



Original Article

Assessing the Expeditiousness of Existing Strategies for Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalization through Prison's Aspect of Criminal Justice System in Isiolo County, Kenya

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This study investigated the expeditiousness of existing strategies for preventing and countering youth radicalization through the Prisons aspect of the criminal justice system in Isiolo County, Kenya. This study was premised on three theories: frustration-aggression theory, rational choice theory, and criminal justice theory. The study area was Isiolo County. Isiolo County is located almost in the centre of the country, 285 km north of Nairobi. Its capital, Isiolo Town, lies along the main highways leading to both Moyale, Ethiopia, and to Somalia. Though Islam and Christianity are practiced in Isiolo County, the inhabitants are largely Muslim. The county is mostly arid with some semi-arid areas, economically poor and marginal. The study focused on Isiolo, Merit, and Garbatulla sub-counties. Additionally, the study was underpinned by a descriptive survey research design. The sample size was composed of 287 households, remandees and mainstream prisoners, key informants, youth returnees, and radicalized and extremist youths. The sampling strategies that were used included, simple random sampling, purposive sampling for key informants, and snowballing for youth returnees and radicalized as well as extremist youths. Data was collected through questionnaires, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. Quantitative data was analysed through the statistical package for Social Science (SPSS) tool version 24 where descriptive and inferential statistics were generated while qualitative data was analysed using content analysis with themes generated through verbatim triangulation. The findings were presented in form of tables, pie charts, and graphs. In line with the study objective, the study concludes that the existing strategies have not been effective despite concerted efforts to employ them and

counter youth radicalization in Isiolo County. The study recommends that new strategies be adopted to reinforce the existing ones to prevent the escalation of youth radicalization within prison cells.

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INTRODUCTION

Across the globe, the criminal justice system has been castigated as flawed and biased in addressing cases of youth radicalization (OSCE, 2014). Indeed, contemporaneous protection of the populace by established structures such as the police system is often an aberration rather than a norm. The reference work on access to justice in Central and Eastern Europe addresses the idea of access to criminal justice in the context of legal aid and makes the argument that the right to free legal help is one of the fundamental and inalienable rights to a fair trial that is enshrined in international human rights treaties. This is irrespective of the nature of the crimes committed (Bjorgo and Gjelsvik, 2015).

In Norway and Scandinavia, researchers have studied the violent radicalization of numerous ideologies. Most research has focused on the phenomena, not young radicalization. As Norway's problem with right-wing radicalized teenagers subsided, researchers moved on to other topics. Despite the criminal justice department's engagement, there was essentially no academic research on right-wing radicalization in Norway

between 2005 and 2011. (Bjorgo and Gjelsvik, 2015).

The Swedish government acknowledges that the Prison and Probation Service possibly nurture terrorists and extremists. The Prison and Probation Service states that "radicalized clients are sentenced to short sentences and treated by probation" Sweden's softer stance on radicalization is due to evidence linking it to minor offenses (Kotajoki, 2018). Kemp (2014) says many countries fail to ensure socioeconomically fair access to criminal justice. Kinnes et al. (2009) said state entities must provide legal services. Poor, politicized, and extremist youth in developing social movements are often priced out of the judicial system (Kemp, 2014).

African justice is weak. Criminal justice in industrialized countries is system-based. Contemporary African criminal justice is mostly founded on colonial legacy (Kemp, 2014). Intrastate disputes, wars, and coup d'etats have damaged criminal justice. Political revolutions, tyrannies, poor governance, and unstable states produce calamity. Postcolonial regimes perpetuate colonial

justice. Favoured parties profit from broken criminal justice systems. Despite government tinkering, criminal justice remains a major concern in African conflict and justice studies. For rule of law and criminal justice efficiency, Africa's legal system must be legitimate (Kemp, 2014).

Youth radicalization is a security problem in Kenya. Youth extremism has caused death, injury, psychological anguish, and increased instability and insecurity in many countries. Terrorism and violence result from youth radicalization. This has led to unprecedented levels of insecurity, distracting Kenya's economy, especially the tourism sector, which accounts for 10% of the GDP (Tubei, 2017). Kenya claimed it was an innocent victim of the Somali terrorist fight against the West. Al-Shabaab, a young Islamist group, has said it will attack everybody who voted for the government that sent troops to Somalia after Kenya's military involvement in October 2011 (Hellstein, 2016). Young Kenyans have recently plotted and carried out attacks. This proves Kenya's foreign and internal policies are linked to terrorism (Hellstein, 2016).

Hellstein (2016) argues it is hard to reconcile national security and young radicalization in Kenya, and human rights groups are concerned about government measures to boost state security. Criminal justice, court, and security entities' response are worrying (Kere, 2019). Suspects and civilians violated international human rights. Arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment, severe and humiliating punishment, and extrajudicial killings of young men (ICAP P/CVE, 2018).

Bryans (2016) suggests jail influences inmate conversion and radicalization. Somalia's Mogadishu Central Prison was radicalized by Al-Shabaab. Lebanese prison conditions fuelled extremism (Lomojo, 2020). Youth radicalization causes violence and bloodshed in Kenya (Hassa, 2012). USAID/NIWETU data shows that 200 Isiolo youngsters joined Al-Shabaab in 2013. Security forces are specialized. Youth unemployment fuels radicalization and extremism.

Mkutu et al. (2014) argue that both Muslim and non-Muslim youth are influencing extreme Islam in Isiolo County. Isiolo has a problem with indoctrinating teenagers, especially boys, into

violent extremist groups (Otieno et al., 2017). Poor police and courts in Isiolo County. Youth radicalism infiltrates the county because such atrocities have no deterrent, response, or pacification. Law enforcement authorities struggle in the broad, dry terrain to garner community engagement (Otieno et al., 2017).

The prison population of 54,579 in 108 institutions is more than double the holding capacity of 26,687. Kenya Statistics Bureau. Judges utilize community service to prevent prison overcrowding (Kenya Crime & Safety Report, 2008). Kenya's jails remain crowded despite reforms. Pretrial detention crowded prisons. Several pre-trial penalties exceeded the law. Under the current system, even death-row inmates can post bond. Some went months without bail. Delaying helps radicalize inmates.

Therefore, despite reintegration policies, action plans and security interventions put in place to curb youth, prison's aspect of the criminal justice system has been insufficient to effectively deal with youth radicalization.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Adopting working strategies to combat youth radicalization is a Herculean task. In response to rising crime and violent extremism, prison reforms, law enforcement, the courts, and reformatories have been lax. Nordic countries have created policies and capacities to prevent and resist radicalization (Kotajoki, 2018). Criminal justice departments, actors, and administrators have worked closely with radicalization victims, yet conceptual ambiguity and evidence-based research are lacking.

New research implies that Scandinavia and the Nordics could benefit from this long history of crime research to combat radicalization. Despite the European Commission's efforts to avoid violent extremism, defining extremism is difficult, according to Kotajoki (2018). Lowe says that extremism is replete with useless abstractions and that the term extremism 'itself' has become a common language. Professional literature on radicalization focuses on why (and to a lesser extent how) someone acquires beliefs and habits that

permit subversive conduct, especially violence against civilian non-combatants.

According to Woodhams (2016) in "Connections Among Communities: Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism Through Social Network Analysis," CVE has become a top worldwide security priority. Several governments use CVE policies and strategies to deter violent radicalization. "Prevention" is used to describe many CVE techniques. Mastroe and Szmania (2016) find that the White House's national CVE approach, "Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the US," fights radicalization. These include "engaging and empowering individuals and groups at the local level" Strategic Implementation Plan builds on the 2010 National Security Strategy, 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and 2011 Plan. It covers the operations of ministries and agencies and the government's focus on three major areas: (1) strengthening engagement with and support for local communities; (2) building government and law enforcement skills for preventing violent extremism; and (3) combatting violent extremism (Mastroe & Szmania, 2016)

In Africa, the criminal justice system, which includes the judges, police, prosecutors, correctional services, and the legal aid scheme, is broken. Staff shortages, a lack of transparency, and corruption are all contributing to the system's slow but steady collapse (Eme et al, 2009). From beatings to the death penalty and the burning of the offender's home and belongings in cases involving extremely serious offenses, to fires and ostracism of not only the offender but also his family and anyone else who continued to associate with him in other cases, in Africa, punishment for crime ranged widely (Nweje, 1975: 188).

The preceding context suggests that the traditional justice system in this society may be less alienating than the modern ones. The present criminal justice system was born as a result of a series of alterations to the system's structure and procedures. Members of the enforcing agency have been accused of alienating, depriving, subjugating, exploiting, and dominating the audience. After independence, people anticipated that things would change, but in reality, they have deteriorated (Kolo, 2002:13).

Intelligence and Community Policing for Youth Radicalization and Extremism

The distinctive social, cultural, religious, political, psychological, and economic characteristics of Kenya contribute to the creation of numerous terrorist subgroups. An equally diverse counter-radicalization campaign is needed because of the confluence of these positive and negative forces. Terrorists are identified as a threat based on terrorist typologies or generic profiles. Thus, each of the strategy's components focuses on one of the terrorists' specific methods for radicalizing young people (Asim, 2007). An intelligence-led counter-extremism policy is seen in recent events in Kenya. National Intelligence Service's (NIS) effectiveness in shutting down radicalization and indoctrination into terror cells and groups in East Africa is evidence of a well-rounded policy in place. Terrorist recruitment agents operating in cyberspace have also been identified by the Intelligence Service. Terror cells linked to Harkat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen, the Somali Islamist organisation, have been targeted by HUMINT operations since the fourth quarter of 2014.

Such measures should be tightly integrated with the criminal justice system in order to generate stronger community resilience and better procedures for dealing with internal problems, even though there is a strong argument for this. When it comes to working with government agencies and others outside their community, they have a network of people they can rely on. Consequently, effective counter-radicalization and counter-extremism policies rely heavily on community engagement, which has a significant impact on both strategy development and implementation (Ali, 2017). First and foremost, counter-radicalization efforts must place communities at the heart of their efforts because they are our own in-built early warning system. In addition, the community is the best place to make a lasting change (Ali, 2017).

Ndili (2014) argues in a paper titled "The Role of Community Policing in The Prevention of Youth Radicalization in The Eastleigh Area of Nairobi County" that for the National Intelligence Services to implement effective community policing for counter-radicalization and counter-extremism, there must be a strong homeland security policy,

widespread public awareness, effective law enforcement, and most importantly, inter-agency coordination. Preventing radicalization and the threat of extremism is the focus of Kenya's policy. The strategy's primary goal is to protect civilians and the nation's property against extremists (Schmid, 2013). The administration is ensuring that the conditions that foster radicalism are identified and destroyed.

According to Rogers (2010), although SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) efforts were successful 85%, there were significant assessment phase deficiencies. Because of this, there is no proof that a rigorous evaluation process was used. When it comes to assessing the performance of a program, they say that 'informal' judgments like "things are calmer now" are the most commonly used method of measuring. Reduced terrorist attacks do not, according to the findings of this study, imply decreased radicalisation. When you consider that the evaluation step is crucial in the "feedback" or experiential model SARA uses and that this aspect of the process has long been identified as one of the core faults within the model itself, this is extremely distressing (Oluteyo et al, 2018).

SARA is a community policing principle (Miller, 2017). All four rounds of SARA problem-solving involve community people, therefore this is a crucial part. In SARA, it is hard to discover information on how the local community gathered data and analysed results. Oluteyo et al (2018) said the SARA approach is built on community policing, although community policing has numerous definitions. Most scholars believe that in practice, it requires police and citizens to work together as partners to identify and address diverse problems (Espejo, 2014). Criminal justice is key. This document promotes organizational solutions that leverage partnerships and problem-solving methods to fight crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. This simplistic summary does not explain how SARA uses the community to manage crime and disturbance. They observed that SARA does not consider community usage, as other researchers have noted (Goldstein, 1990; Eck & Spelman, 1987).

Community partnerships, a core pillar of community policing, explain community involvement without overtly referencing SARA. The police, the people, and organizations they serve, and the public should work together to solve problems and establish confidence. Miller (2017) recognizes that police alone rarely solve public safety challenges and advocates relationships with important stakeholders. Miller (2017) believes such coalitions can achieve two goals. First, develop public confidence in group problem-solving and deliver solutions.

The Judicial System in Kenya

Terror suspects have not been prosecuted in Kenya because of the country's inadequate court system, say members of the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATU). Terrorist arrest and prosecution are not solely determined by domestic legislation, nor is it necessarily a reflection of a state's competence to deter terrorist operations (Aronson, 2012).

Many other aspects, like how well these laws are put into practice, how well our legal system is functioning, and whether or not countries handle counterterrorism by addressing its core causes, are also crucial. The fact that African governments are more interested in enacting and expanding counterterrorism legislation suggests that this will be an area of increased action in the future. Kenya's recently enacted security laws (Amendment) Act serves as a cautionary tale about the need for stronger political and institutional counterbalancing in the event of a law like this.

Now, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) can authorize covert operations to carry out any of its functions, such as accessing any area, getting anything or any information, searching or taking anything back and putting it back, or even installing it. In addition to this, there were other provisions with broad definitions. An individual can face up to 14 years in prison for uttering anything that could be construed as an "invitation" to engage in terrorist activity, whether or not they do so themselves (Afrobarometer, 2015). Any NIS officer can "detain any individual the officer... suspects of engaging in any act or thing or being in possession of anything which constitutes a threat to national security," so

there is a lot of latitude for interpretation in this section as well (Afrobarometer, 2015).

Also included are clauses that allow the NIS to request any information from any government agency, imprison suspects for up to 90 days without any fresh proof, and arrest them several times for the same offense without a warrant.

Advocacy by Religious Leaders and Groups

Although various experts have documented the detrimental effects of prisoner radicalization, it is generally acknowledged that religious or intellectual conversion is common, but violent extremism is rare (Silke and Veldhuis, 2017). After doing research in the US, Hamm (2011) says that jail conversions "do more good than harm and sometimes promote de-radicalization." In a UK high-security prison, Liebling and colleagues found that religion can establish moral and social norms and help convicts make sense of their captivity (Silke and Veldhuis, 2017).

Saudi Arabia's Islamic debate program is an example. By focusing on detainees, moderate religious experts and prisoners can discuss religious interpretation, jihadism, and Muslim-non-Muslim interactions (El-Sai'd, 2012b, p. 14). El-Sai'd (2012b, p. 14) argues that Islamic scholars participating in such programs should be well-versed and well-respected. Indonesian de-radicalization efforts rely mainly on religious networks and individuals (Ranstorp, 2009).

Religious dialogue programs in Malaysia, Yemen, and Jordan were unable to attract enough scholars with these qualifications because they were unable to find the right religious leaders. Radical preachers have been subject to official control in several nations in North Africa and abroad. A comprehensive religious reform program, for example, has been implemented in Morocco as part of the country's counter-radicalization efforts (El-Sai'd, 2012a).

Religious leaders can also play an important role in combating the conditions that encourage the spread of terrorism through their work inside and among diverse faith communities.

The importance of Kenyan religious groups and religious leaders in the fight against jail radicalization cannot be overestimated. As a result, radicalizations in Kenya have religious undertones, and youth organizations have expressed a desire to divide the country along religious lines and create a conflict of that nature.

At Garissa University, religious leaders condemned the most recent major incident while demystifying tensions between Muslims and Christians (Hyrkö, 2015).

SUPKEM, Kenya's supreme Muslim body, leads anti-terrorist efforts (Lynch, 2011). SUPKEM and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission surveyed the coastal region to better understand radicalization and are campaigning for amnesty laws for returning Al-Shabaab members. Kenyan cabinet members led a 1973 Muslim umbrella organization. As the only organization permitted to represent Kenyan Muslims and maintain relations with Islamic organizations outside of Kenya, it was recognized as such in 1979 and remains so now. Muslim religious leaders from the Borana and Somali communities have committed to assist with the Kenyan government to tackle Muslim terrorism, which has killed many innocent people (Nzwili, 2015).

Advocacy by Civil Society Organizations

Little research has been done on prison services and civil society's role in identifying and preventing jail radicalization. Penal Reform International (PRI) held a 2015 roundtable on combating prison radicalization in Amman, Jordan. This forum included jail authorities, embassies, and NGOs.

The Advisory Group on CSOs and Aid Effectiveness (2007–2008) defines "civil society organizations" as "non-market and non-state organizations outside the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared objectives in the public domain." Environmental groups, women's rights groups, farmers' associations, labour unions, chambers of commerce, and independent research institutions are examples. (OECD, 2009).

After serving their sentences, terrorists in India receive a stipend, vocational training, and family aid. Jammu and Kashmir community leaders often

meet with violent extremist prisoners. Due to the plan's unpredictability, CSOs can play a key role in promoting the acceptance of various distinct sections (Munene and Thakhathi, 2017).

The Strategy is a 'living document' that evolves. CSOs, with their long-term presence in the field and excellent awareness of local context, help ensure implementation keeps pace with changing circumstances. Civil society must be involved in the formation and implementation of any comprehensive counterterrorism policy. Broad-based collaboration between the state and CSOs can help ease public concerns about counterterrorism actions.

Odhiambo (2014) argues in 'Use of Track One and a Half Actors as Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Kenya' that civic societies interact in daily life and relationships. Odhiambo says civil society has an executive responsibility in preventing youth radicalization and extremism. Civil society cannot affect radical youth behaviour.

Evaluations of jail and probation programs and approaches to reduce prison radicalization are sparse. Most programs are not reviewed. Others undergo partial assessments that focus on process indicators rather than outcomes. When jail policies are evaluated, objective inspection and evaluation are challenging. This means the criminal justice system lacks evidence regarding "what works." Impact evaluations are scarce. This study analysed how Isiolo County, Kenya combats youth radicalisation.

Top-Down Approach

"Top-Down" counterterrorism measures serve as a buffer for government and international organization public diplomacy operations. This method strengthens the government's CVE position and performance through strategic alliances and policy formulation (USIP, 2014). Grassroots groups view the strategy as ceremonial, divorced from reality, and disingenuous for addressing problems they caused. Due to the "gate-keeping mindset" and lack of space, civil society organizations using this strategy are mistrusted (Finn, 2016).

This method has been accused of being too boardroom-focused for communal issues (s). Many

administrations have been attacked for counterterrorism tactics that violate human rights, high levels of corruption and unemployment, and the exclusion of religious or tribal communities. These factors increase radicalization and lead to terrorism. The government is perceived as an opponent trying to rebuild its reputation through PR (Shannon, 2013).

In Kenya, the 'Top-Down' approach is used to promote policy review and reform toward effective and results-oriented CVE policy and practice. Without these advancements, CVE policy and practice would be difficult. The approach is becoming more transparent and predictable with grassroots groups. This strategy ensures the professional conduct of practitioners and stakeholders, reduces congestion, and advances CVE monitoring and assessment. This problem's importance cannot be understated because it affects human and national security (Shannon, 2013). Kenya's Nyumba Kumi Initiative and Operation Usalama Watch are Top-Down examples.

"Operation Usalama Watch," originally termed "Operation Rudisha Usalama" (Operation Restore Safety), began in the third quarter of 2014 after an attack on March 23 in Mombasa and explosives on March 31 in Nairobi's Eastleigh region (USAID, 2012). Beginning April 4, security personnel unlawfully detained and rounded up thousands of Somalis in Nairobi's Eastleigh district. Despite assertions to the contrary, the operation was criticized for its disproportionate impact on Somali refugees and asylum seekers.

In addition to Somalis, refugees, NGO workers, Kenyans, and foreigners without proper identification were arrested (IPOA, 2015). The operation was denounced as an excuse for discriminatory profiling and targeting of the Somali population in Kenya, despite the country's genuine security concerns (Amnesty International, 2014). International refugee regulations and human rights were completely disregarded. Kenya's Interior and Coordination Minister Joseph Ole Lenku ordered all refugees to camps on March 26 citing "security reasons." Kenya's Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) would implement forced camping, citing an "unbearable and unmanageable threat to national security" " The administration later called this a first

step toward returning all urban migrants 'after conditions are met.'

Militating Against the Online Radicalization

The complexity of Internet monitoring makes countering internet radicalization the most challenging undertaking. Multidimensional online environments can have enormous consequences. Extremist groups use the internet to recruit new members, therefore counter messages can be conveyed to people who have fallen for their lies. To fight the everyday barrage of extremist images and messages, we need compelling, good, and inspiring stories. Thus, "social encounters" should be easier to plan.

Extremists and recruiters must also be considered; ignoring their comments and attempts to infiltrate society is not enough. Recruiters must be considered when developing countermeasures. Because they have a skewed view of extremism and violence, it would be beneficial to lure them away from it. Service providers and the government have made technology and the internet cheap for Kenyans. As a result, more individuals are using social media and online media to receive news, entertainment, and information. Online serves as a catalyst for action and transformation in Kenya.

As a result of the widespread use of social media, a great deal of progress has been made in a variety of fields. Online movements like the well-known #Kenyansontwitter (KOT) have sprung up as a result of the well-known Twitter and Facebook hashtags (#) have criticised and rebuked various societal ills, resulting to good changes in society. Kenyans' reactions to Cable News Network's (CNN) claim that Kenya is a "hotbed of terror" are one such example. To express displeasure and demand an apology from CNN, the hashtag #SomeoneTellCNN appeared on 75,000 tweets in just one day, sparking a media outcry (Independent, 2015).

Traditional media must be considered with online media for counter-extremism. The media's ability to develop, dismantle, and reconstruct narratives is vital in combating radical beliefs. The media focuses on violent and gloomy tales because bad news spreads faster and produces more money. This has not helped counter violent extremism, sadly.

Regular hate speech can harm interethnic and religious ties (Media Council of Kenya, 2014).

Media that inflames or challenges cultural or ethnic sensibilities can deepen rifts. According to UNESCO, the media may promote tolerance and acceptance of difference; therefore, the media must challenge common attitudes and presumptions about religious diversity, move beyond stereotypes, and eradicate ignorance that produces mistrust and suspicion (UNESCO, 2011). Extreme violence and terrorist attacks require extreme vigilance around the media. A story can affect the public conversation, and those who dominate it can socially develop a narrative of "knowing." Understanding interactions is crucial in a society with winners and losers, good and evil, in and out.

Media coverage can help reduce unfavorable attitudes and prejudices that sustain the terrorism narrative. The media's role in upholding dominant discourses and combating extremist ideology requires a paradigm shift in how it shows extremism issues or promotes alternative stories. As noted, terrorism has long been founded on retaliation for violence, and the media has reflected this. The media should focus on positive stories to prevent extremism. The tone of terrorist stories must be sensitive to viewers' interpretations. Effort Usalama Watch was a 2014 government operation to catch Al-Shabaab individuals and sympathizers. In 48% of TV news stories that portrayed police violence, such as gunshots, orders to crawl on the ground, kneeling as they move, lying on their tummies, or being assaulted as they were forced to board police cars, the media ignored the feelings and responses of the victims' families (Media Council of Kenya, 2014).

The dominant language impacts what is eaten and considered "true." Al-Shabab, which once meant "youth," now solely refers to terrorists in common discourse. "Mujahideen" is overused even among Muslim journalists. This is especially true after 1979-89 when Afghan Mujahideen fought the Soviet forces.

The media can help reduce religious hatred by disseminating compassionate and understanding interfaith news, advocating for ethical use of the airwaves, and monitoring media coverage (Ghassan, 2011). Religious prejudices will be dealt

with more effectively as a result of this strategy. As difficult as it may be, Ghassan believes that good tales demonstrating cross-faith understanding can offset the media's religious biases (Ghassan, 2011). Tolerance and diversity-based religious education can lead to captivating stories that argue for religious tolerance.

The #illridewithyou social media campaign in Sydney, Australia serves as an example of how social cohesion can be fostered. Tensions and Islamophobia were eased as a hostage scenario broke out in a popular Sydney restaurant. To show solidarity with another Muslim woman who removed her hijab after hearing of the Sydney siege, an Asian Australian woman created the #walkinsolidarity hashtag (Bahrawi, 2014). The ad served as a symbol of unity in a country rife with anti-non-white sentiments. Some argue that it promotes the image of a good and evil Muslim, but the fact that it displays inclusiveness and fosters relationships across populations who otherwise would not interact is worthy of praise.

A similar strategy to Kenya's could reconcile divided populations. Social cohesion campaigns, such as those supporting the Somali community, could have eased tensions when terrorists targeted buses. Cohesion requires community resilience. Community resilience is the ability to accept, respond to, and recover from adversity (OSCE, 2014). Kenyans must be prepared for the anguish of an Al-Shabab attack if it happens or is not halted. Citizens must aid each other during natural disasters. Resilience has not been evident after attacks in Kenya.

METHODOLOGY

The study area was Isiolo County. Isiolo County is located almost in the centre of the country, 285 km north of Nairobi. Its capital, Isiolo Town, lies along the main highways leading to both Moyale, Ethiopia, and to Somalia. Though Islam and Christianity are practiced in Isiolo County, the inhabitants are largely Muslim. The county is mostly arid with some semi-arid areas, economically poor and marginal. The study focused on Isiolo, Merit, and Garbatulla sub-counties. Additionally, the study was underpinned by a descriptive survey research design. The sample size

was composed of 287 households, remandees and mainstream prisoners, key informants, youth returnees, and radicalized and extremist youths. The sampling strategies that were used included, simple random sampling, purposive sampling for key informants, and snowballing for youth returnees and radicalized as well as extremist youths. Data was collected through questionnaires, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. Quantitative data was analysed through the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) tool version 24 where descriptive and inferential statistics were generated while qualitative data was analysed using content analysis with themes generated through verbatim triangulation. The findings were presented in form of tables, pie charts, and graphs.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Effectiveness of Counter Youth Radicalization Measures Put by Criminal Justice System

The study sought to assess the effectiveness of counter-youth radicalization measures put by the criminal justice system in Isiolo County Kenya. Out of 287 respondents, 9(3.136%) stated that the extent was very great, 10(3.48%) reasoned that the extent was great, and 20(7.317%) affirmed that the extent was moderate. Besides, 211 (73.17%) disagreed with the inquiry and 7(2.4%) strongly indicated that 37(12.89%) said that there was no extent.

In addition, the findings on the measures by the police/security officers that contribute to preventing radicalization indicate that public barazas, media campaigns, community dialogues as well as prosecution and jailing of radicalized individuals were practiced, as shown from the following responses;

Early discovery of radicalization offenses, apprehension, and conviction of kingpins. Media efforts educate communities on radicalization's consequences on the whole community. Promoting formal education in afflicted areas to de-radicalize and occupy adolescents (Interview with a key informant, 14/7/2021, Isiolo Sub-County). By avoiding punitive and adopting pre-emptive terrorism tactics (Source: CSO representative Isiolo

Town). *Jihadism education is underway. This helps counter-jihadism teamwork. In partnership with religious leaders, police educate the community on the true meanings of Islamic terminology and violent extremism and ideas used to radicalize individuals* (Interview with key informant 14/7/2021 Isiolo town).

Further, another respondent indicated that:

Building the capacity of the local community to identify early warning signs of radicalization among the youth and address them is used. This helps in improving the youth's sense of identity and purpose and improving community cohesion and tolerance of diversity. Some of the strategies like the meetings between the youth and the security have improved their relationship to some extent and may have addressed some of the pull factors however others are just a way of clearing the work plan by the development actors (Interview with a local chief, 2/8/2021 at Merti).

When asked to clarify whether there is an effective relationship between security sectors and community sectors one of the security officers averred that:

It is a well-known phenomenon that security actors use collective punishment in responding to VE incidents. The platform for dialogue between the security actors and community sector groups including the youth has provided an opportunity for all actors to express their concerns and recommend better ways of responding to such incidents while at the same time giving the security actors the opportunity to air the concerns about the local community (Interview with a police officer, 4/8/2021 Archers Post).

Further, for those who identified the measures by the community, community policing, public barazas, youth empowerment, and the role of religious leaders were identified as shown by the responses obtained:

Youth cafes, youth-led community discourse, mentorship programs, youth and security consultative meetings, and sports for youth deradicalization are used by civil society

organizations to combat youth radicalization. Community policing is a key exercise in the sub-county, especially the Nyumba Kumi program, peace committees, clustering areas, through t-shirts, Barazas, and chief meetings (Interview with a Local Community Leader 5/8/2021 Mado, Isiolo County). *Most youngsters today work in social companies that help them financially. Kids' training has helped because trained youth mentor other peers on radicalization. Engagements have improved the interaction between youth and security. Positive synergy between security and community* (Interview with a Community Leader 6/8/2021 Mado, Isiolo County).

If chiefs detect radicalization, they report it promptly. Sheiks and Imams dissuade children from getting radicalized by bad people and encourage a constructive lifestyle (Source: Religious leader). *Youth-led community discourse and youth cafes have reduced the stigma of discussing terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization. A few years ago, such themes were harmful, but these techniques have normalized them* (Interview with a Youth Leader, Isiolo Town, 15/7/2022).

Saberi (2019) lists police procedures to prevent radicalisation. Belgium's Community Policing Preventing Radicalization and Terrorism (COPPPRA) initiative helps first-line police personnel spot radicalization signals early on. When radicalization symptoms are discovered, social actors such as the city's preventive agency, schools, social workers, and religious organizations should react and collaborate. This study does not say how much counter-narrative techniques contribute to youth radicalization.

Schmid (2014) identifies government initiatives for counter-narrative programs. According to the study, the efficacy of governments' counter-narrative campaigns may be limited. Instead, they should encourage community efforts to create good tales. Schmid (2014) adds that governments could deploy alternate signals in public discussion transmitted through political personalities and public comments to avoid contradictions. This study does not assess if counter-narrative techniques contribute to youth radicalization. Noppe, Verhagen, and Easton (2012)

note that local possibilities for deliberation and consultation can enable conversation between local communities and the police.

Botha (2014) reports that Kenya is suffering waves of terrorism and terrorist strikes targeting soft targets, including people while shopping and Garris University students while sleeping. In response to these security threats, Kenyan authorities have enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act and established several units within the security organs and architecture to detect and avert terrorist acts before they happen and hold terrorists accountable for their acts if they have already occurred. This study does not assess if counter-narrative techniques contribute to youth radicalization.

Levi's (1997) operationalization of rational choice theory explains how actors weigh options. According to rational choice theory, terrorist strikes are purposeful and well-planned. Youth are told the rewards outweigh the costs. Youth would radicalize if they saw the benefits of this chapter's results.

Exist Strategic Partnership Between Prisons Youth Groups in Counter-Radicalization Efforts

The study sought to assess whether there exists a strategic partnership between prison youth groups in counter-radicalization efforts in Isiolo County, Kenya. Out of 287 respondents, 245(85.37%) stated that there was an evolving strategic partnership. On the contrary, 42 (14.63%) stated that there was no strategic partnership.

Due to the ongoing radicalization issue, member nations of the United Nations have developed Counter-radicalization plans (OHCHR, Fact Sheet No. 32, 2008). To control the problem's spread, the U.S. welcomes and protects immigrants. The approach promotes de-radicalization and rehabilitation for individuals wounded by attacks on Muslims while ensuring the Muslim community feels welcome in American culture. Europe has implemented best-practice approaches based on the issue's severity. Britain's civic education programs benefit the needy. Most European countries teach about radicalisation through civil studies. Danish imams reduce radicalization among convicts (OHCHR) (2008). Kenya, like many African

countries, has a plan to prevent radicalization by sensitizing disadvantaged communities and youth. The National Counter Terrorism Centre has a fund to de-radicalize at-risk youth by providing counsellors. Kenya received NCTC funds for anti-terrorism efforts, especially the Wafula Civic Education Program (2014). Several official entities, international organizations, and non-governmental groups have contributed to addressing radicalization and implementing anti-radicalization initiatives.

Community Involvement and Participation is Important in Countering Youth Radicalization

The study sought to assess whether community involvement and participation are important in countering youth radicalization in Isiolo County, Kenya. Out of 287 respondents, 266(92.68%) stated that there was an evolving strategic partnership. On the contrary, 21 (7.317%) stated that there was no strategic partnership. Respondents averred that community involvement and participation were demonstrated through community policing.

From the prevent findings, one of the key informants added that:

Locals oversee security. They check community identities. This setup helps with 'neighbourhood watch' This engages the community in crime prevention or deterrent. It identifies radicalized people and their hideouts. It also helps the community handle such a group (Interview with the key informant, 15/7/2021 Gariba, Isiolo County).

Community policing is based on the idea that everyone in a given area should be treated as an equal participant in finding and enforcing effective solutions to issues of public safety. The underlying assumption is that locals have a better grasp of the most pressing issues facing their neighbourhood. Therefore, mutually beneficial partnerships are so essential to community policing. Transparency, open communication, and mutual respect are the cornerstones of effective community policing partnerships (Scheider, Chapman & Seelman, 2004). When law enforcement and the communities they patrol work together, they are better able to craft programs that are tailored to meet mutually identified needs and advance a shared goal of reducing crime. Long-term collaboration is critical

for law enforcement in the fight against violent extremism, as it allows them to strike a good balance between providing standard police services and working to prevent radicalization.

The government launched *Nyumba Kumi* (ten households) in 2013 to develop Community Policing at individual residences (Kenya gazette Notice No. 14485). In 2013, radicalization hotspots like Isiolo created community policing clusters. The launch aimed to help Isiolo law enforcement battle terrorism. Community policing clusters and religious leaders can resist violent ideologies and narratives by standing for justice, fairness, inclusiveness, and opportunity. The study attempted to determine how well the Police coordinated with community groups to discover variables that spawn radicalization among Isiolo's young and to offer points of convergence that could permit lasting relationships.

Young Kenyans lose faith in their legal institutions due to the impunity of politically connected elites, say Mogire and Agade (2011). This may be due to the criminal justice system's partiality. Youth claim they face severe consequences for small offenses like loitering and not possessing an ID. Politicians promise major reforms to improve young people's lives, playing on their resentment. After elections, they are forgotten, leading many to assume violent extremism is the only solution. Uneven implementation of POTA has been a problem for Kenyan youth, notably in Nairobi's Eastleigh district (IPOA, 2014). Police measures touted as a "fight against radicalization" seem to worsen their alienation and neglect. Young people crave adventure, grandeur, heroic or iconic stature, and activities that let them construct their own routes to discover their place in the world (Speckhard and Paz, 2012).

Isiolo youngsters are not immune to extreme Islamic teachings, which use their seclusion to recruit new members. Young individuals are more likely to seek meaning and establish worldviews that allow them to grow personally. Bartlett and Birdwell (2010) found that monitoring young people's actions and ideas helps prevent radicalisation. Current research aims to determine whether *Nyumba Kumi*, peace committees and

religious leaders in Isiolo spot warning signals of radical activity and report them to authorities.

Isiolo residents dislike the police due to how they handle terrorism intelligence. Isiolo is a hub for a trust-based commercial community spanning East Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This has attracted people of different backgrounds and faiths. Establishing channels of contact between various portions of Isiolo and the police can create a potent intelligence network. If there is a specific danger or potential for radicalization, police can act quickly. Community and police trust is vital to intelligence management. This study aimed to help law enforcement officers examine residents' allegations of rising radicalism among young people without risking public trust in their authority.

Need for Prisons' Reforms to Effectively Prevent and Counter Youth Radicalization

The study sought to assess whether there is a need for prison reforms to effectively prevent and counter youth radicalization in Isiolo County, Kenya. Out of 287 respondents, 151 (92.68%) strongly agreed that there is a need for prison reforms, 64(23.36%) agreed to the inquiry, 40(13.94%) disagreed with the inquiry, and 32 (11.15%) strongly disagreed.

The way prisons are administered and inmate circumstances are changed to meet national and international human rights standards (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2004). Prisoners are urged to take charge of their rehabilitation by gaining social and occupational skills (Adler, 1995). An open-door policy, increased infrastructure like housing, clothing, and bedding, a review of penal laws, and rehabilitation programs like social and spiritual counselling, formal education, vocational training, recreational activities, and using alternative means to imprisonment have all been introduced to penal institutions around the world, including in African countries, to alleviate prison overcrowding (KNCHR, 2005; PRI, 2001).

The 'jail without bars' or open prison is a relatively recent invention in the correctional system. It is obvious why. New purposes for incarceration, such as deterrence and rehabilitation, have emerged as prisons fail to contain and safely confine offenders. Open jail seems paradoxical (Jones & Cronos, 1977). This is a drastic shift from the jail's

conventional position as a place of safe confinement and containment. According to Cressey's (1961) prison survey, jails transform people. All their research, except Etzioni's (1965), finds that environment-organizational interaction is key to prison operations. The open-door concept views the jail as an interactive system with external consequences for inmate behaviour (Duffee, 1975; Katz & Robert. 1966)

Closed-system correctional administrators have generally been hesitant to modify prison architecture and management, despite internal and external data. Usually, jail reforms are grudging and gradual (Brandley, 1969). Staff members' inability to adjust to changing situations caused U.S. prison riots. They wanted better food, medical treatment, and security training. The institution had not reacted to the changing demographics of its inmate population or the offenders' heightened legal and social awareness (Newsweek, September 27).

Sir Alexander Paterson remarked prison is a punishment, not punishment (1922-1947). He wanted to replace prison punishment with "training." He seems to have always had doubts about the efficacy of traditional locked prisons. In 1933, the first open British jail, New Hall Camp, was created as a satellite of Wakefield Prison based on his second famous aphorism, "You can't train a man for freedom in prison" (Fox, 1952). Under the open-door policy, stakeholder participation has been encouraged in African penal institutions like Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. Their work has been reflected in many areas of prison work, including rehabilitation, improving prison conditions, Human rights, legal reforms, and access to Medicare (PRI, 2003; KNCHR, 2005).

Before 2001, prison conditions in Kenya were so awful that the government initiated a massive reform initiative that led to a transformation from a closed to an open system termed the Open Door Policy. The new strategy comprised 16 jail stakeholder representatives (GJLOS, Oct. 2005; McOdongo, 2007).

Ex-inmates in Kenya were asked about their views of the country's prison system and whether it reduced crime and rehabilitated prisoners. 96.7% of respondents said jails were ineffective, while 3.3% were undecided. Before asking about efficiency, we

asked regular prison officers and Heads of Prisons to describe the objective of incarceration. Penitentiary officers knew that rehabilitating inmates was the goal of incarceration. While 61.7% of regular prison officers felt Kenyan prisons were inefficient at rehabilitation, 38.3% said they were effective, showing an institution cannot be entirely dysfunctional. Guards explained their answers.

The majority (46.7%) stated most convicts were not rehabilitated and reverted to criminal conduct. 15% said prisons lacked appropriate physical and human resources for rehabilitation programmes. Four jail managers were the other responders. Former prison officials say Kenya's correctional system is inefficient. Convicts and former inmates lacked rehabilitation chances, and prison officials lacked training and oversight, they said. Kenyan jail warden: inmates develop vital skills behind bars. Kenyan inmates and prison employees were polled on the penal system's effectiveness in decreasing crime and rehabilitating offenders. The majority (61.7%) did not think prisons were useful, whereas 35.0% and 2.3% did. Four administrators surveyed deemed jails unproductive, while one found them helpful.

This research found that prison guards' ability to promote convicts' rehabilitation was limited by two types of working environment obstacles and constraints. First, jail-related problems and limits. These concerns involved insufficient or incorrect resource allocation (money, equipment, people). Issues affected prison administration, guards, and inmates. The second set of troubles was caused by the police and courts. Following judicial and police sentencing, inmates were sent to prison. In a recent poll, we asked Kenyan ex-inmates about their jail experiences and correctional facility difficulties. Some of the informal interview respondents shared the perspectives of 60 ordinary prison personnel, 4 district jail chiefs, and others. Several former offenders requested police and courts reevaluate sentencing.

76% also advocated enhancing physical and human resources/facilities, while 23% recommended doing the same for the Prisons Department's budget. Both regular prison guards and department heads stated the Prisons Department needs more money to enhance its physical and personnel resources.

Corrections authorities delivered consistent answers when asked about prison problems. 93% of respondents said police lacked financial, physical, and human resources. Only 4 (6.7%) indicated a hostile environment and lack of financial, physical, and human resources were the problems.

The vast majority of correctional officers (98.3%) believed boosting and properly managing the Prisons Department's financial resources and enhancing its physical and personnel resources would go a long way toward resolving the concerns outlined above.

The problem was whether jails had enough money for rehabilitation. All prison wardens and commissioners complained that their institutions did not have enough money for food and maintenance. They were concerned about the lack of money for food, medicine, clothing, bedding, and staff uniforms. According to the survey, Isiolo Prison detainees had meal credit. Isiolo Prison's warden says he has been allotted only 10 million Kenyan Shillings for the 2020/21 fiscal year, which is not enough to fund basic recurring needs or for development. Isiolo Prison received food on credit and no money for upgrades. Prisons need development capital to build houses for inmates and staff and install phone and radio networks.

The capital was needed to buy machinery, tools, and other items for manufacturing, fabrication, and agriculture. All study respondents said jails lacked Alter Care-Services because of a lack of resources. Unpaid bills prompted poor phone service in Isiolo Prison, interrupting prisoner contact. According to respondents, poor communication between jails and headquarters or between rehabilitation program partners limits the transfer of crucial information. At the time of this investigation, mobile phone service did not reach all jails, making prisoner communication more difficult. All prisons have mobile phone access. The prison's industrial and craft-work sections are important for rehabilitation. Prison officials lack the funds to renovate its industries and workshops. Where they existed, infrastructure was outdated or inadequate. Most institutions lacked mechanical facilities and transportation vehicles, which made matters worse. Isiolo prison lacks even a workshop, an examination found.

Ex-inmates were asked about prison architecture and amenities. The reactions were supposed to signal potential resource concerns. 70% of ex-inmates surveyed were dissatisfied with prison instruction, with 46.7% completely dissatisfied and 23.3% somewhat dissatisfied. Dissatisfied respondents said: (26.7%) there were inadequate training facilities and unqualified trainers; (20%) inmates were pushed into skill training against their will; (16.7%) training was inadequate and selective for a few offenders; and (6.7%) some inmates were not instructed in anything. 30% of respondents were satisfied with the training because it was adequate (16.7%), some long-term offenders learned necessary skills (10%), and trainers were competent (3.3%). Only 3.3% of the 120 former convicts polled were satisfied with inmates' leisure opportunities. Happy prisoners said they could play darts and sing in the prison choir. 96.7 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the absence of Sunday leisure activities.

The purpose of this research was to establish whether or not there were sufficient corrections officers to carry out the various rehabilitation initiatives. In a survey of those who have previously served time in jail, 66.7% of those who are now free reported that the officers were very insufficient, and 33.3% said that they were inadequate.

One ex-prisoner respondent had this to say:

Many of us had underlying mental health issues brought on by our home lives and our incarceration that manifested themselves in negative ways throughout our time behind bars. There was rarely a prison guard around to help us. Other police simply did not empathize with our plight and instead advised us to "man up" and "lean into it" in similar situations (Interview with Ex-prisoner at Bulapesa, 16/7/2021).

Respondents said there were three times as many prisoners as guards. Two officers monitor groups of ten or more criminals, according to responses. Every jail supervisor said they needed more officers when asked about staffing levels. Reforms to the criminal justice system and constitution are needed to help former criminals re-enter society. All political detainees need de-radicalization classes. Both prison reform and improving the jail's public

image are vital to averting inmate radicalization. Speckhard and Paz (2012) suggest two pillars for prison reform: changing staff rules and procedures and establishing prison-to-outside contact. The prison and the public must stop focusing on single crimes and instead explore creative ideas to resolve the fundamental causes that cause crime and discontent (Horowitz, 2012). The goal is to create an expert, representative, responsive, and accountable public-private institution. When handing down sentences, courts and magistrates should be cognizant of the link between incarceration, recidivism, and terrorism.

Findlay (2004) argues that a major restructuring of police institutions is needed to achieve a "community-based" counter-terrorism strategy. The agency's employment and progression should be based on merit, not favouritism. To fight corruption, implement strong regulatory systems. New complaints channels should increase jail staff's responsibility (Cole, 2003). The Prison should reconnect with long-ignored underprivileged communities. First, educate the public on their rights, the jail guard's role, and police safety procedures.

Any initiatives to strengthen police-community relations should focus on at-risk or disproportionately harmed youth (Spalek, 2012). Countering radicalization should involve all relevant parties and strike a balance between competing interests and zones of influence. Establishing a competent and accountable correctional service that uses a new style of community-focused policing is vital in preventing radicalization (Cole, 2003). As many people as feasible should be involved in the program's design, planning, implementation, monitoring, and assessment to achieve buy-in. Less is known about jail adjustments needed for community policing to prevent radicalization. Aronson (2012) looked studied Muslim and non-Muslim contributions to Kenya's fight against terrorism quantitatively.

Instead, this research aimed to find ways to mobilize as many locals as possible in the fight against radicalization in Isiolo County. Professionalism, human rights, resource management, the rule of law, and detecting new radicalization patterns that could lead to violent extremism were all considered in

strengthening officers' abilities. Expanded responsibility and organizational flexibility for patrol officers should allow police to investigate crimes and community issues from new angles. Baker et al. (2007) suggest that police must be more informed about global events and their effects on local people to embrace community policing methods in preventing radicalization.

Policy Adjustment with Different Non-Security Sectors and Stakeholders in Countering Youth Radicalization

The study sought to assess the extent of policy adjustment with different non-security sectors and stakeholders in countering youth radicalization in Isiolo County Kenya. Out of 287 respondents, 141(49.13%) stated that the extent was very great, 67(23.34%) reasoned that the extent was great, and 39(13.59%) affirmed that the extent was moderate. Besides, 40 (13.94%) indicated that there was the little extent.

In support of the aforementioned conclusions, Horgan, Altier, Shortland, and Taylor (2017) argued that the use of fear appeals by non-state security actors was a successful tactic for some anti-radicalization goals. For instance, the study stated that causing people to be fearful may discourage them from committing suicide attacks in order to convey the fact why people should be afraid to engage in violent actions. However, it is possible that the technique of fear appeals may not be a very effective strategy for constructing counter-radicalization in the context of (violent) radicalization, given the mentioned attitudes and the specific target group. This study falls short since it does not examine the present policies in place to curb radicalization.

Effectiveness of Prisons' De-Radicalization Programs for the Youth

The study sought to assess the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs for the youth. The study established that despite concerted efforts to carry out de-radicalization programmes, there were underlying issues styming the programs. Out of 287 respondents, 53% reasoned that the programs were effective while 47% were of the contrary opinion. The researcher argues that there is a worrying

outcome regarding how effective these programs are. The findings are underpinned in the ensuing paragraphs.

Radicalized inmates differ from regular offenders (Goldman, 2014, p. 48). This subset of offenders follows a certain ideology behind bars (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 67). Pressman and Flockton (2014) found that terrorists, violent extremists, and non-ideologically driven violent offenders all exhibited distinct features.

Both terrorists and violent extremists utilize violence to accomplish political, religious, and ideological purposes, but violent extremists' acts are less likely to "create fear and panic among civilian populations or decision makers." Authors reference violent antiabortion extremists. "They have not shown an interest in indiscriminate civilian killing or maximal diffuse destruction," but this gang wants to damage public property, buildings, cars, and hospitals (Presman & Flockton, 2014, p. 124). Terrorist activities often have this psychological goal (Presman & Flockton, 2014, p. 124).

Counter Narrative Strategies for Youth Radicalization

The study also sought to determine the extent to which the respondents agreed with statements given to them regarding the strategies used in preventing youth radicalization. The study found that 200 (62.3%) of the respondents agreed that building trust among Christian and Muslim communities yields positive results in countering radicalization, 84 (26.2%) agreed, 26 (8.1%) strongly disagreed, and 11 (3.4%) disagreed. Also, 178 (55.5%) of the respondents strongly agreed that religious leaders play an important role in countering radicalization, 180 (56.1%) strongly agreed that conveying knowledge and understanding of radicalization is a strategy used to reduce radicalization, 172 (53.6%) agreed that use of media to inform and increase awareness on radicalization helps reduce radicalization among the youth and 184 (57.3%) agreed that engaging the youth in productive activities such as employment and education leads to reduced attraction to radicalization

From the open-ended questions and interviews conducted, the findings indicated that mentorship, career guidance, psychological support, education

and community sensitization, use of the internet to counter radical narratives, community participation and empowerment were the major counter-narrative campaigns/strategies used in the area.

The following responses were obtained;

Some Isiolo and Merti youths were mentors. These mentors function as change agents in the community by mentoring other youngsters through BCCGs (Source: Community leader). The government has prioritized education and awareness of radicalization's detrimental effects to counter radicalisation. In the town centre, billboards explain radicalization's repercussions. The government is spending on fighting extreme propaganda online. Parents and instructors do not always know what is happening online. Trainers of trainees, religious leaders, and peer educators coach and deconstruct radicalization narratives. Creating and strengthening young networks empowers youths to be change agents against violent extremism through youth groups and social enterprises. Most at-risk youths receive psychological support. Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP), USAID initiatives, and national security agencies have helped bring teenagers together and teach them about the dangers and repercussions of narratives spreading across the sub-county. This enhances security, youth, and community relationships. We offer mentorship and career counselling. Successful adolescents can advise other youngsters and help deconstruct the narratives they have been taught. This is successful (Interview with a CSO representative, 19th August 2021 Isiolo Town).

Counter-narratives are understood as a presentation of a story that is aimed to undermine the strength of the dominant narrative of radical groups (Colaert, 2017). There are different types of counter-narratives relevant to countering radical narratives. Positive/alternative narratives recognize that reacting to narratives from radical groups is not enough while strategic counter-narratives are useful for governments or large, multilateral organizations wishing to condemn radical groups and their efforts (Byrne, 2018). Ethical counter-narratives point out that violent action is not a moral way of achieving

aims. These arguments according to Ljujic, Prooijen, and Weerman (2017) point out the commonalities between all humans and call for better cooperation between all nations and peoples. The radical groups tailor the methods of radicalization based on the individuals, their location, and local grievances.

Badurdeen (2016) asserts that the way ideologies and propaganda of these groups are framed both online and offline facilitate radicalization. In Pakistan, radicalization is high due to radical groups' simplistic narratives, scapegoating, and emotive appeals to fear, rage, shame, and honour (Cohen, Kruglanski, Gelfand, Webber & Gunaratna, 2018). They base their aggressive, exclusive beliefs on the identity crises of the young people they target. There are a number of strategies that can be employed to combat radicalization through the deployment of counter-narratives. By equipping vulnerable individuals with means to deconstruct damaging narratives and propaganda and to enhance their own sense of self, preventative measures can function as de-radicalizing measures (Uhlmann, 2015). Those who are already radicalized may be led to reconsider their beliefs through the "delegitimization and invalidation" of those stories (Koehler, 2013).

From helping to de-radicalize people who are already radicalized, to preventing radicalization by planting seeds of doubt in "at risk" audiences who could otherwise be exposed to or seek out the content of radical and extremist groups (Schmid, 2014). As a result, counter-narratives are often proposed as a response to the proliferation of internet propaganda by terrorist organizations like IS and al-Qaeda, and their usage to prevent radicalization is gaining traction (Hemmingsen & Castro, (2017) notes that religious authority in the target population can assist decide counter-narrative efficacy (Jacobson, 2010).

A tactical counter-narrative can argue that violence is harmful to an organization's goals and image (Colaert, 2017). Peace, interfaith and interethnic narratives, Islam as peaceful and nonviolent, factual, and emotive counter-narratives are more examples (Doosje & Eerten, 2017). Kenyan authorities have mixed counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures to combat increasing

radicalism (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016). These authors say such strategies involve military or police operations against extreme or violent extremist organizations. Kenya's experience illustrates that CI and CT often fail or backfire. People are realizing they need conflict-sensitive security policies that address the root causes of radicalization and balance security and development.

An interview with one of the religious leaders revealed that:

Everyone should be careful with their children, especially their sons, as they can potentially be tempted to join unlawful extreme groups. CVE programs in the sub-county have provided adolescents a voice to convey their needs, including misconceptions, and how to address them. Empowering youth is a critical method to keep them active and away from the threat of religious radicalization (Interview with a religious leader, 2/8/2021 Archers Post Isiolo County).

Therefore, the strategic logic of information operations campaigns by radical groups is based on counter-narrative methods (Abbas, 2017). Rompuy, Bonazzi, Frontini, Ritzmann, Manea, Goodwin, and Abbas (2017) propose that counter-radicalization methods should first deconstruct the messaging, then employ messengers who can reach out to a wide range of people, especially those on the verge of radicalization, and finally, aggressively collaborate with the media to promote the messengers and assist break down the negative messages. Different periods have unique windows of opportunity; hence the manifestations of this concept might vary (Stuart, 2017).

Fishman and Lebovich (2011), who examined preventing domestic radicalization by focusing on the lessons for intelligence collection and community engagement, stated that 1,120 "at-risk" teenagers were identified and directed to the program for assistance between 2007 and 2010. The survey indicated that British officials were eager to employ an outreach strategy that placed a premium on getting to know influential Muslims in the country.

Among Muslim and British communities, the plan aimed to foster a spirit of coexistence through increased involvement and integration. Although counter-narrative methods are explored, the study does not address the difficulties of these strategies or the solutions developed to address them. Community policing has been effective in preventing radicalization in Britain, as noted by Kosseim (2011), who studied the topic of counter-radicalization with an emphasis on the best practices in the United States and lessons gained abroad. The study noted that the "Channel Project," a community outreach program established under the contest strategy to prevent radicalization in the country, had been successful in inspiring police and other representatives of Muslim societies to identify individuals at risk of radicalization and to create the necessary interventions. The difficulties of counternarrative methods are not presented in this research. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2012) performed research on East African youth radicalization prevention.

The report emphasized the need for interagency collaboration to combat teenage radicalization. Youth ministries should coordinate with police, gendarmerie, army, and intelligence services, according to the report. The research also emphasized the need for security agencies to keep open lines of communication with education, health, and labour departments. The survey revealed that churches, clubs, schools, and sports teams fight extreme beliefs. These organizations were more positioned to help youth than government authorities. The report recommends that governments and external donors support civil society mentorship initiatives. It also proposed a regulatory environment that permitted CSOs to work with youngsters. This study does not explore counter-narrative issues and mitigation solutions.

Abdikadir (2016) used a Kenya case study to analyse young radicalisation in East Africa. Religious leaders and groups are fighting extremism, the study found. The Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) led anti-terrorism efforts in Kenya's Muslim community, researchers found. SUPKEM examined the coast to see what drives radicalization. In partnership with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, they sponsored an amnesty roadmap for Al-

Shabaab-affiliated youth (NCIC). SUPKEM, the Council of Imams, and the Council of Elders from Borana and Somalia in Kenya collaborated with the Kenyan government to remove radical Islamic doctrine.

This study does not cover counter-narrative tactics' challenges or solutions. Yarrow (2016) used Kenya as a case study to examine how counter-radicalization diplomacy affects East African security. Kenya's diplomatic initiatives affected the fight against radicalism. The report underlined the government's regional and bilateral measures to create links with states who have endured similar abuses in the area and abroad owing to frequent threats and their harmful effects on security and economies. As part of the government's regional counter-terrorism activities, several meetings were organized under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the Commonwealth, and the United Nations to promote counter-radicalization (UN). This study does not examine counter-narrative challenges and solutions.

Davis (2016) cites US-Kenya military training as the most prominent diplomatic attempt to combat radicalization and terrorism. Countering radicalization and terrorism in the region was a "top priority." Radicalization is still pervasive in the country, despite the priorities. Ratemo (2015) focused on counterterrorism in Kenya. The research used qualitative content analysis. The study found that public-private partnerships (PPP) provided narratives and messages against violence to counter radicalisation in Kenya.

In light of the foregoing, one of the key informants averred that:

CVE skills and knowledge trainings for government officers show some positive responses from trained security officers in handling counter-narratives as the way of approaching radicalized youths changes from arresting them to ensuring they are rehabilitated from the ideas already running in their heads. The youth now have optimism for the future since they are registered, trained on PVE and early warning signals of radicalization, and linked to microfinance institutions in the county where they may apply

for loans. Youth groups will receive in-kind social entrepreneurial help from the initiative. Isiolo County's CVE plan. Youth economic empowerment and engagement are important topics. Even if it has not been implemented extensively, its inclusion in the plan is a big step forward. A number of stakeholders are addressing CVE drivers and carrying out activities such as advocating for National identification cards for youth through the Isiolo youth Bunge network, citizenship issues like the large number of families who joined the Somali refugees for economic reasons and their children not getting national IDs - the government has started a process to address the same, and strengthening community security relationships by building the Isiolo youth Bunge network (Interview with a key informant, 3rd August 2021 Isiolo Town).

According to the study, this approach also presented an alternative as well as a non-violent way to reaching mutual goals and it promoted diversity in the institutions involved in fighting radicalization. The study pointed out that it was crucial for the nation of Kenya to build trust among communities and also ensure their active participation in the war against radicalization so as to mobilize the resources of a community. The study concluded that it was crucial for law enforcement agencies to recognize that among the crucial rules of CVE was building trust with those predominantly at risk of being radicalized. Qureshi (2014) discusses Kenya's counter-radicalization strategy pointing out that each element of the strategy pays attention to the unique tactics exploited by terror groups in radicalizing youths. The events in Kenya, as Qureshi sees it, prove that a multifaceted intelligence-led counterterrorism policy is not just a theory. According to the research, the National Intelligence Service's (NIS) success in preventing radicalization and indoctrination into terrorist cells and organisations in East Africa is evidence of the success of a comprehensive approach. Many online terror recruiters had been profiled and arrested by the Intelligence Service. Since the fourth quarter of 2014, throughout all of 2015, human intelligence (HUMINT) activities have been stepped up to target terror cells run by the Somali Islamist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen.

Kumba (2016) discussed the Kenyan Judicial System's role in fighting radicalization. The Kenyan government introduced and fought for the Security Laws in 2014. Kenya fought hard against post-9/11 counterterrorism legislation, he said. The court approved up to 14 years in prison for any speech "likely to be understood as encouraging or influencing another person to participate or prepare to commit a terrorist act," regardless of whether the recipient commits or plans such an act. Another provision allowed any NIS officer to "detain any individual the officer suspects of engaging in any act or thing or being in possession of anything that threatens national security," giving room for interpretation. Other measures eliminated legislative control of the NIS, allowed the agency to demand any information from any government entity, allowed suspects to be imprisoned for up to 90 days, and allowed multiple arrests for the same offense without fresh proof or a warrant. The Institute for Strategic Studies (2013) recognised the achievement of the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), founded in November 2003 as an anti-radicalization method. Young Muslim activists formed this coalition so they could communicate with other Kenyans. The alliance was formed to help Muslim teens, who are targeted by radical groups.

KMYA implemented civic education and engagement initiatives to help Muslims understand democracy, gender equality, human rights, free expression, religious tolerance, and jihad. KMYA aimed to address the misconception of the principles by many Muslim intellectuals, who used their considerable support to mislead Muslim youth into believing concepts like democracy were anti-Islamic. KMYA has challenged the narratives of extremist groups through media and networks of moderate Muslim academics.

Religious leaders can oppose Daesh's theological and ideological narratives by responding to the group's requests to justify violence in the name of Islam, according to Faris and Zeiger (2017). Popular religious leaders' words of wisdom were respected by their followers. Many MENA Muslim intellectuals oppose Daesh's propaganda.

This research does not address counter-narrative challenges. Beutel (2016) claimed that counter-

narratives are required to highlight the concerns that endorsed much of the empathy for radical or extremist groups without authenticating the measures generally espoused by these groups, often involving violence. He suggested constructing narratives that address a specific population's issues and offer nonviolent alternatives to radical and extreme groups' deadly techniques. If individuals felt heard, they would be less likely to fight the counter-message.

This research does not address counter-narrative limitations. Devine (2017) stated that religious organizations must uphold truth, justice, and kindness over dishonesty and division in Eastern Africa. Religious leaders and their followers have an obligation to promote tolerance given their psycho-spiritual power and persuasion opportunities. Often, a "war of ideas" fuelled bloodshed. The research found clergy should study peace, development, comparative religion, and international relations.

Further, an interview with a key informant revealed that:

There have been meetings and football tournaments between security and youth which has created the opportunity for both to see the other in a completely different way. The youth organizations are helping bring a constructive dialogue on how to empower the youths, and therefore reduce their chances of joining radical groups. Narratives used currently by violent extremism is based on development and resource, the government is also working hard to counter the narrative by engaging and planning with the community on their

development agenda and there is devising of actions to address the same. However, the government should have a holistic approach to CVE by engaging all levels of the community (Interview with the key informant, 2/8/2021 Modogashe Isiolo County).

In spite of covering counter-narrative tactics, this study does not address their inherent difficulties. Mwangi (2017) emphasized the value of fostering religious tolerance via free expression and mutual economic benefit. In order to combat negative stereotypes and attitudes that lead to stigmatization and marginalization, the study found that interreligious dialogue forums were necessary. These forums would provide a safe space for leaders from various religious communities and civil society actors to have open discussions. Based on their findings, they suggested that Islamic religious education programs adopt a more uniform curriculum. A constructive conversation was also advocated between Muslim and Christian groups through the sharing of information and the promotion of peace and togetherness rather than division.

The success of Strategies Used in Countering Youth Radicalization Narratives

The study sought to determine the extent to which the campaigns being used had been successful in countering radicalization in Isiolo County. The findings of the study indicated that 151 (56.61%) of the respondents identified the strategies to be somehow successful, 55 (19.16%) said they were successful to a great extent while 28 (9.75%) identified the strategies not to be successful, as shown in *Table 1*.

Table 1: Success of strategies used in Countering youth radicalization Narratives

Success level	Frequency	Percent
Great extent	55	19.16%
Some extent	151	56.61%
Low extent	53	18.46%
Very Low extent	28	9.75%
Total	287	100

Source: Field Data, 2021

The aim of counter-narratives is to expose the shortcomings of radicals' and extremists' narratives and to counter their ideas (Neumann, 2017). Those

susceptible to the propaganda of radical groups can be persuaded to reconsider their beliefs through the use of "counter-narratives," which expose the

propaganda's flaws, lies, and contradictions (Bizina & Gray, 2014). These efforts seek to combat radicalization by exposing and countering harmful ideologies; fostering openness, moderation, and democracy; and addressing potential risk factors (Danish Government, 2014).

Various programmes seek to promote self-awareness and critical thinking in young people. Funk and Said (2014) examined the narratives of conflict and conflict transformation focusing on Islam and the West. By adopting the narrative analysis approach, the study explored the most common “stories” used by parties that identified themselves with Islam and the West in organizing their thinking about conflict: a story of intercultural confrontation and a story of intercultural compatibility. According to the study, since both Western and Muslim narrators of these stories made various outstandingly comparable claims, proposing a “new story” that emphasized intercultural complementarity could assist agents of conflict transformation in reframing differences as well as advancing the cause of peaceful coexistence. The research showed that if the West and Islam are going to work together, it is important to stress the importance of peace as a shared value between the two cultures and to remind people that they always have a choice.

Muslim and Western values were found to be comparable, with the study acknowledging that Muslims and Westerners followed different cultural traditions in the formulation and application of these values. Without war, terrorism, and severe breaches of human rights, the West would consider the region to be at peace. True peace, according to Muslims, is characterized by the coexistence of justice, individual liberty, and social harmony. Bukar (2017) conducted a study on transforming violent extremism. According to the study, in crafting narratives, the opportunity lies in augmenting credible voices in a community that reinforced inclusive values and highlighted peaceful avenues for change. The study pointed out that, through the use of media, peer-to-peer outreaches, and even personal interactions innovatively, it was possible to build progressively resilient and multi-ethnic societies that rejected violence. The risk according to the study was possibly sowing disconnect and mistrust in relationships with vulnerable

communities by targeting their deeply held beliefs and values through counter-messaging. The study recommended that selecting voices as role models for empowering societies needed to remain ideologically neutral and founded on fostering constructive ways to redress grievances. This study, however, does not discuss the challenges and the measures put in place to mitigate the challenges in counter-narrative strategies.

Mwangi (2017) emphasized building religious tolerance through free expression and economic advantage. The study revealed that interreligious conversation groups are needed to prevent stigmatization and marginalization. These gatherings would allow religious and civil society leaders to hold open debates. Based on their findings, they recommended a more standardized curriculum for Islamic religious education. Muslim and Christian organisations were encouraged to share information to promote peace and brotherhood. This study covers counter-narrative methods, but not their challenges.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In line with specific objective two, the study concludes that the existing strategies have not been effective despite concerted efforts to employ them and counter youth radicalization in Isiolo County. The strategies do not address social, economic, marginalization, and lack of employment in Isiolo County.

Overall, the study concludes that despite various efforts and strategies adopted by the government, both national and County, to militate against youth radicalization in Isiolo County, the Prisons aspect of the criminal justice system has continued to face multiple challenges that have stymied its efficacy. Thus, the situation has continued unabated, to the detriment of the greater population of Isiolo County. This has warranted the need to establish new strategies to bolster the existing ones for youth radicalization to be fought effectively.

The study suggests adopting new techniques to bolster the existing ones in the battle against youth radicalization in Isiolo County. For example, implementing an all-encompassing deradicalization and rehabilitation program for prisoners

incarcerated for terrorism-related offences is crucial. These people's severe religious and ideological ideas should be countered with more techniques. To lead disengagement interventions and deradicalization initiatives, specialized personnel such as psychologists, social workers, and religious leaders should be appointed.

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