination to the implementers of the counter-terrorism measures.

4.2.5. Gender of the Respondents

The male-female gender percentage representation is shown in figure 6. Gender consideration was of immense benefit to the study due to the types of diverse assignments both male and female carry out in the process of handling terror suspects. Apart from the general police work, female officers are specifically assigned the roles of escorting female suspects and also some terror suspects and victims are only comfortable talking to female officers during questioning. It is also the role of female police officers to conduct body searches and body frisking of female suspects. Meanwhile, only male officers do the same to male suspects. However, there was no specific difference between male and female despondence it was still relevant to

include the gender aspect in this study as it would assist in the placement of both male and female security officers who handle the increasing female terror suspects. This should be based on the average ratio of the gender of those suspects handled by the officers

Figure 6: Distribution of Respondents Gender

Source: *Author (2018)*

The gender distribution was higher among males at 81.6% with a marginal female representation of 18.4% as illustrated in Figure 6. This depicts that there are more male police officers than female officers. According to Ndung'u, Salifu & Sigsworth (2017), women in Kenya are increasingly getting engaged in violent extremist activities, therefore, the increase in the percentage of female police officers should be made a priority in order to handle the increasing numbers of female terror operatives proportionally.

4.2.6. Highest Education Level

The highest and lowest levels of education of the respondents were analysed and presented in figure 7. The questionnaires were structured in a way that the respondents were supposed to be literate and capable of comprehending the questions since they needed to read, understand and write their responses. According to

Nyaguthii (2010), in Kenya, those who attain a high level of education are considered to be capable of perceiving and analysing issues objectively. The highest level of education of the respondents gave the study insight into their ability to perceive and analyse matters to do with violent extremism more comprehensively and were cable of answering the research questions rationally. However, in the services the majority had higher education levels, there were also a few officers with low education levels. Therefore, it was important to include this category during the piloting stage in order to tailor the questions that can be easily understood by all. For this reason, the respondents were asked to state their highest education levels.

Figure 7: Highest Education Level

Source: *Author (2018)*

The majority of the respondents had the highest level of their education being Secondary School Leavers at 53.7%, Diploma holders at 16.9%, Degree holders at 15.4%, Master degree holders and A-level certificate holders each at 5.9%, standard eight school leavers were 1.5% and the least was 0.7% for form two school leavers. Most of the respondents were Kenya Certificate of Secondary School leavers and this is the basic level from where higher education can be pursued.

4.2.7. Individual Roles of Respondents

The respondents played a variety of roles within their sections of duty. Role in this category represented the actual responsibility the officer was assigned to in their daily work within their work station.

Table 4: The Various Roles of the Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
In charge ATPU	2	1.5
Controller	2	1.5
Deputy DCIO	2	1.5
DCIO	3	2.2
Driver	2	1.4
Gate Keeper	5	3.8
GD	50	36.8
IC3 Dispatcher	1	0.7
In charge of TPU	3	2.2
Investigator	45	33.2
OC crime	1	0.7
OCS	3	2.2
Prosecutor	3	2.2
Records Manager	3	2.2
Remand Officer	1	0.7
In charge-Discipline	2	1.4
SOB	1	0.7
SOP	1	0.7
Sub County Commander	4	2.9
Anti-Crime	1	0.7
Welfare	1	0.7
Total	136	100.0

Source: *Author (2018)*

The Investigators, In-Charge ATPU, DCIO, Deputy DCIO, OC Crime, Sub County Commander, OCS and Anti-Crime are in the category that first responders to come

into contact with terror suspects during the initial arrest or questioning. Handling of those terror suspects culminates into counter-terrorism a measure which is the basis of this study.

The IC3 dispatcher and the controller are roles that are performed by specifically trained police officers from an integrated command, control and communication room where they monitor the closed-circuit television Security cameras mounted in the streets of Mombasa and Nairobi cities. They communicate any suspicious activities or persons to the first responders who move in to confront and handle those situations. Some of those activities are terror-related suspicions that require counter-terror measures; hence this category of respondents was vital for this study.

The remand officer, gatekeeper, records manager, driver, in charge of discipline and welfare are distinct roles of Prisons officers while handling prisoners. The Prisons officers receive from the police those terror suspects who have been remanded by the courts. They maintain and keep the suspects in prison custody and escort them to and from courthouses during the trials. Being part of the criminal justice system they play assisting roles to the police, therefore, their interactions may have an effect on the behaviour of those terror suspects, therefore, it was important to get responses from this category.

The SOB and SOP are roles by senior police officers. They involve human and resource planning within respective stations. The SOB is in charge of the planning of administration and communications while the SOP is in charge of the personnel placement. They were relevant to this study in that they have the mandate of identifying and transferring specific and qualified officers from various police units

into the Anti Terrorism Police Unit. Therefore it was important to get their views regarding counter terror operations.

4.3. Physical Security Measures Against Violent Extremism

The study aimed at evaluating the physical strategic actions that the police take in countering terrorism activities. The respondents were asked to indicate their level of concurrence with the hard measures which the police take to prevent terrorism and the result of their response were as indicated in table 5 below.

Table 5: The Hard Security Actions Against Violent Extremism

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Security screenings	47.8	40.4	9.6	1.5	0.7
Guarding of vital installations	40.4	44.9	11.0	2.2	1.5
Security patrols	40.4	51.5	5.9	2.2	0.0
Security road checks	44.9	39.7	6.6	8.1	0.7
Security swoops in dwelling areas	39.0	44.9	11.0	5.1	0.0
Total	42.5	44.3	8.2	4.3	0.6

Source: *Author (2018)*

The results in table 5 indicate that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that security screenings at entrances are an effective countermeasure against violent extremism with 47.8% strongly agreeing, 40.4% agreed. Meanwhile, 9.6% of the respondents were neutral, 1.5% disagreed and 0.7% strongly disagreed. However, only a total of less than 3% felt were not in agreement. From the results, it is shown that the majority of the respondents 88.2% affirmed that this measure could prevent

violent extremism. Screenings by the police at vital locations is aimed at detecting any dangerous weapons that may be sneaked in by terror operatives and other criminals; therefore, this measure may detect such weapons before they get into those vulnerable public places. It may also deter any terror operative from sneaking any deadly arsenal past the screening points. This means that security screenings are important first-line protection against violent extremist activities and terror attacks.

The majority of the respondents also concurred that having physical protection such as guarding of vital installations such as places of worship, shopping malls, and learning institutions were effective against violent extremism. 40.4% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement and 44.9% agreed. On the other hand, 11% were neutral and 2.2% disagreed while none strongly disagreed. In summation, the majority agreed that this measure was effective in preventing terrorism. These installations are public social places that attract large numbers of worshippers, students, revelers, shoppers and many others. Terrorist groups aim at such targets because if they manage to attack, they are most likely to achieve mass casualties and extensive damage of property. This would create real fear and panic in the public. Therefore, to ensure success against terrorism policymakers should ensure guarding of vital installations as a countermeasure is given maximum consideration.

The other identified measure is security patrols. The majority of the respondents affirmed this measure is highly relevant in countering violent extremism because 40.4% strongly agreed, 51.5% and agreed. On the other hand, 5.9% was neutral, while only 2.2% disagreed with none strongly disagreeing with the statement. Terror operatives conduct their attack after planning covertly and they fear being detected before they execute the plot. The police patrol around vulnerable targets is important in that they may detect and prevent an attack while still in the planning stages.

Although patrol is a short term strategy, it may provide the insight into formulation of long term counter-strategies.

Security road checks by the police also had a majority concurrence as an effective countermeasure towards violent extremism with 44.9% strongly agreeing, 39.7% agreed. Those who neutral were 6.6%, while 8.1% disagreed and 0.7% strongly disagreed. Most of the logistics to attack are transported by motor vehicles. The police conduct both random and selected physical security checks of the vehicle cabins, on the occupants, their Identity Cards and passports. Through road checks, detection and deterrence may be realised hence disruption of any planned attack. This measure is effective in preventing any imminent terror attack.

It was established that 39% of the respondents strongly agreed with general security swoops from profiled dwelling areas as an effective countermeasure. In the meantime 44.9% agreed, 11% were neutral and 5.1% disagreed with none strongly disagreed with the statement. It was felt that security swoops would be more effective in handling subjects with more humility and understanding than to punish them. This was a surprise finding that majority of the respondents approved indiscriminate security actions against selected subjects with only a minority disapproving this particular measure. General security swoop is a hard approach and Boucek, (2008) stated that softer approaches yield more success than hard approaches. However, this study established the contrary where the respondents felt that hard approaches could also yield success within the location of the study. This measure may only be effective and minimally applied when an identified population intentionally conceal and assists the terrorists.

A mean total of 86.8% of the respondents approve physical security measure as the only immediate strategy against terror activities. It is through this measure that dangerous weapons, suspicious movement, last stage attack execution planning and usage of false documents may be detected and pre-empted. However a mean total of 4.9% felt these measures would only prevent and deter immediate and imminent terror activities, but should be supplemented by long-lasting non-physical and softer to counter approaches to violent extremism.

4.3.1. Non-Physical Security Measures Against Violent Extremism

The non-physical security measures refer to the soft approaches against violent extremism or terrorism activities. These measures include collection and sharing of intelligence on terrorism by the various security agencies, watching of terror suspects through covert surveillance, offering rewards to the public for information leading to the apprehension of those suspects, and using counter-narratives against radicalization. The respondents were asked to indicate their concurrence with the non-hard physical measures and the outcome is indicated in table 6 below.

Table 6: The Soft Approaches Against Violent Extremism

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Intelligence	66.2	30.1	2.9	0.0	0.7
Inter-agency exchange of information	58.1	35.3	5.9	0.7	0.0
Price tag wanted terror suspect	28.7	35.3	22.8	8.8	4.4
Surveillance on terror suspects	61.8	33.1	4.4	0.7	0.0
Sensitization of the public	52.9	31.6	8.1	4.4	2.9
Total	53.4	33.1	8.2	2.9	1.6

Source: *Author (2018)*

Table 6 shows the findings in percentage on the soft measures as expressed in the five statements. Intelligence information about terrorism is carefully gathered on specific targets. The information is processed, analysed, refined then disseminated to the police for action. This is important in that it offers the action teams real-time information about specific terror suspect or violent extremism activities. With the information, the police may be able to carry out intelligence-led operations against violent extremism. This may take a short time as the police can go directly to their identified target for action. It may also save resources in that operations may be optimized to a specific location. It may avoid a constrained police–public relationships that might be caused by indiscriminate security swoops which could probably victimize both suspects and victims alike.

The study found that 66.2% of the respondents strongly agreed that the use of intelligence is an effective measure against terrorism, while 30.1% agreed, and another 2.9% were neutral. None disagreed but 0.7% strongly disagreed observing that terror suspects only understand hard measures to revert from their actions. The respondents asserted that the use of intelligence against terrorism was an effective measure. Therefore, for a securer environment, the counter-terror operatives should consider focusing more effort on gathering intelligence against violent extremism.

On sharing of terror-related information among the various security agencies, 58.1% of the respondents strongly agreed that it was an effective countermeasure, while 35.3% agreed, 5.9% were neutral, and 0.7% disagreed. However, none strongly disagreed. Information held separately by the different agencies may not be useful unless it's brought together to provide a complete overview of terror activities within a given setting. The respective various security agencies collect and receive information on terrorism. The agencies include the intelligence services, the police,

49

the military and the directorate of criminal investigations. It is important that those agencies share the information among themselves, as this may help visualize on time any attack planning by the operatives. This would give the police and other security agencies the leverage to act and pre-empt any intended terror attacks. The importance of sharing information was also largely approved by the respondents, therefore, making it an important countermeasure against violent extremism.

Offering money to the public as a price tag for information leading to the arrest of terror suspects was also considered a soft approach. It was found that 28.7% of respondents strongly agreed, 35.3% agreed, 22.8% neither agreed nor disagreed, as 8.8% disagreed and 4.4% strongly disagreed that this countermeasure was effective. This measure includes publishing the photos and names of wanted terror suspects and posting them to the public through social media, newspapers, radios and posters. The public is offered money to provide information leading to the arrest of those suspects. The respondents were not as authoritative with this measure as compared to the rest in this category hence making it a less preferred measure. However, it may scare off those operatives from the streets for fear of being arrested. it may work well only if implemented alongside the other measures such as sharing of information and the use of intelligence.

Regarding surveillance on terror suspects, 61.8% strongly agreed that it is an effective countermeasure, while 33.1% agreed, and 4.4% were neutral, another 0.7% disagreed as none strongly disagreed. Surveillance is the use of covert approaches to watch identified terror suspects in order to pre-empt any terrorism activity by those operatives. Through monitoring, the security agencies might get details on violent extremist activities which include but not limited to the source of finances, the cell members involved in terror attack plots, any weapons they intend to use and any

selected targets. Therefore, monitoring the activities of those suspects is useful to the police in planning countermeasures.

On sensitization of members of the public against violent extremism, 52.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that it was an effective measure, 31.6% agreed, 8.1% were neutral, 4.4% disagreed and 2.9% strongly disagreed. The respondents exceedingly approved sensitization as an effective measure the police can use to counter-terrorism. However, sensitization against any criminal activities is not a core function of the police but policymakers should consider the importance of police contribution. Nevertheless, the police may utilize social media to sensitize members of the public against terrorism.

A paltry mean total of 4.3% disapproved soft approach to contering violent extremism against overwhelming majority of 86.5% who approved soft approaches as being more effective than the hard counter terrorism measures.

4.3.2. Police Measures against Individual Terrorism Suspects

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements relating to the manner in which the police handle terror suspects within their custody. The individual terror suspects are those who are arrested or summoned by the police to be investigated for engagement in violent extremist activities. Five statements were used to rate the opinion of the respondents regarding the question. The results are as presented in table 7 below.

Table 7: Counter-Measures Against Individual Suspects

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Proactive arrests	47.1	44.1	7.4	1.5	0.0
Interrogations/interviews of terror suspects	28.7	52.9	12.5	4.4	1.5
Prosecution of terror suspects	42.6	40.4	11.0	4.4	1.5
Detaining of terror suspects	41.2	38.2	10.3	8.1	2.2
Compelling attendance to police station	18.4	32.4	17.6	23.5	8.1
Total	35.6	41.6	11.8	8.4	2.7

Source: *Author (2018)*

The result in table 7 shows that 47.1% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement indicating proactive arrests as a way of deterring terrorism, the police need only to apprehend individuals believed to be engaged in violent extremism, this view was shared by another 44% who agreed, 7.4% were neutral, while 1.5% disagreed and none strongly disagreed. The 1.5% who disagreed with the arrest measure narrated that some of the suspects are driven into violent extremism by other social factors that may only be cured by social remedies but not legal action such as arrests.

On interrogation and interview of terror suspects as an effective measure to deter them from engaging in terror activities, 28.7% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 52.9% agreed, while 12.5% disagreed and another 1.5% strongly disagreed. Interrogation is the use of coercion and threats to get information from a terror suspect whereas an interview is friendly questioning between the suspect and

the interviewer. The latter may create an atmosphere of trust between the suspect and the interviewers as opposed to the former where the suspect may only give information true or not, just to evade punishment. According to the respondents who agreed (52.9%), the police should initially apply interview questioning and may only apply interrogation as a last resort, but those who strongly agreed (28.7%) were of the opinion that it was appropriate to use both interview and interrogation simultaneously. The respondents who disagreed (12.5%) and strongly disagreed (1.5%) added that only interviewing was effective in getting information from a terror suspect. Therefore, the police should be encouraged to first use interview methods while trying to get information from a suspect.

Police measures against individual terror suspects include; premeditated arrest and prosecution of individuals who are in the process of planning terror attacks against the public and their property. However, any such arrest should be intelligence guided to ensure they are accurate to the wanted suspect and also done within the precincts of the relevant laws. During the arrests and prosecutions, there is a likelihood of disrupting and disorienting the operatives' strategies. The respondents highly concurred that the action can pre-empt violent extremism with 42.6% of the respondents strongly agreeing that terror suspects should be prosecuted, while another 40.4% agreed. The respondents who were neutral on the measure were 11%. However, 4.4% disagreed and 1.5% strongly disagreed. The majority of the respondents felt that this specific action was sufficient in countering violent extremism.

The respondents who strongly agreed that detaining terror suspects was an effective countermeasure were 41.2% and 38.2% agreed, 10.3% were neutral but 8.1% disagreed and 2.2% strongly disagreed with the statement. The outcome from

questions on prosecution and detaining of those suspects gave very close results therefore, it reaffirmed that a subjecting individual terror suspect through the criminal justice system was greatly approved by the respondents.

On summoning terror suspects to the police station to respond to reports of terror activities involvement 18.4% of the respondents strongly agreed, 32.4% agreed, 17.6% were neutral, 25.5% disagreed and 8.1% strongly disagreed. Police summons is part of the criminal justice system and similarly received majority approval as previously discussed.

Majority of the respondents with a mean total of 77.2% approved stern actions against the individual terror suspects. However some of the respondents with a man of 11.1% noted that such actions would futher harden those suspects into terrorism and felt that it was better to address the social greviances that might have led them into violent extremism. To this end, however, not exclusive, the responses established that processing of terror suspects through the criminal justice system is an effective action in deterring violent extremism.

Figure 8: Mean Total Response on Actions Against Individual Suspects

Source: *Author (2018)*

Figure 8 indicates the total level of concurrence with all the elements aimed at evaluating police actions against individual terror suspects. A Total score of 35% respondents were in strong agreement with the actions against the individual, while 42% agreed on the same. However 12% were not sure and another 8% disagreed while , 8% were in total disagreement. This means that a total mean of 87% endorsed the actions by indicating, the measures against the individual terror suspect was well undertaken as opposed to 11% who were against the actions. A total of 12% were not sure, however, the figure was insignificant to make any difference between those who agreed or disagreed.

4.4. Drivers to Violent Extremism

It was also important to analyse the factors that made individuals engage in violent extremist activities. Therefore, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which given social factors could drive the subjects to violent extremism. This objective was evaluated through seven statements and the results are shown in table 8 below.

Table 8: Causes of Terrorism Activities

	Strongly Agree	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Poverty	26.5	33.1	22.8	10.3	7.4
Offers for employment	33.1	47.1	7.4	8.8	3.7
Radicalization by radical clerics	55.9	30.9	8.1	2.9	2.2
Marginalization	21.3	33.1	19.1	14.7	11.8
Encouragement by family/ community members	16.2	31.6	15.4	25.0	11.8
Extreme religious beliefs	42.6	33.8	11.8	8.1	3.7
Lack of formal education	25.0	29.4	19.9	18.4	7.4

| Total | 31.5 | 34.1 | 14.9 | 12.6 | 6.5 |

Source: *Author (2018)*

The result in table 8 indicated that 26.5% of respondents strongly agreed that poverty was a driver of violent extremism, 33.1% agreed, and 22.8% were neutral. However, 10.3% disagreed and 7.4% strongly disagreed. Poverty is synonymous with crime in general. For long-lasting solutions to these crimes, there is a need to focus on the reduction of poverty. This is evident from the outcome of this question with a total of 59.6% of respondents who were of the opinion that poverty was a driver to violent extremism. Only 17.7% had a reservation with poverty being a cause of violent extremism. Terror organizations may easily and successfully lure unemployed youth from poor families with offers of employment through fighting for terror groups. Such youths may be attracted to join terror groups. Therefore, the results of this question confirm that Poverty may lead to violent extremism.

On whether the subjects were driven to terror activities due to lack of employment which the terror groups promised to offer, 33.1% of the respondents strongly agreed, followed by 47.1% who agreed, while 7.4% were neutral, 8.8% disagreed and another 3.7% strongly disagreed with the statement. Lack of employment could lead to poverty since those unemployed individuals may not adequately afford basic social needs such as food. The 8.8% who disagreed, and 3.7% who strongly disagreed argued that there are other individuals who have good employment but still opt to engage in violent extremism activities, and therefore, lack of employment was not necessarily a driver to violent extremism. They argued that some of the terrorists may join terror groups only for self-esteem, nevertheless, the majority of the respondents affirmed that lack of employment might be a key driver to terrorism.

Radicalization through radical sermons by clerics who encourage their followers to join the jihad fight in order to fulfil spiritual martyrdom was also evaluated whereby 55.9% of the respondents strongly agreed, 30.9% agreed, 8.1% were neutral, as 2.9% disagreed and 2.2% strongly disagreed. It was noted that radicalization is the earliest stage in violent extremism where the terror recruits are indoctrinated to beliefs, ideas and ideals fronted by the violent extremists. Radical clerics carry out radicalization clandestinely and may not be easily detected by the police.

Another identified factor was whether the marginalisation of certain social groups could result in radicalization and terrorism. The results were 21.3% of the respondents strongly agreed, 33.1% agreed, 19.1% were neutral, while 14.7% disagreed and 11.8% strongly disagreed. It was noted that members of those communities who thought that they have not been included in development programs by the government tended to look for alternative ways by making the public vulnerable to terror activities. Thus the study finds that marginalisation could be a driver of violent extremism.

On the encouragement of individuals by family or community members to join extremism 16.2% of the respondents strongly agreed, 31.6% agreed, 15.4% were neutral and 25% disagreed, while 11.8% strongly disagreed. Encouragement by members of the family arises as a result of strong family beliefs, history and links to violent extremism. Those families believe that they need to offer at least one of them to go and fight for a 'just' cause through violent extremism. Hence, they respond to appeals by radical preachers who call on the faithful to contribute towards a war they believe will earn them some spiritual benefits.

On individuals having extreme religious beliefs, 42.6% of the respondents strongly agreed that it was a driving factor into violent extremism, while 33.8% agreed, 11.8% were neutral, another 8.1% disagreed and 3.7% strongly disagreed. In Islam, extreme religious beliefs are dangerous doctrines imparted by radical clerics into their followers. The beliefs drive individuals to believe that non-believers are unholy and deserve only death. The respondents affirmed that extreme religious beliefs propagated by radical clerics are a driver of violent extremism. To this end, the authorities should consider a policy that would hold such clerics accountable for the actions of their followers.

On education, 25% of the respondents strongly agreed that lack of formal education is a driver to violent extremism while 29.4% agreed, 19.9% were neutral, another 18.4% disagreed and 7.4% strongly disagreed. Therefore, the majority (54.4%) of the respondents approved lack of formal education could lead to violent extremism. Nevertheless, there was also a substantial total percentage (25.8%) of respondents who felt otherwise. As discussed earlier, some terror suspects attained formal education while others did not have. nevertheless, both categories still join violent extremism. Therefore, lack of formal education may not exclusively be a driver of violent extremism.

A total of 19.1% felt that there are more drivers to terrorism than social factors, meanwhile a majority total of 67.6% of the respondents approved lack of social well being as the main driver to terrorism.Therefore lack of social well being is a leading driver to terrorism.

4.5. Intervening Measures Against Violent Extremism

To establish possible solutions to violent extremism, it was important for the study to evaluate the possible countermeasures. Therefore, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with specific interventions that the police may adopt in addressing violent extremism. The interventions were expressed using five statements as shown in the results presented in table 9 below.

Table 9: The Intervening Actions

	Strongly Agree %	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Rehabilitation and reintegration of extremists	44.9	39.7	9.6	3.7	2.2
Engagement of local communities	45.6	41.2	11.0	1.5	0.7
Counter radicalization narrative programs	41.9	45.6	9.6	2.9	0.0
Formal Education to communities in affected zones	33.8	52.2	11.8	2.2	0.0
Amnesty offers to terror suspects	27.2	25.0	20.6	9.6	17.6
Total	38.6	40.7	12.5	3.9	4.2

Source: *Author (2018)*

The results in table 9 show that 44.9% of the respondents strongly agreed, and another 39.7% agreed that rehabilitation and reintegration of the extremists is an effective countermeasure. On the other hand, 9.6% were neutral, while 3.7% disagreed and 2.2% strongly disagreed. Rehabilitation and re-integration solely apply to those terror suspects or returnees who have volunteered to leave the terrorist groups and seek normal life once more. They are booked in reformation institutions, where they are taken through deradicalization programmes and assisted to reintegrate back into society. They are empowered with skills and resources to enable them to engage in life-sustaining activities. This countermeasure is said to work well with those

operatives who were lured into terrorism as a result of poverty or lack of employment. Leaving the returnees without empowering and engaging them in some normal social activities may render them idle, hence vulnerable to relapsing back into violent extremism. However, a minority of the respondents were of the opinion that engaging ex-terrorists may not prevent them from going back to violent extremism; while the majority affirmed it might be an effective measure.

Another analysed intervention was the engagement of the local communities to partner with the police against terrorism. From the findings, an overwhelming majority of the respondents at 45.6% strongly agreed, and 41.2% agreed, while 9.6% were neutral, 3.6% disagreed and 2.2% strongly disagreed. It was noted that terror suspects carry out their clandestine activities within the members of the public, who may have knowledge of those activities but fail to inform the authorities. To this end, the respondents confirmed that it is important for the police to work closely with the members of the local communities in the fight against violent extremism.

Radicalizers begin the recruitment process by imparting extremist ideologies in the minds of their subjects hence to defeat violent extremism there is a need to target the mind for counter ideologies. On the same statement, 41.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that counter-radicalization narrative programs are an effective intervention, while 45.6% agreed, 9.6% were neutral, but 2.2% disagreed as none strongly disagreed. The response greatly deduced that authorities should consider having a clear policy on counter-narrative as one of the solutions to violent extremism.

On having policies that ensure all members of the public in Mombasa County attain at least some formal education, 33.8% of the respondents strongly agreed that,

meanwhile 52.2% agreed, 11.8% were neutral, however, 2.2% disagreed and none strongly disagreed. As found in a previous question lack of formal education is not exclusively a driver to violent extremism, the overall response to this question also shows that having a formal education is only a part, but not a complete solution to violent extremism.

Offering amnesty to terror suspects to surrender themselves to the police in exchange for leniency against their activities was also considered as a possible intervening measure. The findings indicate that majority of the respondents 27.2% strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 20.6% were neutral, 9.6% disagreed and 17.6% strongly disagreed. This may only be a stop-gap measure since not all terror suspects may give in to the authorities. The statistics show that only about half of the respondents approved and the other half failed to approve that terror suspects should be offered amnesty. Therefore, amnesty is not a long-lasting solution but an approach just to interdict violent extremism.

A mean total of 79.3% of the respondents approved alternative counter measures like rehabilitation of terror suspects, police community patnerships, counter radical narratives and amnesty to operatives as the most effective measures. However a minority of 8.1 % felt that these actions would not deter violent extremism and there ought to be alternative means against terror suspects.The findings therefore indicate that the community and authority patnerships are effective against violent extremism.

4.6. Challenges Against Counter Violent Extremism Efforts

This objective was significant for policy formulation as it is important to establish any challenges and extent the police face the same as they fight terrorism. To establish the possible answers to this objective the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to

which specific deficiencies were an impediment to counter violent extremism efforts and the results are presented in table 10 below.

Table 10: Challenges Against Counter Violent Extremism Efforts

	Strongly Agree	Agree %	Neutral %	Disagree %	Strongly Disagree %
Inadequate resources	64.0	25.7	8.8	0.7	0.7
Insufficient legislation	33.1	42.6	10.3	11.0	2.9
Lack of relevant training for police officers	44.9	27.2	17.6	7.4	2.9
Poor police-community relations	35.3	35.3	22.1	5.9	1.5
Clandestine operations of violent extremist groups	28.7	42.6	20.6	3.7	4.4
Lack of intelligence	33.1	35.3	22.1	8.1	1.5
Total	39.9	34.8	16.9	6.1	2.3

Source: *Author (2018)*

On lack of adequate resources, 64% of the respondents strongly agreed it impeded countering violent extremism, as 25.7% agreed, meanwhile 8.8% were neutral but 0.7% disagreed and also 0.7% strongly disagreed. Resources are the enablers that the police ought to be provided with to effectively fight violent extremism. They may include vehicles, Information Technology and Communication equipment and money to pay for intelligence information. At 64% approval, the respondents affirmed inadequate resources to be a challenge in the fight against violent extremism. But less than 2% were of the contrary opinion and argued that not only adequate resources can ensure success against violent extremism. It's important to note that other counter

measures such as engagement of the local communities and use of intelligence may also be useful to the police to realise an effective counter violent extremism measure.

Insufficient laws to tackle violent extremism as a challenge scored at 33.1% strongly agreed, 42.6% agreed, as 10.3% were neutral, however, 11.0% disagreed with 2.9% strongly disagreed. The laws available may not be explicit to handle violent extremism. Apart from enforcement of counter-terrorism laws, the role of the police is not well defined in other countermeasures such as engagement of the local communities and deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes. According to the respondents, despite interacting extensively with terror suspects, the police roles do not include any level of engagement in the offering of counter-narratives, rehabilitation and deradicalization programmes to terror suspects. This role is mainly done only by non-governmental organisations and religious organisations. Therefore, the authorities should consider enacting laws that may enable them to have a role in the engagement of the local communities. Other laws are also not stringent enough to deter acts of violent extremism. To this end, the respondents overwhelmingly highlighted insufficient laws to be a challenge in countering violent extremism.

Lack of training of police officers in tackling terrorism as a challenge was confirmed by 44.9% of the respondents who strongly agreed and 27.2% agreed, 17.6% were neutral, while 7.4% disagreed as 2.9% strongly disagreed. Terrorism is an emerging serious global security challenge. Terrorists continue to invent new ways of committing acts of terrorism and to counter them the police need to be engaged in continuous training. Therefore, training on terrorism would offer the police new skills to handle terrorism and its emerging trends. The respondents were of the opinion that the police are not being trained to deal with terrorism thus making it a serious challenge that should be addressed by the government.

On poor police public relations as a challenge, 35.3% strongly agreed, as 35.3% agreed, with 22.1% remaining neutral but 5.9% disagreed and 1,5% strongly disagreed. Police public relations are the manner in which the police and the public engage each other. Poor relations may yield negative engagement or no engagement at all. When there is a negative engagement the members of the public may know but fail to inform the police of terror suspects amongst them. While if there are positive relations the members of the public are likely to offer the police information about terrorism activities. The majority of the respondents 70.6% termed poor police-public relations to be a challenge in the fight against violent extremism and this ought to be addressed by society in general.

When asked the question of whether the clandestine manner in which violent extremists operate make it difficult for the police to predict and act on those activities 28.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that it is a challenge, 42.6% agreed, 20.6% were neutral, and 3.7% disagreed as 4.4% strongly disagreed. Violent extremists have resorted to engaging in their activities in an extremely discrete manner to avoid detection. This makes it very difficult for the police to apprehend them. It's very dangerous if they may plan a terror attack without being detected. The police can be surprised by an attack due to a lack of information from operatives' activities. This tactic by the terror operatives poses a serious challenge to the police as affirmed by the response statistics at a total of 63.2% of the respondent.

On lack of intelligence on violent extremism activities 33.1% of the respondents strongly agreed, 35.3% agreed, 22.1% were neutral with 8.1% disagreed and 1.5% strongly disagreed. Intelligence is the backbone of a good security policy; therefore, lack of intelligence is a serious challenge to tackling violent extremism. However, a total of 9.6% felt that lack of intelligence was a challenge, while the majority at a total

of 68.4% respondents were of the opinion that lack of intelligence was a challenge to the police while in the process of countering violent extremism.

A mean total of 74.7% approved that institutional cahellenges such insufficient resources and constrained relations between the police and the public was an impediment to the fight against terrorism. However a mean of 8.4% of the respondents were of the contrary opinion and felt that the above factors were not barriers for an effective counter terror war.

4.7 Summary of Analysis

A mean total of 86.8% of the respondents approve physical security measure as the only immediate strategy against terror activities. It's through this measure that dangerous weapons, suspicious movement, last stage attack execution planning and usage of false documents may be detected and pre-empted. Meanwhile a mean total of 4.9% felt these measures would only prevent and deter immediate and imminent terror activities, but should be supplemented by long-lasting non-physical and softer to counter approaches to violent extremism. An insignificant mean total of 8.2% were not sure of whether the physical security measure was effective or not and if at all they were to agree or disagree they could not change the feeling of the majority.

Only a mean total 4.3% disapproved soft approach to contering violent extremism against overwhelming majority of 86.5% who approved soft approaches and felt it was more effective than the hard counter measures. The   soft   approaches   yields intelligence that help the security agencies to deal with specific subject.This would avoid generalization as seen in security swoops that may victimise the innocent as well.The soft approach may als create confidence between the police and the public

through patnerships and this is evident with the overwheliming approval this approach received from the respondents.

Majority of the respondents at mean total of 77.2% approved stern actions against the individual terror suspects however some at 11.1% felt that such actions would futher harden those suspects into terrorism and felt that it was better to address the social greviances that might have led them into violent extremism. Only a mean total of 11.8% were neutral but majority were of the opinion that processing of terror suspects through the criminal justice system was an effective measure against terrorism.

A total of 19.1% felt that there are more drivers to terrorism than social factors meanwhile a majority total of 67.6% of the respondents approved lack of social well being as the main driver to terrorism.Therefore lack of social well being is a leading driver to terrorism.

A mean total of 79.3% of the respondents approved alternative counter measures like rehabilitation of terror suspects, police-public patnerships,counter radical narratives and pardon to operatives as the most effective measures meanwhile a marginal of 8.1 % felt that these actions would not discourage violent extremism and there ought to be alternative means against terror suspects.The findings indicate that the community and authority patnerships are effective against violent extremism.

A mean total of 74.7% approved institutional challenges such insufficient resources and constrained relations between the police and the public as impediment to the fight against terrorism however mean 8.4% of the respondents were of the differing opinion and felt that the above factors were not obstacles for an effective counter terror war.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed summary of the effectiveness of police security measures in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County, in Kenya. The chapter begins with a summary of the findings, conclusions, recommendations and suggestion for further studies.

5.2. Summary of the Findings

5.2.1. The Nature and Causes of Violent Extremism in Mombasa County

Despite concerted efforts by the police to end violent extremist activities, the problem is escalating more and more. Thus, this agitated the need to understand why the vice continues despite the police efforts; hence the resolve of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of security measures taken by the police to counter and deal with violent extremism in Mombasa County.

The drivers to violent extremism were found to be linked to social factors such as poverty and lack of employment that lure youths to join those groups. The youth are promised employment to earn a living and likewise the poor promised material wealth if they join or support the terror operatives. If offered an opportunity, individuals already with deep and radical religious beliefs easily join the terrorists in order to actualize those beliefs. Some of the radical beliefs are imparted into those individuals by radical clerics, however, some are self-radicalised through jihadist websites and social media. It was also found that the feeling of marginalisation in terms of social development such as lack of opportunity for good schooling, offers to state employment and appointments led them to feel unwanted and easily found alternative

affiliation with terror groups .Their main aim is recorgnition and identification. Lack of formal education also noted to play a role in causes of violent extremism in that the violent extremists easily target the youths without formal education with the promises of Islamic religious education and thereafter employment. This makes those youths easily give in, some ending up as fighters, errand boys and girls for those groups. Encouragement by family members came in as a surprise since some families believed that they need to sacrifice at least a member of the family to fight jihad as advocated by radical clerics.

5.2.2. The Effectiveness of the Measures Adopted by the Police in Curbing Violent Extremism in Mombasa County

The nature of the measures taken by the police against violent extremism was found to be physical actions that include ensuring that soft targets were well guarded and extra security put in place to deter any terror attacks, security screenings at vulnerable public place entrances, security patrols, road checks and swoops in selected areas.

On the physical security measures by police against acts of violent extremism, the findings indicated that over 40% of the respondents were in agreement that hardening of the vulnerable target is the most important measure against terrorist attack or other extremism activities. This is in concurrence with the argument by Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly, & Jarvis, (2014) that preventing terrorist acts through ensuring physical preventative hard security measure is indeed an effective strategy that could pre-empt terrorism attack. This is further supported and confirmed by the conceptual framework's independent variable of protecting vulnerable targets (figure 1). According to Miyandazi (2012), indiscriminate hard security actions may worsen the situation as the extremists seek to engage in retaliatory actions to drive their message of displeasure with the security measures. Nevertheless, it was a surprise that the

majority of over 40% of the respondents approved indiscriminate security actions against selected subjects with only a minority of 5.1% who disapproved of this particular measure. This contradicted the Miyandazi theory that indiscriminate actions may cause reactions. The outcome for this question also contradicted, Boucek (2008), who stated that softer approaches yield more success than hard approaches.

The findings confirmed El-Said (2012), argument that social diversity dictates the type of security measures to be applied in different locations against terrorism. Mombasa County has unique social, demographic and geographical features, therefore to yield desired results; the security measures should suit those aspects. This outcome indeed produced surprise findings to the study since most scholars have the opinion that only softer approaches worked most effectively. From table 5, a total mean of 42.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that the physical security measures were effective against violent extremism. While only a total mean of 0.6% was in strong disagreement.

The non-physical security measures were found to be the use of intelligence-led policing, inter-agency exchange of information, sensitization of members of the public, surveillance on terror suspects and use of posters to advertise wanted terror suspects for public awareness.

On the non-physical security measures against violent extremism, the results indicated that 66.2% and 30.1% of the respondents strongly agreed and agreed respectively with the use of intelligence as a countermeasure which is the most effective strategy against violent extremism. This makes a total of 96.3% who gave the nod to the application of intelligence as opposed to 0.7% who disagreed with this measure. The use of intelligence-led counter-terror operations by the security agencies may help in

avoiding indiscriminate actions that may victimize both the innocent and terror suspects alike. According to Botha (2013), lack of intelligence on terrorism is a serious challenge to the fight against terror. Without information to single out the suspects, then generalizations would make innocent victims be caught up and may develop a negative perception towards the security officers. The findings in this study confirm what Botha indicated.

From table 6, the total mean for respondents who strongly agreed with the softer approaches was 53.4% and those who strongly disagreed was 1.6%. The police measures against individual terrorism suspects were found to be proactive arrests, interrogation and interviews, prosecution of those suspects, holding them in police custody and compelling suspects to report to the police periodically

The objective of this question was to evaluate the manner in which the police handle individual terror suspects. The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents thought that tough actions against individual terror suspects were effective in the war on terror. This was a contradiction of Boucek (2008), who posits that positive engagement of terror suspects yields 80% success in disengaging them from violent extremism and back into normal life. Boeck's argument is supported by a majority of studies as a successful countermeasure. This has also received backing from McQuaid, Asfura-Heim, Mak, & Powell (2015), who posits that expanding counter violent extremism approaches beyond law enforcement interventions allows a broader operational space in the social domain with multiple actors and expertise. Most of the respondents were law enforcement officers and their response against the individual terror suspect was not a surprise. Therefore, to address violent extremism, law enforcers should as well be equipped to deal with violent extremism within the community sphere apart from their mainstream law enforcement duties.

Table 7 indicated that a total mean of 35.6% strongly agreed that isolating the terror suspects and taking specified legal actions against them was effective against violent extremism. However, 2.7% strongly disagreed with the approach.

5.2.3. Approaches to Improve Police Counter Violent Extremism Measures in Mombasa County

On the intervening measures, the respondents were asked to indicate the level to which they approved specific actions which the police may adopt in addressing violent extremism. The actions were presented in five statements and the result was that the average mean score for those statements found that engagement of local communities and counter-radicalization narratives by moderate clerics with the highest score being 45.6% of the respondents' approval. This suggests the police should direct more effort in engaging targeted individuals and communities to boost the fight against violent extremism. The results of the response to this question confirm Fink (2014), United Nations Resolution 2178, 2014 which emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach that include engagement of local communities and security agencies in addressing the problem of violent extremism.

The response also supported McQuaid, Asfura-Heim, Mak, & Powell (2015), who states that expanding counter violent extremism approaches beyond law enforcement interventions allows a broader operational space in the social domain with multiple actors and expertise.

Table 9 indicates that a mean total of 38.6% of the respondents strongly agreed that the use of intervening measures would improve the effectiveness of police actions against violent extremism, whereas 4.2% strongly disagreed with the intervening measures to be sufficient in police action against violent extremism.

5.2.4. Challenges Against Counter Violent Extremism Efforts

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which specific deficiencies were an impediment to counter violent extremism efforts and the results were, insufficient resources to the police in countering violent extremism had the highest concurrence at 64% of the responses.

This confirms what McGaghie, Issenberg, Petrusa, & Scalese, (2010) stated that lack of capacity impeded any effort to address violent extremism.

Table 10 indicated that a mean total of 74.7% felt that deficiencies were a challenge to counter violent extremism efforts while 2.3% strongly disagreed with the statement.

5.3. Conclusion

The study examined the effectiveness of the measures employed by the police in addressing violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya. It was established that police measures had both direct and indirect impact on the levels of violent extremism. The respondents were of the opinion that certain police actions such as general swoops on targeted communities had adverse effects on the prevalence of violent extremism instead of reducing it. It created mistrust between the members of those communities and the security agencies. Some community members went as far as even sympathizing with the terrorists as a direct result of police action. It was particularly noted in the physical hard measures and the need to use softer community approaches such as liaising with the members of the community was seen to have a greater advantage in mitigating acts associated with violent extremism. On the other hand, softer approaches such as the use of intelligence to deal with terrorism were seen as the greatly preferred approaches.

The causes of violent extremism were found to be push and pull factors such as social-economic conditions such as poverty, lack of formal education and radicalisation and encouragement by radical clerics. The individuals who engaged in terror activities were driven by the search for ways to sustain their livelihoods. Others were convinced to join those groups due to extreme ideologies and not for material gains. The approaches to improve measures used by the police to address violent extremism in Mombasa County were established as the factors moderating violent extremism activities. These include counter-narratives by moderate clerics and reintegration and rehabilitation of surrendered terror operatives, the need for Police-public partnership. (Figure 1: Conceptual Framework). There was also the need for authorities to ensure that the youth receive basic education and announce offers of amnesty for any radical individuals who gave in to the authority.

The challenges the police face was found to hinder the countering violent extremism efforts by those law enforcers. Inadequate resources, lack of relevant training to the police and poor police – public relationships were the most predominant challenges in the police measures against terrorism.

5.4. Recommendations

Grounded on the findings of the study were various recommendations aimed at improving police measures against violent extremism. The study endorses the application of intelligence-led policing approaches to pinpoint the terror operatives hence avoid the general inconvenience of indiscriminate security swoops that apart from going for terror suspects, might also net innocent individuals.

The study also recommends the hardening of soft targets such as crowded public places through security guard frisks, walk through security scanners, surveillance

cameras and improved access controls. This will help in making it harder for terrorists to carry out pre-attack surveys and in the end the prevention of terrorism.

The police and members of the public should partner more in controlling violent extremism. This can be done by the creation of forums where both will specifically focus on violent extremism to find solutions to the problem. This will help the police in getting intelligence reports from the members of the communities on issues concerning terrorism that they experience within their areas.

The major stakeholders including and not limited to County governments, community leaders, the interior ministry in charge of security, the Ministry of Finance, the Kenya National Police Service and the National Counter Terrorism Centre to work together in building police capacity necessary to manage violent extremism. This can be through more funding and training of police officers in Counter Violent extremism.

5.5. Suggested Areas for Further Studies

This study suggests the following area for future studies; -

1) To determine the differences in police measures against violent extremism over different localities, similar studies to be done in other geographical locations with almost similar physical and social setups, this may include studies in western Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and any other place around the globe.

2) Establish the measures taken by the police against violent extremism over a different period of time and place to determine any improvement or changes in the effectiveness of those measures.

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APPENDIX I: Research Study Budget

Item/ Description	Unit/ Rate	Amount *(in Kshs.)*
1. Stationery		
a) Printing paper	5 reams @ 500	2,500.00
b) Pens/ Pencils/ Ruler/ etc.	Assorted	1,600.00
c) Flash Disks/ Recording devices	Assorted	5,500.00
2. Field Expenses		
a) Travelling		2,5000.00
b) Food & Accommodation		70,000.00
c) Hiring of research assistants		15,000.00
d) Other auxiliary expenses; e.g. phone credit and internet	Approximate	5,000.00
d) Contingencies	25% of total expenses	25250
TOTAL		**127,750**

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH STUDY WORK PLAN

Activity	Jan '18	Feb '18	Mar '18	Apr '18	May '18	Jun '18	Jul '18	Aug '18	Sep '18	Oct '18	Nov '18	Dec '18
Proposal Writing					■	■						
Defence of proposal							■					
Data Preparation/ Collection								■	■			
Data Analysis/ Interpretation										■		
Report Writing											■	
First Submission Draft												■
Final Submission												■

84

APPENDIX III

Dear sir/Madam

My name is Martin Otieno, a Master student from Kenyatta University. I am currently carrying out research as a requirement for the attainment of a Masters of Arts Degree in Leadership and Security Management. The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures taken by the police to counter violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya. I would be grateful if you spare a few minutes to fill in this questionnaire. Your participation is completely out of free will and any information you provide shall be kept confidential. The data collected from this research shall be used for research and academic purposes only. For any communication, kindly contact me at martinomumbo@yahoo.com

SECTION A: OFFICERS PERSONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL DETAILS

Fill/Tick as appropriate

1. Name of your current Station

    _____

2.

Rank	Constable	NCO	Inspectorate	Gazetted Officer
Tick appropriately				

3. Your Current Department within the

_____

4. Your age bracket

Age	Below 20	20-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60
Tick appropriately									

5. Gender? Male ☐   Female ☐

6. Highest Education level? Please tick in the box ☐ PhD   ☐ Master's Degree

☐ Degree   ☐ Diploma   ☐ A-level   ☐ Form four   ☐ Form two

☐ Standard eight   ☐ Standard Seven   ☐   Any other (Specify)
_____

7. What   is   your   Current   position/role?

_____

8. How long have you been in the Service?

Years of Service	Below 5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	Over 30
Tick appropriately							

IN THIS PART FOR SECTIONS A, B, C & D, PLEASE APPROPRIATELY FILL IN THE SPACES PROVIDED SCALES AS INDICATED (FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS)

Strongly Disagree (SD) = 1

Disagree (D) =2

Neutral (N) =3

Agree (A) =4

Strongly Agree (SA) =5

SECTION B: PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

9. The following statements are meant to establish the level of effectiveness of the preventative physical security measures of patrols, security checks and guarding of vulnerable areas in preventing violent extremism

Physical Preventative Measures	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
Security screenings at entrances of vital and vulnerable areas can effectively prevent terrorist activities					
Guarding of vital installations and places is an effective measure against violent extremism activities					
Security patrols are an effective measure against.in deterring violent extremism activities					

Security road checks are an effective measure against violent extremism					
Security swoops in dwelling areas believed to be holding terrorists is an effective measure against violent extremism					

SECTION C: NON-PHYSICAL MEASURES AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

10. The following statements are aimed at establishing the level of effectiveness of non-physical proactive measures of intelligence gathering, sharing of information, offering rewards for information leading to arrest of wanted terror suspects

Non-Physical Actions and Proactive Measures against terrorism activities	SA (5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
Intelligence gathering and dissemination to relevant section is an effective measure against violent extremism					
Sharing information within the law enforcement agencies is an effective measure against violent extremism					
The price tag on wanted terror suspect is an effective measure against violent extremism					
Surveillance on terror suspects is an effective measure against violent extremism					
Sensitisation on issues of violent extremism in churches, private security companies & private institutions is an effective measure against violent extremism activities					

SECTION D: POLICE MEASURES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM SUSPECTS

11. The following statements are aimed at establishing the level of effectiveness of arrests and prosecution of terrorist suspects by the police in mitigating violent extremism

Police Actions Against Individual Violent Extremist Suspects	SA (5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
Proactive arrests can effectively prevent violent extremism activities					
Interrogations/interviews of terror suspects can effectively prevent violent extremism activities					
Prosecution of terror suspects can effectively prevent violent extremism activities					
Remanding and Jailing of terror suspects can effectively prevent violent extremism activities					
Compelling attendance to the police station can effectively prevent violent extremism activities					

SECTION E: DRIVERS TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

12. The following statements are aimed at establishing the drivers to violent extremism and the highest, possible and most effective measures by the police to curb them

Drivers To Violent Extremism	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
Violent extremists are pushed into those terror organizations due to poverty					
Offers for employment by the violent extremist groups pull individuals to join those groups					
Radicalisation by radical clerics is the root cause of individuals joining violent extremist groups					
The marginalisation of certain communities is a pushing factor for individuals to join violent extremist groups					
Encouragement by family or community members is a factor that drives individuals to join violent extremist groups					
Extreme religious beliefs pull individuals into violent extremism groups					
Lack of formal education pushes individuals into violent extremist groups					

SECTION F: CHALLENGES AGAINST COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM EFFORTS

13. The following statements are aimed at establishing challenges against counter violent extremism efforts

Challenges in counter terrorism efforts	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
Inadequate resources					
Insufficient legislation					
Lack of relevant training for police officers					
Poor police-community relations					
Clandestine operations of violent extremist groups					
Lack of intelligence					

SECTION F: INTERVENING MEASURES

14. The following statements are aimed at establishing the possible effective measures by the police to counter violent extremism

Intervening Measures Against Violent Extremism	SA(5)	A(4)	N(3)	D(2)	SD(1)
Rehabilitation and reintegration of extremists can effectively reduce violent extremism					
Engagement of the local communities can effectively reduce violent extremism					
Counter radicalization narrative programs reduce can effectively reduce violent extremism					

Formal education to communities in affected zones can effectively reduce violent extremism					
Amnesty offers to terror suspects to surrender can effectively reduce violent extremism					

SECTION H: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE COUNTER-MEASURES (FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS)

15. Any other way in which the police can make the physical preventative measure to be more effective?

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16. Any other way in which the police can make the non-physical preventative measure to be more effective?

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17. What are your suggestions on the improvement of the handling of violent extremist suspects?

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18. Your comments on challenges of counter violent extremisms measures

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APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Dear sir/Madam

My name is Martin Otieno, a Master student from Kenyatta University. I am currently carrying out a research as a requirement for the attainment of a Masters of Arts Degree in Leadership and Security Management. The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures taken by the police to counter violent extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya. I would be grateful if you spare a few minutes to fill in this questionnaire. Your participation is completely out of free will and any information you provide shall be kept confidential. The data collected from this research shall be used for research and academic purposes only. For any communication, kindly contact me at martinomumbo@yahoo.com

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

Fill/Tick as appropriate

1.

	Employed	jobless	Self-employed	business	Any other /specify
Please tick in the box					

2. Your age bracket

Age	Below 20	20-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60
Please tick in the box									

4. Gender? Male ☐ ☐ Female

5. Highest Education level? Please tick in the box ☐ PhD ☐ Master's Degree

☐ Degree ☐ Diploma ☐ A-level ☐ Form four ☐ Form two

☐ Standard eight ☐ Standard Seven ☐ Any other(Specify) _____

6. Proffession_____

INFORMED CONSENT

After being informed of the purpose of the interview I agree………. /do not agree………. (Tick appropriately) and also reserve the right to withdraw at any stage of the interview.

Signature of interviewee…………………. date…………………

Signature of the interviewer………………date…………………

SECTION B: GUIDING QUESTIONS (FOR ALL CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS)

1. What are the drivers towards violent extremism?

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2.Are the measures taken by the police against violent extremism effective against the vice?

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3. What are the most effective measures the police can take to mitigate violent extremism?

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APPENDIX V: RESEARCH APPROVAL

KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

E-mail: dean-graduate@ku.ac.ke

Website: www.ku.ac.ke

P.O. Box 43844, 00100
NAIROBI, KENYA
Tel. 810901 Ext. 4150

Internal Memo

FROM: Dean, Graduate School

DATE: 30ᵗʰ April, 2019

TO: Martin Otieno Omumbo
C/o Security and Correction Science Dept

REF: S203/38604/2017

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF RESEARCH PROJECT PROPOSAL

This is to inform you that Graduate School Board at its meeting of 18ᵗʰ April, 2019 approved your Research Project Proposal for the M.A Degree Entitled, Effectiveness of Police Security Measures in Addressing Violent Extremism in Mombasa County, Kenya".

You may now proceed with your Data Collection, Subject to Clearance with Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation.

As you embark on your data collection, please note that you will be required to submit to Graduate School completed Supervision Tracking Forms per semester. The form has been developed to replace the Progress Report Forms. The Supervision Tracking Forms are available at the University's Website under Graduate School webpage downloads.

Thank you.

HARRIET ISABOKE
FOR: DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL

c.c. Chairman, Department of Security and Correction Science

Supervisors:

1. Dr. Cyprian Kavivya
   C/o Department of Security and Correction Science
   Kenyatta University

HI/Imn

97

APPENDIX VI: RESEARCH PERMIT

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. MARTIN OTIENO OMUMBO
of KENYATTA UNIVERSITY, 90707-8100
MOMBASA, has been permitted to
conduct research in Mombasa County

on the topic: EFFECTIVENESS OF
POLICE SECURITY MEASURES IN
ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN
MOMBASA COUNTY, KENYA

for the period ending:
7th March, 2020

Applicant's
Signature

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/19/36634/28571
Date Of Issue : 7th March, 2019
Fee Recieved : Ksh 1000

Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation