Comparative Challenges in Securing the Horn of Africa and Sahara

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Geography helps to explain why violent extremist organizations are difficult to counter; vast ungoverned spaces combined with weak states make it nearly impossible to decisively defeat them. However, partial success has been achieved by the United States in the Horn of Africa with a strategy of training, equipping, and supporting African intervention forces and attacking extremist leaders. In contrast, a strategy of containment in the Sahara, focusing on counterterrorism training for regional security forces and countering extremist ideology, did not succeed in preventing militant groups from taking over northern Mali and expanding their activities to other parts of the region.

Introduction

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, ungoverned spaces have been viewed by security experts in the United States and elsewhere as potentially "dangerous places" which can host security threats.[1] In some ungoverned spaces, violent extremist organizations and other violent non-state actors have been able to establish operating bases and move freely through territory and across boundaries to carry out activities that endanger the security of others.[2] In Africa, the two ungoverned spaces with the most dangerous places for global security have been located in the Sahara, where Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates, and the Horn of Africa, where Al Shabaab is based. In the Horn, the major ungoverned spaces have been in the semiarid pasturelands of Somalia, northeast Kenya, and southern Ethiopia, while the most dangerous places have been in the southern part of the collapsed state of Somalia, including the urban centers of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Compared to the Horn, the Sahara spans over a much broader ungoverned space and encompasses more than half a dozen countries. The dangerous places in the Sahara have been located in mountains and caves in vast arid tracts from where militant groups and criminal gangs have operated.

This article explores the extent to which geography explains how dangerous a place is and the challenges with trying to make ungoverned spaces more secure. A principal issue is the effectiveness of the security strategies of the United States in dealing with certain ungoverned spaces in order make them less dangerous places.[3] The United States is the one country that can project power into ungoverned spaces and counter militant groups. In the Horn, the United States has established a long-running military presence in Djibouti and has worked with regional anchor states in the fight against Al Shabaab. In the Sahara, the United States has supported local regimes in efforts to strengthen the

defense of their vast territories against violent extremist organizations. This article argues that a peace-enforcement and state-building approach in the Horn has been more effective than containment in the Sahara in dealing with ungoverned spaces and dangerous places and countering militant groups and other violent non-state actors. However, the vastness of both spaces and the weakness and poor governance of local regimes have meant that both approaches have not been able to achieve complete success in making them safe places.

Geographical factors, such as terrain, distances, and resources, help create conditions for security threats and conflict.[4] Phil Williams has analyzed the links between ungoverned spaces and a range of violent non-state actors, including criminal gangs and violent extremist organizations, and has shown how they are able to thrive in often austere spaces.[5] Jeffrey Herbst has observed that weak states in Africa focus on securing control of the capital city and that the farther an area is removed from the capital city, the more difficult it is to control, much less govern. Therefore, the vaster a country is, the vaster the ungoverned space.[6] James Fearon and David Laitin have found that mountainous areas provide optimal sanctuary for insurgents, including guerrillas who want to seize state power or set up a separate state and warlords who merely want to enrich themselves. Counterinsurgencies often leave behind remnants in mountainous areas.[7] Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala show that separatist guerrillas seeking to carve out a new state are able to sustain themselves better when they are located long distances from centers of power.[8] Landlocked countries are also more prone to conflict and are affected by spillover of violent non-state actor activity from neighboring coastal countries.[9] Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn draw a distinction between "road-roaming" insurgencies that aim to capture state power and "bush-roaming" ones that tend to have more universalistic goals, such as global jihad, or have degenerated into "warlordism."[10]

Certain ungoverned and weakly governed spaces attract militant groups, where they can train and plan for operations without surveillance and enforcement from state security agencies.[11] For Al Qaeda, the spaces have had to include populations that are sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to its radical Islamist message and efforts to impose strict sharia law. In Sudan in the early 1990s, a radical Islamist order was established, and Al Qaeda was invited to set up training camps, which was the movement's first involvement in the greater Horn of Africa. In Afghanistan in the late 1990s, the geopolitical order was one in which the Taliban came to take control of most of the country and allowed Al Qaeda to set up training bases near Kandahar and plan and stage attacks against U.S. and other Western targets. Thus, Afghanistan was a weakly governed space, and one in which the Taliban was antagonistic to U.S. and Western influence and had ideological affinity with Al Qaeda. After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the Taliban were able to escape to the mountainous, ungoverned spaces on the Pakistan side of the border, from where "Al Qaeda Central" was able to resume its campaign against the United States and its allies.[12] Pakistan was reluctant to counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban, which made the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and especially North Waziristan one of the world's most dangerous places. In Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was able to set up operations in remote areas which were difficult for the under-resourced and overstretched Yemeni military to control. By 2009, the movement was able to develop into a dangerous operational organization threatening global security and surpassed Al Qaeda Central, which was under persistent attack.[13] In sum, remote parts of Pakistan and Yemen, as well as the Horn and Sahara, have been ungoverned spaces which became some of the most dangerous places for global security.

There is evidence that some violent extremist organizations and other violent non-state actors prefer weakly governed spaces to ungoverned ones. For example, Ken Menkhaus and others have found that, while the collapsed state of Somalia was an ungoverned space, Al Qaeda found it difficult to recruit, train and operate in the 1990s up to 2006, due to the dominance of clan-based warlords and the absence of the facilities that a functioning state could offer.[14] In a similar vein, some militant groups and other violent non-state actors require access to technology and institutions that can best be provided in a weakly governed urban setting rather than in ungoverned spaces. They need to be able to communicate with each other and their supporters and have access to financial and Internet facilities. Thus, there are violent extremists who have a need for some of the conveniences that a weakly governed city can offer— a space that is not too ungoverned or too well-governed. According to this logic, Mombasa, Kenya, would be more attractive to some violent extremist organizations than the rural areas of Somalia or the middle of the Sahara.

In contrast, there is evidence that security forces can more easily control and suppress militant groups and other violent non-state actors in urban spaces than in mountains and vast expanses. For example, while Karachi is relatively ungoverned, it is more likely that such actors can be monitored and suppressed in Karachi than in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. Mombasa, Fallujah, Mogadishu, and Timbuktu are other urban areas that have hosted militant groups at one time or another, but they all have been countered to some extent by security forces. It is indicative that government counterinsurgency efforts usually focus on moving people from rural to urban areas where violent non-state actors can be more easily monitored.[15] In addition, with mobile information technology, such actors can often operate from remote areas.

Another problem is weak states that are unable to control their ungoverned spaces, which leads them to become dangerous places. This was the case with Mali in 2012.[16] Weak states can also badly govern spaces, which can transform them into dangerous places. Such is the case with northeast Nigeria, where Boko Haram militants operate. Heavy-handed actions by the Nigerian security forces have generated recruits and supporters for the violent extremist organization. Therefore, for some experts, alternatives to state management, such as local traditional rule or warlords, are preferable to badly governed spaces.[17] These experts and others believe that multidimensional security and a multilateral approach achieves the optimal results.[18]

Since 2001, it has become clear that the degree to which counterterrorist forces are concentrated and take action helps to determine how dangerous a place an ungoverned space is and how difficult it is to secure. From 1996 to 2001, Afghanistan, with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, was considered by many to be perhaps the most dangerous place for global security until U.S. forces invaded and occupied the country. This brought the shift to Pakistan. From 2002–09, Pakistan was considered by many to be the most dangerous place for global security. From 2006 onward, the drone campaign in Pakistan began against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, which reduced the organization's effectiveness. By 2009, many considered Yemen to be the most dangerous place for global security, as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched a series of attacks on U.S. targets. The U.S. drone campaign in Yemen helped to reduce the militant organization. In the meantime, Al Qaeda dispersed into several "franchises." Today, it is difficult to determine if Al Qaeda Central is still the organization that is the most dangerous to global security.[19]

In regard to the U.S. security strategy for dealing with ungoverned spaces and dangerous places, there was criticism of the initial U.S. approach from 2001 to 2008 as too broad, encompassing too many ungoverned spaces, weak and rogue states, and violent non-state actors. It was only when the Obama administration came to office that the focus narrowed

to Al Qaeda and its franchises, which were really the only organizations intent on attacking the United States and U.S. interests abroad. This selective approach led to a focus on Pakistan/Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines, where the threats to U.S. interests were deemed to be the greatest.

As a result of the Obama administration's more selective approach, there has been criticism of a lack of U.S. leadership and action in dangerous places like Mali and the Sahara. Some have questioned why the United States was not so committed to countering violent extremist organizations attacking Mali and occupying half the country in 2012, in contrast to U.S. interventions in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.[20] The answer lay in the Obama administration's perception of a lack of threat from militant groups in Mali to U.S. interests and an expectation that France would act to prevent its former colony from falling into militant hands. However, once the violent extremist organizations began their march toward strategic centers in central Mali in January 2013, the United States supported the French intervention force with air assets and intelligence.

The challenges for the United States in securing ungoverned spaces and dangerous places are shaped by geopolitical factors. The geopolitical challenges are greater with larger and rougher ungoverned spaces, universalistic militant groups, and weaker regional regimes. Taken together, these factors make the Sahara a more difficult place to secure than the Horn. Also, there are more capable and willing partners in the Horn region, such as Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, compared to the Sahara. U.S. policymakers have decided that threats to U.S. interests are greater in the Arabian Peninsula than in Africa, which makes the nearby Horn more important to the United States than the Sahara, which is more geographically isolated and where the violent extremist organizations mainly threaten Algeria, France, and other European and trans-Saharan states.

In addition, the differences between the U.S. approach to countering violent extremism in Eastern and Western Africa can be partly explained by the division of Africa into two geographical combatant commands before October 2008. In the Horn, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), as the "counterterrorist" combatant command responsible for fighting Al Qaeda, was in charge and decided to establish the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti and carry out some counterterrorism operations. CENTCOM was aware that Somalia was close to the Arabian Peninsula and susceptible to an Al Qaeda takeover. In contrast, the Sahara was the area of responsibility of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), which has been more involved in building the Partnership for Peace than countering Al Qaeda. EUCOM has been a combatant command accustomed to working with partners in "shaping" its area of responsibility (AOR). Thus, there was no Joint Task Force, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was spread among eight different countries, without much coherence and focus.[21] Since 2008, U.S. Africa Command has been responsible for all of Africa except Egypt, which falls within CENTCOM's area of responsibility.

Ungoverned spaces can enable violent non-state actors to create dangerous places that threaten security. These spaces are further away from countering forces and provide places to conceal operations. Such actors provide the necessary condition for the creation of dangerous places from ungoverned spaces. Together, ungoverned spaces and violent non-state actors create sufficient conditions for dangerous places. Such actors wish to avoid detection, while they sustain themselves and train for and prepare their actions. Therefore, ungoverned spaces provide an optimal condition for the sustainment of dangerous places. However, such actors might act, regardless of whether or not the space is ungoverned and how large or impenetrable it is. For example, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda ended up in

Taliban-governed Afghanistan not by choice, but because it was the only place they were accepted in 1996.

It appears that the containment approach of supporting regimes, such as Mali's, in a weakly governed space is more cost-effective than stationing troops and funding, training, equipping, and resourcing an intervention force, as has been the U.S. approach in the Horn.[22] The United States spent over $10 million a year on states like Mali and $100 million a year on the trans-Sahara as part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program from 2005 to the present. In comparison, the United States spent more than $130 million a year on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia from 2007 onward and more than $300 million a year on the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) from 2002 to the present.[23] When the containment approach fails, intervention leads to escalating costs. This was the case when the Mali regime proved incapable of defending its territory and French forces had to intervene. Today, the challenges of securing the Sahara are daunting, as there is no offensive force that can replace the French, and there are no countries like Uganda in West Africa that can lead an intervention like the one in Somalia.

It is logical to hypothesize that an assertive strategy of training and supporting of-fense intervention forces and counterterrorist attacks is more likely to succeed in securing ungoverned spaces and dangerous places and curbing violent non-state actors than contain-ment, which focuses on counterterrorism training for regional security forces and winning regional "hearts and minds." A dangerous place is more likely to be sustainable for those actors if the U.S. strategy is containment. In the Horn, the approach has been more assertive, with the State Department providing training, equipment and support for African Union forces and with U.S. forces launching occasional counterterrorist attacks that degraded Al Shabaab's leadership. As a result, Al Shabaab was driven out of urban areas, and a Somali government was established.

A related hypothesis is that the United States is more likely to directly attack violent non-state actors if they are committed to attacking U.S. targets and interests and less likely when they might attack the interests of another country, such as France or Algeria. Therefore, the more concentrated threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Peninsula and absence of a state in Somalia influenced decision making on the Horn and led to support for African Union forces and the Combined Joint Task Force. In contrast, the more dispersed and indirect threat in the Sahara led to a less intensive approach, which resulted in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

A counterhypothesis is that neither a containment strategy nor a peace-enforcement and state-building approach are likely to bring success in decisively countering violent non-state actors in ungoverned spaces. While the United States has scored successes in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, Al Qaeda–linked militant groups have not been eliminated; they have merely been curbed. By this logic, it could be hypothesized that the larger and more ungoverned the space where violent non-state actors choose to operate, the more sustainable a dangerous place will be and the more difficult it will be to pacify. The Sahara is a bigger place than the Horn and is likely to be a more dangerous place, where violent extremist organizations and other actors can sustain themselves and avoid interdiction.

An ungoverned space is an area where the state does not exercise sovereignty and territoriality.[24] It is also a place where people do not pay taxes, and governments do not provide services. Violent non-state actors can carry on their activities without concern for detection and interdiction. They only have to worry about coexisting with the local population. In this article, the most dangerous places are defined as those spaces that are

most threatening to global security. For example, militant groups who want to attack U.S. embassies as well as New York make those ungoverned spaces the most dangerous places. Securing the Sahara and Horn primarily means neutralizing threats to global security from Al Qaeda–linked violent extremist organizations. Of course, there are many dangerous places that are mainly threatening to local or regional populations. For example, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo does not threaten global security and inevitably draws in outside forces, such as UN peacekeepers, to counter security threats. However, The Central African Republic demonstrates that an ungoverned space can move from a peripheral threat to global security to a more serious one; external funding is fueling the rise of a radical Islamist insurgency.

The article first compares the challenges of securing the Horn and the Sahara, including geopolitics, capabilities of militant groups and capacity of regional regimes. It compares the Sahara as a larger ungoverned space than the Horn, which appears to make Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other militant groups more difficult to combat than Al Shabaab in the smaller ungoverned space of Somalia. Comparative analysis gives rise to an explanation of differences and similarities between security challenges in the Sahara and the Horn as ungoverned spaces. The analysis takes into account factors, such as hiding places, regime capacity and salience. Second, the article compares the implementation of two different U.S. strategies in helping to secure two ungoverned spaces with dangerous places—the Horn and Sahara. The containment approach in the Sahara is compared with the more assertive strategy in the Horn in waging war against violent extremist organizations. The conclusion includes evaluation of the hypotheses.

Comparing Ungoverned Spaces, Violent Non-State Actors, and Regimes

The Sahara is 9.4 million square kilometers, while the Horn is less than 2 million square kilometers. The Sahara spans from the Atlas Mountains in North Africa to the southern Sahel and from Mauritania to Sudan. The focus of this article is on the two-thirds of the Sahara west of Sudan where Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other violent non-state actors operate, as well as the Horn lowlands outside of the Abyssinian highlands where Al Shabaab and other violent non-state actors are located. The area of focus in the Sahara is approximately six times larger than the Horn. The distances from capital cities in the Sahara are greater than in the Horn; for example, Bamako, Mali, is almost three thousand kilometers across the Sahara from Algiers, Algeria, while Mogadishu, Somalia, is one thousand kilometers across the Horn lowlands from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A thousand kilometers in the Sahara only covers the distance from Bamako, to Kidal in Tuareg territory in northern Mali.[25]

In the Sahara, there are plenty of mountains and caves in which violent non-state actors can conceal their operations, and regional governments have very limited control of these areas through isolated military garrisons and border posts. The Horn has ungoverned spaces in the semi-arid areas that fall between the Ethiopian highlands and Kenya highlands. The reach of the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments is largely coercive. In the Sahara, the indigenous people include the Tuareg, who have been able to sustain the struggle for autonomy in Mali and Niger and make a living through smuggling and trade for decades. The radicalization of Islamic youth in the northern Sahel has been significant.[26] Cross-Sahara traffic and kidnapping for ransom provide violent non-state actors with sources of income for survival. Organized crime gangs have been found to be generating massive drug smuggling to Europe and cooperating with violent extremist organizations.[27]

In Somalia, much of the illicit commerce has taken place in the urban areas of Mogadishu and Kismayo and other areas along the coast. In the interior, Somali nomads roam with their herds and are difficult to monitor, but they are not as involved as the Tuareg in kidnapping and smuggling. There was no government in Somalia between 1991 and 2012, so violent non-state actors have been able to come and go with little or no detection and interdiction, except by U.S. forces. Since being pushed out of Mogadishu and Kismayo in 2012, Al Shabaab has embedded itself in villages in the Somali countryside.

Al Shabaab has been more of a "road-roaming" insurgency, while Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been more "bush-roaming." AQIM has Algerian roots but has become transnational in the Sahara.[28] The movement was forced to leave the populated areas of northern Algeria in the late 1990s and chose to set up operations primarily in the Sahara and with a residual presence in the mountains of northern Algeria. In the Sahara, they came to control smuggling routes and carry out kidnappings to continue the jihad against the Algerian regime, its Western supporters, and Sahelian states. AQIM and its offshoots seem to have settled on operating in the Sahara,[29] and it could be concluded that it is primarily a bush-roaming insurgency, while maintaining the universalistic goal of establishing a caliphate in the Maghreb and West Africa.

In 2012, AQIM and two other Islamist militias, Ansar al Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), took over northern Mali, including Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao, and proved themselves more powerful than both Tuareg separatist fighters and the Malian military. In January 2013, militant forces advanced in central Mali. They could only be pushed back by French forces. AQIM and other militant groups could make a comeback as French forces depart Mali, as the UN Peace Support Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) remains weak, and as the Malian military is reconstructed. AQIM has been found by experts to be cooperating with Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Al Shabaab has roots in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) movement of the early 2000s in Somalia. The militant group took over Kismayo and most parts of Mogadishu in 2007 in a campaign to set up an Islamist caliphate. Before 2007, it was thought that Somalia was too inhospitable for Al Qaeda, due to the dominance of clans. However, the rise of Al Shabaab led to an opening of the door to foreign fighters from Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and other locations. Initially, Al Shabaab enjoyed broad-based support in Somalia for suppressing clan violence.

The injection of African Union forces that took back Mogadishu and Kismayo damaged Al Shabaab, which became more like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb after it was driven out of northern Algeria's cities and villages. While the movement has been forced to become more of a bush-roaming insurgency, it continues to mount attacks in Mogadishu, with the eventual aim of returning to the capital city. After the French intervention, the violent extremist organizations returned to their hideouts in northern Mali and mountains of the Sahara, with the possibility of returning to take over Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao and perhaps other urban centers in Mali. Both AQIM and Al Shabaab have generated splinter groups; however, the latter movement has been able to neutralize most offshoots. Finally, Al Shabaab has been transnational in the sense that it has links to diasporas in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere from where it has received considerable funding for its operations. Al Shabaab launched sensational attacks in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010 and Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013 with help from sympathetic Somalis in those cities. In contrast, militant groups in the Sahara have relied less on the diaspora and received little outside funding and operational support.

Eastern African states, such as Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Burundi, have proved themselves to be more capable than West African states in mitigating threats from ungoverned spaces and violent non-state actors. Eastern African regimes have sent thousands of troops to engage in offensive operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia. They were able to push Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and Kismayo, and now fight in the countryside. In contrast, West African troops sent to Mali proved incapable of acting as a buffer to prevent militant groups from attacking toward Mopti and other urban areas in the middle of the country. Instead, they had to rely on French forces to defeat the insurgents. Today, West African forces are incapable of pursuing and fighting militant groups in the Sahara. As for North Africa, Algeria is a capable state but has only been willing to fight violent extremist organizations on its own territory and drive them southwards into Mali, Niger, and Mauritania.

The farther north one proceeds in the Sahara, the less governance Sahelian states have been able to exercise.[30] For instance, Mali has experienced more difficulty controlling its Tuareg areas than Kenya and Ethiopia have their Somali areas. However, there is not a collapsed state like Somalia in the Sahel. Mali has had the weakest regime, followed by Niger and Mauritania. In comparison to Mali, the recently formed Somali government has little or no reach outside of Mogadishu. Also, the government of the de facto independent territory of Somaliland in the north has displayed limited ability to counter Al Shabaab.

French forces were able to push the violent extremist organizations out of populated areas of Mali, while East African forces have driven Al Shabaab out of urban centers in Somalia. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as a "desert- and mountain-roaming" insurgency, may be more difficult to defeat than Al Shabaab, which still operates in Somali villages. In addition, the Sahara is a vaster and more mountainous space than the Horn, which makes the challenges facing the United States and its partners greater in the Sahara. Although the Sahara and its militant groups comprise a greater challenge than the Horn, the United States perceives greater threats to its interests in the Horn and has invested more there than in the Sahara in fighting Al Qaeda affiliates.

Comparing U.S. Security Strategies in the Ungoverned Spaces of the Horn and Sahara

The United States directed more power toward countering the smaller ungoverned space of Somalia and neighboring territories than toward the much larger space of the Sahara. This decision was mainly the result of a U.S. determination that Somalia and the Horn posed more of a threat to its interests than did the Sahara. In the ungoverned spaces of the Horn of Africa and Somalia, the United States became a major driver of a top-down security approach after September 11, 2001, with the Bush administration's "global war on terror."

In 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) established the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti to enable U.S. Special Operations Command to undertake operations against Al Qaeda and other extremists in the region. CENTCOM selected Djibouti because of its strategic location between the ungoverned spaces of Somalia and Eastern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Also, Djibouti was chosen because of the receptivity of the government, which had hosted French forces since its independence.

By 2004, the United States had narrowed the ungoverned spaces that were cause for concern to Somalia and surrounding territory in Ethiopia and Kenya. CJTF-HOA shifted its approach and adopted a more indirect and bottom-up "hearts and minds" campaign, which centered on the drilling of wells for Somali pastoralists living in areas adjacent to

Somalia, especially in Kenya and Ethiopia.[31] The campaign scored some initial successes but experienced serious setbacks in Ethiopia in 2007 and in Kenya in 2009. Also, mistakes were made, including drilling boreholes in areas that caused conflict between clans. CJTF-HOA was forced to reformulate the campaign, which became less focused on Somali pastoralists and relatively less effective in helping to achieve U.S. security goals in the ungoverned spaces of the Horn.[32]

In 2004, the United States began to support the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in the hope of reconstituting the Republic of Somalia, which would eventually be able to counter violent extremist organizations and reestablish sovereignty and territoriality. In 2005, Jendayi Frazer became Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and assumed a leading role formulating Horn of Africa policies, introducing a more robust strategy of combating violent extremism and attempting to reestablish governance by backing the development of the transitional government into a governing and military force.[33] After the surging ICU defeated the U.S.-backed warlords and united South-Central Somalia under its rule, the Bush administration acquiesced to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, and the United States increased military assistance to Ethiopia. The Bush administration also backed the plan of the African Union (AU) to send a peace enforcement force, led by Uganda, to Somalia.

The U.S. Department of State (DOS) led the way in arranging the training and equipping of Ugandan and Burundian African Union forces and the new Somali National Armed Force (SNAF). The DOS Political-Military Affairs office, its Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, and security cooperation officials in embassies in Kampala, Bujumbura, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi to engage with African Union and Somali forces.[34] They organized the training and equipping of Ugandan and Burundian forces and the SNAF and arranged assistance for their operations in Mogadishu.[35] The successor to Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, continued the peace-enforcement and state-building policy under the Obama administration, as articulated in a March 2010 briefing: "The Djibouti peace process recognizes the importance of trying to put together an inclusive Somali government and takes into account the importance of the history, culture, clan and sub-clan relations that have driven the conflict in Somalia for the past 20 years."[36]

By 2011, AU and Somali forces strengthened and scored successes against Al Shabaab. Of particular significance were the August 2011 liberation of Mogadishu and the 2012 Kenyan intervention in Somalia that led to the takeover of the Al Shabaab stronghold of Kismayo and much of the surrounding province of Jubaland.[37] In 2012, the Federal Republic of Somalia was reconstituted.

The United States spent $650 million from 2007–2012 on the top-down security enterprise for Somalia and continues to spend tens of millions of dollars each year.[38] Most of the funds have been channeled through the State Department's program for training, equipping, and supporting Ugandan and Burundian forces that became the core of the African Union Mission.[39] The Defense Department provided support, with combined exercises and help in training. The Combined Joint Task Force arranged intelligence sharing with the African Union Mission for defensive purposes. Finally, in April 2013, with the lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia, the United States began arms shipments to the new Somali army.

In sum, the United States and its partners have made considerable progress in rolling back Al Shabaab and securing the ungoverned spaces of the Horn. African Union forces have risen in size from 6,000 in 2010 to over 22,000 in 2014. On a negative note, the Republic of Somalia government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud started out well, but it soon sank into the morass of corruption similar to previous Somali interim governments. Therefore,

the goal of Somali self-sufficiency in security is still years away. Al Shabaab still mounts attacks inside Mogadishu and is still a major security threat.

In the ungoverned space of the Sahara, U.S. strategy has been more about containing and preventing the southward flow of extremism and has been less coherent and focused than in the Horn. The Defense Department and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) devised the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002 in the wake of 9/11 and the Bush administration's concern about ungoverned spaces and weak and failing states and the threats they posed to the United States and its allies in the global war on terror.[40] Saharan and Sahelian states were under similar pressures from violent extremist organizations as Horn states. In particular, the Sahel was vulnerable to militant groups, especially Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The Bush administration proceeded first with the idea that building military counter-terrorism capacity would be the most effective method to defend the Sahara and Sahel from violent extremist organizations; protecting U.S. and EU interests in Algeria, Nigeria, and other states and rolling back militant groups. In the Sahel, it was expected that weak states would be able to develop capabilities to contain threats from dangerous places. Therefore, the United States began funding programs in the Sahel states in 2002 to help build their ability to exercise sovereignty and territoriality and control their borders. During 2002–04, the U.S. military trained and equipped one rapid-reaction company of about 150 soldiers each, in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad, to enhance border capabilities against arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the movement of transnational violent extremist organizations. U.S. Special Forces and EUCOM took the lead in training and exercises. In regard to building capacity to establish governance in the Sahara, the strategy was unclear. For example, Toyota Land Cruisers were provided to Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad in the hope that it would strengthen border control in the vast Saharan Desert. However, there was insufficient follow-up to ensure that the aid had been effective.

By 2005, the Bush administration altered the strategy and launched the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), deciding that building state capacity and government capabilities and winning hearts and minds would be a better way of defending the Sahel from militant groups and preventing the spread of extremism. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department were given the lead, with EUCOM supporting. The United States funded the TSCTP with $500 million from 2005 to 2010, and funding was extended from 2010 onward.[41] At the same time, EUCOM and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) launched Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) to train African forces to counter violent extremist organizations. EU-COM also continued to mount Operation Flintlock to jointly exercise U.S. forces with regional forces. In 2008, EUCOM passed control of OEF-TS to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Under the Obama administration, it was made clear that development and diplomacy were under the purview of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and that the TSCTP was primarily their program.[42] A description of the partnership noted that the interagency program mobilizes resources and expertise to "assist host governments to improve their security services, extend effective government control over remote areas that terrorists use as safe havens, address underlying causes of radicalization, and increase the positive influence of moderate leaders with vulnerable populations." The program provided regional university students with useful work skills to better prepare them for the transition between school and the workplace, as well as provide rehabilitation and training opportunities for disenfranchised youth and vulnerable populations. Furthermore, it was noted that "Congress has made TSCTP a priority for the

first time by approving a line item for the program." However, there still was no measure to gauge the reduction of extremism.[43]

In 2011, a USAID-sponsored survey found that USAID-funded TSCTP programs in Chad, Niger, and Mauritania had diminished the underlying conditions that were leaving at-risk populations vulnerable to extremism. The programs included youth development, former combatant reintegration, and education, as well as rural radio and media programs, peacebuilding and conflict management, and small-scale infrastructure projects like drilling wells and constructing schools. In particular, USAID civic youth programs and TSCTP "peace and tolerance" radio programs were found to significantly reduce youth extremism.[44] Furthermore, the survey determined that the programs had built local government capacity and the ability to communicate with the youth of the Sahel and implemented the type of capacity and programs necessary to lessen extremism. It has been noted that the types of programs and projects that have been instituted are not complex and could be sustained once the U.S. footprint is lessened.

While the TSCTP was found to help reduce support for violent extremism among youth in the Sahel, this was not the case in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahara (for example, among the Tuareg). Thus, the partnership can be considered a limited success, especially since most of the population lives in Sahel and not in the Sahara. It could be concluded that the TSCTP helped to prevent the southward spread of extremism and that a firewall had been built against extremism in the most populated areas of Sahel. The problem was in the northern Sahel and southern Sahara and how to change attitudes there and roll back extremism. It was problematic for U.S. programs to reach those ungoverned spaces.

In his 2012 study of the Trans-Sahara Partnership, William Miles found that the strategy produced disappointing results in Mali. [45] The relative success of Tuareg and extremist insurgencies showed that the tens of millions of dollars spent had not helped Mali defend itself and exercise territorial control over its northern spaces. He found that in Niger, violent extremist organizations remained a threat. In Nigeria, Boko Haram continued conducting frequent mass attacks, which U.S. programs have done little to help stop. In Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Chad, U.S. efforts produced greater capabilities; merged U.S. security and development specialties; and, enhanced U.S. security interests to some extent.[46] This was partly due to the relative strength of the regimes and professionalism of the security forces.

In sum, the United States and its partners have made mixed progress in the Sahel and not much progress in the Sahara.[47] This is due to a combination of ungoverned spaces in the Sahara and effectiveness of violent extremist organizations, as well as Sahelian states' security forces limitations. There is a debate over the future of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Some think it should be enhanced with a Joint Task Force–Western Africa. Others think TSCTP should be tightened and more focused on Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, especially in countering Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram.[48]

Conclusion

The different approaches of the United States in the Horn and Sahara and the differences in ungoverned spaces demonstrate that geography and the capabilities and aims of violent non-state actors have an effect on levels of threat and the ability to counter threats. Geography helps to explain why such actors in ungoverned spaces and dangerous places are very difficult to counter. Vast ungoverned spaces combined with weak states make it nearly impossible, even with U.S. support, to decisively defeat violent non-state actors.

This article has demonstrated that a more assertive strategy of supporting offensive intervention forces and attacking militant group leaders partially succeeded in securing an ungoverned space and curbing a violent extremist organization in the Horn, in contrast to the partial failure of a containment approach in the Sahara, which focused on counter-terrorism training for regional security forces and countering extremist ideology. In the Sahara, the U.S. containment strategy of supporting regional regimes and providing programs for youth led to some progress in curbing extremism in the Sahel but very limited success in countering militant groups and other violent non-state actors in the Sahara and failure in preventing militant groups from taking over northern Mali in 2012. Since then, violent extremist organizations have expanded their activities to other parts of the region. The more assertive strategy in the Horn led to the expulsion of Al Shabaab from ungoverned urban and some rural spaces and enabled the formation of a Somali government. Also, U.S. forces launched occasional counterterrorist attacks that degraded Al Shabaab's leadership. This article has also confirmed that a dangerous place is likely to be more sustainable for violent non-state actors if the U.S. strategy is merely containment rather than preemption or intervention.

The U.S. strategy of supporting Uganda and the African Union Mission in Somalia and using U.S. counterterrorism attacks reaped a partial victory but did not neutralize Al Shabaab. While the United States has scored successes in Somalia, the Al Qaeda–linked militant group has not been eliminated; it has merely been curbed. Therefore, the assertive approach had an impact but did not achieve victory. Given the failure of U.S. strategy in both the Horn and Sahara to *decisively defeat* militant groups, it must be concluded that geopolitics, in the form of ungoverned spaces that cannot be controlled by weak regimes, provides a significant part of the explanation. The counterhypothesis has been upheld that neither an assertive nor a containment strategy is likely to bring success in *decisively countering* violent non-state actors in ungoverned spaces. This fits the pattern established in the war against Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.

The vast size of the Sahara makes it difficult for all eight regional regimes to control, even with backing from the United States and France. Therefore, it is questionable if the more assertive strategy applied in Somalia and the Horn could work in Mali and the Sahara. The Sahara is a bigger ungoverned space than the Horn and appears to be a more dangerous place, where violent extremist organizations and other violent non-state actors can sustain themselves and avoid interdiction. However, it is difficult to definitively conclude that the larger and more ungoverned the space where such actors choose to operate, the more sustainable a dangerous place will be and the more difficult it will be to pacify. One can only conclude that ungoverned spaces create an advantageous condition for such actors to make dangerous places.

The level of success in the Horn can be explained by the level of U.S. national interest and weight of effort, as well as the relatively small ungoverned space. The level of threat to U.S. interests against violent extremism was greater in the Horn than in the Sahara and Sahel. Also, the high degree of salience of Ugandan leaders and the capability of Ugandan forces, backed by other Eastern African forces, was greater than leaders and forces from Sahelian and other West African countries.[49] Comparison of U.S. strategy in the Horn and Sahara demonstrate that the United States is more likely to assertively attack militant groups if those actors are committed to attacking U.S. interests, especially in the Arabian Peninsula, and less likely when they might attack the interests of a less important country or region. The more concentrated threat to U.S. interests and absence of a state in Somalia influenced decision making regarding the Horn, which led to the Combined Joint Task Force and support for the African Union force, while the more dispersed threat and weak

states in the Sahara led to a less intensive approach, which resulted in the PSI and then the TSCTP. The United States was unwilling to intervene in Mali in 2012, because the threat to U.S. interests was low and because the Obama administration was less inclined to use force than the Bush administration had been.

Notes

1. *2002 US National Security Strategy*. The NSS raised the prospect that weak states are more dangerous than strong ones and that ungoverned spaces are more dangerous than governed ones. This preoccupation with weak and failed states has come under criticism. See Michael J. Mazarr, "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm: Requiem for a Decade of Distraction," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2014), available at http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/140347/michael-j-mazarr/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-failed-state-paradigm?sp_mid= 44859064&sp_rid=c3RlcGhlbbi5idXJnZXNzQG1heHdlbGwuYWYubWlsWlsS0 (accessed February 3, 2014). Critics of the 2002 NSS and its emphasis on the "global war on terror," weak states, and ungoverned spaces, accuse the authors of the NSS of overgeneralization. Supposedly, there was a lack of focus on Al Qaeda and the relatively few ungoverned spaces from which it could operate.

2. Katharyne Mitchell, "Ungoverned Space: Global Security and the Geopolitics of Broken Windows," *Political Geography*, vol. 29, no. 5 (2010): 289–297. Mitchell observes that disorderly, ungoverned spaces are often viewed by some security experts as insecure and dangerous, requiring constant attention.

3. Research data collected for this article include the results of meetings during two U.S. Air War College Regional and Cultural Studies program field visits to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, March 2–13, 2014, and Uganda and Tanzania, March 2013, as well as field research in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, and at U.S. Africa Command headquarters in Germany, May–June 2012.

4. Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, "Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 53, no. 4 (August, 2009), 544–569.

5. Phil Williams, "Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Places and International Security," in Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 17–33.

6. Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Mineral-rich areas that are far-removed from the capital city are the only ones that forces of the state make efforts to control.

7. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review,* vol. 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90.

8. Buhaug et al., "Geography," 544–569.

9. Michael L. Faye, John W. McArthur, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Thomas Snow, "The Challenges Facing Landlocked Countries," *Journal of Human Development,* vol. 5, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–39.

10. Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn, *African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007).

11. Conrad Schetter, "Ungoverned Territories: The Construction of Spaces of Risk in the "War on Terrorism," in Detlef Muller-Mahn, eds., *The Spatial Dimension of Risk: How Geography Shapes the Emergence of Riskscapes* (London: Routledge, 2013), chapter 7.

12. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan–Afghanistan Frontier," *International Security,* vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 1–19.

13. Sally Healy and Ginny Hill, *Yemen and Somalia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks and the Limitations of State-Building*, Chatham House Briefing paper, October 2010, 1–15, available at chathamhouse.org (accessed February 5, 2014).

14. Ken Menkhaus and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Non-State Actors and Failed States: Lessons from Al-Qa'ida and the Horn of Africa," in Clunan and Trinkunas, eds., *Ungoverned Spaces*, 77–94. In opposition to arguments about the hostility of Somalis to Al Qaeda, a homegrown Somali violent extremist organization, Al Shabaab, arose in 2006 and allied itself with Al Qaeda in 2008. Afterward,

foreign Al Qaeda fighters flooded into Somalia. The lesson is that ungoverned spaces, which may be unwelcoming to violent extremist organizations, can be changed by local actors and become more dangerous places.

15. Eric Jardine, "Population-Centric Counter-Insurgency and the Movement of Peoples," *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* vol. 23, no. 2 (2012): 264–294.

16. Stewart Patrick, *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 245–246.

17. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority, and Softened Sovereignty," in Clunan and Trinkunas, eds., *Ungoverned Spaces,* 17–33. Clunan and Trinkunas and other authors wrestle with the problem of how ungoverned spaces can be managed without the state, which would make them less dangerous places.

18. B. P. Salazar, "Multidimensional Security, 'Ungoverned Areas' and Non-State Actors," in Monique Greenwood Santos and Stephen J. Randall, eds., *Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies* (Calgary, Alberta, Canada), Occasional Paper Number 9, March 17, 2013, 147–168.

19. Chas W. Freeman, "Coping with Kaleidoscopic Change in the Middle East," *Middle East Policy,* vol. 20, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 29–36.

20. Roland Marchal, "Military (Mis) Adventures in Mali," *African Affairs*, vol. 112, no. 448 (2013): 486–497.

21. Eliza Griswold, "Can General Linder's Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?" *The New York Times,* June 13, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat. html?hpw&rref=magazine (accessed June 15, 2014); and Bill Knarr, "Matching the Footprint of Governance to the Footprint of Sovereignty," in *The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment,* Joint Special Operations University, November 2013, 31–40. The role of Special Forces (SOF) has been instrumental in combating violent extremists, especially in Somalia and the Sahara, and will continue to be so if the United States wants to intervene more assertively in resource-constrained environments. In both the Horn and Sahara, good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) are required to manage the dangerous places.

22. Michael D. Rettig, "Mitigating the Threat Posed by Ungoverned Spaces: Cost-Effective Proposals to Enhance US Counterterrorism Initiatives," *The Partnership for Research in International Affairs Journal,* vol. 1, no. 2 (July 2013), available at www.priad.org/wp.../10/PRIAD_ POLICYJOURNAL_Rettig_MDR.pdf (accessed February 20, 2014).

23. Jan Bachmann, "'Kick Down the Door, Clean up the Mess, and Rebuild the House'—The Africa Command and Transformation of the US Military," *Geopolitics*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2010): 564–585. More than $300 million a year has been spent on U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) since it became operational in October 2008 in order, to a large extent, to focus on combating violent extremists in the Horn. In 2011, AFRICOM generated the first of its campaign plans—the East Africa Campaign Plan— to deal with the Horn. A West Africa Campaign Plan emerged soon afterward and dealt with the Sahel. Also, there are proposals to establish a U.S. Joint Task Force West Africa, modeled on CJTF-HOA.

24. Robin Luckham and Tom Kirk, "The Two Faces of Security in Hybrid Political Orders: A Framework for Analysis and Research," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development,* vol. 2, no. 2, (2013): 1–30, available at http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.cf/126 (accessed February 4, 2014). Luckham and Kirk find that "questions of legitimacy compromise security where governments are too weak or captured by special interests to be able to protect all or some of their citizens, as in Mali." They also find that "unsecured borderlands are spaces where state authority is suspended or violently challenged by alternative claimants to power and providers of security, including non-state armed groups . . . Examples are . . . the Somali-speaking region that traverses Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia and Northern Kenya."

25. This article compares a larger ungoverned space with a relatively small security effort (TSCTP) with a relatively smaller ungoverned space with a larger security effort (AMISOM and CJTF-HOA). Further research that included comparison of a relatively large space (like the Sahara)

with a larger effort and a smaller space (like the Horn) with a smaller effort would lead to a more comprehensive comparative analysis.

26.   Olawale Ismail, "Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in West Africa: Implications for African and International Security," *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2013): 209–230.

27.   James Cockayne, "Chasing Shadows: Strategic Responses to Organised Crime in Conflict-Affected Situations," *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 158, no. 2 (April 2013): 10–24, available athttps://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A517E5941E6832 (accessed February 14, 2014). Organized crime has generated the drug economies of Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and now Mali.

28.   Some have argued that AQIM remains focused on taking power in Algeria, though it has not attacked in northern Algeria for several years.

29.   Catriona Dowd and Cionadh Raleigh, "The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel, *African Affairs*, vol. 112, no. 448 (2013): 1–12.

30.   Cionadh Raleigh and Catriona Dowd, "Governance and Conflict in the Sahel's 'Ungoverned Space,'" *International Journal of Stability of Security & Development,* (2013), available at http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.bs/96 (accessed February 24, 2014).

31.   Karsten Friis, "Peacekeeping and Counter-Insurgency: Two of a Kind?" *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 17, no. 1 (March 2010): 49–66. This shift happened at a time in which U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan were leading to adoption of stability operations, which focused on engaging from the bottom-up with local populations in order to mitigate violent extremism.

32.   Interviews with U.S. defense officials, U.S. Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, June 2012.

33.   Jendayi Frazer was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in June 2005.

34.   Interview with U.S. Somalia expert, U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya, June 12, 2012.

35.   Interviews with Somalia experts at U.S. AFRICOM headquarters, Stuttgart, Germany, May 30, 2012.

36.   "U.S. Policy in Somalia," Special Briefing by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, and Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Mission in Rome, Washington, DC, March 12, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm (accessed February 20, 2014).

37.   Ken Menkhaus, "After the Kenyan Intervention," Enough Project, January 2012, 1–15, available at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/MenkhausKenyaninterventionSomalia.pdf (accessed January 20, 2014).

38.   "Transcript: General Carter Ham Discusses Security Challenges, Opportunities at George Washington University," U.S. Africa Command, December 3, 2012, available at http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Transcript/10170/ transcript-general-ham-discusses-security-challenges (accessed February 20, 2014).

39.   "Senior State Department Official Previewing Conference on Somalia," February 22, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/ r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184480.htm (accessed February 20, 2014). From 2008–2011, the United States spent $385 million supporting the African Union Mission.

40.   William F. S. Miles, "Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa," *African Studies Review,* vol. 55, no. 3 (December 2012): 27–60.

41.   General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation on Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)," July 2008, available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08860.pdf (accessed February 21, 2014). The GAO report found that there was no discernible effect on militant groups and a lack of focus and coherence; these problems have persisted.

42.   U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, "Programs and Initiatives," available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/ (accessed February 21, 2014).

43. U.S. Agency for International Development, "Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership," U.S. Foreign Assistance Performance Publication, Fiscal Year 2009, available at www.state.gov/documents/.../159220.pdf (accessed February 21, 2014).

44. U.S. Agency for International Development, "Midterm Evaluation of US Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa," 1–47, available at www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691725 (accessed February 21, 2014).

45. William F. S. Miles, "Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa," *African Studies Review,* vol. 55, no. 3 (December 2012): 27–60.

46. Miles, "Deploying Development," 27–60. Miles concludes that the partnership between AFRICOM and USAID had mixed results in the campaign against violent extremism in Africa. Organizational cultures differed. The TSCTP and CJTF-HOA blurred the lines between development and defense. There was suspicion of the military in certain areas. AFRICOM has more resources for development than USAID.

47. François Heisbourg, "A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,* vol. 55, no. 2 (2013): 7–18. Comparative analysis of U.S. and French approaches demonstrates that France is willing to intervene directly with ground forces in case of an emergency in its former colonies, as was the case with Mali. The French intervened when violent extremist organizations threatened central Mali. It was only through French intervention that the militant groups were countered and pushed out of the major centers in northern Mali. In the Horn, France plays a supporting role to U.S. efforts with its forces in Djibouti. The same applied in Mali and the Sahara before January 2013.

48. Research data collected from meetings during the U.S. Air War College Regional and Cultural Studies program field visit to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, March 2–13, 2014. For certain U.S. embassy officials, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) remains merely "an accounting line" and is rarely mentioned. However, regionally focused USAID officials believe that TSCTP is now being taken more seriously, especially since the Al Shabaab attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. One U.S. official commented that the TSCTP is now being accepted as a regional strategy for the Sahara and Sahel.

49. Matt Freear and Cedric de Coning, "Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali," *Stability: International Journal of Stability and Development* (2013), available at http:/www.stabilityjournal.org (accessed February 24, 2014).

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