# Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa: How international interventions influence the Security of Civilians

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Omondi Okwany
University of Nairobi
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Countering Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa: How international interventions influence the Security of Civilians

Author(s): *Omondi Okwany*
Nairobi, Kenya.
Corresponding author: Omondi Okwany

Abstract

International intervention and engagement in the Horn of Africa continuously impacted the security of the civilians in the Horn of Africa. Engagements and policies such as Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter violent

Extremisms (CVE) has fuelled militia groups' action leading to destabilization, uncertainty, and insecurity in the Horn. The military intervention such as the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) engagement in southern Somalia has contributed to a win some lose some game – the militia losing some territory in Kismayo but relatively winning some in coastal Kenya, North Eastern part, and the capital city Nairobi. Such moves have negatively impacted the security of the civilians in the Horn of Africa.

Most of the CVE engagements in the Horn of Africa are funded by external actors. Both Kenya and Somalia's CVE engagements denote the hard-power approach. However, actors in CVE in Kenya are mostly the civil society which is facing an antagonistic relationship with the government, but the Somalia case demonstrates a collaboration of external actors and government. Despite the countering measures and deradicalization programs, CVE engagements in the Horn of Africa are in their infancy.

In understanding concepts such as CT and CVE, the article heavily relies on qualitative approaches. Explaining security requires an informed grasp of the localness – how the locals feel and interpret security. Therefore, the paper relies on interviews done between the years 2015 to 2020 from various projects initiatives such as evaluating the Norwegian embassy project in Kenya and Somalia in 2015, the European Union (EU) horizon 2020 project on ICT4COP[1] 2015 to 2020, and a CVE mapping project for the Search for Common Ground in 2019. The paper

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[1] https://www.communitypolicing.eu/

concludes that it is essential to focus on the existing local dynamics and strategies when it comes to CVE. These locals have different soft approaches when it comes to dealing with insecurity, such as Violent Extremism (VE). Therefore, governments and international actors should embrace some of the civil society strategies of engaging local knowledge.

Introduction

The end of World War II brought with it an increasing engagement of the United States (US) military in Africa with economic, military, and national security interests. In the Horn of Africa, the US supported the Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi administration militarily while the Soviet Union supported Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime (Divon & Derman, 2017). Such engagement tempo increased with the George Bush Administration forming the US African Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 to CT (Mills & Herbst, 2007). This international military engagement contributed to destabilization, insecurity, uncertainty, societal dysfunction, and VE in countries such as Somalia (Besteman, 2017). While in some parts of the Horn of Africa, it has influenced Kenya to join the world in CT initiatives which subjected the Kenyan Muslim population to government's securitization and militarization –hard-power strategies (Kagwanja, 2006; Kamau, 2006; Mogire & Mkutu Agade, 2011; Prestholdt, 2011).

Another example can be seen with the shift of the Ethiopian government and Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) intervention, supported by the US, emerged in 2006 when the political antagonism in Somalia between the Islamic Court Union (ICU) and the TFG of Somalia leading to a military engagement and the rise of al-Shabaab.[1] Before the Ethiopian intervention, the US Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) and the TFG engaged the AIAI[2] militarily. Both the ARPCT-TFG collaboration and the Ethiopian-US intervention failed, leading to the formation of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)[3] to counter Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) such as al-Shabaab (Sousa, 2014).

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[1] An ICU military wing emerged as part of the Union, precursors of al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI) and is affiliated to AlQaeda.

[2] al-Itihad al-Islami was an Islamic militia formed in 1982, Somalia, it was associated with Al-Qaeda, the group rose to overthrow Jaalle Mohamed Siad Barre Said Bare's administration in the 1990s.

[3] An African Union military consist of Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia

The AMISOM intervention pushed al-Shabaab to the west of Jubaland, Somalia, the long porous border between Kenya and Somalia which is challenging to control and al-Shabaab took advantage to carry out sporadic attacks and kidnapping of foreign nationals in north-eastern and coastal Kenya, leading to a Kenyan intervention (O. Okwany, 2016; Williams, 2013). The KDF through *Operation Linda Nchi[4]*, intended to create a buffer zone between the borders of Kenya and Somalia. Later, KDF joined AMISOM to counter al-Shabaab in Jubaland, Somalia (Migue & Oluoch, 2014). This military engagement has led to further Violent Extremism (VE), Radicalization, and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, with al-Shabaab losing some territory on the one hand but the other, winning some in Kenya (Hansen, 2013). Ali's (2019) work also strongly confirms that foreign military interventions have negatively impacted civilians and domestic politics in Somalia. Foreign intervention disengages the public from decision-making and interferes with processes such as domestic justice, peace, and reconciliation.

Despite having more than 18,000 personnel, 8,000 soldiers from Ethiopia and Kenya alone, AMISOM's lacklustre performance in Somalia can be attributed to a lack of relevant capacity and resources to counter al-Shabaab (Williams, 2013). The current uncertainty in Ethiopia between the Tigray ethnic group and the Ethiopian government under prime minister Abiy Ahmed poses a challenge to CT and CVE efforts in the Horn. Already the Ethiopian military has withdrawn from AMISOM claiming a lack of international support. Such a move is an injury to the AMISOM progress and an advantage to the militia.

Al-Shabaab lacking the capacity to fight a conventional war has replied with attacks of retaliation geared towards instilling fear in the civilian population. Amongst these are the 11th July 2010 Kampala attack in Uganda which left 74 dead and 71 injured (Botha, 2016). The 21st September 2013 Westgate attacks killed 67 civilians, the 15th and 17th June 2014 Mpeketoni attacks killed over 60 civilians (Anderson & McKnight, 2014), the 2nd of April 2015 Garissa attacks in which 147 students lost their lives (Mutisya & Owuor, 2018), the El-Adde claiming the lives of an estimated 180 Kenyan soldiers (Williams, 2016), the 2019 DusitD2 complex attack in Nairobi which claimed 21 deaths, just to mention but a few.

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[4] A military intervention/foreign policy decision to fight the Al-Shabaab.

Despite these attacks, there has been increasing attention to politics aiming to CVE within the Horn of Africa (Hansen, Lid, & Okwany, 2019; Ndungu & Salifu, 2017; Ruteere, 2011).

However, CVE in the Horn of Africa is mostly carried out by civil societies supported by international organizations funded by western governments (Hansen et al., 2019). The government mentioned above interventions, global support initiatives, and retaliation from AlShabaab raises the following questions; 1) Why does international and national engagement on CVE lead to other VE in the Horn of Africa? 2) How do the existing externally-funded non-state actors' initiatives contribute to countering violent extremism in the Horn of Africa? and 3) What are the current capacities and limitations in addressing VE dynamics in communities affected by al-Shabaab's Radicalization and extremism?

The paper uses qualitative methods to evaluate these questions. Qualitative approaches are suitable as they focus on community involvement; the methods appreciate the real-life situation and try to shed light on a people's way of life (Golafshani, 2003). Instead, it also needs to be understood in a complex setting, including much more emphasis on the local community aspect.

CVE also differs from the "standard" state view of power in that it emphasizes a different "softer" form of power relations and a community-based approach. In understanding how CVE affects other communities, the "localness" is vital. Hence, the paper relies on information gathered during interviews with key informants from different government institutions, as well as civil societies and local communities in Kenya, telephone and email correspondence from Somalia as the primary source of information. These interviews were done between the years 2015 and 2020 from the various project such as the evaluation of the Norwegian embassy CVE projects in Kenya and Somalia, the EU horizon 2020 project on community policing[5] , and a CVE mapping project for an international organization –Search for Common Grounds. First, an understanding of the concepts CVE, VE radicalization, and deradicalization is necessary to understand the different policy strategies and interventions.

Conceptualization

Since September 11, 2001, VE has dominated the field of security and foreign policy. However,

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[5] https://www.communitypolicing.eu/

VE is still related to 'radicalization' and with CVE connected to the etymological opposite of Radicalization, which is 'deradicalization' (Koehler, 2016). State intervention, like CT, is also associated with deradicalization (Horgan, 2014). The concept of radicalization has an antagonistic nature in its definition. It cannot be treated as absolute, for it is a source of confusion. It is more confusing when put into the context of foreign policy, security, and integration; each has its meaning and agenda (Sedgwick, 2010). VE and Radicalization have been subjected to terrorism (Reinares et al., 2008) or narrowly defined as the process of an individual adopting extremist ideology (Braddock, 2014).

A leading researcher in VE, Koehler (2016) opines that Radicalization is a process of depluralization or decontestation of political ideas, concepts, principles, and values such as freedom, honor, violence, and democracy. It is the process of the individual internalization of political views/concepts with the notion of no alternative interpretation. Internalizing these political concepts or ideas can be intellectual or emotional. (Koehler, 2016, Pg. 65-94).

On the other hand, deradicalization is concerned with concepts such as rehabilitation, counseling, disbandment, deprogramming, amnesty, reforms, demobilization, dialogue, reintegration, disengagement, counter-radicalization, and reconciliation (Horgan & Taylor, 2011, Pg. 175). However, it cannot be said that one is deradicalized after disengagement (Horgan, 2014). Interview with three returnees in Majengo Pumwani, Nairobi demonstrate the same. The highly securitized environment and community rejection in Majengo can lure returnees back to Radicalization. The ground has robust government surveillance, and the denial is contributed by community stigma, leading to uncertainty, the possibility of further Radicalization, and insecurity to the community. The three interviewees demonstrated they are not free to travel without permission from security forces.

An interview with Hassan Ole Nado, a leader at the Supreme Council of Muslims in Kenya (SUPKEM) demonstrates that the return is both an opportunity and a threat depending on how the returnees are being treated. Two other interviews with two community-based organizations in Majengo confirms that despite SUPKEM having a reintegration and deradicalization program, the governments' hard power strategy such as robust surveillance and strict movement measures put on those given amnesties is a hindrance to the deradicalization process. Those granted amnesties feel imprisoned by the surveillance and restrictions from the government.

As indicated earlier, the conceptualization debate leads to the contestation of programs that are meant to alter, reduce, counter, or prevent VE. A new concept Transformative Violent Extremism (TVE) emerged with Mohammed Abu-Nimer's work of 2018. He, however, fails to define the concept of TVE. There is a contradiction between Austin, J Giesmann, and Abu-Nimer who in their writing, aver that research has distanced itself from religious beliefs as a driver of VE and concentrated on the role of civil societies, youth, gender, identity formation, and social exclusion. However, Abu-Nimer believes that there is Islamization of CVE and PVE. Abu-Nimer furthers contends that "many studies emphasize the push rather than pull factors in their diagnosis of the drivers"(Austin & Giessmann, 2018, Pg. 6). In contrast, Austin and Giessmann say push and pull factors are interwoven and mutually reinforcing – push and pull are hardly inseparable, and when one talks of one the other imply (Austin & Giessmann, 2018, Pg. iii).

In contradicting CVE and PVE, Abu-Nimer (2018) avers that there is a lack of empirical data to back this position in CVE/PVE. The reverse of this statement is true. He describes PVE and CVE as programs focusing on hard power – intelligence, surveillance, youth, and their religious leader's engagement strategies. As is demonstrated below, this statement is true in cases of state actors while it couldn't be right because a significant number of civil societies have made great efforts in using soft power strategies in targeting VE.

Austin and Giessmann (2018, Pg. iv) do not comprehensively describe the concept of TVE. They say:

> *"TVE emphasizes the necessity and the possibility of changing actors, and their means of violence, rather than solely stepping up security or resilience to protect and prevent: Transforming violent extremism recognizes that while violent extremism exists, the reasons and motivators leading to an individual being drawn to violent extremist movements can be transformed into a different type of agency or engagement"*. (also see, Slachmui-jlder, 2017, Pg.4).

Austin and Giessmann (2018) add that TVE focuses on the community, religion, and cultural context. However, such a focus is also related to PVE and CVE projects. Focusing on TVE dynamics and actors, a critical question would be 'transformed by who and what transforms not a securitization or a resilience act? If 'transform' means to alter from a situation to a different one, for example, from being a member of a VEO to another agency or engagement in societal accepted

behaviors or institutions, then how different is TVE from CVE or PVE? The practical question worth posing would then be, how should it be done, and who is responsible for doing it? The practicalities of targeting VE is further discussed below.

In line with no alternative interpretation of the political ideas/concepts, Radicalization can lead to extremism such as 1) fundamentalism – strict adherence to a political/religious ideology, 2) dogmatism – the principle of one denying the alternative truth/facts and 3) sectarianism – an excessive attachment to a party or a sect. It can also lead to violence/militancy (Hansen & Lid, 2020). Violence through vigilante groups is not new in Kenya, and It has been a strategy for political parties and leaders, funding organization youth groups to threaten their opponents or opposing supporters (Anderson, 2002; Jonyo & Buchere, 2011).

The Kenyan government gazetted about 46 violent youth groups in 2014, and the KNCHR (2014), some of which are *Mungiki, Taliban*, *Kamjeshi, Bagdaad boys, Angola Msumbiji, Sungu Sungu, Chinkororo, Sabaot Land Defence Force* (SLDF), *Tia Nazi*, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), *Kamukunji* Pressure Group, *Kariobangi* Boys to mention but a few. However, violence is not only associated with these groups but also state security institutions are perpetrators of it. Extrajudicial killings of high-profile Muslim clerics such as Shamir Hashim Khan, Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohamed, Sheikh Abubakar Shariff (also Known as Makaburi), including torture and killings of individuals such as Kassim Omollo and Salim Mohammed Nero is associated with the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU). About 562 cases, most of which are police torture and abuse were linked to government tactical reaction to al-Shabaab clandestine attacks (O. Okwany, 2016).

Why does international and national engagement on countering violent extremism contribute to violent extremism in the Horn of Africa?

It can be argued that the increase of counter-terrorism policies in the Horn of Africa has paradoxically had the opposite effect, leading to increased violent extremism in the region. The international intervention has led to significant al-Shabaab deadliest reprisal such have recently been reported, for example, the 14th October 2017 Mogadishu bombing that claimed the lives of more than 512 and injuring more than 316 civilians (Sheikh & Obulutsa, 2017). Several CVE and deradicalization policies have emerged from international and national engagements. Even though

states giving amnesty to those wanting to disengage with VEOs such as al-Shabaab, CVE, and deradicalization programs and policies in the Horn of Africa are in their infancy.

Funding and creation of CVE programs have heightened despite the lack of clarity in the concept (Hansen & Lid, 2020). The concept is related to deradicalization, and its entomological opposite VE connected to Radicalization. The lack of clarity leads to uninformed and weak policies, programs, and implementation. The turn towards a more research-focused analysis on how international intervention influences the security of civilians with efforts from civil society is understated. However, still, there are large gaps to fill within this research field, especially when it comes to research that is also informed by qualitative research on the ground. This is likely to foster a different and more nuanced perspective that can offer valuable insight both from a theoretical as well as a political point of view.

In understanding VEOs, one needs to take into consideration of the different dynamics of territorialities. VEOs such as Al-Shabaab do not fight a conventional war. States coalitions such as AMISOM is very powerful to the VEOs. However, Al-Shabaab's clandestine tactic plays well in territories with heavy government presence. Full control territories are areas in which the militia has a great advantage. VEOs control these areas and, in some instances, imposes sanctions to the local and provide security. These are areas such as Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba, Bay, and Sakool region in southern Somalia. Social units such as family, clan, religious organizations, and business interact and cooperate with the VEOs for stability and probability of security. Such entities and enterprises pay taxes to the VEOs and in some instances, integrate into the VEOs' structures.

Semi-territoriality is areas with massive government presence such as Mogadishu and Kismayo with heavy AMISOM presence. Governments control these areas, and CVE work only takes place in government watch – on many occasions, hard power tactics exist. CVE work prevails between the brokers and the social order created by militarization. In these territories, social structures are a force to participate in CVE work. The possibilities of families, clans, or businesses getting sanctions in semi-territoriality areas lead them to participate (Gelot & Hansen, 2019). The third reality involves territories with massive government, both police and army based, but the VEOs still manage to conduct clandestine attacks. Such territories are Northeastern Kenya where al-Shabaab recruitment and attacks are sporadic. CVE work in these areas is also complicated due to massive government control. Therefore, understanding the local dynamics, VEOs territoriality

aspect is vital when it comes to CVE work and militarization –hard power proves to be unproductive since deradicalization, and CVE work is sophisticated, they involve not only the physical aspect but also the psycho-social aspect of the individual.

Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya

Following the Kenyan intervention to counter-terrorism in Somalia through a foreign policy initiative – *Operation Linda Nchi*, VE, and Radicalization have been increasing in Kenya (Hansen et al., 2019; O. Okwany, 2016). As mentioned earlier, evidence of VEOs' acts increased since the KDF intervention, with the possibility for further threats looming. The interventions, therefore have led to a territoriality game, what Jarle Hansen calls a 'win some loose some' game.

Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of the gaps in Kenya's security systems and recruited youth between 20 and 26 years of age in the country (Botha, 2014). Interviews in 2019 indicated that the group has been targeting children and youths in their teenage in Kenyan schools. The Garissa University attack confirmed that universities could be a breeding ground for VEOs when one of the attackers was identified as a student of Law at the University of Nairobi. However, further investigation is required in learning institutions (Ousmanou, 2019).

Kenyan government military capability is robust, and there is a massive military and General Service Unit (GSU) in the potential conflict zones. The government investment in enormous military arsenal and personnel in these areas demonstrate the ability to counter-terror. However, the capacity is limited to hard-power strategies while the VEOs have a sophisticated approach such as radicalization combined with the performance of guerrilla insurgencies.

Despite the strengths mentioned above, the hand of government is also limited in such regions. As indicated earlier, the North-eastern parts of Kenya, for example, which are mostly pastoralist dominated areas are a semi-territoriality zone. The Al-Shabaab has somewhat freedom to carry out clandestine attacks in these zones despite the massive military and police in strategic positions. Boni forest is highly dominated by both army and the police in the residential areas. However, areas such as Fafi, and Ijara in Garissa, Garsen in Tana River have relatively limited government presence. The conflicts between the pastoralist community and farmers in Tana

River county feeds into al-Shabaab's narrative.

The 2018 and 2019 fieldwork experience in Tana River, Garissa, and Lamu counties confirmed that the Orma tribe – pastoralist and majorly Muslims, seasonally have conflicts with the Pokomo

farmers who live along the Tana River. These conflicts stretch into Lamu and Kilifi counties that border Tana River county. The pastoralists migrate to the stretch of Lamu and Kilifi county invading the Giriama and the Bajuni farms. An interview on the 20th June 2019 with two Assistant County Commissioners (ACC) in Tana River county confirmed the government's intention to stop the migrating herders with their animals from reaching the southern part of Tana River inhabited by Pokomo and Giriama farmers. An experience in Kipini, Lamu county on the 21st June 2019 confirmed the GSU convoy operation was invading and chasing the herders with their animals from Tana River county.

Interview with NGOs in Kenya such as Haki Africa, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), SUPKEM, the Africa Centre for Open Governance (*AfriCOG*), Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), including the governmental body Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) indicates that civil societies do CVE work for action purposes with some having soft power approach. Such programs highly depend on the nature of the targeted local community, but the hard power strategy from the government erodes such efforts. Article 40(c) of the prevention of terrorism Act 2012 (revised in 2018) for instance stipulates that the Kenya National Counterterrorism Centre has coordinating powers over the civil societies[6]. There is a need for research to target these local initiatives in understanding the dynamics of radicalization and deradicalization approaches. However, state and international actors hardly respect the local ownership and context in decision making. States mostly use hard power and focus on their national interest which explains why insecurity prevails despite external efforts in peacebuilding (Sending, 2009).

An interview with Stig Jarle Hansen, a leading researcher on CVE in the Horn of Africa also posits that the case of Kenya is different from Somalia. In Kenya, civil societies such as Haki Africa, MUHURI, Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), KHRC, Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU), and KNCHR are actors involved in CVE work. These have a somewhat soft power approach. However, most of these organizations have an antagonistic relationship with the Kenyan

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[6] Article 40 (c) of the prevention and terrorism Act 2012 (the 2018 revised version) stipulated that "The Centre shall be an approving and reporting institution for all civil society organizations and international non-governmental organizations engaged in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization through counter messaging or public outreach, and disengagement and reintegration of radicalized individuals" (See, Page 25).

government. Some such as Haki Africa and MUHURI having been gazetted by the government as supporters of VEOs.

Practical CVE work in Kenya has mostly involved civil society with funding from western donors (Hansen et al., 2019; Ruteere & Mutahi, 2018). Organizations such as Independent Medico-legal Unit (IMLU), Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), Haki Africa, Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), Muslim for Human Rights MUHURI, and Supreme Council for Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) are involved in CVE work (Hansen, Lid, & Okwany, 2016); with IMLU engaged in police work such as community policing and investigating extrajudicial killings and police torture. Community policing is vital in CVE work. It creates trust between the police and the community, and it enhances police intelligence and community support to security hence predetermining VE (Omondi Okwany & Brand, Forthcoming article). However, the Kenya case poses mistrust between the police and the community and politicized police (Lid & Okwany, 2020). The main actor in CVE work in both state and non-state actors with the government projecting hard power strategies such as intelligence gathering and surveillance while some civil societies have great efforts on soft power approach but fall short in funding.

Other organizations involved are the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP*) (ibid)*, United Nation Women program (UN Women) through the UN women Japan and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transitional Initiative (OTI)'s Kenya Transitional Initiative (KTI) program in Eastleigh, Nairobi (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014). Mostly the work involves community actors such as religious elders and the youth. It is also worth noting that women are also at the center of VE and CVE work (Ndungu & Salifu, 2017). The Kenyan government has been involved in formulating legislation and policies at the national and county level. The county policies developed in a geographical line, VE affected counties were the first to act on CVE policies. Such are Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Isiolo, Tana River, Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa. The development trend of these policies on a geographical line indicates the government's reaction towards VEOs. These County policies are similar and reflect the national laws and policies which focus on a general and traditional security strategy, yet, Radicalization is sophisticated, feeds into the hard-power strategies. At the same time, CVE and deradicalization depend on the local social stimuli and individual-based.

Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia

Since the fall of Said Barre administration in 1991, Somalia has been the center of political violence, competition, transnational crime, terrorism, international attention, and piracy, tagging Somalia as a desert of war (Ken Menkhaus, 2009), collapse state (Ken Menkhaus, 2013) and framing it as the world most dangerous place (Fergusson, 2013). It has therefore put Somalia to the attention of international actors to developed countering measures put in place to fight VEOs. Most of these counter-insurgency measures initiatives came from the government working with different foreign entities through external funding. The motivation behind this source of funding is to support the reintegration process of individuals disengaged from VEOs such as al-Shabaab into the communities.

With local-relationships, international actors such as states, donors, and brokers conduct CVE work with militarization strategies. The brokers are power holders and local elites who take advantage of insecurity, power transition, and in the absence of state or failure of it. These brokers are sometimes social or religious entrepreneurs. They take advantage of financial and social capital which is a requirement in CVE work. Interviews with consultants in Mogadishu on the Somalia case demonstrate the failure of the state creates brokerage in CVE work. The broker takes advantage of their localness, the failure of the state, prevailing insecurity brought by VEOs. These brokers take advantage of the fact that successful CVE work emphasizes the localness (Schwoebel, 2017).

The Federal government has attracted funds through their National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaging Combatants in Somalia and situated within the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) and Stabilization program attracting United Nation funding and other donors' communities (African Development Bank Group, 2020). The funding initiated four facilities, mostly from the UN mission in Somalia (UNISOM) with the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) being the main partners (Gelot & Hansen, 2019).

Such organizations are Serendi's DDR Centre in Mogadishu funded by European governments such as Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Serendi received significant critics from the locals, religious leaders, academicians, and the Somalia government in equal measures. An interview with a Somalia consultant and Stig Jarle Hansen demonstrated that the critique was based

on the imposing of westerners' ideas on the war on terror influencing deradicalization measures and not applying the local mechanism which is sustainable in a longer-term.

The German-government funding was managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Baidoa and Bay-Bakool region. The locals appreciated IOM initiatives in comparison to Serendi. Adam Smith International (ASI) funded by the United Kingdom had deradicalization centers in the Belet Weyne area and Kismayo, Somalia. The Kismayo center also received funding from the German government. These initiatives demonstrate how global militarism influences CVE work (Felbab-Brown, 2015).

Interview with a Somalia consultant demonstrates that the controversial initiative was the recruitment of the former al-Shabaab fighters into Somalia's National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA). Some of the Serendi recruits joined NISA, but transparency lacked in the recruitment exercise. Despite these organizations' engagement on CVE work, uncertainty, anxiety, and fear over al-Shabaab sporadic attacks continue within the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, such recruitment is in question because it cannot be said in finality that an individual has been deradicalized. Therefore, it is essential to rethink internationalism and government efforts and shift a focus to the existing efforts from civil societies and other social movement networks (Della Porta et al., 2015).

Conclusion

It is an opportunity to focus on existing efforts, looking at how civil societies and local structures such as families, clan, religious, and business organizations deal with conflict dynamics and contribute to the soft approach; this will create a new strategy and security initiatives in CVE. Focusing on the most affected VE countries such as Somalia and Kenya, the paper explored, explained, and made an understanding of how civil societies engage with states in CVE work. The paper concludes that CVE is locally based; it differs from one region to another. Kenya and the Somalia cases have demonstrated hard power from both governments, in the former case, the civil societies and government both are involved in CVE work, but both take different approaches. The Kenyan government fronting the hard power mechanism while some of the civil societies take the soft power approach, leading to an antagonistic relationship between the two. In Somalia, the government supports different organizations in implementing deradicalization strategies. CVE work in areas dominated by international actors such as Mogadishu and Kismayo has proven

unproductive due to the militarized strategies. Such CVE programs are not straightforward whether the victims can be said to have been deradicalized or not. In both states, most of the initiatives are externally funded, and CVE work is in its infancy.

Extremists operations are very dynamic and not static; they are not fixed in time and space. VEOs operate clandestinely, and they do not fight a conventional war. Therefore, international and government militarization strategies have proven unproductive. The need to focus on soft power approaches in understating the local networks is vital; in other words, a people-centered CVE work should be the focus. Local structures such as family, clan, religious, and business organizations, including learning institutions, must be on the frontline in formulating and conduct of CVE policies. There is a need for active and evidence-based research since CVE work is nuanced, evidence in a particular situation might be different in another; therefore, research focusing on qualitative techniques will develop informed policies. VEOs adapt to policies, and they change tactic and territory, government policies need to focus on such tactics and dynamics of territoriality. The protection of human rights and evaluating the security institution is vital in promoting CVE work. Some of the civil society organizations, such as human rights organizations, provide policy and legal security reforms. Others provide legal, health services to police torture and CVE training. Security collaborations such as AMISOM Police and military working with such organizations will enhance the monitoring and evaluation of the security services, and understanding of the nuanced nature of CVE in the communities. Such partnership creates a police-community connection in intelligence and surveillance. Civil society organizations can provide local contact between the security forces and the community, improving the image of the soft power of the security forces. Civil societies organizations can also offer a dialogue space between the citizenry and the police, developing police-citizenry trust, and capacity in understanding human rights.

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