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# Conflict Prevention: Old Wine in New Bottles?

KARIN AGGESTAM

The notion of conflict prevention (CP) has a general appeal to most scholars within conflict research. It implies that we might be able to avoid destructive conflicts through external intervention before any major violent actions have taken place. The notion of conflict prevention tends to be launched as a new phenomenon both in theory as well as in practice. **One of several reasons why CP has received new and extensive attention in the last ten years is the increasing number of internal conflicts in comparison to interstate wars.** Internal conflicts have resulted in state collapse and humanitarian catastrophes such as gross human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing and large groups of internally displaced people and refugees.

Yet, despite the many books and articles on CP there are surprisingly few critical analyses of the present state of research. This article therefore seeks to make a critical assessment of the research on CP. How is CP defined and operationalized? Does there exist a general understanding and knowledge about contemporary conflicts and of CP especially? In what ways does the research offer new insights to the prevention of conflict? Since research on CP is assumed to be policy-relevant, this article also addresses the question of theory and practice. Does a greater emphasis on the prevention of conflict mirror any major alteration in the practice and management of conflict? What roles and activities do nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) exercise and play in the prevention of conflict? In what way do states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs interact in CP, and what are the potentials as well as limitations of such cooperation?

## Theory: Conceptual Confusion?

In 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called for conflict prevention in *An Agenda for Peace*.<sup>1</sup> Today, there is a vast amount of literature on CP and the field of research is multifaceted. Unfortunately, it has not contributed to a greater in-depth

understanding of the phenomena. Most of the studies are empirically oriented and lack explicit theoretical frameworks and operational definitions. Traditional diplomatic strategies tend to be reconceptualized and renamed without any real change of substance and content. There is a whole array of concepts that refer to CP, such as 'blind prevention', 'complex prevention', 'direct prevention', 'structural prevention', 'preventive diplomacy', 'preventive engagement' and 'preventive deployment'. However, it remains obscure what prevention actually stands for. Moreover, prevention contains diverse understandings and norms of strategies. Although most scholars agree on the need to develop and enhance an international norm system of preventing conflict, they tend to avoid the fact that there exist divergent and often competing understandings of CP.<sup>2</sup>

To structure the discussion, I have adopted two commonly used categories of CP, namely direct and structural prevention.<sup>3</sup> Structural prevention focuses primarily on the underlying causes as to why conflicts arise in the first place. Such an approach includes a long-term engagement and commitment. It attempts to address social, political and economic structures, such as political and democratic institution building or economic and social development, which may inhibit conflict escalation. Structural prevention is first and foremost concerned with internal conflicts and actions that are centred on how to prevent state failure and collapse as well as how to reconstruct economic, political and social structures in a post-conflict situation. Consequently, this approach argues for a long-term involvement of CP and an in-depth understanding of the contextual dynamics of specific conflicts. It is therefore less concerned about timing and identification of a particular phase of conflict escalation per se.

Direct prevention has a more limited agenda. The emphasis is placed largely on short-term strategies and interaction of the conflicting actors and third parties. This approach is guided by a pragmatic ambition of prevention without any comprehensive prescribed formula.<sup>4</sup> The primary goal is not to resolve all outstanding issues of disputes but rather to control and remove the imminent causes to violent escalation both within and between states. As a consequence, the timing of preventive actions is mostly centred on the pre-conflict phase and less on the phases after violence has broken out or the post-conflict situation. Hence, CP is more narrowly defined than structural prevention and does not include economic development.

### Preventing What? Diagnosis, Understanding and Prediction of Conflict

The diagnosis and knowledge of conflict dynamics are critical prerequisites of efficient CP since most conflicts are contextually bounded. Prediction has never been the strength of social sciences and in CP it would require long-term monitoring of structural factors and extensive knowledge of how underlying sources of conflict interact with more immediate political dynamics. Today, the civilian populations constitute the majority of war victims. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is no longer valid. The disputing parties are both state and non-state actors, hence questions about recognition and identification of non-state actors become particularly troublesome. The political, military and economic asymmetry between state and non-state actors also has consequences for various efforts to prevent and resolve conflict peacefully. This requires, according to Andy Knight, Mary Kaldor and others, a new proactive understanding of security that addresses failed and collapsing state structures and massive human rights abuses.<sup>5</sup> Yet, many studies on CP are primarily focused on *how* to prevent conflict rather than on in-depth analysis of the causes and characteristics of contemporary conflicts. Conflict is viewed as a general phenomenon, which ranges from interstate, civil, resource and nuclear wars to state-sponsored terrorist campaigns.<sup>6</sup> As a result, attention is largely placed on the 'preventer', that is, activities of third parties rather than the 'target' of prevention.

If we assess more closely the two approaches of direct and structural prevention discussed above, they differ on a number of issues regarding their understanding of contemporary conflict, which have several implications on the selection of preventive strategies. Direct prevention is dominated by a strong focus on the 'preventer', which according to Raimo Väyrynen is the biggest flaw in the voluminous literature as CP is a contingent action.<sup>7</sup> Since the goal of CP is pragmatic, that is, to treat rather than cure conflict, the main aim is to contain escalation and the spread of conflict. Structural prevention is focused on 'cure' rather than 'treatment.' Conflicts are recognized as extremely complex to resolve, without any clear beginning or end. Hence, there is no predictable linear pattern of causes and effects, which limits the predictability of efficient preventive strategies.<sup>8</sup>

**Practice: Alteration in the Management of Conflict?**

The major challenge for the international community is, as discussed above, how to manage communal, ethnic and internal conflicts, which tend to be more intractable than interstate conflicts. The increasing complexity and the occurrence of human catastrophes, such as ethnic cleansing and gross human rights abuses, are the main reasons why CP is a 'buzzword' for both practitioners and academics, though at the same time CP has been described by some scholars as a 'pipe-dream', containing false assumptions about conflict.<sup>9</sup>

In practice, states and IGOs have come to dominate CP. The UN is an obvious player, exercising a critical leading role in the prevention of conflict since it generates international legitimacy and symbolizes what is often referred to as the international community. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has, for example, declared that the goal is to create a worldwide culture of CP in which human rights take priority. Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has underlined that the focus should be placed on the implementation of international norms and standards that are universal and indivisible as there still exists a huge gap between aspiration and reality.<sup>10</sup> However, traditional tools of diplomacy and conflict management frequently referred to in direct prevention, such as mediation, peacekeeping or sanctions, are often state-oriented and limited in time. These strategies are also more reactive than proactive, primarily aimed at influencing the external incentives of the disputing parties.<sup>11</sup> Since the dynamics and characteristics of contemporary conflicts differ from traditional interstate conflict, they have also been of limited use and at times even counterproductive. Kaldor, for instance, argues that 'conflict resolution from above', such as elite-based negotiations, has resulted in several unfortunate outcomes, including giving public legitimacy to individuals who are criminals responsible for grave human rights abuses.<sup>12</sup> Consequently, many calls have been made about the necessity to rethink strategies of international intervention in contemporary conflicts. The following section will therefore focus on the growing number and significance of NGOs in the international arena. In what ways have they contributed to the development of CP and altered the international management of conflict?

*The Role of NGOs in Conflict Prevention*

NGOs refer to a wide range of formal and informal associations and activities. There is subsequently barely any agreement about what NGOs as a whole stand for. They are part of worldwide networks,

which are forged through a variety of links between professional, commercial, religious, research, human rights, environmental and education bodies, only to mention a few. The revolution in communication and information technology has enabled NGOs to cut across national boundaries through loosely organized transnational coalitions formed according to a particular vision of society. NGOs are therefore not value-neutral but they do tend to present ethical judgements as impartial and universal standards. Many NGOs take a strong interest in preventive actions and in strengthening global society. At the same time, NGOs are connected to and dependent on their home governments in ambivalent, cooperative and at times contentious relations.<sup>13</sup>

Most of the contemporary conflicts concern state–society relations, in which victims of war are primarily civilians. This is one major reason for the increasing relevance of NGOs in CP, in particular, human rights and other advocacy groups, such as Amnesty International; humanitarian relief organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); associations promoting socio-economic development, such as Oxfam; and groups supporting conflict resolution techniques, such as the Carter Center in Atlanta.<sup>14</sup>

NGOs are often the first actors to become aware of the risks of conflict escalation and tend to be the ones who remain in conflict areas the longest. Early warning is an essential part of CP and focuses on gathering, interpreting and communicating information about specific and potential conflicts. It aims to create a network of people and associations to monitor conflicts while at the same favouring and supporting preventive solutions on grass root levels through empowering peacemaking. NGOs may, for example, facilitate communication channels, foster peaceful dialogues between disputing parties, and counter hate propaganda.<sup>15</sup> NGOs may also provide documentary evidence and specific case materials on human rights abuses to relevant international institutions.<sup>16</sup>

Structural peace building includes a whole range of activities such as human rights education, developmental assistance, and the (re)construction of political and democratic institutions. These processes may, for example, be supported by NGOs through election monitoring as illustrated by the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government led by Jimmy Carter.<sup>17</sup> NGOs also play increasingly important roles in the growing number of human rights missions and have become integral parts of the second/third generation of peacekeeping in post-conflict settings. Finally, NGOs have become significant actors in economic development, particularly in the last ten

years as the West's official development assistance (ODA) in general has seen major cut backs and/or has been relocated to NGOs. This trend of 'privatization' is partly based on the assumption that development assistance will become more efficient. Activities by NGOs are believed to be more participatory, flexible, innovative and effective while less expensive than governmental agencies. For example, it is easier for NGOs than for governmental agencies to link development aid to ethnic reconciliation.<sup>18</sup>

### **(Inter)Governmental–NGO Relations: Competition or Cooperation?**

Since the end of the Cold War, we have been witnessing a trend where governmental aid in general is increasingly being channelled through NGOs. Development assistance is turning private in form while staying public in purpose. Also many IGOs are 'contracting out' development work and humanitarian relief and assistance to NGOs. According to Mark Duffield, this seems to have become the West's favoured response to political crises and violent conflicts. He concludes that this privatization has led to a 'new aid paradigm', which includes a stronger focus on welfare, relief, people-centred development and general support for civil society and democratization. It may, however, also be viewed as an attempt to 'internalize' and contain the effects of political crisis and conflicts within unstable regions.<sup>19</sup>

This development has been criticized especially concerning the implications for CP. First, it is argued that the privatization of world politics tends to de-politicize CP, which ultimately is value-laden. The activities of NGOs and developmental strategies are often framed as 'technical' problems and as an apolitical tool in the management of conflict. Thus, the 'de-polarization' of NGOs risks focusing on technical and not political solutions. However, others argue that the trend of privatization of world politics is part of a new policy agenda of neo-liberal economics and western liberal democratic theory. NGOs in this interpretation come to symbolize everything that governments are not, that is, unburdened with large bureaucracies, flexible and open to innovations, faster at implementing development efforts and quicker to respond to grassroots needs. If the problem is framed in such a way, it might be argued that the functions of NGOs are politicized and directed not only on the basis of the target groups' needs, but also on the interests of external third parties.<sup>20</sup>

Second, some critics argue that the essence of what makes NGOs attractive might be undermined by the fact that several of them receive more than half of their funding from government sources. Changing

funding arrangements might encourage NGOs to develop fundraising tactics and rivalry in an unregulated and fiercely competitive aid market. The implication of such activities is a tendency to dramatize conflicts and emphasize emergency work while undermining the potential for improved coordination between NGOs.<sup>21</sup>

Third and most important, critics question the assumed causal link between economic development and foreign aid as an integral part of CP. Stephen Stedman points to the lack of a direct relationship between foreign aid and CP. He asserts that such a view suffers from economic and ecological determinism, assuming that the shortage of resources causes violent conflict and therefore the solution must be to increase aid. However, contrary to the general assumption about cost-efficiency, CP might in the end prove more costly and long term.<sup>22</sup> As a result, the competition over scarce resources between various CP strategies, such as between peacekeeping and socio-economic activities as seen in the UN could increase.<sup>23</sup>

#### *The Possibility and Limitation of Cooperation*

The prospect of increasing cooperation between states, IGOs and NGOs in CP depends to a great extent on the existence of some kind of shared understanding of war and peace generally and CP specifically. However, there exists a general division between direct and structural prevention. The first is mostly associated with a state and actor oriented approach, including short-term, pragmatic and traditional methods of conflict management, whereas the latter emphasizes a structural approach, which attempts to address underlying causes to conflict and where NGOs tend to be more engaged. To give an example, the UK Department for International Development refers to CP as 'conflict handling', which encompasses conflict readiness, prevention and mitigation, but excludes ambitions of conflict resolution.<sup>24</sup> The distinction may be traced to a general dualism that also exists in conflict theory, often referred to as conflict management/track one (official) and conflict resolution/track two (unofficial). Conflict management is focusing on strategic interaction where third parties intervene impartially without moral judgement. The unofficial approach strives towards resolving human needs, enhancing human rights and democratic institutions. Third parties are not able to negotiate and compromise on these issues and thus, cannot be morally neutral in conflict. The differences between the two approaches have increased since the end of the Cold War because normative issues such as justice and morality have become more important and increasingly acceptable in the international arena as an



integral part of any peace settlement.<sup>25</sup> According to Frost, this tension expresses a dividing line between supporters of a transnational civil society and a Westphalian state system.<sup>25</sup> There are a number of scholars who view these two approaches as incompatible, whereas others argue that they can complement each other in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict.<sup>27</sup>

In practice, there exists an interdependence between states, IGOs and NGOs from economic, political and social relations around the globe. This (inter)governmental–NGO relationship is described by some as one more of convenience than of a ‘passionate romance’. Each side remains distrustful and uncomfortable about working together, partly because they differ (and at times compete) in their understandings of peace and consequently in CP approaches, and partly because they speak to different constituencies.<sup>28</sup> There are, for example, many governments who evaluate information emanating from NGOs as inaccurate and unbalanced because NGOs are considered to have their own agendas, which do not conform to the views held by many governments. This ‘credibility problem’ becomes particularly troubling at times of early warning issued by NGOs.<sup>29</sup>

Still, there is widespread acknowledgement and an expressed need among states, IGOs and NGOs to pool resources and improve coordination in order to meet the challenging task of preventing contemporary conflicts, which are bound to be at the core of twenty-first century diplomacy. For instance, there is an obvious need to mainstream CP in such areas as information gathering and contingency planning of preventive actions. The UN has attempted to centralize functions and improve interagency flow of interaction and coordination mechanisms with NGOs through the establishment of the UN Department of Political Affairs. Yet it has failed to design comprehensive strategies to prevent failed and collapsing states.<sup>30</sup>

In sum, (inter)governmental–NGO cooperation in areas of CP can best be described as ad hoc. Institutionalization is still lacking or exists in an embryonic state. There is clearly a need to develop norms and institutional capacity for the prevention of internal conflicts. Some analysts argue for the establishment of an international prevention regime, which would contain an ethical code of what CP entails. Such a regime would be able to respond early with operational warnings based on shared and coherent standards of interpreted information and mobilized resources of both states, IGOs and NGOs.<sup>31</sup> Yet, it needs to be recognized that CP is and will continue to be a highly contested process not only between (inter)state agencies and NGOs but also among states in the North and in the South.

## Conclusion

This essay has sought to give an assessment of the present state of research on conflict prevention and to discuss in what ways it expresses any alteration in the management of contemporary conflicts. Both research and practice contain a wide array of definitions and strategies, which tend to result in a confused picture of the exact meaning of CP. Two approaches of CP have been discussed at greater length, namely direct and structural prevention, which hold a number of divergent views about prevention as well as in their understandings of conflict.

The research exhibits a number of weaknesses. First, many studies avoid providing exact definition and operationalization of the concept, or presenting explicit theoretical frameworks for empirical analyses, which consequently do not result in any substantial cumulative knowledge about CP. Second, it is difficult to distinguish in what ways the field of research contributes to any new insights to the management of conflict since CP is used interchangeably with such general notions as conflict management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Many scholars list for instance a whole set of strategies to prevent conflict, but these are rarely new. Also there seems to be little theoretical and methodological awareness of the implications of these strategies and how they might produce counterproductive results. One reason for this is that there is generally a strong emphasis on *how* to prevent (strategies) rather than any in-depth elaboration upon *what* is to be prevented (knowledge about conflict).

If the research is supposed to be of policy relevance this becomes particularly troublesome since it is unable to establish a causal chain of variables and predict conflict escalation. At the same time, prediction is one of the most difficult tasks of social sciences and as argued by Alexander George, neither should it be our main goal.<sup>32</sup> **As an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice, the emphasis should rather be placed on the *diagnosis* of conflict. It means on the one hand that CP needs to be context-specific since no predictable linear pattern of cause and effect can be established. On the other hand, evaluations of various strategies in different conflicts may be analysed and compared as a way to make some kind of conditional generalization and to discuss plausible scenarios.** However, the importance of time and timing should be underlined in such discussions, that is, the problem of both the timing of preventive strategies as well as their time span.

In the analysis of CP in practice, the roles and activities of NGOs have been given particular attention. NGOs have become important

actors in many international arenas and in the various modes of CP as most contemporary conflicts concern unstable state–society relations with great implications for civilians. Two activities have been highlighted in this article, namely early warning and structural peace building. Early warning in particular is a critical contribution of NGOs to the practice of CP since they often hold vital information, which improves the capacity of diagnosis. At the same time, NGOs suffer from a credibility problem, partly because (inter)state agencies and NGOs tend to hold different imperatives of peace and what ultimately is to be understood as preventive actions. Yet, the activities of NGOs often take place in collaboration with states and IGOs, which expresses an interdependent nature of relations between these actors. For example, states and IGOs are today increasingly ‘contracting out’ and channelling development aid through NGOs.

In sum, conflict prevention is a problematic analytical concept and resembles mostly a new label with an old content. CP should nevertheless be viewed as an expression of engagement in promoting a normative agenda and an international culture of conflict prevention. There is today a strong drive for normative concerns about such issues as human rights, justice and democracy in which NGOs constitute a driving force. Greater collaboration and coordination between states, IGOs and NGOs through a transnational framework is not only desirable but a necessary prerequisite if we are to improve our capacity and efficiency in addressing contemporary conflicts.

## NOTES

1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, New York: United Nations, 1992.
2. See, for example, Annika Björkdahl, *From Idea to Norm. Promoting Conflict Prevention*, Department of Political Science: Lund University, 2002. Michael B. Brown and Richard N. Rosencrance (eds.) *The Cost of Conflict Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999; Carment, David and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.) *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2001; Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996.
3. See, for example, Peter Wallensteen, ‘Preventive Security: Direct and Structural Prevention of Violent Conflicts’, in Peter Wallensteen (ed.) *Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges*, Uppsala: University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1998, p.35.
4. Raimo Väyrynen, ‘Preventing Deadly Conflicts: Failures in Iraq and Yugoslavia’, *Global Society*, Vol.14, No.1, 2000, p.6.
5. W. Andy Knight, ‘Towards a Subsidiarity Model for Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy: Making Chapter VIII of the UN Chapter Operational’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, No.1, 1996; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

6. See, for example, Michael Lund, 'Underrating Preventive Diplomacy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.75, No.4, July/August, 1995; Peter Wallensteen, Birger Heldt, Mary B. Anderson, Stephen John Stedman and Leonard Wantchekon, *Conflict Prevention through Development Co-operation*, Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Research Report No.59, 2001.
7. Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework', in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995, pp.27-31; Väyrynen (n.4 above), p.10.
8. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, 'From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World Disorder', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.20, No.1, 1999, pp.18-24; Because of the problem of prediction, Nicolaidis (n.7 above, p.26) argues for 'blind prevention' that is independent of prediction. It should be focused on preventing the reoccurrence of conflict in post-conflict phases, relying on institutionalized rules, norms and procedures that are applicable to all conflicts. Blind prevention should include rapid standing operating procedures and resources, which are to be activated once violence has broken out.
9. Väyrynen (n.4 above), p.32.
10. Mary Robinson, 'The Next Human Rights Agenda: Preventing Conflict', *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol.16, No.5, Fall, 1999, pp.23-8.
11. Nicolaidis (n.7 above), pp.38-9.
12. Kaldor (n.5 above), pp.10, 91, 119.
13. Lund (n.2 above), pp.178-9; Andrew Natsios, 'NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.16, No.3, 1995, p.458; John Stremlau, *People in Peril Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, and Preventing Deadly Conflict*, New York: Carnegie Commission, May 1998, pp.54-6.
14. See further, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Executive Summary of the Final Report*, Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1997, p.32; Mary B. Anderson, 'Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention', in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Process, 1996, p.344.
15. Nicolaidis (n.7 above), pp.60-65.
16. Emily MacFarquhar, Robert I. Rotberg, and Martha A. Chen 'Introduction', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995, p.6.
17. Vikram Chand, 'Democratisation from the Outside in NGO and International Efforts to Promote Open Elections', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.3, 1997, pp.546-50; Ian Smillie, 'NGOs and Development Assistance: A Change in Mind-Set?', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.3, 1997.
18. Mark Duffield, 'NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.3, 1997; Nicolaidis (n.7 above), pp.60-64; Smillie (n.17 above), pp.564-71.
19. Duffield (n.18 above).
20. Ibid.; Natsios (n.13 above), pp.444-6; Dan Smith, 'Legitimacy, Justice and Preventive Intervention', in Wallensteen et al. (n.6 above), p.262.
21. Smillie (n.17 above), pp.563-9; An illustrative example is the Swedish Christian aid organization, *Lutherhjälpen*, which recently appealed in an advertisement campaign for funds in order to prevent a starvation catastrophe in southern Africa. The picture chosen for the ad is a starving child, hanging in a bag, to be weighed. The black and white picture, shown in profile, was taken in Sudan four years ago. Several Swedish NGOs reacted against the advertisement, accusing *Lutherhjälpen* of presenting an over-dramatized picture, which portrays and stigmatizes the African continent as weak, passive and vulnerable. According to some analysts, this type of fundraising is described as 'pornography of poverty'. Smillie, p.569.

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22. Stephen John Stedman, 'Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling "Preventive Diplomacy"', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.74, No.3, 1995.
23. Nicolaidis (n.7 above), pp.27–31.
24. Goodhand and Hulme (n.8 above), p.15.
25. Pauline Baker, 'Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace', in Crocker, et al. (n.14 above), pp.565–7; compare Michael Lund 'Not Only When to Act, But How: From Early Warning to Rolling Prevention', in Wallensteen (n.3 above), p.161.
26. Mervyn Frost, 'Ethical Aspects of Combat in New Wars', Paper presented at British International Studies Association, Bradford 18–20 December 2000.
27. See, for example, John Burton, 'Conflict Prevention as a Political System', in John A. Vasquez, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe and Linda Stamatou, eds., *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995; Ronald J. Fisher, 'Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: A Review and an Analysis', in Vasquez et al.
28. Natsios (n.13 above), p.413.
29. Carnegie Commission (n.14 above), p.10; Felice Gaer, 'Reality Check: Human Rights Nongovernmental Organisations Confront Governments at the United Nations', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.16, No.3, 1995; Lund (n.2 above), p.108; Nicolaidis (n.7 above), pp.34, 65; Stremlau (n.13 above), pp.54–6.
30. Carnegie Commission (n.3 above), pp.10–12; Natsios (n.13 above), pp.415–16; Stremlau (n.13 above), p.53; Wallensteen et al. (n.6 above), p.50; Nicolaidis (n.7 above), pp.23–5.
31. Aall (n.14 above); Lund (n.2 above); Nicolaidis (n.7 above); Kaldor (n.5 above), pp.88, 148, calls for a cosmopolitan approach, based on a political consciousness that is placed in a global context, which is to be attentive to democratic accountability and equality of all human beings. She believes that there already exists a partial cosmopolitan regime through several layers of governance of IGOs, social movements and NGOs that operate according to a set of accepted rules and norms, although lacking mechanisms to enforce cosmopolitan norms and human rights.
32. Alexander George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993.