The Importance of Public Relations in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

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ICCT

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism

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Policy Brief

February 2022

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Abstract

The policy brief makes the case that policymakers and practitioners need to consider how P/CVE programmes engage in public relations (PR), specifically in communicating transparently. P/CVE programmes can benefit from greater community support and trust by engaging in public relations. We show how PR currently benefits different P/CVE programmes. We argue that P/CVE programmes, should develop PR strategies based on the principals of proactive transparency to generate positive news coverage and public support. State-led programmes specifically should provide support within the industry. The brief outlines how research on transparency can inform PR messaging within programmes. Whereas programmes have typically emphasised communicating effectiveness, we show that communicating decision-making processes may be more effective in generating policy support and trust. Overall, the brief contributes to a policy debate on if and how P/CVE programmes should communicate with the public.

Keywords: preventing and countering violent extremism, public relations, reintegration programme, community support; transparency

Introduction

The policy brief makes the case that preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) programmes need to consider how programmes engage in public relations (PR), specifically in communicating transparently. The need to engage in PR is not self-evident: some P/CVE programmes have been accused of a lack of transparency and a reluctance to engage media, while the benefit of engaging in PR is not clear-cut and therefore needs to be set out and considered carefully. We use the term P/CVE programmes to refer to the wide spectrum of programmes which exist, from primary interventions to tertiary interventions involving terrorist offenders, from state-led programmes to smaller programmes ran privately by individuals. Clearly there is a difference in capacity and we make distinctions where relevant, though our focus is primarily on the benefits of PR to P/CVE as a collective industry. As this is an emerging area of research, we firstly set out why programmes should engage in PR campaigns while recognising the differences between programmes. We then outline the need for governments to lead the way in engaging media, while showing that the public is typically receptive to P/CVE. The second half of the brief considers messaging, recommending that programmes shift away from emphasising their effectiveness by showing the potential benefits of other forms of transparent communication. While there is a need for research on C/PVE messaging, we point to several studies which can inform and guide what programmes may try to communicate.

Why to communicate: PR benefits

In the following section we explore the different ways P/CVE currently engage in PR. This level of engagement is not consistent, therefore we also detail the benefits of engaging in PR with the general public. P/CVE programmes around the world can be broken down along three core characteristics[1]: the inclusion of ideology (de-radicalisation versus disengagement), the contact approach (active outreach versus passive availability) and the carrier of the programme (state, non-state or public–private partnership). State-run P/CVE programmes typically perceive that they have the least need for extensive PR work are those which are state-run. Being comparatively financially secure, and by working through their own referral networks for client acquisition (for example, police, judicial system, educational system) or with the information about potential clients the institution automatically collected (for example, during criminal investigations), PR campaigns and related activities still prove to be necessary to spread knowledge about the programme's existence and availability. Managing publicity is not necessarily an existential matter for those programmes, as evidenced, for example, in Germany, where actors from state-run programmes were largely absent in the media discourse. However, the UK's Prevent programme and the wide criticism it has drawn from some circles,[2] including the media,[3] underlines that state programmes also need to consider how to improve their public relations. Furthermore, as P/CVE programmes emphasise greater involvement of civil society,[4] state-run programmes need to consider how support for such interventions can be created and maintained.

1 Koehler, Daniel. *Understanding deradicalization: Methods, tools and programs for countering violent extremism.* Routledge, 2016.

2 Thomas, Paul. "Britain's Prevent Strategy: Always Changing, Always the Same?." In T*he Prevent Duty in Education*, pp. 11-31. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020.

3 Clubb, Gordon, and Ryan O'Connor. "Understanding the effectiveness and desirability of de-radicalisation: How de-radicalisation is framed in The Daily Mail." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 21, no. 2 (2019): 349-366.

4 Wuchte, Thomas, and Mehdi Knani. "Countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: the OSCE's unique regional blueprint." J*ournal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 2 (2013): 76-85.

On the other hand, non-state and passive de-radicalisation and P/CVE programmes have a much higher and broader interest in PR. First, non-state actors involved in this field compete for funding and therefore need to have a strong and positive public profile to increase chances of continued or expanded financial support from either governmental or private donors. Second, programmes which operate mainly based on self-referral by individuals seeking assistance to leave extremist milieus must invest heavily in PR to make their services known and attractive among their core target clientele. Simply reaching out to them is oftentimes not possible for non-state actors, who would normally not possess the necessary data (i.e. names and addresses) except through illegitimate or sometimes even illegal means. These two drivers of PR work alone show that putting resources into publicity management is indeed a matter of survival for many programmes in this category.

Furthermore, non-state and passive de-radicalisation programmes are usually well aware that they are oftentimes competing with governmental actors (at least in Germany and the UK) and hence need to point out their advantage over state-run programmes to convince their potential clientele to choose working with them. Within this dynamic, the number of participants or clients and the trustworthiness of social society actors underpin claims of legitimacy, expertise, quality and effectiveness, beyond the previously cited recidivism rates. One line of argument goes as follows: if many clients choose non-state de-radicalisation programmes over the governmental ones, they should be funded and expanded since obviously a demand for such alternative services exists. Another argument, as extrapolated from the German case[5] is trustworthiness is the currency that allows programmes to reach new clients. Clients would be much more responsive to and trust counsellors from non-state programmes because radicalised individuals would not trust security agencies per se, which, in turn, would exacerbate risks of programme failure. We find that it is often individual and non-state practitioners in this space who are most critical of P/CVE programming and contributing to negative and counter-productive publicity because of the incentives to distinguish themselves from other programmes.[6] Thus, the different motivations for engaging in PR can be counterproductive for the wider field of P/CVE, hence the need for state-led programmes to be more active, and for all P/CVE programmes to consider the incorporation of PR within programme designs.

There are other reasons why all forms of programmes need to have good public relations. P/CVE programmes regularly need the cooperation of statutory and non-statutory service providers, for example, psychologists, vocational trainers, social workers, tattoo removal experts, drug addiction therapists or schools, to name a few. Therefore, programmes are dependent on having a good reputation. Public support is necessary because governments and funders can be sensitive to a public backlash, and negative publicity may have a detrimental effect on operations, such as referrals or participation in programmes. Remaining a low profile may be counter-productive insofar as it allows others to shape the narrative. All P/CVE programme types have one shared goal when it comes to PR activities: to present themselves as successful, effective and desirable; it does not matter if that is, in fact, the reality. While certainly some interest in opening up their own involvement in the discourse to calls for evidence-based approaches, evaluation or proof of impact exists among de-radicalisation and P/CVE programmes, some types of programmes are more prone than others to construct meaning in opposition to (academic) criticism regarding lack of evidence. The prospect to potentially lose discourse leadership in this specific public debate can easily be seen as an existential threat, especially for non-state programmes, which likely would face significant cuts in funding or even complete discontinuation if the public perception moves to regarding them as ineffective, counterproductive or undesirable.

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5 Clubb, Gordon, Daniel Koehler, Jonatan Schewe, and Ryan O'Connor. *Selling De-Radicalisation: Managing the Media Framing of Countering Violent Extremism.* Routledge, 2021.
6 Ibid

In summary, P/CVE programmes of all kinds need to give further consideration to a PR approach and how this can be integrated into work, for the benefits of their own programmes and for the field in general.

Recommendation:

- Programmes should actively communicate with public and media through a public relations strategy.

When to communicate: proactive PR

Much of the research regarding public relations notes that a proactive, offensively minded, communication strategy is needed in order to shape and influence public support and media coverage. The media tends to only cover policies such as de-radicalisation when there is a crisis and coverage tends to be negative.[7] A reactive PR strategy has mixed results. Self-disclosing information about a crisis ('stealing thunder') can prevent reputation loss, as can the content of the message, for example using a 'rebuild strategy' which involves an apology for the crisis and a focus on improvement to prevent repeat crises.[8] However, other studies show a reactive strategy may not mitigate negative effects of a crisis, particularly on trust which "comes on foot and leaves on horseback".[9] Given further reason to be cautious about a reactive PR strategy, preliminary research shows that when respondents hear a negative story about a prevention programme, support among a certain demographic[10] declined further when there is an effort to defend the programme through transparent policy information.[11]

Thus a proactive PR strategy is preferable rather than reactive. Liu et al. note that an active external communications programme by the public sector can lead to the dissemination of accurate information and fair coverage, compounded by the breadth of sources which they disperse their information to, while simultaneously building strong relationships with media outlets thereby further ensuring favourable reporting.[12] Lee highlights that the public sector needs to actively set out to demonstrate their utility to the public, especially at the early stage of a programme's inception, working as 'policy entrepreneurs' to promote their policies.[13] While discussing communication strategies during crisis situations, Horsley and Barker note that the public sector can benefit from a constant and sustained dialogue with the media and their ability to effectively get their messaging out is dependent on this proactive strategy.[14]

7 Clubb, Koehler, Schewe, and O'Connor. *Selling De-Radicalisation*

8 Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan, Femke De Vries, and Wilte Zijlstra. "Breaking bad news without breaking trust: The effects of a press release and newspaper coverage on perceived trustworthiness." Journal of Behavioral Public Administration 1, no. 1 (2018).

9 Kampen, Jarl K., Steven Van De Walle, and Geert Bouckaert. "Assessing the relation between satisfaction with public service delivery and trust in Government. The impact of the predisposition of citizens toward Government on evalutations of its performance." *Public Performance & Management Review* 29, no. 4 (2006): 387-404.

10 People who score highly on trust for government and trust for policy were less likely to support Prevent if the negative reporting was followed by an attempt at transparency. Clubb, G; Kobayashi, Y; and Davies, G. Attitudes to Prevent Report. Manuscript in Preparation.

11 Clubb, Kobayashi and Davies. Attitudes to Prevent Report.

12 Liu, Brooke Fisher, J. Suzanne Horsley, and Kaifeng Yang. "Overcoming negative media coverage: Does government communication matter?." *Journal of public administration research and theory* 22, no. 3 (2012): 597-621

13 Lee, Mordecai. "Reporters and bureaucrats: Public relations counter-strategies by public administrators in an era of media disinterest in government." *Public Relations Review* 25, no. 4 (1999): 451-463.

14 Horsley, J. Suzanne, and Randolph T. Barker. "Toward a synthesis model for crisis communication in the public sector: An initial investigation." *Journal of business and technical communication* 16, no. 4 (2002): 406-440.

The benefit of an active PR strategy embedded within a programme based around the principles of transparency and improvement is it contributes to a positive understanding of P/CVE and de-radicalisation, which can pre-empt and limit damages when 'things go wrong'. Evidence shows that organisations with a reputation and practice of communicating transparency have higher levels of trust and support.[15] Transparency refers to the extent to which external actors ,such as citizens, are able to regularly access information that allows them to understand what an organisation is doing.[16]

Recommendation:

- A P/CVE PR strategy should be based on the principals of proactive transparency and building a reputation for transparency – a reactive approach is counter-productive

How to communicate: engaging media

State programmes tend to seek publicity less than non-state programmes, while non-state programmes are incentivised to distinguish themselves in relation to state programmes (often by being critical of other programmes). One reason for reluctance to speak about programmes may be due to the assumption that such programmes are unpopular or for fear of a public backlash. While it is true that media coverage of public policy and government generally tends to be neutral or negative, with negative coverage exceeding positive coverage,[17] this is not an inevitability. For instance, consensus on political issues is a major factor in determining the tone of media coverage; when the political elite are in agreement about the benefit/need of a policy, media coverage will reflect this and produce favourable coverage.[18] Beyond reproducing political consensus, the media's role in positively (re)distributing government messaging results in a 'surge' in approval and support.[19] What is highlighted by research on the public sector's PR and communication strategies is that it receives far more attention from the media than its private counterparts, in part because it is reliant on the media to (re)distribute its messages.[20] The consequence of this is that the public sector needs a definitive PR/communication strategy tailored specifically towards the media if they want to effectively distribute their message.

15 Dong-Young Kim & Junseop Shim (2020) Government communication and public acceptance of policies in South Korea, International Review of Public Administration, 5:1, 44-63,

16 Porumbescu, Gregory A. "Using transparency to enhance responsiveness and trust in local government: can it work?." *State and Local Government Review* 47, no. 3 (2015): 205-213.

17 Gross, Kimberly, Sean Aday, and Paul R. Brewer. "A panel study of media effects on political and social trust after September 11, 2001." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 49-73.

18 Aday, Sean. "Leading the charge: Media, elites, and the use of emotion in stimulating rally effects in wartime." *Journal of Communication* 60, no. 3 (2010): 440-465; Gross, Aday, and. Brewer. "A panel study of media effects on political and social trust after September 11, 2001."

19 Gross, Kimberly, Sean Aday, and Paul R. Brewer. "A panel study of media effects on political and social trust after September 11, 2001." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 49-73.

20 Liu, Brooke Fisher, J. Suzanne Horsley, and Abbey Blake Levenshus. "Government and corporate communication practices: Do the differences matter?." *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 38, no. 2 (2010): 189-213; See also: Fitch, Bradford. Media relations handbook for agencies, associations, nonprofits, and Congress. The Capitol Net Inc, 2004.; Wamsley, Gary L., and Mayer N. Zald. "The political economy of public organizations." Public Administration Review (1973): 62-73.

While the public sector is reliant on the media[21] to (re)distribute their messages the media also rely on information not discovered by investigative reporters but provided by government[22] and much that reaches the public through the media arrives through government-dominated information channels.[23] So, while the media may spin and frame their portrayal of policies and events along their ideological biases they are largely dependent on the government to provide them with the underlying messaging. In many ways then the public sector has a captive audience with regard the dissemination of their messaging, often viewed as credible sources of information,[24] so long as the media are interested in their policies and programs.[25] As policies regarding national security are always newsworthy[26] a program concerning de-radicalisation or P/CVE should have plenty of access to the media and the ability to broadcast its message to the public.

The potential negative consequences of media coverage are obvious as a high degree of negative reporting on the public sector may influence attitudes toward government.[27] But the benefits are also manifold: they can increase levels of trust and political efficacy amongst a population,[28] they can better facilitate and improve relations between the government and its citizens,[29] and as a consequence government administrations are not helping their own image when they do not communicate their achievements.[30]

While support for different types of programmes can be uneven, the general public is usually far more receptive to P/CVE programmes than often assumed. Recent studies have shown high levels of public support for the UK's Prevent programme for instance, which has been typically characterised as 'failed and friendless'. [31] Even negative cases involving Prevent, often covered by newspapers, seem to only have a small effect on support: in an upcoming study, when respondents were exposed to negative media coverage of Prevent, a majority still supported Prevent, although the level of support was smaller for respondents who were given a 'neutral' definition of the programme.[32] Therefore, programmes should be optimistic about public support but mindful that active promotion of the programmes may be necessary to maintain this support. Media coverage of such programmes is partly positive too, signalling some potential to generate more positive news coverage through actively engaging in PR, particularly by state-led programmes who can generate more coverage.[33]

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21 Ibid

22 Heise, J. Arthur. "Toward closing the confidence gap: An alternative approach to communication between public and government." *Public Administration Quarterly* (1985): 196-217.

23 Ibid

24 Thrall, A. Trevor. "A bear in the woods? Threat framing and the marketplace of values." *Security Studies* 16, no. 3 (2007): 452-488.

25 Lee. "Reporters and bureaucrats: Public relations counter-strategies by public administrators in an era of media disinterest in government."

26 Archetti, Cristina. "A multidisciplinary understanding of news: Comparing elite press framing of 9/11 in the US, Italy, France and Pakistan." *Journal of International Communication* 13, no. 1 (2007): 86-118.

27 Hvidman, Ulrik, and Simon Calmar Andersen. "Perceptions of public and private performance: Evidence from a survey experiment." *Public Administration Review* 76, no. 1 (2016): 111-120. See also: Cappella, Joseph N., and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. "News frames, political cynicism, and media cynicism." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546, no. 1 (1996): 71-84.

28 Liu, Horsley, and Yang. "Overcoming negative media coverage: Does government communication matter?.". See also: Gross, Aday, and Brewer. "A panel study of media effects on political and social trust after September 11, 2001."

29 Gunnlaugsdottir, Johanna. "Government secrecy: public attitudes toward information provided by the authorities." *Records Management Journal* (2015).

30 Liu, Horsley, and Yang. "Overcoming negative media coverage: Does government communication matter?."

31 Clements, J; Dan Forman and Manon Roberts.
Listening to British Muslims: policing, extremism and Prevent. Crest, 2020 https://www.crestadvisory.com/post/listening-to-british-muslims-policing-extremism-and-prevent

32 Clubb, Kobayashi and Davies. Attitudes to Prevent Report.

33 Clubb, Koehler, Schewe, and O'Connor. *Selling De-Radicalisation*

While state programmes may need positive PR less than non-state programmes, all P/CVE programmes benefit by creating a positive but constructively critical discourse of P/CVE which is focused on improvement.

Recommendations:

- Governments need to take leadership with shaping the public debate – transparent communication should be a principal underpinning state-led and state-funded programmes.

- Governments should provide support and resources to enable P/CVE programmes to effectively communicate with the media and public.

What to communicate: embedding transparency

The effect of transparent communication on policy trust and support is more nuanced than typically assumed – the existing evidence base could help shape PR messaging. There are three categories of transparency: policy transparency; policy decision-making; and policy outcome transparency. Policy transparency refers to the communication of information related to a policy, such as who benefits from the policy. Decision-making transparency has two aspects – decision-making process details how decisions are made such as publishing minutes of a committee or outlining procedures, whereas decision-making rationale provides the facts and reasons why a decision was made.

Policy outcome refers to the timely release of data that discuss the results of policies.[34] Transparency has been linked with increasing policy support, compliance, trust and inducing behavioural change in relation to a policy. Transparent communication from the government is essential during times of public danger to strengthen public resilience, ensure trust in institutions, and facilitate the adoption of behaviours necessary to reduce risk. However the majority of research evidence shows the positive effects of transparency is far more uncertain than typically assumed. Firstly, decision-making rationale transparency has been shown to be more effective at increasing trust and policy support.[35] Secondly, transparency can have a detrimental effect on trust and support in states where the population has less familiarity with transparent governance and is more accepting of greater distances between citizens and centres of power.[36] Thirdly, transparency has different effects depending on the policy area, where existing research shows that transparency has no effect in controversial policies which handle trade-offs with human life.[37]

There is a need for evidence on the link between transparent communication and P/CVE but several practical points can be made to shape how programmes communicate. Firstly, programmes should consider what type of information they release – the emphasis has typically been on information about a policy or its effectiveness, however overly focusing on effectiveness sets policy up to fail.

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34 Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan, Feie Herkes, Ian Leistikow, Jos Verkroost, Femke de Vries, and Wilte G. Zijlstra. "Can decision transparency increase citizen trust in regulatory agencies? Evidence from a representative survey experiment." *Regulation & Governance* 15, no. 1 (2021): 17-31.
 ; Porumbescu, Gregory A. "Does transparency improve citizens' perceptions of government performance? Evidence from Seoul, South Korea." *Administration & society* 49, no. 3 (2017): 443-468
35 de Fine Licht, Jenny. "Policy area as a potential moderator of transparency effects: An experiment." *Public Administration Review* 74, no. 3 (2014): 361-371.
36 Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan, Gregory Porumbescu, Boram Hong, and Tobin Im. "The effect of transparency on trust in government: A cross national comparative experiment." *Public Administration Review* 73, no. 4 (2013): 575-586.
37 de Fine Licht, Jenny. "Policy area as a potential moderator of transparency effects: An experiment." *Public Administration Review* 74, no. 3 (2014): 361-371.

Instead, existing research shows that communication of why decisions are made within a programme can increase trust and support – this form of transparency does not carry the same privacy and security risks that communicating policy outcomes tends to do (e.g. individual success stories). Secondly, there should be greater transparency in Western democratic states regarding P/CVE programmes as they may benefit more in terms of increased trust and support. Thirdly, it is likely that the strength of transparent communication will be more effective with (primary) prevention programmes rather than a (tertiary) de-radicalisation programme. However, transparent communication is still important beyond these areas as transparency has intrinsic value and because the evidence base is still developing. Research on P/CVE suggests how messaging can have a positive effect, both on media reporting and public opinion.

A common criticism made against P/CVE and de-radicalisation programmes is that they securitise social policy,[38] which leads some programme PR strategies to actively shift away from security language toward safeguarding.[39] There are good reasons to be cautious about using security language in programme PR, particularly concerning issues such as reduced likelihood of people referring loved ones suspected of extremism, and the risks of creating 'suspect communities'.[40]

However, our research argues that the hybrid – security and community - focus of the programmes helps them speak to different political alignments in newspapers. Typically, the media frames issues related to security and terrorism differently from other policy areas.[41] Therefore in P/CVE policy, as mentioned elsewhere,[42] embracing both aspects may be helpful in generating community support. Preliminary research in another project shows that security versus safeguarding language makes no difference to the levels of support for a programme or willingness to make a referral to Prevent, despite assumptions that safeguarding narratives would increase community support.[43] Furthermore, in an experiment in the same project, the vignette which emphasised that the objectives of de-radicalisation programmes are to provide security had the effect of increasing support for the programme. Of course, audiences matter and these findings may not be applicable to specific target populations in a programme, underlining the need to tailor PR strategies for different audiences. However these findings are sufficient to prompt a reconsideration of policy narratives targeting the general population. Furthermore, portraying a P/CVE programme as one-sided, without its inherent security aspect might produce a distorted image of its activities and goals to the public, accompanied with unfeasible expectations of its effects and performance. In short, the strength of P/CVE programming lies in its hybrid nature, which should be at the core of PR messaging.

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38 Eroukhmanoff, Clara. *The securitisation of Islam: Covert racism and affect in the United States post-9/11.* Manchester University Press, 2019. James, Natalie Claire. "Implementing the Prevent Duty: Conceptualising Threat within Greater Manchester's Further Education Sector." PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2020.
39 da Silva, Raquel, Giuditta Fontana, and Megan A. Armstrong. "'It's about keeping children safe, not spying': A governmentality approach to Prevent in primary education." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (2021): 13691481211021212.
40 Taylor, Joel David. "'Suspect Categories,'Alienation and Counterterrorism: Critically Assessing PREVENT in the UK." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 4 (2020): 851-873.; Shanaah, Sadi. "Alienation or Cooperation? British Muslims' Attitudes to and Engagement in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2019): 1-22.
41 Archetti, Cristina. "Terrorism, Communication, and the Media." In *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media,* pp. 32-59. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013.
42 Ahmed, M; and Alvis, S. 'Past, Prevent and Future: Improving Prevent for a New Generation'. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (September 2020)
43 Clubb, Kobayashi and Davies. Attitudes to Prevent Report.

Recommendations:

- Messaging should also communicate decision-making processes and rationale within programmes, it could be more effective than trying to communicate programme effectiveness.

- Emphasising security might be more effective as a de-radicalisation PR strategy.

- Context is important – transparent communication is more likely to increase trust and support in Western democracies; elsewhere other communication strategies need researched.

Conclusion

The policy brief has made an argument for PR strategies based on transparency to be prioritised within P/CVE programmes. P/CVE programmes would benefit from greater openness regarding how they operate – negative PR often relates to misrepresented information of what a programme does.[44] Programmes could consider what their PR strategy consists of, distinct from any counter-narrative campaign and include a PR strategy which builds upon their programme design, as detailed in the Handbook for Structural Quality Standards.[45] There is a wide-spread recognition that successful P/CVE programmes need to engage with communities[46] – programmes with a PR strategy embedded within their design can be more pro-active and transparent in community engagement. A PR messaging strategy built around transparency does not need to share recidivism rates or real individual cases, nor does it need to give in-depth information about a programme and the underlying approach – in fact, several studies show this may actually decrease support.[47]

Communicating the decision-making process and the role of community feedback tend to be more effective in increasing support (hence the benefits of integrating PR within the programme design).[48] Of course, there are different capacities in engaging in PR across P/CVE. While state-led programmes may have greater resources to develop and benefit from a PR strategy, it is in the interest of states to also support non-state programmes in transparently communicating the objectives of P/CVE. To conclude, the benefits of PR and how it should manifest are not self-evident across the P/CVE landscape – the following policy brief has made a first step in collating the existing and developing evidence base to make a broader point on the importance of taking PR more seriously.

44 Clubb, Koehler, Schewe, and O'Connor. *Selling De-Radicalisation*
45 Koehler, Daniel. "Structural quality standards for work to intervene with and counter violent extremism: A handbook for practitioners, state coordination units and civil society programme implementers in Germany." (2017).
46 Silverman, Tanya. "UK foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq: The need for a real community engagement approach." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 12 (2017): 1091-1107.
47 Porumbescu, Gregory, Nicola Bellé, Maria Cucciniello, and Greta Nasi. "Translating policy transparency into policy understanding and policy support: Evidence from a survey experiment." *Public Administration* 95, no. 4 (2017): 990-1008.; Cucciniello, Maria, Gregory A. Porumbescu, and Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen. "25 years of transparency research: Evidence and future directions." *Public Administration Review* 77, no. 1 (2017): 32-44.
48 Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan, Feie Herkes, Ian Leistikow, Jos Verkroost, Femke de Vries, and Wilte G. Zijlstra. "Can decision transparency increase citizen trust in regulatory agencies? Evidence from a representative survey experiment." *Regulation & Governance* 15, no. 1 (2021): 17-31.

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